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SUMMARY 
The moral justification of punishment is the fundamental 
concern of this thesis. It is argued that a moral response to 
crime has to be a civilised response; therefore, the notion of 
"civility" is defined and discussed. Punishment is then 
defended in such a way that it accords with being a civilised 
response to crime. It is argued that in order to be such a 
response, and thereby qualify as a moral response, punishment 
must have a certain structure, i.e. it must fulfil seven 
necessary conditions, which, it is argued, together constitute 
the sufficient condition for morally justified punishment. In 
arguing for each of the necessary conditions, different one-
dimensional theories of punishment are dealt with 
(retributivism, utilitarianism, deterrence theory, 
rehabili tationism, a paternalistic theory of punishment, and 
restitutionalism), indicating that each fulfils some of the 
criteria for morally justified punishment. None of the one-
dimensional theories fulfils all the necessary conditions, 
however, and hence none on its own fulfils the sufficient 
condition for morally justified punishment. This is not to 
argue that a straightforward theory could never on its own 
fulfil the conditions for morally justified punishment, but I 
have not been able to conceive how this could be done. The 
theory I here present is therefore a hybrid approach, 
incorporating elements of all the above-mentioned theories 
into a unitary theory. In doing so, it fulfils all the 
necessary conditions for being a civilised response to crime, 
thereby fulfilling the sufficient condition too, and hence 
providing a morally defensible account of punishment. 
Finally, the question of how this theory can be put into 
practice is addressed. Because the objective of punishment 
ought to be a civilised response, thereby benefiting both 
society as a whole and those being punished and rehabilitated, 
I 
the thesis may be seen as a progressive synthesis of the 
various approaches examined. 
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CHAPTER 1 
THE PROBLEM OF JUSTIFYING PUNISHMENT 
1.1 INTRODUCTION 
Deliberately inflicting harm on others is usually morally 
wrong. However, under certain circumstances we seem to agree 
that punishment, which is a deliberate infliction of harm upon 
others, is not only acceptable, but can also be morally 
justified. The main objective of this thesis is to show that 
despite the fact that punishment is deliberate infliction of 
harm upon others, it can be morally justified. This 
justification, I shall argue, is connected to being civilised, 
i.e. a morally just response to crime is a civilised response. 
I shall therefore define the term "civilised" and argue that a 
pluralistic approach, one incorporating aspects of various 
other approaches, is required to answer the question. In 
doing so it resolves two thorny questions: who is to be 
punished and by how much? In addition to resolving these two 
questions, I shall argue that a morally acceptable account of 
punishment must also have at least five objectives. These 
are: ( 1) punishment should serve as a recognised channel for 
the release of public anger and indignation at offenders; ( 2) 
punishment should contribute towards the reduction of crime; 
(3) convicted offenders should be made better persons, rather 
than left as they are or to deteriorate further, by the 
process of punishment; ( 4) the harm or injury inflicted by 
crime should be rectified by punishment; and ( 5) punishment 
should be economical, i.e. it should not waste social 
resources. I shall argue that the two questions and the five 
objectives is each a necessary condition for morally justified 
punishment, and together they constitute the sufficient 
condition for such punishment. I shall argue further that 
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although each of the simple theories I examine fulfils some of 
the necessary conditions, none satisfies the sufficient 
condition. 
Having stated that I consider a morally justified response 
to crime as being a civilised response, I need to show what I 
mean by "civilised" and then demonstrate why I hold the seven 
conditions I defend as being necessary, rather than fewer 
conditions or another set of them. 
1.2 DEFINING THE TERM "CIVILISED" 
For a society to be worthy of the description "civilised," it 
must endorse certain values. The norms of a society must be 
moral if that society is to be a civilised one, i.e. there is 
a logical connection between civility and morality. Let us 
imagine the opposite condition for a moment, a state in which 
no civility existed, such as in the Hobbesian state of nature. 
Civility in such a state is non-existent, and morality could 
not exist or develop either. A civilised environment is 
required for morality to be capable of germinating and 
developing. A society that did not care about whether 
innocent persons were being punished could not be described as 
"civilised." Nor could a society that did not care about 
whether offenders were brought to justice or not because, for 
instance, it believed everyone had sole responsibility for his 
or her own safety. A society which endorses power as the only 
regulating principle of human relationships does not begin to 
approach the requirements of any civilised society. It 
follows that punishment cannot be imposed on just anyone or in 
any manner in a civilised society, i.e. it cannot be imposed 
on anyone or in any manner if it is to be justified. 
Therefore, I set out in this thesis to determine exactly when 
punishment meets the requirements of civil society and hence 
when it is morally acceptable. 
2 
The question that now arises is, "when is a society 
civilised?" A civilised society furthers the normality of its 
members as well as of the society as a whole. This brings us 
immediately to the next question, namely, what is meant by 
"normality?" Before answering this question, however, it is 
appropriate to consider the contrary position, namely a 
society that does not further the normality of its individual 
members and of the group as a whole, i.e. a society that is 
not concerned with the well being of the individual and of the 
group. Would we consider such a society civilised? The 
answer almost everyone is bound to agree upon is that we would 
not. 
Since I hold the notion "civilised" to be connected in an 
inextricable way to the notion of "normality," it is 
appropriate to address the question, "what is normality?" 
Since the word "abnormal" literally means "away from the 
normal," it implies a deviation from some specifically defined 
norm. But what is the norm? In the case of physical illness, 
the norm is the structural and functional integrity of the 
body; on this level, the boundary between normal and abnormal 
is usually, but by no means always, clear. However, what is 
normal behaviour? On a psychological level, we have no ideal 
or even ideal model to use as a base of comparison. 
Definitions of what is normal or abnormal on a psychological 
or behavioural level thus abound. Ultimately, any definition 
of normal behaviour must be somewhat arbitrary. Definitions 
tend to represent one of two broad perspectives. One view 
holds that the terms "normal" and "abnormal" are meaningful 
only from within a given culture. Abnormal behaviour is thus 
any behaviour that violates society's rules. This is 
generally the definition advocated by legal systems, entailing 
that behaviour which violates society's laws is abnormal. 
This definition is not satisfactory, however, since it entails 
that a sick society whose norms and rules are themselves 
pathological cannot be considered abnormal. Examples would be 
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Nazi concentration camp commanders who would be considered 
normal to the extent that they were responding accurately and 
successfully to their environment by not breaking its rules, 
law enforcement officials upholding immoral rules in Apartheid 
South Africa, or laws passed by the Taliban in Afghanistan. 
Their behaviour would be repulsive to most Western value 
systems today. Such repulsion is based on a particular set of 
values; and many of the perpetrators adherent to the laws of 
these regimes would today be indicted as war criminals or 
considered as having been oppressors. This implies that one 
may select values that apply to another society, which in turn 
raises the question as to who is to select these values. This 
situation in which one group's values is dominant over others 
is the fascistic background that gave rise to many oppressive 
systems, such as that of the Nazi camp commanders', of 
Apartheid, and of the Taliban. Complete cultural re la ti vism, 
defining normality as what is accepted by the culture in 
question, rests on the dubious assumption that it is social 
acceptance that makes behaviour normal, that one set of values 
is just as good as another for human beings to adopt (Carson, 
Butcher & Coleman 1988: 8). 
An alternative conception of normal 
conducive to adaptation and abnormal as 
is to see it as 
being maladaptive. 
Some degree of conformity is clearly essential to group life, 
and some forms of behaviour are not only harmful to the group, 
but also to the individual performing them. I therefore agree 
with Carson et al. (1988: 8-9) that the best criterion for 
determining the normality of behaviour is not whether society 
accepts it, but rather whether it fosters the well being of 
the individual and ultimately of the group of which he or she 
is a member. By "well being" is 
survival, but also growth 
actualisation of potentialities. 
meant not only maintenance or 
and fulfilment, i.e. the 
According to this criterion, 
behaviour is abnormal when it is maladaptive, even when it is 
socially accepted. This would include much behaviour that is 
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not usually prohibited by law, such as prejudice against 
others, wasteful use of our natural resources, regardless of 
whether such behaviour is prohibited or accepted by a given 
society. According to this view, we are morally justified in 
changing the behaviour of others when their behaviours have 
been identified as maladaptive, even if those behaviours are 
not prohibited by law. 
With the adoption of abnormal as maladaptive, two 
assumptions are being made: (1) that survival and 
actualisation of one's potential is worth striving for, both 
on an individual as well as a group level; and (2) that human 
behaviour can be evaluated in terms of its consequences for 
these objectives. It may be objected that such assumptions 
are arbitrary, but unless we value the survival and 
actualisation of the human race, there seems little point in 
identifying abnormal behaviour and doing anything about it 
(Carson et al. 1988: 9). 
The implications of defining "civilised" in terms of 
normality are that, just as with the notion of normality, 
whether a society or culture is civilised can be evaluated and 
determined from outside as well as inside that society. 
Moreover, there are different degrees of being civilised since 
different societies promote the well being of their members 
and themselves as a group to different degrees. Being 
civilised should therefore not be seen as an all or nothing 
matter, but should rather be seen as ranking on a continuum 
with absolutely uncivilised being the one pole and completely 
civilised the other. 
1.3 THE PROBLEM OF PUNISHMENT 
Punishment is 
justification. 
morally problematic because it requires 
The problem is contained in the fact that it 
involves doing things to people that, when not described as 
punishment, are held to be morally wrong. If punishment is 
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defined as the "intentional infliction of pain or 
by someone in authority to do so as a response 
deprivation 
to a harm 
suffered," and these pains or deprivations are not unlike the 
harms caused by crimes fines are similar to theft, 
imprisonment to kidnapping, capital punishment to murder, etc. 
- then it seems to follow that punishment needs justification, 
especially in a constitutional democracy, which is committed 
in theory to the protection of human rights and the values of 
civil liberties, privacy and autonomy. 
Underlying my argument is a particular view of personhood, 
an individual with rights. The view of persons underlying the 
theory is that persons are moral agents who may be held 
accountable for their actions, and that they are at least in 
theory capable of being improved. Holding persons accountable 
for their actions also presupposes that they are free agents, 
not being mere components in a mechanistic uni verse. I shall 
argue, however, that under certain specifiable conditions, 
they forfeit some of their rights, thus the rights of persons 
are not inalienable. 1 
Different kinds of theories provide different reasons why 
punishment may be justified. Justification may be undertaken 
by referring to intrinsic or extrinsic factors. The former 
holds that the justification lies within wrongdoers by 
referring to their guilt or to their capacity of being 
improved as moral agents; the latter refers to aspects outside 
the person being punished, such as deterrence of others, or 
undoing the harm done to others. The theory I shall expound 
synthesises both perspectives into a unitary theory. 
Different moral theories have attempted (unsuccessfully, I 
maintain) to justify punishment. For classic utilitarians, 
for example, for whom pleasure is the only intrinsic good and 
unhappiness the only intrinsic evil; punishment is problematic 
because it involves the infliction of pain, i.e. unhappiness. 
It is therefore justified only if it can be shown that it 
1 I shall argue for this in Section 2.4. 
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produces sufficient pleasure or happiness, or prevents 
sufficient pain or unhappiness, to outweigh the evil caused. 
By contrast, moralists defending the values of autonomy and 
freedom as fundamental rights see punishment as problematic 
because it is coercive - it is inflicted on offenders against 
their manifest wills. For such proponents, punishment is 
justifiable only if the coercion is consistent with respecting 
the individual as a rational and autonomous agent. I, by 
contrast, argue that punishment must be a civilised response 
to crime, i.e. it must strive to further the well being of 
both the individual who is punished and the group of which he 
or she is a member. 
1.4 OTHER REASONS WHY PUNISHMENT IS PHILOSOPHICALLY RELEVANT 
Although I am chiefly concerned with the justification of 
punishment as the main reason why the notion is interesting 
for philosophy, punishment may also exert special appeal to 
philosophers for at least five further reasons, all of which 
are relevant to the fundamental problem: (1) The issue deals 
with an intersection between law and morals, between what is 
illegal and what ought to be prohibited. Not all moral 
offences are legal offences (abortion in the early stages of 
pregnancy is legalised in many countries, although many people 
believe the practice to be immoral) , nor are all legal ones 
immoral (neglecting to wear seat belts might be illegal, but 
is usually not considered immoral, unless morality is defined 
in such a manner as to be co-extensive with law, or unless law 
is held to be a subset of morality) . ( 2) The moral centrality 
of the concept of punishment requires that it be dealt with, 
at least to some extent, to gain a firmer grasp on notions 
such as blame, praise, reward, mercy, forgiveness, and 
justice. I shall show that my theory is capable of adequately 
addressing each of them. ( 3) Metaphysical issues, such as 
free will and determinism, and the analysis of human actions, 
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play a fundamental role in philosophising about punishment. 
The theory one is prepared to endorse and def end regarding 
punishment provides a good indication of the conception one 
holds of a person. If one endorses strict determinism 
(holding that criminals could not do otherwise than they did), 
then punishment cannot consistently be employed as a means 
towards the improvement of offenders. If we hold, however, 
that punishment ought to improve offenders, we implicitly 
endorse the view that persons can be changed, which implies 
that at least some free will exists. If it is argued that 
punishment ought to deter potential offenders from committing 
crimes, it is assumed that they have the ability to choose 
between prohibited and accepted behaviour. (4) Political 
philosophers, for whom the notion of "coercion" is the central 
notion of political power, may be drawn to philosophical 
ponderances of punishment since it is arguably the most 
powerful institutionalised form of coercion available. 
Punishment is the institution through which the state 
exercises force over those persons within its jurisdiction who 
do not comply with society's laws. In order to do so, it 
employs other institutions of power, such as the police, the 
courts, and penitentiaries to achieve this objective. ( 5) 
Finally, the philosopher's theorising about the subject 
intersects with other human sciences. Philosophers who now 
argue that one of the justifications of punishing potential 
offenders is that it deters, would have to revise their 
theories if convincing scientific evidence were obtained 
showing that punishment did in fact not serve as a deterrent. 
It reminds us that philosophy arises in and is accountable to 
the life-world, because if persons would not commit crimes, it 
would make the institution of punishment redundant, thereby 
also eliminating the need to justify the institution; but 
because persons do offend, and society wants to respond to 
such disobedient behaviour, it must be justified. The goals 
our justification endorses must have practical utility, i.e. 
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they must not only have theoretical value, but must be capable 
of being pursued in practice too. 
not subservient to the scientist. 
However, the philosopher is 
Scientists may be compelled 
to adjust their crime prevention or rehabilitation techniques 
so as not to conflict with the notions of justice or desert 
propounded by philosophers. 
Regardless of the motivation behind an attempt to defend 
punishment, the justification of the practice remains a 
philosophical undertaking. Vindicating the goals or 
principles pertaining to the justification of punishment 
requires conceptual argument that cannot be established by any 
empirical means. Science might be able to show that 
punishment deters, or fulfils a need of society, for instance, 
but it is incapable of demonstrating why this justifies the 
practice. For such an account, philosophical reasoning is 
necessary. 
1.5 PUNISHMENT AND A CONCEPTION OF CRIME 
Since I shall be concerned 
vindicable response to crime, 
question, "what is crime?" 
with 
it is 
Crime 
punishment as a morally 
important to answer the 
is the violation of 
another's rights, whether of an individual, a group, or a 
corporate body, where this violation is prohibited by law. A 
crime can therefore only be committed against someone who has 
a right of some sort or other. Others have an obligation to 
honour this right. 
of a crime. 
Failure to do so results in the commission 
This def ini ti on of crime does not imply that only those 
who can claim their rights have rights. Since the notion of 
"right" is connected to the notion of "obligation," X has a 
right to P if others have an obligation to provide X with P. 
X does not have to be capable of claiming his or her right to 
P. Thus, parents have an obligation to care for their 
children in an appropriate manner, even though the latter may 
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be incapable of claiming their right to be cared for properly, 
or even be aware that they have this right. The definition of 
right therefore applies to children, infants, the mentally 
ill, the comatose, and even non-human beings. This definition 
of crime therefore does not only make provision for fully 
rational adult indi victuals who can claim rights. We may thus 
also speak of the rights of children, of animals, etc. The 
state is the guardian of those who cannot claim there rights, 
having the obligation to prosecute the guilty who have 
violated the rights of others, even if the victims do not, or 
are not able to, press charges for having been victimised. 
The state is obliged to prosecute murderers, for instance, 
even though victims are no longer able to press charges, and 
even if they do not have someone who presses charges on their 
behalfs. 
Some actions may be considered as immoral, but if they are 
not prohibited by law (i.e. if society does not explicitly 
proclaim that such actions are to be condemned), then 
punishing persons for performing them has no moral basis. For 
instance, if there is no law prohibiting the sale, 
distribution, or possession of pornographic material, persons 
selling, distributing, or possessing such material may not be 
punished even if society is of the opinion that the sale, 
distribution, or possession of such material is immoral. 
Since crime is taken to be the violation of another's 
right, we may legitimately ask: "what makes punishment an 
appropriate response to crime?" Consequentialists who believe 
that the main objective of punishment is the reduction of 
crime may argue that crime is actually or potentially harmful, 
and therefore the state may inflict harm in order to reduce 
the greater harms of crime. Retributi vis ts, those arguing 
that punishment must be justified as an intrinsically 
appropriate response to crime, must show why it warrants a 
punitive response. 
the taking of an 
They may argue that punishment involves 
unfair advantage over the law abiding, an 
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advantage which is annulled by punishment, or that crime 
requires censure which is administered by punishment, or that 
crime severs the bond between the criminal and the community 
and the good, a bond which punishment can re-establish (Duff & 
Garland 1998: 4). Proponents of reform theory may see 
punishment's justification as lying in the fact that it 
provides the state with an opportunity to rehabilitate 
offenders. Rehabilitation is not equated with deterrence 
since it involves a change of character or behavioural 
pattern. Still another approach, restitutionalism, sees 
punishment as a means of undoing the harm done to victims 
through crime. I shall argue that each of these approaches 
has merit in that each partially justifies punishment, i.e. 
each fulfils some of the necessary conditions of justifying 
punishment. None does so in full, however (hence none fulfils 
the sufficient condition) , and therefore I propound a 
collaborative theory, one drawing on the positive elements of 
each. 
1.6 THE OBJECTIVES OF THIS THESIS 
One can seek philosophical justification of punishment at two 
levels: firstly, one can take for granted the principle that 
offenders ought to be punished and question whether a 
particular form of punishment, such as the death penalty or 
solitary confinement, is morally justified. Here one is 
concerned with any general criterion that any particular act 
of punishment must satisfy. Secondly, one can deliberately 
question the moral defensibility of the whole institution of 
punishment as a procedure for inflicting deliberate pain or 
suffering. As already indicated, I shall primarily be 
concerned with justifying punishment on the latter level. 
After analysing and criticising the main theories of 
punishment, I shall put forth a unitary theory of punishment, 
i.e. a theory that incorporates elements from both forward-
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looking and backward-looking approaches, including from 
retributive, deterrence, rehabilitative and restitutional 
theories. 2 Before proceeding any further, I shall explain why 
I believe a hybrid theory (one incorporating both backward-
looking and forward-looking perspectives) is necessary. In 
addressing the issue of how any system of punishment can be 
morally justified, two other underlying questions need to be 
answered: whom are we justified in punishing? And by how much 
are we justified in punishing them? I shall argue that only a 
backward-looking justification, such as provided by 
retributivism, is adequately able to answer the "whom" 
question, but retributivism is unable to answer the "how" 
question. The contrary, however, is the case with forward-
looking justifications, such as consequentialism. Although 
they are incapable of providing a suitable answer to the 
"whom" question, they can answer the "how" question. 
Therefore, in order to answer both questions, it seems that 
the only morally justifiable approach to punishment is a 
hybrid approach, one synthesising both backward-looking and 
forward-looking justifications. I shall claim that we need 
backward-looking retributivism because it enables us to 
determine whom to punish, but not how or in what manner. It 
is consequential ism, however, that furnishes us with a 
criterion for determining how much to punish, but not whom to 
punish. 3 
2 R. S. Downie (1986: 339-346) struggles with the question, what separates 
retributivists from utilitarians regarding punishment? He illuminates 
shortcomings and advantages of each approach and concludes that a 
comprehensive theory of punishment must incorporate retributive and 
consequentialist (deterrence and reform) elements, if it is to be capable 
of giving an adequate justification for the complex problem of punishing 
criminals. 
3 Feinberg (1995g: 613-617) states that an increasing number of writers has 
come to regard both pure retributivism and utilitarian theories as too 
extreme to be credible, and has opted instead for a mixed theory. 
According to this theory, since moral guilt is a necessary condition for 
legal punishment, social utility cannot itself be sufficient; and since 
social utility is deemed necessary, mere moral guilt cannot be sufficient. 
Both retributivism and utilitarianism have, therefore, to give up their 
sufficient conditions for justifying punishment. Feinberg argues that a 
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I shall argue that any theory endeavouring to justify 
punishment, and thereby constitute a civilised response to 
crime, must fulfil certain conditions, i.e. it must have a 
certain structure and endorse certain goals. Before 
presenting the goals of my theory, let me turn to reflections 
on why a theory need have goals at all, what their internal 
and external relations ought to be, and that they ought to be 
reasonable and coherent. 
1.7 CHARACTERISTICS OF A THEORY JUSTIFYING PUNISHMENT 
A theory may be described as a coherent attempt to portray, 
explain or predict any subject under investigation in a 
systematic manner. In this thesis, it is an attempt to 
morally justify punishment, i.e. to explain by means of 
argument under which conditions I hold punishment to be 
morally justifiable. One of the questions that must therefore 
be answered is "which characteristics must such a theory 
have?" I shall argue that there are five characteristics: it 
must have a function, be internally consistent, be realistic, 
statements pertaining to factual matters must be in accordance 
with known fact, and it should be simple. Theories should 
often also have other characteristics - theories of science, 
for instance, should often have predictive value too. In 
justifying punishment, however, I am not concerned with 
predicting anything. I am not, for instance, trying to predict 
how punishment would be most effective, how it would have 
greatest deterrent value, what kind of punishment would reduce 
crime most effectively, what punishment would satisfy society 
most, or the like. I am merely concerned with establishing 
under which conditions punishment is morally justifiable. 
Therefore, the five theoretical requirements of my theory are 
sufficient for it to qualify as a theory. 
mixed theory may thus hold that moral guilt and social utility are 
separately necessary and jointly sufficient. 
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(1) A theory attempting to justify punishment must explain 
why punishment is necessary at all. This is what I term its 
"function." 
practice, 
Delineating 
objectives. 
Why is punishment necessary and not some other 
such as compulsory education of offenders? 
a practice's function clarifies its practical 
A theory justifying punishment will not specify 
exactly what punishment ought to be administered in a given 
case, such as car theft, but will set out general principles 
that ought to guide specific actions, such as that punishment 
ought to be graded according to the severity of offences, and 
hence car theft ought not to receive the same or greater 
punishment as murder, rape, assault, armed robbery, or the 
like, ceteris paribus. 
(2) A theory of punishment must be internally consistent. 
This entails more than that a single statement ought not to be 
asserted and denied, such as that rehabilitation is a 
paternalistic measure: a point argued for in one section ought 
also not to contradict a point argued for in another. A 
theory holding in one chapter that persons ought never to be 
used as means towards social ends and in another that 
criminals may be used for purposes of general deterrence would 
violate this requirement. It is imperative that any theory 
should be consistent. Because my theory incorporates both 
backward-looking and forward-looking perspectives, it may 
prima facie seem inconsistent. The perspectives are not 
mutually exclusive in my unitary theory, however, since they 
address different aspects of the justification of punishment. 
( 3) Any theory attempting to justify punishment must be 
realistic. By "realistic" I mean that it ought not to have 
objectives that cannot plausibly be pursued or attained, such 
as that punishment is justified only if it achieves the 
elimination of crime, or rehabilitates offenders in such a 
manner as to be certain that they will not offend again. A 
theory of punishment ought rather to have the more realistic 
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goals of bringing about a reduction in crime, or improving 
offenders. 
( 4) A theory of punishment must also be compatible with 
known facts. This means that those statements dealing with 
matters of fact (not with logical relations or value 
statements), such as that punishment deters potential 
offenders, should accord with currently held factual 
knowledge. A theory arguing that punishment is justified 
because it deters potential offenders would not be worth 
anything if the vast majority of research done on the matter 
showed that punishment does not have any deterrent affect. 
( 5) The final theoretical characteristic of a theory is 
that it should be committed to simplicity. It ought not, for 
instance, to propose seven objectives for the justification of 
punishment if five were to jointly pose a sufficient condition 
for punishment's justification. This may be described as 
being committed to "parsimony" or what is often referred to as 
"Ockham's razor." 
1.8 THE NECESSARY AND SUFFICIENT CONDITIONS 
Now that I have described the theoretical requirements any 
theory must fulfil, I shall briefly set out what I shall argue 
in the chapters to follow. 
Firstly, I shall aim to resolve two fundamental questions: 
(1) Whom may one justifiably punish? 
(2) How (in what manner and to what extent) is one 
justified in doing so? 
Since I hold that moral justification of punishment must be a 
civilised response to crime and hold civilisation to be 
inextricably connected to the furthering of well being of both 
the individual and of the group, punishment must pursue at 
least five goals, so establishing seven conditions for its 
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moral justification; failure to do so would not further the 
well being of individuals and of society as a whole. The 
goals punishment must have are: 
( 3) Punishment should serve as a recognised channel for 
the release of public indignation and anger at 
offenders. 
(4) Punishment should contribute to the reduction of 
crime. 
( 5) Convicted offenders should be made better persons, 
rather than left as they are or made worse, by the 
process of punishment. 
(6) The harm or injury inflicted by crime should be 
rectified by punishment. 
( 7) Punishment should be economical, i.e. it should not 
waste social resources. 
I shall argue for each of these in the chapters to follow, and 
then I shall argue that these seven conditions are each a 
necessary condition and together they constitute the 
sufficient condition for morally justified punishment. Any 
theory that does not adequately answer the two questions and 
pursues the five goals is morally unacceptable. 
I shall also derive three restraining principles from the 
arguments I shall expound in Chapter 5, principles that ought 
to check misuse in striving to realise the objectives. 
are: 
These 
(1) No one ought to violate another's rights where there 
is a feasible alternative. 
(2) Fairness requires that punishments should be graded in 
severity, according to the severity of the offences. 
(3) If the rights of individuals are to be threatened, the 
threat should fall more heavily on wrongdoers (the 
guilty) than on others (the innocent). 
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The goals of my theory may be seen as being the aims of 
four distinct theories attempting to morally defend punishment 
retributivism, deterrence theory, rehabilitationism, and 
resti tutionalism. Retributi vism pursues the goal of allowing 
society to express its anger and indignation at offenders, but 
does not pursue any of the other four. Deterrence theory is 
committed to the pursuit of two of the five goals, namely 
bringing about a reduction in crime, and being economical, but 
does not pursue any of the others. Rehabili tationism aims at 
improving offenders (i.e. making them better persons), 
bringing about a reduction in crime, and, I shall argue, at 
being economical in the long run; but it does not aim at 
serving as a recognised channel through which society can 
express its anger and indignation at offenders, nor is it 
committed to undoing the harm done or injury suffered through 
crime. Resti tutionalism is primarily concerned with undoing 
the harm done by offenders, but, I shall argue, is also 
committed to being economical and serving as a recognised 
channel through which society may express its anger and 
indignation at offenders: I shall argue, however, that it is 
neither committed towards the objective of improving 
offenders, nor in practice towards bringing about a reduction 
in crime. None of these theories therefore itself pursues 
more than three of the five goals, and, I shall claim, even 
though they do address the moral issue, are all insufficient 
as adequate moral justifications of punishment. 
In addition to being insufficient in respect of pursuing 
the five goals, the theories at issue also do not each 
adequately address the "whom" and "how" questions. 
Retributi vism and resti tutionalism provide an answer of whom 
to punish, but not how; deterrence theory furnishes us with a 
means of determining how much to punish, but not whom, and 
rehabilitation theory does not satisfactorily address either 
of these two questions. 
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In the next two chapters, I shall be preoccupied with 
retributivism. In the first of these chapters, I shall give a 
broad overview of the theory and criticise its shortcomings by 
arguing in which respects it cannot be defended and by 
pointing out in which respects it is deficient. In the second 
of the two chapters, I shall defend a version of retributivism 
by arguing that it acknowledges that society has a need to 
express its anger and indignation at offenders. The reason 
for my starting with retributi vism is that this approach is 
best able to furnish an answer to the first of the two 
fundamental questions, namely whom to punish. After this, I 
shall turn to deterrence theory, rehabili tationism, and 
restitutionalism. 
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CHAPTER 2 
RETRIBUTIVISM AND ITS LIMITS 
2.1 INTRODUCTION 
In this and the next chapter, I shall focus on retributivism. 
Arguably, it may be an expression of the most commonly held 
belief in society regarding the moral defensibility of 
punishment and may have the longest history too. I shall 
begin by providing a general overview of the theory, 
presenting its main elements and their implications. I shall 
then present a paradigmatic case of retributivism, namely that 
of Immanuel Kant. His theory will be discussed in general, 
before two issues he raises will be dealt with in greater 
detail and rejected, namely that it is never morally 
justifiable to use anyone as means towards ends, and that 
criminals will their punishment. I shall deal with the latter 
issue by examining Hegel's position on the matter in depth 
too, since his stance regarding this matter is more accessible 
because it is expounded in greater detail, while being 
consistent with Kant's position. I will then also present and 
reject attempts to justify retributive punishment with 
reference to consent. I address the question of whether 
retributivism is capable of adequately providing an answer to 
the question of how much punishment is morally defensible, and 
I argue that retributivism is incapable of providing a morally 
acceptable response to this question because it is committed 
to the principle of lex talionis, neglects important 
variables, and is not actually committed to respecting 
punished individuals as it claims it is. 
In the next chapter, I provide a partial defence of 
retributi vism by arguing that it is morally appropriate for 
one to express anger and indignation at offenders and that 
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retributive punishment justifies this. Let me now, however, 
begin with a general overview of retributivism. 
2.2 THE MAIN ELEMENTS OF RETRIBUTIVISM BRIEFLY DESCRIBED 
Retributivism (non-consequentialism) insists that punishment 
be administered intrinsically, independent of any 
consequentialist objectives, i.e. persons are to be punished 
because they deserve it, and that only those deserving of it 
are to be punished. In this regard a distinction between 
negative and positive retribution may be made the former 
holding that no one but the guilty deserve punishment and may 
be punished, the latter holding that the guilty must be 
punished to the full extent of their desert. Positive 
retributivists thereby offer a complete justification of 
punishment, while negative retributivists do not; however, 
their theories may feature as constraining principles on 
consequentialist theories, by for instance, insisting that 
only the guilty be punished, even if punishing others were to 
have overall beneficial consequences. 
Furthermore, punishment is seen to be good in itself, i.e. 
punishment is not justified by appealing to some external goal 
or principle. The strong version of retributi vism, such as 
that which is propounded by Kant, holds that the guilty must 
suffer and that the moral order requires that punishment be 
imposed. This version of retributivism denies that punishment 
needs any external justification (by referring to beneficial 
consequences for society or the punished); those who are 
guilty fulfil the sufficient condition for punishment. 
Retributive theories of punishment are backward-looking 
since it is only the crime itself, its nature, its motive, and 
its extent that is the object of interest for retributivists. 
Retribution may be seen as having as its underlying principle 
the notion that punishment is justified insofar as it is a 
morally fitting response to the violation of another's rights. 
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One of the central problems of retributi vism therefore is to 
explain the notion of "desert." Since punishment is supposed 
to be justified as an intrinsically appropriate response to 
crime, desert is supposed to provide the connection between 
past crime and present punishment. But what exactly is this 
connection? And furthermore, does desert make punishment a 
fitting response to crime? The intuition that the guilty 
deserve to suffer is often offered as a reply, but this 
intuition requires explanation. 
Fundamental to morality is a belief that persons ought to 
get what they deserve. What they deserve are benefits or 
harms made appropriate by some prior fact of the recipients. 
Therefore, benefits are rewards for achievements or 
compensations for injuries, while harms are punishments 
arising from culpable deficiencies in the recipients. 
Benefits and harms are deserved depending on some action, 
relation, or characteristic that is under the direct control 
of the individual involved. Importantly, the nature of desert 
has both a backward-looking and a forward-looking component. 
This is because desert demands that the morally significant 
element in a person's life (past) determines whether a person 
ought or ought not to receive some benefit or harm in the 
future. Applying this to the concrete case of punishment, it 
is the wrongful act of the criminal that is the element 
justifying the future action of punishment. 
Given this view of punishment, whom may we punish? 
Retributivism concisely maintains that we are justified in 
punishing those who have willingly and knowingly committed 
crimes, i.e. only those who knowingly and willingly commit 
crimes deserve to be punished. Al though looking remarkably 
similar, as shall be pointed out in 3.3.1, this is not 
necessarily the endorsement of revenge, if we narrow the 
definition of revenge to exclude retributive acts of 
punishment carried out by impartial officials of the state in 
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an unbiased and unemotional manner on behalf of wronged 
individuals. 
Retributi vism also maintains that because it is just to 
reward according to desert, so it is likewise just to punish 
according to desert. Consequent on the latter claim are three 
points: 
(1) Inflicting legal punishment on anyone who has not 
violated a law is grossly unjust. 
( 2) A person who fails to satisfy one or more of the 
mental or psychological conditions for moral 
responsibility must not be punished, because it is 
believed that only persons who are aware of their 
actions' consequences can be held accountable for 
them. 
(3) The amount of punishment inflicted must be in 
proportion to the offender's desert. 
The "ought" in desert is supported by the underlying notion of 
"moral equilibrium," which demands that the benefits or harms 
an individual deserves are determined proportionally to the 
significant element (the crime) in the person's past. This 
position is that the criminal takes an unfair advantage of the 
law abiding, an advantage which can be annulled by punishment. 
It advocates positive retributivism since it does not only see 
punishment as an available option, but rather as an 
imperative, since if criminals were to be allowed to get away 
with their unlawful actions, the law abiding would suffer an 
unfair disadvantage (Duff & Garland 1998: 13; Benn 1985: 10). 
A different retributive approach emphasises the expressive 
nature of punishment. Here punishment is not the mere 
infliction of hard treatment or deprivation in response to 
criminal conduct, but also involves an expressive element, 
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communicating to criminals that their actions were wrong. 1 
This is also what distinguishes fines from taxes, 
instance. Censure is by definition backward-looking; 
for 
it 
expresses disapprobation for an action that has already 
occurred. 2 Two distinct questions immediately arise, namely, 
why should censure be expressed by the state, rather than by 
victims or other concerned individuals? And why should 
censure be expressed by hard treatment or deprivation? Could 
it not be expressed by mere conviction, or by a symbolic 
expression? The same treatment may also be justified in 
consequentialist terms hard treatment or deprivation may 
more forcefully convince criminals that they ought not to 
repeat the offences, and also deter others from committing 
similar offences (Duff & Garland 1998: 14). This reveals that 
retributivist and consequentialist rationales are not 
necessarily diametrically opposed; they sometimes justify the 
same action with different reasons. 
In addition, both views: that there ought to be less 
punishment in the world, and that there ought to be more; are 
compatible with retributivism. Those holding the former 
belief may conceive retributivism as a means of limiting 
punishment and the class of those punishable. Retributivism 
is accordingly held to be a way of limiting inhumane practices 
because it does not seek justification of punishment 
disproportionate to the magnitude of the crime committed. 
Capital punishment for car theft, for instance, would be 
unjustifiable in retributivist terms. Those holding the 
latter conviction, however, may envisage retributivism as a 
means for limiting permissiveness and codling of criminals 
because a punishment too mild would not be administered 
1 Duff (1995: 169-198) maintains that one important element of punishment 
is communication. It allows the community to express an important message, 
both to itself and to the criminal, in the hope that such communication 
will bring about genuine penance on behalf of the wrongdoer. 
2 Joel Feinberg (1995a: 592-602) argues that proper punishments express, 
often through their conventional symbolism, resentment, disapproval, 
condemnation, or reprobation. 
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according to desert. As I shall explain in 2.7.1, 
retributi vism is committed to the principle of lex 
which maintains that the magnitude of the crime 
talionis, 
and its 
accompanying punishment should be equal because the punishment 
serves as an annulment of the unfair advantage taken through 
committing the crime (Radin 1985: 152). If the punishment is 
not of equal magnitude as the criminal act, then it does not 
annul the crime completely; punishment in excess does more 
than is required for annulment and hence results in a further 
injustice. 
In order for legal punishment of offenders to be morally 
vindicable, according to retributi vism, they must have 
violated a law. Violation of a law is a necessary condition 
for legal punishment, but not a sufficient condition for moral 
justification: A law may be unjust. By violating such a law, 
offenders may not be acting immorally, and therefore would not 
deserve to be punished. This would not alter the legal status 
- for example, not carrying a pass in Apartheid South Africa 
for black persons was both a legal necessary condition and a 
sufficient condition for punishment under the pass laws, 
although it was morally unjustifiable. The same is true of 
many laws in Germany under Hitler, as well as in other 
oppressive regimes. 
I pointed out that the moral justification of punishment 
requires the answering of two distinct questions, namely whom 
we are justified in punishing and in what manner. The first 
question may also be translated into why we are justified in 
administering punishment because in identifying whom we may 
punish we must provide a reason why these persons, and not 
others, can morally be chosen for punishment. In the next 
section, I shall be concerned with Immanuel Kant's theory of 
punishment since it is a paradigmatic case of strong 
retributivism. Kant clearly identifies the group of morally 
punishable people. He also argues for appropriate amounts of 
punishment, but I shall argue in a later section that a 
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retributivist account is inadequate in providing a morally 
satisfactory answer to this question. 
2.3 KANT'S PARADIGMATIC RETRIBUTIVE THEORY OF PUNISHMENT 
Kant defends retributivism by arguing that a retributivist 
claim is required by a general theory of political obligation, 
which is more plausible than any alternative theory (Kant 
1965: 34) . He presents a theory of punishment that rests on 
the general view that political obligation is to be analysed 
contractually in terms of reciprocity. If the law is to 
remain just, it is imperative that those who obey it will not 
be taken advantage of by those who do not. It is important 
that no one profit by his criminal wrongdoing. Stated 
differently, it is important that no one benefits from not 
bearing the burden of self-restraint. The objective of 
criminal punishment, he maintains, is the proper balance 
between benefit and obedience. 
In order to understand Kant's position pertaining to 
punishment, it is important to gain a firm grasp on his moral 
philosophy because his theory of punishment is derived from 
it. 
Kant's philosophy contains an important connection between 
free will, moral agency, and rationality. Kant holds rational 
decision to be identical with moral decision, i.e. the demands 
of rationality and morality are the same. He also maintains, 
however, that to be a free agent is to be a rational agent. 
It follows from this that to be a free agent is to be a moral 
agent too. A free will, according to Kant, is not a will 
unrestrained and undirected, it is a will directed by 
rationality; and this is a will subject to morality. 
The distinctive feature of Kant's moral philosophy may 
therefore be seen as its uncompromising rationalism. He holds 
that it is reason in human beings that makes them moral 
beings. He believes the moral law, i.e. the principles of 
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morality, to be unchanging and universal, applicable in all 
societies and in all circumstances and throughout time. The 
problem facing us concerning morality is to distinguish 
maxims. He argues that since maxims must be universal, it 
follows that what is a right maxim for one must also be a 
right maxim for all others. It must be such that it could be 
and ought to be accepted and acted upon by anyone at any time 
in the relevant circumstances. Thus, if I wish to determine 
whether my actions are morally good, I merely have to ask 
whether I can will that my maxim become a universal law. If 
not, it must be rejected because it cannot enter into a system 
of universal legislation, and not because it fails to benefit 
others or me in any way. It is thus impossible for me as a 
rational being to adopt any principle as a guide for my 
actions that I could not also will others to act upon. This 
means that if persons will a crime, such as stealing, then 
they cannot object if they are victims of theft since their 
actions are to be applicable for all others too. Thus, 
according to Kant, those who choose to murder forfeit their 
right to life since they proclaim by their actions that life 
may be taken, which entails that they can be executed; 
property can be appropriated from thieves, etc. 
Kant insists that judicial punishment ought never to be 
used as a means to promote some other good, neither for 
criminals themselves, nor for society (Kant 1986: 346). 
Punishment ought only to be imposed on criminals because they 
have committed crimes. The reason for this is that he holds 
all persons to be ends in themselves. To use other persons 
merely as means is, he argues, to ignore those persons' 
positions as themselves independent and rational judges of 
their own actions. Thus, conversely, to treat persons as ends 
is to allow them the same right and opportunity of choice and 
decision one claims for oneself, resulting in consistency in 
one's attitude to one's own case and to that of others. If we 
use other persons as means only, we exact for ourselves a 
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special and superior position, which it is impossible that all 
can enjoy. Consequently, our claim could not qualify as a 
universal maxim and therefore, Kant insists, is in conflict 
with the demands of morality. Kant adds that all rational 
beings inevitably regard themselves as ends in this sense, 
therefore none can rationally refuse to recognise the demands 
of this categorical imperative. It is morally unjustifiable, 
for instance, to perform scientific experiments on criminals 
condemned to death in order to benefit society. If all people 
are to be treated as means and not ends, it follows that 
punishment, according to Kant, does not have any justification 
on grounds of deterrence since using persons for purposes of 
deterrence is to use them as a means and not see them as ends 
in themselves. However, this is an untenable position to hold 
since it overlooks certain important differences between 
people. In the next section I shall argue against the claim 
that persons may never be used as means towards ends by 
arguing that not all persons are of equal moral standing, that 
those of a lower moral standing may sometimes be used as means 
towards certain ends, and that criminals have lower moral 
standing. 
For Kant, the principle of equality is fundamental to the 
performing of punishment, i.e. he maintains that the same 
amount of suffering ought to be inflicted upon offenders as 
was caused by their crimes, the same degree of suffering 
imposed upon them as they imposed on others by their criminal 
actions, whether their actions harmed individuals or society. 
According to the principle of equality, Kant argues, any harm 
one does to someone else, one does to oneself. Thus, if 
someone vilifies another, he vilifies himself; if he steals 
from another, he steals from himself; if he kills another, he 
kills himself, and so on. This position is derived from 
Kant's argument that all actions ought to proclaim universal 
maxims, i.e. by our actions, we express the will that those 
actions are to be universally accepted, and hence, what may be 
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done to others is also willed upon oneself. It follows that 
criminals will their punishment because by laying down 
universal modes of conduct through their actions, they will 
that the same be done to them as they do to others. Thus, if 
they steal, they will that property be taken from them; if 
they murder, they will that their lives be taken, etc. I 
shall argue against this position in 2. 5. 4 by claiming that 
criminals do not proclaim universal laws of conduct through 
their actions, and hence it cannot be held that criminals will 
their punishments. 
According to Kant, only the law of retribution, which is 
to do to others as they have done to us, can determine exactly 
the kind and degree of punishment because by examining what 
criminals have done, we can establish how much and in what 
manner to punish, and thereby determine punishment in 
accordance with the principle of equality. Other 
considerations, such as punishment's maximum utility in a 
given instance, would often yield punishments that are not of 
equal magnitude or of equal kind as the crime. I shall expand 
on this point in Chapter 4. 
Kant stipulates that morally justified punishment must be 
determined in a court of law and not in one's private 
judgement because even though he considers all people to be 
rational agents, being victimised can lead to intense 
emotions, which may compromise one's ability to assess the 
crime in question in a rational manner. It ought therefore to 
be done by impartial officials. Retribution must determine 
the magnitude of the punishment by weighing the magnitude of 
the crime. By stealing from someone, offenders make the 
ownership of everyone insecure; hence, they rob themselves of 
the security of any possible ownership in accordance with the 
law of retribution. Again, this is because by acting we 
proclaim categorical imperatives, which means that if I 
believe it to be right that I may take your property, thereby 
making your property insecure, I am proclaiming that this 
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ought to be universally the case, hence my property may be 
made insecure and confiscated. Thieves therefore hold that 
nobody's property can be secure, which means that the thieves 
themselves also do not possess anything that cannot be taken 
away from them, nor can they acquire anything that cannot be 
taken away from them. The state will provide for convicted 
criminals, but it therefore has the right to demand their 
labour for any kind of work it may require; consequently they 
become slaves of the state for a specified length of time, or 
indefinitely, depending on the case in question. It follows 
that the only proper punishment for murder is death; no 
substitute satisfies the requirements of moral justice: 
nothing except death is equal to death. The execution of 
murderers must be conducted without any maltreatment of the 
condemned, however, in order to respect their humanity. Kant 
held that humans ought always to be treated with respect since 
only by doing so are we proclaiming the categorical imperative 
that everyone be treated with respect, and hence can expect to 
be treated with respect ourselves. If we would disrespect 
others, we would will that we be disrespected too. 
Kant argues, if a society fails to carry out the 
punishment, it may be seen as an accomplice to the crime (Kant 
1986: 346). This is so because we would not will that the 
imbalance created by criminals through their actions be 
undone, and hence we could be seen as being accomplices to the 
actions and willings of the criminals. 
In this section, I pointed out that Kant maintains that 
persons ought never to be used as means towards ends, and why 
we can say that criminals will their punishments. I shall 
argue against both issues in turn, beginning with the claim 
that persons may never be used as means towards ends. 
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2 . 4 THE MORAL STATUS OF INNOCENT PERSONS, CRIMINALS, AND 
FORMER CRIMINALS 
For the purpose of my argument, I need to distinguish between 
"innocent persons," "criminals," and "former criminals" to be 
able to argue that some persons may be used as means to an 
end, such as a socially desirable end, for instance. I define 
"innocent persons" as persons not yet having been found guilty 
of an offence, "criminals" as having been found guilty and 
presently being punished, and "former criminals" as persons 
who have already been punished for crimes for which they were 
found guilty. It is significant that the moral status of 
these three categories differs because it enables me to argue 
that some persons may be used as means towards an end in 
virtue of their having a diminished moral standing, as I shall 
now explain. 
A "possible X" has the ability of becoming an X provided a 
significant event in its development occurs for its potential 
to be actualised. Thus, every healthy human ovum or 
spermatozoon has the possibility of developing into a person, 
if an important event, the fusion at fertilisation and 
implantation, takes place. A "potential X" will, given the 
normal course of development, become an actual X. An 
implanted zygote will, given a normal course of development, 
become a person, and may therefore be described as a 
"potential person." An "actual X" is a being that has 
actualised its potential for becoming an X. Thus, a fully-
grown, normally developed adult person may be described as an 
"actual person." A "former X" was an actual X, but no longer 
is such an X. Dead persons were once actual persons. 
What is important for my argument is that the moral status 
of these categories differs. Actual persons have all moral 
rights accorded beings with personhood status. Thus, all 
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persons have a serious right to life. 3 A potential X, however, 
has rights in virtue of becoming an X, but less than it would 
have as an actual X. Maturing foetuses are therefore accorded 
certain rights in virtue of their becoming persons, but these 
rights may be overridden when they come into serious conflict 
with those of actual persons. A late-term abortion is 
accordingly usually held morally and legally justifiable if 
the life of the mother is at stake. Possible persons hardly 
have any moral standing - probably no one seriously holds the 
position that all ova and spermatozoa have a serious right to 
life. Former persons also have certain rights, namely those 
derivative from the status they had as actual persons. 
Consequently, a former scientist is respected in virtue of 
having been a scientist, a former president is respected in 
virtue of having been a president, a former successful athlete 
is respected in virtue of having been a successful athlete, 
the dead are respected and have certain rights (such as having 
their wills honoured) in virtue of having been persons, etc. 
The reciprocal is the case when dealing with negative 
moral terms, such as criminals. Here criminals have least 
moral standing and former criminals derive their status in 
proportion to the status they had as actual criminals. 
Potential criminals may be seen as persons having a high 
likelihood of becoming criminals because they live in an 
impoverished community, are unemployed, come from broken 
homes, and dropped out of school, for example. Possible 
criminals are all persons who have not become criminals but 
have the possibility of becoming criminals (which we all 
have) , but are not categorised as potential criminals. The 
class of possible criminals thus includes those who are not 
expected to become criminals, such as those coming from good 
homes and favourable environments. For the arguments to 
follow, it will not be necessary to distinguish between 
3 By "serious right to life," I mean a right that can only be overridden by 
very weighty considerations, such as self-defence. 
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possible and potential criminals in detail, since both are 
innocent persons, i.e. persons not yet found guilty of an 
offence. Importantly, potential criminals are just as 
innocent as possible criminals are. Potential criminals may 
have a much higher likelihood of becoming criminals, but there 
is no certainty that any potential criminal will indeed engage 
in criminal behaviour. Possible criminals and potential 
criminals can therefore be accorded equal moral status. 
Having established that criminals and former criminals no 
longer have the same moral standing as innocent persons do, we 
enquire as to the implications of this finding. When 
comparing potential persons and actual persons, I pointed out 
that the rights of the latter can override those of the former 
when there is a serious clash of interests. Thus, a late-term 
foetus may be aborted to save the life of the mother, even 
though late-term foetuses are usually already accorded a 
serious right to life. This indicates that superior moral 
categories can override more minor ones when there is a 
serious clash of interests between them. Returning to 
criminals and former criminals on the one hand, and innocent 
persons on the other, I shall argue in subsequent chapters, 
such as when I argue for the moral acceptability of general 
deterrence, that criminals may be used in ways that benefit 
society (the innocent people) in virtue of their having a 
diminished moral status. 
It is important to note, however, that not just anything 
may be done to beings having a diminished moral standing. It 
is immoral for one to torture a horse for hours, even if one 
were to gain a great deal of sadistic pleasure from such 
torture. When there is a serious clash of interests, however, 
such as the right to life of a foetus and its mother, or when 
the safety of society seriously depends upon it, then beings 
of lower status morally may be used as means towards ends. 
Before proceeding to the next section, I wish to address 
concerns that my argument that criminals and former criminals 
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have a diminished moral standing rests on a false analogy. If 
it is objected that the way in which criminals lose some of 
their moral standing is not analogous to how foetuses have a 
diminished moral standing compared to adult persons, I must 
clarify that this example was used merely to illustrate the 
fact that beings may have different moral standings at 
different times. Of course, we usually hold that criminals 
did not become criminals as predictably as foetuses become 
persons, rather we usually believe that criminals exercised at 
least some free will in doing so. This, however, only 
strengthens the argument that criminals may be used as means 
towards some end, such as general deterrence, because they 
could have done otherwise. Persons that are forced into 
committing an offensive act do not fulfil the requirement of 
being guilty in virtue of their not having acted voluntarily. 
In such cases, they accordingly also do not acquire a 
diminished moral status. 
The conclusions drawn in this section (namely that 
criminals and former criminals have diminished moral statuses 
and that they may therefore be used as means towards certain 
ends) will have significance in subsequent chapters. For the 
present, I merely want to show that Kant's claim can be 
overridden when we make distinctions that he overlooks and 
therefore why we cannot agree that no one, not even criminals, 
may be used as means towards some end. 
I turn now to the second of Kant's issues I hold important 
to address in detail, namely that criminals will their 
punishments. Is this really the case? What is actually 
entailed in the claim that they will their punishments? The 
issue of willing one's punishment needs to be critically 
evaluated; therefore, I shall do so in the next section, with 
special focus being on the philosophy of Hegel. The reason 
for my shifting the main focus from Kant to Hegel is that 
Hegel's philosophy (if correct) is consistent with Kant's 
position on the matter, but is more accessible to analysis 
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because Hegel expounds his position in greater detail. The 
shift in primary focus from Kant to Hegel will not disrupt the 
analysis of Kant's position in any way, and I shall point out 
consistencies and differences between Kant and Hegel where 
appropriate. 
2.5 DO CRIMINALS WILL THEIR PUNISHMENT? 
Retributivists such as Kant and Hegel, to name two, often 
maintain that criminals have a "right" to be punished. How is 
this to be understood? Kant's position was laid out in 2. 3, 
namely that criminals lay down universal imperatives by their 
actions, so they will that the same be done to them as they do 
to others. If they kill, they express through their actions 
that they are to be killed too; if they steal, they express 
through their actions that their property is to be 
appropriated, etc. Hegel maintains that criminals will their 
punishment by their own free will on the following grounds: 
Given the universalisability of rules, the violation of rights 
has been proclaimed by criminals as their own rights. 4 Their 
crimes are the negation of rights. Punishment is the negation 
of this negation, and consequently a re-affirmation of right 
(Hegel 1965: 244) . 5 How can this be understood? In this 
section, I shall examine what it means to say that criminals 
will their punishments. Once this is understood, it is easier 
to see why the general claim must be rejected as incorrect. 
2.5.1 HEGEL AND FREEDOM OF THE WILL 
Hegel maintains that right is based on the will. This means 
that right is based on freedom because freedom constitutes the 
4 See 2.3 above, especially pages 25 to 26. 
5 If punishment is to be justified, it must respect the rights of those 
being punished. An important distinction is therefore made between what it 
would be good to do on grounds of utility and what we have a right to do. 
Since we do not always have a right to do what would be most expedient, the 
distinction is of paramount importance (Murphy 1985a: 76). 
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substantiality of the will: " ... freedom is both the substance 
of right and its goal, while the system of right is the realm 
of freedom made actual, the world of mind brought forth out of 
itself like a second nature" (Hegel 1965: 20). "Freedom of 
the will" has two distinct meanings for Hegel. In the first 
sense, it means that persons are free to do what they want, 
that they are not restricted from doing whatever they feel. 
When the will is free in this sense, it chooses from different 
natural inclinations, opening up to one of them and accepting 
it, while rejecting others. 
In this element of the will is rooted my ability to free myself from 
everything, abandon every aim, abstract from everything. Man alone 
can sacrifice everything, his life included; he can commit suicide. 
An animal cannot; it always remains ... in an alien destiny to which 
it merely accustoms itself (Hegel 1965: 227). 
This (the freedom of humans as natural beings) Hegel terms 
"arbitrary freedom." The arbitrary will chooses from 
inclinations external to it, opening up to it, accepting it, 
and thus being determined by it. It is something external to 
it. Real freedom, according to Hegel, is different: it is 
what he terms "absolute freedom." Primoratz points out that 
Hegel claims that the will has absolute freedom when it is the 
"general will" that expresses the conditions under which 
individuals with their arbitrary wills can live together in a 
community (Primoratz 1997: 67). 
Hegel makes the distinction between the general will and 
the arbitrary will based on a dualistic conception of human 
beings. Human beings are both free agents having rights, but 
are simultaneously constrained by the interests of society. 
The latter interests are considered by Hegel as objective, and 
the former as subjective. As natural beings, persons are 
subject to the arbitrary will, being beings with instincts, 
passions, urges, and desires. At the same time, persons are 
spiritual beings with the ability to act in accordance with 
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the demands of morality and the law. 
Hegel, states: 
Primoratz, commenting on 
As a natural being, the individual is the subject of the arbitrary 
will, preoccupied with himself and his individual wants and 
interests, different from others, sometimes in conflict with them. At 
the same time, as a spiritual being, he is the subject of the general 
will; this will is no less his very own - his ethical and therefore 
"true" will, and something he has in common with others (Primoratz 
1997: 68). 
As can be expected, the arbitrary will and the true will are 
not always in agreement and therefore can conflict. When they 
do, the former ought to be checked and overridden by the 
latter because Hegel sees the arbitrary will as subjective and 
inferior, the general will as objective and superior. The 
arbitrary, subjective will is inferior because it is 
determined by emotions, feelings, desires, and impulses, which 
may be irrational. A conflict of the two wills, resulting in 
victory of the true, general will is neither a defeat of the 
individual, nor a triumph of a force alien to the individual. 
It is the emancipation of the individual from that which is 
subjective, transient, 
affirmation of that 
superior. 
and inferior in the individual, and the 
which is objective, permanent, and 
Hegel therefore sees individuals as truly free, not when 
they are capable of pursuing their subjective goals and 
satisfying their subjective desires, but when their wills are 
in accordance with general ethical principles, because Hegel 
believes that such principles are what every person wills 
objectively, and are therefore an expression of the general 
will. The general will is expressed in laws when these are in 
accordance with reason. Laws demand "that every individual be 
respected and treated by others as a free being, for only thus 
does the free will find itself as its subject and contents in 
another." Only when someone is recognised as a free being is 
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he or she treated as a person. Consequently, an act is right 
if it is not a restriction of others' 
it is such a restriction, thereby 
persons (Hegel 1965: 38). 
freedoms, and wrong when 
not respecting them as 
Now that I have described Hegel's position regarding the 
will, I can discuss his position with respect to punishment by 
dealing with the objective and subjective wills in turn, and 
then dismissing the claim that criminals will their 
punishments. 
2.5.2 HEGEL'S OBJECTIVE JUSTIFICATION OF PUNISHMENT 
By "objective justification," Hegel means justification from 
an external perspective, not from the perspective of the 
person being punished. The general will may be seen as the 
will of society, and since each individual is also a member of 
society, everyone shares in society's will, i.e. in the 
general will. 
Hegel sees the breaking of a law as something 
contradictory and negative. It is something negative because 
it is the first act in the breaking of a law, the breaking of 
something positive (Hegel 1965: 246). He sees an offence as a 
nullity in a normative sense in that it gives expression to 
the arbitrary will of the criminal, which has an unlawful 
objective. This is in opposition to the will of the general 
will. The true will, which being general, is also the will of 
the criminal expressing the criminal's higher, permanent and 
objective will. Since it is an expression of the subject's 
better nature, it ought to dominate the arbitrary will and 
rule over it. An offence is also an act of a rational being 
and hence an expression of a rational rule. Like Kant, Hegel 
holds that persons affirm rules of conduct through their 
actions. These rules of conduct are the proclamations of 
universal modes of conduct. But a rule laid down by criminal 
conduct is in opposition to another existing, accepted general 
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rule, namely of the law: the expression of the general will. 
It is in opposition to something positive, and consequently 
cannot maintain itself. Finally, the rule laid down by the 
criminal act is also a nullity because its mere existence 
calls forth punishment, which is its negation (Hegel 1965: 
246). Punishment is thus not merely a simple negation, but 
the negation of a negation, the second negation. By 
nullifying the offence, it demonstrates the nullity of it. 
What is the nature of this negation? It is not concerned 
with restitution because that, according to Hegel, would be 
concerned only with the consequences; that is, the external 
conditions of the crime. Hegel argues that what must be 
negated is the malicious will of the criminal that is 
essential to crime. This is achieved in the same way in which 
the criminal negated the rights of the victim and the law on 
which it is founded, i.e. by coercion. The criminal used 
force or coercion to violate another's rights (by victimising 
others, stealing from them, assaulting them, killing them, or 
the like), and force or coercion is used to punish. 
As we have seen, punishment for Hegel is the negation of a 
negation because it is the negation of the negation of the 
law. Stated differently, by breaking a law, one negates it; 
by punishing in response to the violation of law, one negates 
the breaking of the law. Since the law is the expression of 
the general will, punishment is the negation of the negation 
of the general will. This double negation, says Hegel, leads 
to a reaffirmation of right (Hegel 1965: 244). To put it in 
Primoratz's words: 
Punishment "annuls" the offence first and foremost by negating it. 
Offence is the negation of right; therefore punishment, as the 
negation of the offence, is not a negation of something positive, but 
a negation of a negation. By negating a negation one gets what was 
negated by the first negation. Thus punishment restores what the 
offence has negated - the right and the law (Primoratz 1997: 74). 
38 
This double negation does not restore the original 
condition, however. In the previous condition, in the 
condition in which no violation had been committed against the 
law, the law's authority had not been demonstrated in 
practice. By contrast, the law that has been negated and 
thereby become victorious through the negation of its own 
negation has assumed a mature form, one that has been tried in 
practice. When we examine the implications of Hegel's 
philosophy, we can see that they are remarkably similar to 
Kant's position. Both hold that the criminal must be 
punished. Kant maintains that criminals must be punished 
because by their criminal actions they have laid down a 
universal rule that also applies to themselves. If we would 
not acknowledge their rules as universal ones by refusing to 
punish them, we could not demand that our maxims be treated as 
universals either. This would, according to Kant, lead to a 
breakdown of morality. Refusing to punish criminals would 
make us accomplices to their crimes in this sense. For Hegel, 
punishing criminals is imperative since not doing so is to 
deny the law any force, which is an endorsement of wrongdoing. 
Hegel's philosophy compels him to conclude that the commission 
of an offence is not only the justification for punishing, but 
also the source of our duty to punish offenders. 
Consequently, we not only have a right to punish offenders, 
but an obligation to do so. He also holds that an offence 
that would go unpunished would be its affirmation as right. 
Failure to negate the negation of a law results in that law's 
loss of authority and hence ceases being a law (Hegel 1965: 
27 4) . A law that is applied, however, according to Hegel, 
exercises force, creates order, and expresses the will of 
society. 
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2.5.3 HEGEL'S SUBJECTIVE JUSTIFICATION OF PUNISHMENT 
According to Hegel, it is not sufficient that punishment be 
justified objectively, i.e. from the viewpoint of the general 
will; it must also be justified subjectively, i.e. from the 
viewpoint of offenders. However, as already pointed out, 
punishment is a coercion, and hence subjectively an 
undesirable state of affairs. How can it therefore be 
justified in this way? 
Hegel asserts that laws embody the general will and that 
punishment is justified subjectively as an expression of this 
will. This will is not alien and external to individuals, but 
is their own will expressing the better part of them, thus 
enabling them to participate in law and morality. Violations 
against the general will, i.e. criminal offences, therefore 
injure not only the individual offended against, or the 
society as a whole, but the offender as well (Hegel 1965: 38-
39). This is in agreement with Kant, who holds that free, 
rational beings will their actions to be universally 
applicable. Therefore, by willing that others be coerced, one 
wills that oneself be coerced too. Returning to Hegel, a 
criminal offence may therefore be seen as the will in 
opposition to itself, the arbitrary will of the individual 
opposing the general will which is also part of the 
individual's will. When offences are requited by punishment, 
it is not only the expression of the general will of society, 
but also as the embodiment of the general will within the 
offenders themselves. Punishment is thus the expression of 
the offender's own will and therefore it follows that 
criminals can be said to will their punishment. Of course, 
this does not mean that criminals must will their own 
punishment on the empirical, subjective level of their wills. 
In fact, very few criminals do so. Most criminals do 
everything to evade detection by the police and avoid arrest. 
Persons may be unaware of their general wills, however, when 
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they fail to perceive what the rational, objective course of 
behaviour requires (Hegel 1965: 38-39). 
The general will of individuals therefore wills the 
punishment of themselves. In this sense, punishment may be 
seen as having an aspect of coercion that is not coercion, and 
does not violate the dignity of free beings because it 
subjects them to treatment that they themselves will and hold 
as good. Through punishment, argues Hegel, one therefore does 
not impose treatment on others with which they do not agree 
because the general will is not only the general will of 
everyone else, but also of themselves. 
Hegel furthermore endeavours to establish that punishment 
is also in accordance with the subjective, arbitrary will of 
the offender. Every offence is an act of generality too for 
the following reasons: It is an act of a rational being, as 
opposed to non-rational, because for Hegel human beings are by 
definition rational, having the capacity to use reason to 
determine which actions to perform. To see it as an act of a 
rational being means conceiving it not as an act of 
particularity, but rather as an act subsumed under a general 
rule, i.e. an act willed not only in this instance, but in 
other cases too. In the case of an offence, the rule 
proclaimed by the criminal is in opposition to right, it is 
not accepted by society, it does not express the general will 
and therefore it cannot be a universal rule. The connection 
with Kant is perspicuous, who holds that criminals will that 
the same be done to them as they do to others since they are 
rational, freely acting beings. A rational action is such 
that one would will for all others too, including oneself. 
Offenders thus have adopted a rule that has applicability for 
them, even though it cannot become a universal rule since it 
is in opposition to the general will. By their actions, they 
have declared it as their own particular rule; they may 
thereby be treated in accordance with it. By committing 
murder, they have proclaimed the rule that human life may be 
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taken; their lives may therefore be taken as well. The 
criminal's own rule is then simply being applied to her. By 
stealing, she proclaims the rule that the property of others 
may be stolen; her own property may accordingly be 
appropriated. When we treat criminals in this manner, we are 
not applying a rule that is foreign, incomprehensible, or 
hostile to them. It is her own rule, a rule that is involved 
in her own act. Of course, this rule could not be 
universalised, for either Kant or Hegel. For Kant, the 
practical impossibility that everyone takes property away from 
everyone precludes this rule from becoming categorical. 
Hegel, the rule is in opposition to the general will, 
may be seen as a rule applicable throughout society. 
For 
which 
By 
acting, criminals express 
treated in the same way in 
a generality and may hence be 
which they violated the rights of 
others. Others have the right to treat criminals as criminals 
have treated others. This establishes equality and 
universality. 
2.5.4 REJECTING BOTH OF HEGEL'S JUSTIFICATIONS 
In response to Hegel's subjective justification, it may be 
retorted that criminals do not want to proclaim a general rule 
by their actions; they merely wish to establish a privilege 
for themselves, an exception to the rule, while expecting 
others to honour the rule they have broken. By stealing, 
thieves do not proclaim a general rule. They do not steal 
that others may steal in the same proportion from them. It 
would be irrational since it would not result in any gain. If 
all offenders commit crimes because they wish to be punished, 
i.e. if they desire to be punished and hence commit crimes, 
then they would be equitable to masochists because they would 
perform actions to bring forth pain or suffering upon 
themselves. The claim that all offenders are masochists is 
highly doubtful. Subjectively therefore, the punishment 
42 
remains unwilled. 
follows: 
Primoratz responds to this position as 
If we came across a thief who argued along these lines, we should 
retort that his punishment is merely an application of the rule 
contained implicitly in his act, that it is in this sense based on 
his own will and in so far justified not only objectively, but 
subjectively as well. If he persisted in his refusal to universalise 
the rule and insisted on being privileged, on being an exception, the 
question would be: On whom does the onus justificandi rest? I think 
that it would rest on him, rather than on those who wanted to treat 
him in the same way he had treated his victim. He would be bound to 
prove that he has a right to treat others in a way in which they have 
no right to treat him - that, for example, he can rightfully take the 
property of others, but others have no right to take his property. 
This would be a tall order indeed (Primoratz 1997: 78). 
If we confront offenders with a rule, they are bound to 
respond that there is no rule and that we are trying to point 
at something that does not exist because they will deny having 
proclaimed any rule by their unlawful conduct. If we then 
mention to them that by their conduct they were laying down a 
rule, even if they were ignorant of doing so, as Hegel 
explains, they may reply that our insistence that there is a 
rule does not convince them. Furthermore, Primoratz is not 
correct in maintaining that the onus justificandi rests on the 
criminal, because in punishing we are playing an active role, 
a role that is not forced upon us as in self-defence, but one 
that we voluntarily assume. We are not coerced by the general 
rule and hence by the demands of the double negation; we have 
a choice whether to punish or not. For this reason the onus 
justificandi rests on us. 
Laying down a rule presupposes that the agent is free and 
hence capable of acting rationally. If he was not capable of 
doing so, we would not consider him a free agent, but rather 
as a subject with some behavioural disorder beyond his 
control, for instance. It may therefore be assumed that the 
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rules laid down by free, rational beings are rational. Many 
instances of criminal conduct are, however, not rational 
many murders are committed in a fit of uncontrolled rage. 
Rape is not a rational act, nor is child molestation, etc. 
Rational people may lay down rules by their actions, but this 
is often not the case with criminals. 
not always a subjective justification 
the criminal behaviour cannot 
rational action, even if it is 
beyond the individual's control. 
always 
not 
There is consequently 
for 
be 
punishment, 
described 
determined by 
since 
as a 
factors 
Having dismissed Hegel's subjective justification, I turn 
now to rejecting his objective justification. His objective 
justification relies on the distinction between the arbitrary 
will and the general will. The general will is expressed in 
laws when these are in accordance with reason. Here the 
problem arises. What exactly is the general will in 
accordance with reason? Crimes are the violations of laws. 
In a democracy, laws are passed by a majority of the 
legislature. Is the general will therefore to be equated with 
the majority opinion? If it is objected that society in 
general comes to adopt those laws that are required for the 
general good (such as traffic laws, laws against murder, rape, 
assault, drug dealing or possession, etc.), the best society 
developing out of the natural needs of its members, we then 
may concede that this might be the case in general, but there 
have been numerous societies one now generally considers 
immoral because they had immoral legal systems, for instance, 
and even generally acceptable societies sometimes pass bad 
laws, i.e. laws that turn out to be unjust in practice or do 
not further the good of the general society. If the general 
will is to be equated with the majority opinion, then this is 
a disconcerting answer, since majorities have often been 
mistaken or immoral. Moreover, majority opinions may also be 
no more than mere generalised subjectivity. If laws made by 
majority vote are not an expression of the general will, then 
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punishing violations of them has not been justified in any 
way. If laws are equated with the general will, and laws are 
the will of the majority, then the general will is nothing 
other than the will of the majority, hence there must be some 
other justification which gives the majority its claim. Laws 
which are not made democratically also cannot express the 
general will because such decisions ignore the will of the 
people. If this is how we interpret the general will, then 
Hegel's objective justification can be seen as nothing other 
than a positivist conception of law, i.e. that laws have 
intrinsic value and are to be upheld and obeyed in virtue of 
their being laws. 6 Hegel thus does not make any distinction 
between the moral and legal obligations to obey the law, or 
the moral and legal justifications of punishment. If this is 
what Hegel means by his justifications, then they are unsound, 
and since we can interpret his argument in such a way, there 
is good reason to reject his justifications. I therefore 
conclude that neither Hegel's subjective justification, nor 
his objective justification, is acceptable. 
2 . 6 REJECTING JUSTIFICATIONS OF RETRIBUTIVE PUNISHMENT BY 
CONSENT 
Arguably, one way in which persons attain a right over us is 
by our consent. If, for example, I consent to your preventing 
me from spending money gambling, I cannot morally make a 
legitimate complaint when you do prevent me from doing so. I 
had given you the right to do it, and you had the right to do 
it. In doing it, you violated no rights of mine, even if at 
the time of the action I did not want that right to be 
6 Austin (1995: 31-42) outlines his positivist conception of law, which is 
a species of command, and he argues that the law's status as law is 
distinct from the question whether the law is compatible with morality or 
divine law. Austin's conception of law does not entail that laws must be 
just. By contrast, D' Amato (1995b: 19-30) invents an ingenious fictional 
tale of an unjust law to persuade us that justice is indeed part of the 
very structure of law. 
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exercised. The implication this carries for punishment is 
that my autonomy may be thwarted: I may be punished if I have 
consented to my being punished, even if I do not will the 
punishment at the time of its infliction. The question that 
will be examined in this section is whether there is any 
plausible argument maintaining that criminals will their 
punishment. Theories of the general will and social contract 
are two theories that attempt reconciliation of the 
curtailment of individual liberty with legitimate state 
authority, including the right, or authority, of the state to 
punish. 
To justify government or the state in this context, it is 
necessary to justify at least some coercion. For Kant, as I 
shall now explain, for whom freedom is the highest human 
value, coercion is justified only if its imposition is 
necessary to prevent a greater loss of freedom. Freedom is 
the only value that can be employed to limit freedom because 
the appeal to any other value, for example utility, would 
undermine the ultimate status of the value of freedom. Kant 
thus argues that some forms of coercion are morally defensible 
since they are consistent with rational freedom. The argument 
may formally be laid out as follows: Coercion may prevent 
persons from doing what they desire on a particular occasion, 
and is therefore prima facie wrong. Such coercion may 
however, be shown to be fully justified, and hence not wholly 
wrong, if it could be shown that the coercion is such that it 
could be rationally willed by the person whose desire has been 
compromised (Murphy 1985a: 79) . 7 Thus, if it can be shown that 
we rationally will our being punished when we transgress the 
law, we cannot complain when we are subsequently punished. 
John Rawls' s position is illuminative on this point. He 
argues that we ought to imagine an original position in which 
it would have been rational to adopt a rule of law and thus 
7 This latter point, I shall argue in Chapter 7, permits more than Kant 
might have realised - it opens the way to a paternalistic justification. 
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run the risk of having our desires thwarted, rather than an 
alternative arrangement, such as the classic state of nature. 
The only coercive institutions that are justified then are 
those that rational beings could agree to adopt for governing 
their social relations. The validity of such a theory does 
not depend on such an original position actually having 
occurred, however. The point is that any legislature has to 
provide us with a system of laws and principles upon which we 
could have agreed under such an original position. Laws to 
which the rational members of society could not all agree, are 
unjust (Rawls 1971: 17-22). If a law that prohibits women 
from occupying certain official occupations, is enacted for 
instance, then such a law is unjust, since rational beings 
could not agree to such a law from behind a veil of ignorance. 8 
The criminals' complaints are not justified because they have 
rationally consented to, or willed their own punishments. The 
laws or rules they have broken work to their advantage as 
citizens when they are obeyed by others. In the original 
position, these laws would have been consented to by the 
original contractors. If they do not choose to sacrifice by 
restraining themselves, then they choose to pay in another 
way, namely by the prescribed penal ties. This also 
illustrates why Kant maintains that any harm one does to 
someone else, one does to oneself. If one vilifies another, 
one vilifies oneself; if one steals from another, one steals 
from oneself; if one kills another, one kills oneself, and so 
on. 
In arguing that the criminal has a right to be punished, 
Primoratz (1997: 105-106) employs the Rawlsian experiment of 
imagining oneself in an original position behind a veil of 
ignorance. One cannot be certain whether one would oneself 
not end up in a position in which one is an offender, and 
therefore be dealt with by the institution one has chosen. He 
8 For a more elaborate development of the idea regarding the right to be 
punished, see M. D. Dubber (1998: 113-146). 
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claims that we would not select a rehabilitative system 
because of certain unacceptable consequences of this approach. 
I argue in Chapter 6 that these concerns include indefinite 
and disproportionate sentencing, treatment of non-offenders, 
as well as denying persons their autonomy, the right to make 
one's own choices, and denying one any personhood status. 
Primoratz believes that we would reject any utilitarian 
institution of punishment, rejecting emphasis on the common 
good, punishment of the innocent, disproportionate sentencing, 
as well as the emphasis on society and the denial of 
individual rights, which this theory could imply and I argue 
later. He argues that we would adopt a retributivist theory, 
with its 
which we 
committed 
guarantee 
108) . 
emphasis on justice and desert, 
could only be punished if 
as a system under 
we had voluntarily 
sees it as the best 
(Primoratz 1997: 105-
an offence. He therefore 
of our individual liberties 
It is here I strongly disagree with Primoratz. The veil 
of ignorance experiment requires one's setting aside all 
information about one's distinguishing social characteristics. 
In Rawls's theory, one is supposed to make a blind choice of 
principles from behind the veil of ignorance (being ignorant 
of one's race, sex, religion, wealth, talents, or ultimate 
values or aims in life), so that one will choose as though one 
would be in any social position, thereby having to take into 
account the interests of everyone equally and consequently 
ensuring fairness to all. It is by no means obvious to me 
that we would choose a retributivist system from behind a veil 
of ignorance. Would we choose to be punished according to the 
severity of our offences? If we assume that we may have 
turned to crime due to faulty learnt behavioural patterns, 
then it is safe to assume that we would prefer a 
rehabilitative system, a system in which we can expect to 
acquire more constructive behavioural patterns. The 
retributive model is by no means the obvious choice from 
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behind the veil of ignorance. I therefore conclude that 
retributivism is not defensible on the grounds of appealing to 
a connection between criminals and their wills. 
In the next chapter, I shall provide a partial defence of 
retributivism that is acceptable (since I shall use aspects of 
retributivism in my own theory) by arguing that it addresses 
society's need to express its anger and indignation at 
offenders. Before doing so, however, I shall point out other 
shortcomings of retributivism. My defence of punishment rests 
on the demand, amongst others, that any theory justifying 
punishment must also adequately answer the question of how 
much to punish (the "how" question) . I shall now argue that 
retributivism is not able to do so. 
2.7 RETRIBUTIVISM AND THE "HOW" QUESTION 
In Chapter 1, I pointed out that the justification of 
punishment must answer two fundamental questions, namely whom 
one is justified in punishing and by how much. In the next 
chapter, I shall give a partial defence of retributivism, 
thereby also arguing that it is able to answer the "whom" 
question. In this section, I shall address the question of 
whether it is able to provide a morally acceptable answer to 
the "how" question, and I shall argue that it is not. 
2.7.1 RETRIBUTIVISM AND THE MEASURE AND KIND OF PUNISHMENT 
As I have indicated, an important question that must be 
addressed is how much punishment ought to be administered. I 
shall now examine whether retributivism is capable of 
providing a satisfactory answer to this question. If one 
believes that the extent and nature of punishment ought to be 
determined by what offenders deserve, then the extent and 
nature of their punishment will be determined by the extent 
and nature of their offences committed. Retributivism entails 
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lex talionis because it is committed to the principle of 
equality (as I explained when dealing with Kant's retributive 
theory in 2.3). Lex talionis is the law of retaliation, 
according to which deserved punishment is precisely equal to 
the harm done in the crime, neither more nor less. It is best 
known in the biblical statement, life for life, eye for eye, 
tooth for tooth, wound for wound (Exodus 21: 22-25). It 
entails that not any punishment is justified, but only the 
right kind of punishment in the right amount. This entails an 
equal treatment aspect like crimes ought to receive like 
punishment. There is also a resemblance aspect - punishment 
should fit the crime (Radin 1980: 154): 
the law looks only at the nature of the damage, treating the 
parties as equals, and merely asking whether one has done and the 
other suffered injustice, whether one inflicted and the other has 
sustained damage ... Hence the unjust here being the unequal, the 
judge endeavours to equalise it ... the judge endeavours to make them 
equal by the penalty or loss he imposes, taking away the gain 
(Aristotle 1999: 275). 
Let us assume for the moment that lex talionis is to be 
the guiding principle with which to determine the nature and 
extent of punishment. This entails that one is justified in 
exacting as much suffering on offenders as they inflicted on 
their victims, but no more. The principle of lex talionis, 
however, also entails that if one punishes, one is obliged to 
administer punishment to the same level of suffering as was 
suffered by the victim, but no less. To fulfil both 
conditions simultaneously is a very delicate balancing act. 
Primoratz ( 1997: 80) points out that lex talionis can be 
understood in two ways. Firstly, it can be taken literally, 
as Kant and Hegel would have us do, meaning that punishment is 
to be administered in the same way and to the same degree as 
the offence that was committed. Murder is therefore to be 
punished by capital punishment, kidnapping by imprisonment, 
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theft by fines, and so on. But how is one to punish child 
molesters, rapists, persons who commit perjury, embezzlers, 
slanderers, or those found guilty of treason? Clearly, the 
principle cannot be applied consistently in this form. 
However, lex talionis can also be interpreted as a demand that 
punishment and the offence be equal in respect of their 
magnitude, i.e. they are to be equal in value. Thus theft and 
imprisonment are different in kind, the former deprives 
victims of their material security, while the latter deprives 
off enders of their freedom. Both should be equal in value in 
the sense that the punishment should deprive offenders of 
something to the same degree in which their actions deprived 
their victims. However, one consequence of administering 
punishment in this manner is that it rules out the possibility 
of having victimless crimes, such as attempted crimes. An 
example is if X shoots at a passer-by with the intent to kill, 
narrowly missing the target, and thereby causing no injury. 
Furthermore, it would rule out the possibility of punishing an 
off ender if the victim consented to the offence being 
committed, such as when adults freely choose to engage in a 
polygamous marriage, a practice prohibited under most Western 
legal systems. 
Primoratz (1997: 88-89) maintains, however, that lex 
talionis, the law of retribution, is not to be interpreted 
literally. It merely requires that punishment be administered 
proportionally. As Aristotle states it in the Ni coma chean 
Ethics: "justice is therefore a sort of proportion" (Aristotle 
1999: 269). This, however, also poses a problem: if 
punishment is to be proportionate, then it should be 
proportionate to some highest level, but how this level is to 
be determined has not been satisfactorily established. Taking 
life for life in the case of murder may be comprehensible, as 
Kant suggests, but this would not work in the case of other 
crimes. What would be the proper response to rape, child 
molestation, blackmail, or perjury? If crimes are ranked 
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according to a proportionate punishment system, the latter 
being anchored to some fixed upper and lower limits, the 
problem still remains of how to establish this 
proportionality. When is a given crime X, for instance, twice 
as serious as another crime Y, thereby demanding two distinct 
punishments, the former's being twice as intensive as the 
latter's? 
It is perfectly conceivable to rank offences on an ordinal 
scale according to their severity, and to do likewise with 
punishments. The most serious punishment would then be 
reserved for the most serious offence, the second most serious 
punishment for the second most serious offence, and so on down 
the scale to the mildest punishment for the least serious 
offence (Garvey 1998: 747). Having adopted this policy, 
however, we would still have no indication of how serious each 
punishment should be. Obviously, the most serious punishment 
should be reserved for the most serious offence, but what is 
this most serious punishment to consist of? Should it be the 
death penal ty? 9 Should it be the death penalty preceded by 
severe torture? Should it be life imprisonment? 
Alternatively, ought it only to be a lengthy prison term less 
than life imprisonment? Perhaps it should not be imprisonment 
at all. If first-degree-murder is punished by a prison term 
of six months because this is the most serious punishment on 
our ordinal scale, we would say that the punishment is 
proportionate to the offence in a way, but only in an 
unsatisfactory formal way, but that it is totally 
disproportionate in another more substantive sense because it 
is much too mild when considering the gravity of the offence. 
The punishment suff erect by criminals would then affect them 
much less than their acts affected their victims. Similarly, 
if disorderly conduct were to be punished by five years 
9 Walter Berns (1979) defends the death penalty by arguing that the real 
issue is not deterrence, but justice, which demands the death penalty as a 
continual reminder of the moral order by which we alone can live as human 
beings. He maintains that it is about justice in an imperfect universe. 
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imprisonment because that is the least serious punishment 
provided for, we would have a similar objection, only this 
time we would complain that the punishment is much too severe 
(Primoratz 1997: 89-90). It may be expected that the latter 
contingency would lead to disrespect with resulting loss of 
effectiveness of the legal system, juries and judges refusing 
to find persons guilty (even if there were sufficient evidence 
to do so) in order to spare the offender from an outrageously 
disproportionate punishment. This was frequently the case in 
England during the early nineteenth century. 10 
Primoratz argues that punishment should aim at 
proportionality in a substantive sense because then it will 
also have formal proportionality: murder should be punished by 
death, disorderly conduct by a small fine (Primoratz 1997: 
90) . But this is a very simplistic form of punishment, one 
that is not acceptable. On the contrary, punishment, as I 
shall argue in the next chapters, should not only be 
retributive, it should also yield positive results. Staying 
with pure retribution for the moment, however, we can 
establish how punishment ought to be determined. Although we 
can agree with Primoratz (1997: 90) that one should first 
determine how serious the injury caused to the victim was: the 
more serious the injury, the more serious the punishment, 
ceteris paribus, even this is problematic. If Smith steals 
amount X from Jones, are we then to fine Smith amount X? What 
if Jones suffered extensively because of the loss, such as 
that his family had to starve, would we not demand that the 
punishment be more severe than the mere material equivalent? 
It seems that the extent of punishment is not to be determined 
solely by the material loss suffered, but also by the 
magnitude of the disruption caused in the victim's life. Once 
10 Greenawalt (1995: 359-363) points out that in the Anglo-American legal 
system, jurors are aware that they have a duty to obey the instructions of 
the judge, and that they have legal power to disobey them when their 
consciences direct them to do so in the interests of justice for the 
defendant. 
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the seriousness has been established, the culpability of the 
offender should be taken into account. Furthermore, 
punishment should be greater when the offence was committed 
deliberately than when it was committed out of negligence, 
maintains Primorat z, because the former is more serious than 
the latter. Primoratz does not give a reason for this 
assertion, which can be justified consequentially, but not on 
retributivist grounds. Retributivism cannot justify it 
because the principle of lex talionis merely looks at the harm 
caused by the criminal act, determines the magnitude in the 
light of it, and a crime caused by negligence and the same 
kind of crime caused deliberately can cause the same amount of 
harm, hence, according to retributi vism, require equal 
punishment. If retributi vism could show that punishment is 
connected to the will, then it could be argued retributi vely 
that offences deliberately willed are more serious than 
offences that are not willed. However, as we have seen (in 
2.5 & 2.6), retributivism neglects to provide an adequate 
connection between the will and punishment. There are 
arguments, however, that can establish that punishment of a 
deliberate offence ought to be more serious than punishment of 
an offence negligibly brought about, but these arguments are 
not retributive ones, they are consequentialist ones, which 
will receive attention in a later chapter. 
Primoratz (1997: 90-91) asserts too that the motives of 
offenders should also be taken into account which again 
would involve the will, which retributivism neglects. Leaving 
the will aside for the moment, however, he insists, for 
instance, that an offence committed out of retaliation ought 
to be punished less seriously than the same offence committed 
out of mere enjoyment. This, just as the previous point, 
cannot be established by retributivism either, because, as 
already pointed out, lex talionis only examines the harm 
committed, which can be the same with different motives, 
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requiring equal punishment for different motives, 
paribus, if there is to be consistency. 
ceteris 
Lex talionis also has other difficulties. We generally 
accept that a person is to be punished less severely for a 
first offence than for a further offence. Lex talionis is 
incapable of making such a provision. I shall discuss this 
further in the next subsection. 
2.7.2 RETRIBUTIVISM NEGLECTS IMPORTANT VARIABLES 
We generally hold that a person convicted of a first offence 
ought to receive a more lenient sentence, ceteris paribus, 
than one having a prior record of criminal convictions. If 
only the severity of the offence is to be taken into account, 
then lesser sentences for first off enders cannot be accounted 
for by retributi vism. This means that retributi vi st theory 
thus faces the charge of neglecting important variables. 
Furthermore, retributivism leaves no room for mercy since 
it cannot accommodate the institution of pardon in any manner. 
If persons have committed a minor offence, requiring a fine, 
ought mercy not to be shown when not doing so would bring 
about great hardship on innocent persons, such as their 
families? Of course, it may be countered that the perpetrator 
should have considered this before offending. Nevertheless, 
we may want to leave open the possibility of mercy in some 
situations, such as when a person is guilty of a first 
offence, or did not intend the full extent of the outcomes of 
her offensive action, which was partially caused by 
unfavourable chance factors in the environment. 
Primoratz ( 1997: 109) attempts to defend the ins ti tut ion 
of mercy while retaining retributivism by positing a hierarchy 
of principles, higher ones sometimes being able to override 
lower ones. The principle of justice, for instance, is very 
high on the ladder, capable of being overridden only in very 
rare cases. He further posits that the principle of mercy can 
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sometimes override the principle of punishing according to 
desert. He argues that whenever the administering of 
punishment would bring about severe hardship on innocent 
persons, then the principle of mercy ought to override the 
principle of justice. However, he sees the principle of 
justice as being very difficult to override and provides us 
with no clear rule by which this can be done: 
Now, the duties of justice are generally more binding than those of 
preventing suffering, so that most of the time the duty to punish 
will have to be carried out in full, notwithstanding the suffering of 
innocent third parties indirectly caused. But there will also be 
cases where the conflict of retributive justice and mercy will be 
resolved the other way round. Sometimes, when the offence committed 
is not very grave, and the suffering of the innocent parties involved 
that would be brought about by meting the full measure of deserved 
punishment would be very, very great, the call for mercy will 
override the duty to punish, and the penalty will be considerably 
reduced. There will also be cases in which the facts calling for 
mercy will be so weighty - say, the offender has sincerely and deeply 
repented of his misdeed and made great efforts to compensate the 
victim, and has been law-abiding generally ever since his offence -
that the final decision will be a full pardon (Primoratz 1997: 110). 
If retributivism is wholly backward-looking, however, then 
retributivism and mercy are incompatible: Retributivism is 
usually held to be wholly backward-looking, relying only on 
deontological principles. To apply mercy because it would 
bring about suffering for innocent persons if justice were 
applied to its full extent is not to have a backward-looking 
perspective, but a forward-looking one; it is not to apply a 
deontological principle, but a consequentialist one. 
Because retributi vism focuses only on the nature of the 
crime, not the intention of the offender in question, the 
theory is incapable of adequately dealing with offences with 
different intentions but with similar outcomes. Applying this 
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theory does not reflect our general beliefs about how a 
justice system should operate: 
Taken literally, lex talionis focuses only on the harm the offender 
has caused and ignores the offender's moral culpability. An offender 
guilty of intentional homicide would get the same punishment as one 
guilty of reckless homicide because the resulting harm - the victim's 
death - is the same. Lex talionis is therefore an ugly recipe for 
disproportionate punishments (Garvey 1998: 777). 
2.7.3 THE PROBLEM OF RESPECT 
A distinguishing feature of most retributivist theories, such 
as Kant's, is the notion of proportionality: punishment must 
fit the crime and must not be more or other than criminals 
deserve. Another feature is that we are required to give them 
what they deserve in order to respect them as persons or as 
autonomous moral entities (Radin 1980: 151-152). Following 
from this view of retributi vism are two aspects, namely that 
any punishment that is not proportional is unjustified, and 
that any punishment that fails to respect the personhood of 
the offender is also unjustified. This line of retributi vism 
generates a rights thesis - all offenders have the right to be 
punished in proportion to their desert and with respect for 
their personhood, and these rights are fundamental. I 
therefore set out Kant's argument as follows: 
(1) Persons are never to be used as means towards an end, 
even if it is for their own end. 
(2) Administering punishment as a means toward attaining 
some end, such as deterrence, or rehabilitation of 
the offender, is therefore not acceptable. 
(3) Therefore, the only justification for inflicting 
punishment on anyone is that the individual has 
committed a crime. 
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Committing a crime is thus a necessary condition 
inflicting morally defensible punishment. Underlying 
for 
this 
principle is, according to Kant, however, a more fundamental 
principle, namely that persons ought always to be treated with 
respect and dignity. Kant is therefore forced to argue that 
the execution of murderers must be conducted without any 
maltreatment of the condemned in order to respect their 
humanity. I formulate his argument as follows: 
( 1) Persons have a fundamental and inalienable right to 
dignity and respect. 
( 2) The principle of equality demands that criminals be 
punished in accordance with the nature of their 
crimes. 
(3) However, since a person's right to dignity and respect 
is fundamental and inalienable, it is not justifiable 
to apply the principle of equality to the letter for 
some brutal and heinous crimes. 
Certainly, we can understand the implications of the argument 
we would not torture persons for days or weeks before 
executing them, even if they had been found guilty of 
inflicting such cruelty upon their victims. There is an upper 
limit to the extent of pain and suffering we are willing to 
inflict on criminals, regardless of the nature of their crimes 
simply in virtue of the fact that they, like us, are human 
beings. Kant, however, advocates death as the only suitable 
punishment for murder. We are entitled to ask whether capital 
punishment as such is not a violation of a person's right to 
respect and dignity. Even if we assume that symmetry were to 
exist between the crime and the execution - that the execution 
were not carried out after an extended period of 
incarceration, that the date of the execution were not made 
known long before it is to be administered (leading to 
psychological harm), and that if a highly ritualised procedure 
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of execution were not followed would it still not be an 
expression 
dignity? 11 
of disrespect and disregard of the person's 
Surely, respect here for dignity of criminals would 
be to give them the opportunity to realise the suffering and 
harm they have caused, be contrite, and make amends, rather 
than to make these possibilities impossible by taking their 
lives. Executing murderers is denying them the very 
opportunity for fulfilling these conditions. 
2.8 SUMMARY AND PERSPECTIVE 
In this chapter, I gave a general outline of retributi vism, 
enumerating its main elements and their implications. Kant's 
retributive theory was then examined in detail as paradigmatic 
of the general theory. Two issues argued by Kant I 
subsequently rejected in turn, namely that it is always 
morally wrong to use persons as means towards ends (criminals 
have forfeited some of their rights and may therefore be used 
for such purposes), and that criminals will their punishment. 
Since the latter claim is also endorsed by Hegel, it was 
rejected by examining Hegel's philosophy regarding punishment 
and the will in detail. Not only has his philosophy been 
highly influential on the matter, but is also consistent with 
Kant's claims. Neither Hegel's objective, nor his subjective 
justification was able to stand up to criticism. I then 
rejected attempts at justifying retributi vism with reference 
to consent. Subsequently I evaluated retributivism in respect 
of how or how much to punish. I argued that retributivism is 
11 Hugo A. Bedau (1982) examines the death penalty in detail in America. He 
gives historical, sociological, etiological, legal and political 
perspectives, and both sides of the issue are presented. The background, 
development, the law, and the executions, and American society's attitude 
towards the death penalty are illuminated. Deterrence, problems, 
doctrines, and evidence regarding the punishment are presented. One of the 
first studies regarding deterrence of the death penalty on prison murders 
is included. The problems of recidivism and parole are also examined. The 
question is posed, is the death penalty desirable for punishing terrorism? 
The death penalty is discussed in relation to racism and rape. Important 
Supreme Court decisions pertaining to the death penalty in the United 
States are presented. 
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incapable of providing a morally acceptable answer to this 
question because it is committed to the principle of lex 
talionis, and is therefore incapable of regarding important 
variables (such as first-time offences, mercy or other 
external factors), and is not committed in practice to 
respecting offenders although it claims it is. 
Now that I have revealed the nature of retributivism and 
how it cannot be defended, I shall give a defence of the 
approach by arguing that it enables us to express anger and 
indignation at offenders, which I shall show to be morally 
appropriate. Even though I will defend retributivism on these 
grounds, and because I claim that punishment should include an 
aspect of retribution if it is to be morally justified, I only 
do so in a limited way, continuing, where relevant, to point 
out its limitations. 
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3.1 INTRODUCTION 
CHAPTER 3 
DEFENDING RETRIBUTIVISM 
In this chapter, despite its short-comings, I shall provide a 
partial defence of retributivism by arguing that moral 
judgements are linked to emotional concerns, and that it is 
morally appropriate for one to express one's anger and 
indignation at offenders and their offensive actions. I shall 
examine the connection between anger and indignation on the 
one hand and guilt on the other, and argue that we are only 
justified in expressing anger and indignation at those who are 
guilty, i.e. at those who have committed crimes and fulfil the 
requirements for moral guilt. Importantly, retributivism thus 
provides a morally acceptable answer to the question of whom 
we are justified in punishing. Because the expression of 
one's emotions can be excessive, especially when one is the 
primary victim, I shall argue that retributivism does not 
justify private revenge, and hence I shall argue for well-
regulated punishment, i.e. punishment in an institutionalised 
form. If punishment serves as a recognised channel through 
which society can express its anger and indignation at 
offenders, it fulfils a need of society; and as I have already 
pointed out in Chapter 1, it is an objective any system of 
punishment ought to have. I shall then also defend 
retributivism against the claim that it endorses legal 
positivism. Finally, I discuss the limits of the 
retributivist justification, which lie primarily in the social 
conditions of a society and in the way the least fortunate are 
treated by the state. 
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3.2 ANGER AND INDIGNATION AND PUNISHMENT 
In this section I shall be concerned with three tasks: I first 
discuss the nature of emotions, secondly, I argue that they 
are morally significant, and thirdly I defend punishment as 
morally appropriate for the expression of anger and 
indignation at offenders. 
3.2.1 WHAT ARE EMOTIONS? 
The initial reaction to this question is to give an answer 
such as that an emotion is a mental item like a sensation, and 
the having of which one cannot be mistaken about. This 
Cartesian view equates emotions with feelings, since in order 
to establish whether I presently have a given emotion, such as 
anger, I need merely to introspect for a reliable answer. It 
would be similar to my establishing whether I have a specific 
feeling, such as a headache. The problem with this "feeling 
theory of emotions" is, however, that the question of how we 
come to speak of emotions in an inter-subjective way, 
attributing them to others and being able to speak of them 
more or less uniformly, is left unanswered because I only have 
direct access to my emotion, such as anger, while you only 
have access to yours, and we have no real way of determining 
whether we share the same emotion. Moreover, it is not always 
the case that we correctly identify our own emotions: you may 
believe that you are angry with your father, but a 
psychoanalyst may interpret this as resentment. Furthermore, 
one may be unaware of one's emotions: a psychologist may lead 
one to the discovery that one has unconsciously loved a 
particular person all the while. Therefore, it thus seems 
sometimes to be that one is mistaken about an emotion, or one 
may have an emotion without feeling it. Emotions thus seem 
capable of having an unconscious existence, something that is 
inconceivable of mere feelings. Feelings that leave the realm 
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of consciousness are thought of as going out of existence, 
rather than having a continued existence at an unconscious 
level. Thus, when a doctor asks her patient whether he has 
had any pain during the night, the answer that he slept right 
through does not prompt the suspicion that the pain has 
continued on an unconscious level. When operated on under 
anaesthetic, one has no pain because one is without 
consciousness, i.e. no realm in which the feeling of pain can 
exist. Therefore, it follows that emotions cannot be equated 
with mere feelings. 
One contrary position to this theory is held by William 
James who holds that without felt bodily symptoms emotions 
would be nothing but detached observation, and hence not 
emotions at all. He conceives emotions as physiological 
disturbances caused by perception, i.e. of external events. 
Thus, we are sad because we cry, angry because we strike, 
happy because we laugh; rather than crying because we are sad, 
striking because we are angry, laughing because we are happy, 
etc. This theory has the weakness that it applies only to 
presently occurring emotions, and not to lasting dispositional 
or unconscious ones. It also opens the door to the 
experiencing of emotions without the relevant context because 
only physiological disturbances are necessary. 
A drug induced state in which physiological symptoms of 
anxiety were produced without any of the normally accompanying 
psychological states would qualify as anxiety on this account, 
even if the person who is drugged perceived them only in a 
detached way. This theory leaves no room for regarding 
emotions, as we often do, as justified or unjustified, 
rational or irrational, realistic or unrealistic, or of 
excessive magnitude. 
Behaviourism is a third type of theory. In its extreme 
form, such as that advocated by Ryle, Skinner, and Watson, it 
holds an emotion as nothing other than behaviour of a given 
kind, or at least one's disposition to behave in a given 
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manner in given circumstances. This theory does credit to the 
public nature of emotions since the emotions of others are 
often observable. However, it neglects the private nature of 
an emotion, the inner state, emphasised by the Cartesian 
theory. Behaviour is the only criterion we have for 
attributing emotions to others, but we do not depend on our 
own behaviour to recognise that we are experiencing a specific 
emotion. In addition, by behaviour alone, it is difficult, if 
not impossible, to distinguish between some emotions, such as 
indignation from vexation, or either from resentment. 
A fourth theory of emotions, propounded by Aristotle and 
Aquinas, 
aspects. 
makes cognition, motivation, or evaluation central 
For present purposes, it is unimportant whether we 
hold emotions to be cognitions, caused by cognitions, causing 
cognitions (as held by emotivism), or part of a motivational 
process. If there is a necessary connection between emotions 
and beliefs, then emotions can be rational or irrational, 
reasonable or unreasonable, just or unjust, etc., rather than 
random. Accordingly, emotions may be seen as complimenting 
reason, giving insight to moral, aesthetic, and religious 
values. This theory does not account for differences in 
emotion when perceptual states are identical, however. Why 
does one person who is cheated react with anger, while another 
takes it with amusement? The answering of this question would 
go beyond the scope of this thesis. However, many 
philosophers today (M. Stocker, R. M. Gordon and R. C. Solomon 
being three notable examples) endorse the view that emotions 
have cognitive components. It is widely held that emotions 
require beliefs; and emotions also require values and desires 
the agent holds. Descriptions of emotional states are rich in 
causal implications. For instance, one is embarrassed only if 
one is in a state having certain causal connections, 
particularly to beliefs, desires, and wishes (Gordon 1987: 
ix) . "If one is to explain or predict human behavior in terms 
of beliefs and desires, then one should be prepared to 
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introduce emotions as well into the explanatory schemeu 
(Gordon 1987: 9). This is illustrated by Gordon in the 
following example: Let us imagine two farmers each wishing 
that it would rain so that their crops will not be destroyed 
by drought. Each believes as strongly as the other that his 
crops will not survive another week without water, and each 
cares as much as the other about the survival of his crops. 
Farmer A sets out pipes for irrigating the crops in case it 
does not rain. Farmer B does not undertake any such measure, 
however. From their actions we may infer that B believes it 
will rain, while A believes it will not. Let us imagine 
further, however, that both have been informed by a source 
they both trust to an equally high degree that there is a 
fifty percent chance of rain during the next seven days. So 
neither believes that it will rain, neither believes that it 
will not. They do not differ in any other relevant belief 
In order for us to explain the difference in their either. 
behaviour, we must refer to emotions, otherwise explaining the 
difference would be impossible. We may assume that A is 
afraid it will not rain and B is hopeful that it will. One 
who fears it will not rain but wishes it would, would tend to 
act like a person who believes it will not rain but wishes it 
would. Similarly, one who is hopeful it will rain, will tend 
to act as a person who believes it will rain and hopes it 
would. The different emotions of the farmers therefore serve 
as an explanation for their difference in action. 1 
In the next subsection, I shall show that morality is a 
practical subject concerned with our expression of emotions. 
1 For further discussions regarding the motivational element of emotions, 
see Stocker (1987), Gordon (1987), and Solomon (1976). Emotions are often 
said to distort our reality, and to tear us from our interests and lead us 
astray. Solomon argues that they are responsible for our reality, and 
create our interests and our purposes. In short, he holds our emotions and 
passions in general to be our reasons in life. 
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3.2.2 EMOTIONS AND MORAL DELIBERATION 
Before I can successfully argue that punishment is a morally 
legitimate means through which society can express its anger 
and indignation at offenders, I find it important to first 
show why the expression of anger and indignation is relevant 
by arguing that emotions are an integral part of morality. I 
shall therefore begin by discussing the nature of morality. 
My arguments shall rest mainly on the position expounded by 
Simon Blackburn in the first chapter of his Ruling Passions: a 
Theory of Practical Reasoning (2001). 
According to Blackburn, we must first note about morality 
that it deals with how we live in the world; therefore, it is 
a practical subject. It distinguishes those things that we 
will not do (or not do with considerable uneasiness) from 
those that we do readily. Morality is displayed both in our 
attitudes towards ourselves and others. Towards ourselves it 
is displayed as pride, guilt, shame, self-satisfaction, or the 
like; while towards others it is displayed in our attitudes 
towards them whether they behaved well, fulfilled their 
duties, did more than was required of them, lived in ways we 
admire or disapprove of, etc. Our morality is shown in the 
things we demand of ourselves and others, tolerate, or forbid. 
To have a moral personality is to be sensitive to different 
aspects of things, and to have a disposition towards using 
them towards influencing or determining attitudes, emotions, 
and choices. As a practical subject, morality is manifested 
in our reactions to things and the motivations we have. It 
pressurises us towards behaving in a certain way, which 
choices we make, and of what we approve and disapprove. We 
also use moral considerations to put pressure on others in the 
way in which they make their choices (Blackburn 2001: 1). 
Moral knowledge is concerned with how to behave, when to 
refrain from taking actions, whom to admire, with whom to get 
angry, etc., rather than what a state of affairs is actually 
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like. Moral knowledge thus is concerned with how to act or 
respond, and our values are exhibited through our actions. It 
follows that morality is therefore not only manifested in the 
situations in which we find ourselves, but in the way we react 
in those situations (Blackburn 2001: 1-2). 
One of the questions that now arises is, "how do we attain 
moral knowledge?" I believe Blackburn is correct in 
maintaining that we acquire it in the process of growing up, 
just as we do our mother tongue, by interacting with others, 
thereby learning which values are appropriate or 
inappropriate. Some moral knowledge we get through direct 
instructions by parents, teachers, religious authorities, or 
the like - "it is wrong to tell lies!" We also learn moral 
behaviour through modelling by observing others, either of 
those with whom we have direct contact, such as our parents, 
or those we only know through the media, such as television or 
sports personalities i.e. Daddy regularly gives to 
charities; I think it is good to be charitable. Although 
these situations differ somewhat, all of them involve human 
interactions. Of course, it is conceivable that someone could 
grow up without taking interest in any values, norms, and 
emotions, in a totally alienated manner (such as Camus' 
stranger or in real life as illustrated by psychopathic 
behaviour which, not coincidentally, we take to be abnormal); 
but usually values are absorbed, often without one's realising 
it, until one has acquired them, one introspects, or someone 
points them out to one. Later in life, one might rebel 
against one's values, but even rebels need ways of expressing 
what they are concerned about, what they are rebelling 
against, and what they demand from themselves and others. 
These other concerns then constitute their morality, since it 
is their value system, a system in accordance with which they 
will determine their behaviour and expect others to do so too. 
Morality is the set of values, norms, 
attitudes according to which we 
principles, beliefs, and 
behave and react in 
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interactional settings and the basis for judging how others 
choose to live their lives. 
Blackburn (2001: 5) analyses morality into inputs and 
outputs: inputs are evaluations of persons, situations, or 
consequences as being of a certain kind; outputs are having an 
attitude, putting pressure on others to have a certain 
attitude, or favouring certain policies or actions. We need 
to practice morality to become skilled at turning the right 
inputs into the right outputs. This position is in line with 
Aristotle's views that we have to practice making the right 
decisions in different contexts until they become habitual 
modes of behaviour. An analogy from sport may be 
illuminative: a batsman needs to practice different strokes to 
deal well with different deliveries. At a high level of 
expertise, he may seem to carry out the strokes with precision 
and accuracy quite automatically. However, when practicing, a 
coach may point out different elements of a particular stroke 
and delivery to him. The same is true for moral judgements 
and actions. One may come to recognise certain injustices and 
respond appropriately in an instance, but this is not how we 
were born. We have to learn what information is to be 
evaluated in what way in order to be able to respond in an 
appropriate manner (Blackburn 2001: 5). 
Moral concerns are different to other concerns, such as 
mere desires or preferences, however. I may desire chocolate 
ice-cream, or prefer tea to coffee, but even though these 
involve value judgements, they do not normally express any of 
my moral beliefs. Of course, if I believe that coffee is 
addictive and think that using addictive substances is wrong 
and that I should refrain from them, then my preference for 
tea may well be a moral one, but if I merely prefer the taste 
of tea to that of coffee, then it has no moral connotations. 
Morality addresses needs that can only be addressed 
interpersonally. We would not have to campaign against unsafe 
nuclear reactors built in our vicinity if no such reactors 
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were built in the first place; we would not have to raise our 
voices against racial hatred if no such hatred were evident 
anywhere; global warming was not a moral issue until 
scientists alarmed us with data suggesting that we may be 
causing a rapid warming of our planet; the issue of cloning 
did not concern ethicists until the sheep Dolly was cloned, 
which brought human cloning a big step closer; and we would 
not have to concern ourselves with the justification of 
punishment if no one were ever to transgress, thereby making 
any punishment redundant, and so on (Blackburn 2001: 2-4). 
Connecting values to morality in the way Blackburn does 
implies that morality is concerned only with issues that are 
of an intersubjective nature. But does this not include 
aesthetic ones too? Are all issues of aesthetics then to be 
considered as moral issues too? Aesthetic judgements, for 
Kant, are distinguished both from the expression of subjective 
likes and dislikes (such as that I prefer strawberry ice-cream 
to chocolate ice-cream merely on the basis of their tastes) 
and judgements that ascribe an objective property to 
something. Aesthetic judgements must hence be made on the 
basis of subjective factors, such as pleasure, but like 
property ascribing judgements, aesthetic judgements are 
concerned with making claims with which others are expected to 
agree. This is very similar to the conception of moral 
judgements here being defended, the crucial difference being 
that moral judgements are also prescriptive in respect to 
behaviour, while aesthetic judgements are descriptive. I may 
hold Mozart's compositions as being of the finest ever 
produced, and express this belief strongly in admiration, but 
I am not thereby suggesting that his compositions ought to be 
emulated. Aesthetic judgements may be prescriptive only in so 
far as that I expect you to agree with me on Mozart's 
compositions, and if you do not I will probably try to 
persuade you by pointing out features of his works. Aesthetic 
judgements do not prescribe actions or attitudes to actions, 
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however. But when I applaud charitable behaviour, I am 
implying that it is good to emulate such behaviour, I am hence 
prescribing charity; therefore this is an instance of a moral 
judgement. 
Morality does not concern the whole realm of human choice 
and actions, however. I may prefer one tea to another and buy 
one brand of cereals because it is cheaper, but this does, 
prima facie, not involve moral conduct. Of course, morality 
is not necessarily excluded in these actions either - I might 
select the tea I drink because it is marketed by an 
environmentally-friendly company and I may decline a more 
expensive brand of cereals because many other people cannot 
afford it. Tastes are normally not to be disputed, but even 
here the matter is not a straightforward one: even simple 
pleasures of the palate can evoke moral and social judgement. 
Society regulates to some extent what foods are permissible 
and impermissible. Not any food pleasurable to me may honour 
a guest, for example. In the West, it is usually held 
inappropriate to serve a dog for dinner, for instance, because 
dogs are usually held as pets or service animals, therefore 
people have a special kind of relationship with them that 
makes them unsuitable as food, but in some Eastern societies 
this restriction does not apply. If someone deliberately 
chooses what is held to be disgusting in a society, they may 
become the target of moral reactions (Blackburn 2001: 8-10). 
In answering the question, what the precise domain of 
morality is, we may say that a moral concern is always of an 
intersubj ecti ve nature, i.e. it always concerns others too, 
and its expression has a prescriptive component. Blackburn 
(2001: 9) suggests that we should think in terms of a 
staircase of practical and emotional ascent, with simple 
preferences, likes and dislikes at the bottom. Above this, we 
are to place actions, situations, or characters to which we 
have a more insistent hostility (such as having a simple 
aversion to it, have a disposition to be disgusted by it, to 
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hold it in contempt, to avoid it, or be angered by it). The 
difference between the two levels is not so much one of kind 
as one of degree, the second level involving a greater 
emotional involvement. For this reason, I think Blackburn's 
staircase should not be seen as having distinct categories, 
but rather as a continuum with boundaries between adjacent 
steps not always being easily visible. Nevertheless, the 
staircase example is effective in augmenting the perspicuity 
of the differences in emotional involvement between various 
levels. Continuing now with the staircase, the third level is 
the level constituting reactions against reactions of the 
previous level: you may be angry for my becoming angry and 
tell me that it is none of my business being angry over the 
matter. Suppose, however, that you share my anger, that may 
be all, but you may also feel strongly disposed towards 
encouraging others to share in the anger too. At this stage, 
you are clearly treating the matter as one of public concern, 
you are now clearly treating the matter as one of morality 
since it brings about a strong emotional involvement on your 
behalf (although this isn't what makes it moral) and you are 
ready to approve of those who agree with your stance and 
disapprove of those who do not. Going up a further rung, you 
may consider the sentiment compulsory, meaning that you are 
prepared to express hostility against those who do not share 
it. One level above that, you may even believe that the 
latter hostility is compulsory, and be prepared to confront 
those who do not share your anger, even though they might 
themselves be concerned at what was done. It should be clear 
that the emotional involvement becomes more intense the higher 
we climb the ladder of concern (Blackburn 2001: 9). I once 
again wish to stress that the boundaries between the different 
rungs is not always precisely determinable, al though a 
definite transition is perceivable from one to another, just 
as adjacent colours on the visible part of the electromagnetic 
spectrum may not be easily demarcated (we cannot say precisely 
71 
where red ends and orange begins in a non-arbitrary way), yet 
we have no difficulty in distinguishing different colours such 
as red from orange. 
The staircase gives us a scale with pure preference on the 
one hand and public concerns with emotional intensity 
describable as "moral commitment" on the other. The scale 
does not only indicate our emotional involvement; it indicates 
to which degree things or events capture our attention, our 
degree of engagement, and our preparedness to exert pressures 
on others to conform or to change (Blackburn 2001: 9-10). 
Both those who climb the ladder too quickly and those who 
do not climb it quickly enough are subject to disapproval. 
The former may be considered with contempt for overreacting in 
a given situation, the latter with contempt for exhibiting a 
disinterested attitude. An example of a person who climbs the 
ladder too quickly is someone who demands that criminals 
convicted of mere housebreaking without any aggravating 
circumstance (such as that they were carrying firearms with 
the intention to kill or harm someone who detected them in the 
process) should receive life-imprisonment without the 
possibility of parole, or a teacher who would expel pupils who 
did not do their homework as required. A person totally 
disinterested by a murder committed in his or her office is an 
example of someone who failed to climb the ladder of emotional 
involvement far enough. 
If we accept Blackburn's staircase of emotional 
involvement, then we have cases of harm and evil at the top 
end of the emotional scale where descent is not tolerated: I 
think paedophilia is fundamentally immoral, and there is not 
much room for discussion. If you disagree with me, then I am 
against you too, and my opposition may be exhibited in any of 
a number of ways, from my avoiding your company, to advising 
others to do so too, to attempting to change you, to 
constraining you in whichever way possible, or to deploying 
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social and legal pressures of whatever kind against you 
(Blackburn 2001: 12). 
Moral disputes cannot be resolved by merely holding a vote 
since even if I realised that most people believed paedophilia 
to be morally acceptable, I would regard their view as 
completely wrong and them as having inappropriate standards 
for evaluating the matter (Blackburn 2001: 14-15). 
Can we accept the arguments set out in this section? If 
we can, then emotions have profound significance for the 
justification of punishment. Kant, as already mentioned, 
would of course reject it outright, since morality, according 
to him, can only be determined through the objective, rational 
will. But it is difficult to agree with Kant on this point 
because if we take punishment, for instance, and hold as I 
argued in the previous chapter that criminals do not will 
their punishment, then we could not punish them in accordance 
with a rule they established, as Kant believes. Nevertheless, 
we still feel that we have a right to punish them because they 
intentionally violated the rights of others. We feel angry 
because a crime was committed. We feel that we have a moral 
right to express our anger in an appropriate way, such as 
through punishment, even if such punishment were to yield no 
positive consequential result. We believe that we have a 
right to punish merely in virtue of the fact that a crime was 
committed. It is furthermore plausible that it is this 
compulsion to express our emotions that drives us to the 
establishment of a morality. If emotions were not to be the 
driving force behind moral actions, we might lack the 
conviction to act against injustices, wrongs, or to act for 
justices and rights. I therefore come to the conclusion that 
Blackburn is right in arguing that emotions are an integral 
part of morality. 
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3.2.3 EMOTIONS AND CRIME 
In the previous subsection, I argued that the more we value a 
certain thing, behaviour, or state of affairs, the more 
emotional involvement we have towards it. It thus follows 
that if I have no disposition to be moved by a given event, 
then the event is unimportant to me, i.e. I do not care about 
it. Applying this to crime, if I am unmoved by a murder in my 
neighbourhood, it is an indication that murder does not matter 
to me, it leaves me cold, and I may therefore rightfully be 
described as having a callous personality. As I argued in the 
previous subsection, certain issues should matter to us, they 
should affect us emotionally; they should not leave us cold if 
we wish to avoid being morally condemned by others. If we 
react against murder, we indicate that life is important to 
us; if we react against armed robbery, we show that we are 
against the unlawful use of force; if we react against crime, 
we express the moral view that the unlawful violation of 
another's rights is unacceptable. Punishment is more than the 
mere infliction of pain upon offenders in response to their 
violations of law. It is a kind of language communicating a 
message. 
What does punishment say? At the very least, it says that 
the offenders' actions were wrong and will not be tolerated by 
society. Punishment is not merely something done to, or 
inflicted upon, offenders. It is more than that. In 
comprising an expressive or communicative component, it allows 
society to express its anger and indignation at offenders, 
communicating thereby that it is deeply offended by their 
offences. This distinguishes punishment from mere penal ties; 
both are deprivations, but only the former has this expressive 
function: 
Punishment is a conventional device for the expression of attitudes 
of resentment and indignation, and of judgements of disapproval and 
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reprobation, on the part either of the punishing authority himself or 
of those "in whose name" the punishment is inflicted. Punishment, in 
short, has a symbolic significance largely missing from other kinds 
of penalties (Feinberg 1998: 74). 
Punishment can also be described as a form of condemnation 
since it is an accepted institution through which society can 
express its anger and indignation at members who violate its 
laws. If the institutions of justice would refuse to bring 
someone to justice when it seems obvious that the persons in 
question are guilty, the institutions would disregard the 
values of society, thereby insulting it: 
It expresses condemnation much like champagne at a wedding expresses 
celebration, or black dress at a funeral expresses mourning. The 
conventions or social norms by which punishment "speaks" are a 
product or artefact of culture and history. Of course, these 
conventions, like those governing natural languages, do change, but 
at any particular moment they are relatively stable and impose 
"objective" constraints on how we can effectively express our 
condemnation (Garvey 1998: 741). 
When we hear about a specific crime, it is appropriate to 
become emotional about the matter and demand that those 
responsible be brought to justice. By being affected in this 
way, our moral and social concerns are being demonstrated. 
When we hear of bloody murders, violent rapes, brutal 
molestations of children, or other atrocious crimes, we 
believe that the responsible beings deserve to be punished; we 
believe punishment to be right even if no beneficial 
consequence were to result from it. But the mere having of an 
emotion is not enough; actions should be taken demonstrating 
that we are really serious about the matter. Once having 
apprehended, tried, found guilty and punished the responsible 
person, we may be relieved and feel satisfied that we have 
taken action against something that greatly concerned us. In 
fact, according to Aristotle, we need to feel the right and 
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appropriate emotion if we are not to continue harbouring 
resentment against wrongdoers: 
Now we praise a man who feels anger on the right grounds and against 
the right persons, and also in the right manner and at the right 
moment and for the right length of time. He may then be called 
gentle-tempered, if we take gentleness to be a praiseworthy quality 
The defect, on the other hand, call it a sort of Lack of Spirit 
or what not, is blamed; since those who do not get angry at things at 
which it is right to be angry are considered foolish, and so are 
those who do not get angry in the right manner, at the right time, 
and with the right people. It is thought that they do not feel or 
resent an injury, and that if a man is never angry he will not stand 
up for himself; and it is considered servile to put up with an insult 
to oneself or suffer one's friends to be insulted. Excess also is 
possible in each of these ways, for when a man retaliates there is an 
end of the matter: the pain of resentment is replaced by the pleasure 
of obtaining redress, and so his anger ceases. But if they do not 
retaliate, men continue to labour under a sense of resentment - for 
as their anger is concealed no one else tries to placate them either, 
and it takes a long time to digest one's wrath within one (Aristotle 
1999: 231-233). 
I argued that emotions are not of the same kind as 
sensations, i.e. perceptions without value 
Sensations do not have any cognitive content, i.e. 
constitute propositional attitudes. Because 
judgement. 
they do not 
they lack 
cognitive content, describing sensations as reasonable or 
unreasonable, or just or unjust, is making a category mistake. 
Emotions are different, however. Since they have cognitive 
content, it is possible to describe them as reasonable or 
unreasonable, just or unjust. When can emotions be described 
as reasonable? Emotions that are unfounded, such as being 
afraid of the dark when there is no perceivable danger, may be 
described as unreasonable. When there is a perceivable 
danger, such as that there is a housebreaker in one's house, 
feeling great fear is not excessive, and hence the emotion may 
be held as reasonable. Being anxious that one is being spied 
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upon is irrational when there is no evidence that this has 
ever been the case, but if one finds a miniature camera hidden 
in one's home, the emotion may be regarded as rational. In 
the next subsection, I shall examine the connection between 
guilt on the one hand and anger and indignation on the other. 
I shall then argue that anger and indignation are only morally 
appropriate when the subjects towards whom these emotions are 
directed are guilty. Our emotional responses are hence 
connected in this way to rationality -anger is therefore 
appropriate when we believe someone to be guilty, but if this 
belief turns out to be false, the anger against whom it is 
directed should subside too. In the next subsection, I shall 
argue that anger at persons is only justified when those 
against whom it is directed are guilty. 
As I already pointed out, the excessive expression of an 
emotion may lead to moral disapproval, just as a too mild 
expression might. How are we to ensure that punishment of 
off enders is perceived as just, not being too harsh or too 
mild? When just having been victimised, our emotions against 
the off ender may be much greater than what they are after a 
considerable period of time has elapsed; or bystanders 
witnessing the crime may be outraged too, but exhibit a more 
socially acceptable emotional intensity against the offender. 
Because direct involvement in a crime can cause us to have 
excessive emotions, i.e. can cause us to climb the ladder of 
emotional involvement too far, the case for punishment to be 
administered by impartial officials of the state can be made, 
which I shall substantiate in 3.2.5. Before moving on, 
however, I wish to show that retributive punishment is 
justifiable from another perspective as well. 
In order to demonstrate the appropriateness of expressing 
retributive emotions from a first-person perspective, imagine 
that you commit a dreadful crime, such as killing someone 
close to you. The murder need not have been premeditative, 
but may have occurred in a fit of uncontrolled rage. This is 
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not as unrealistic as it might seem since most murders are 
committed under similar circumstances. Would you not 
experience extreme guilt at realising the severe injustice and 
suffering you have caused? Many will agree that it is 
virtuous to experience guilt in such a situation, or if 
"virtue" is not the appropriate term to use, guilt seems 
appropriate by any standard of evaluation. Our feeling guilt 
in morally appropriate situations shows that others and our 
actions matter to us, and hence that we have moral 
sensi ti vi ty, i.e. that we are morally motivated. Of course, 
some criminals will not be so motivated, and hence not feel 
guilt for their crimes. I do not have to argue, however, that 
an immoral or non-moral person agrees that criminals ought to 
be punished. All I need to show is that moral persons hold it 
appropriate in order to argue that it is in accordance with 
morality. 
Guilt feelings are sometimes held to be undesirable 
because they focus wholly on the past. The contrary, however, 
is the case. Taking the past seriously, acknowledging one's 
responsibility of past actions, is in many circumstances the 
only morally appropriate thing to do. Not to feel guilty over 
spilt blood (unnecessary blood) is at least indecent. Having 
committed a murder, for which the emotion of guilt is 
appropriate, is punishment as a suitable response not 
consequentially obvious? It is hardly conceivable that any 
humane punishment, of whatever magnitude, could be excessive. 
Since you are guilty and feel guilty, you are certain to 
understand the appropriateness of punishment as a consequence 
of your actions. You might even feel that punishment is not 
only morally justifiable, but that you ought to be punished 
for your deed. This insight makes no demand that the harm be 
undone in a restitutional sense. If I burn down my 
neighbour's house, it would hardly be perceived as justice if 
I merely build it up again and make compensation for destroyed 
property, were I to have the financial means of doing so. 
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Guilt requires more; it demands that punishment entail 
suffering. Remorse would be appropriate, but it is not always 
possible to determine when punished individuals are really 
remorseful because we only have access to their emotions from 
a third-person perspective. Having established that it would 
be appropriate for us to be punished, the question that needs 
to be answered is, whether it would be appropriate to punish 
others in similar circumstances. It would be condescending to 
withhold punishment from others that we judge appropriate in 
our own hypothetical situation, and thereby fail to fulfil an 
important moral principle, namely the universalising principle 
(Moore 1995: 123-126). 
Applying this theory to concrete situations requires that 
we follow the following procedure: we ought to be able to 
imagine ourselves capable of committing a crime such as the 
one in question. We then ought to ask ourselves what we would 
experience psychologically after having become aware of our 
actions' consequences. This is followed by the recognition 
that feeling guilt for the wrongful act is appropriate under 
the circumstances. From this should follow the recognition 
that our guilt requires that we be punished. (Of course, it 
would only matter for moral persons, but as already mentioned 
above, this is all that had to be shown, since this shows that 
it is in accordance with morality.) From our requiring that 
we be punished, it should follow that we be punished to 
respect our wills, and hence be treated as persons of value 
and respect. Finally, returning to the case in question, the 
conclusion drawn is universalised to justify the 
appropriateness of any person being punished in similar 
circumstances to those in which we would agree to be punished 
ourselves. This latter point satisfies the demands of Kant's 
categorical imperative - do unto others as you would have them 
do unto you. 
A similar conclusion may be arrived at by employing the 
Rawlsian experiment, establishing society's rules and 
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principles from behind a veil of ignorance: I may want to 
establish a society in which love and forgiveness are 
possible, and even play a prominent role, but I may equally 
want to leave open the possibility of revenge against those 
committing grievous injustices against me. Of course, the 
principle would also be binding upon me, making revenge 
against me possible if I grievously harm another person. This 
is a consequence of consistency with which I may be completely 
satisfied. 
What has been established in this section is that morality 
is inextricably linked to our emotions. Crime causes society 
to be angry and indignant at offenders and hence it is morally 
appropriate that this anger and indignation be expressed. 
Before arguing that punishment should be well-regulated, I 
shall address the connection between anger and indignation on 
the one hand and guilt on the other. Thereby I shall argue 
that one is only justified in expressing anger and indignation 
at guilty individuals, and that one is therefore only 
justified in punishing guilty individuals. Retributivism 
hence provides a morally acceptable answer to the question of 
whom we are justified in punishing. 
3.2.4 ANGER AND INDIGNATION AND GUILT 
Since I have shown that our emotions are involved in making 
moral judgements, I need to establish the nature of anger and 
indignation because one of the goals I maintain any punishment 
system ought to have is that punishment serve as a recognised 
channel through which society can express anger and 
indignation at offenders. Thereby I shall show that these 
emotions are inextricably linked to guilt. 
Anger is an intense emotion of disapproval brought forth 
by presumed guilt. We feel guilty when we believe that our 
actions would rightly anger others. I may therefore be angry 
at hearing about an armed robbery that took place down the 
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road this morning, knowing that someone must be responsible 
for it. One may feel guilty at having run over a child due to 
one's inattention on the road, believing that one's action 
would rightfully anger others (and of course, one may also be 
angry at oneself) . Therefore, guilt requires agency. One 
does not feel guilty for not being able to play cricket well 
if one believes that one does not have a talent for the sport; 
at best, one might feel ashamed for not being able to do 
better. Shame does not require agency. Of course, one might 
experience guilt if one believed that one's dismal performance 
at cricket was due to one's not having practiced. In the 
former case, in which one believes that one does not have a 
talent for the sport, anger from others would be regarded 
wholly inappropriate. However, if one should have practiced, 
then anger from others may be completely comprehensible. This 
shows that anger is connected to agency, and hence guilt. 
Anger may thus be seen as an intense reaction against the 
failure of others to perform in the expected manner, having 
had the ability to do otherwise than what they did. 
Since I maintain that punishment should serve as a 
recognised channel through which society can express its anger 
and indignation at offenders, the above ought to have 
clarified that anger at just anyone is not morally acceptable. 
Anger is only acceptable when the agent against whom it is 
directed is believed to be guilty. Punishment ought therefore 
only to be administered when transgression of a law has 
occurred, the accused fulfils the conditions of moral guilt, 
and the law transgressed was indeed a moral one. Since anger 
is only appropriate when it is in response to guilt, guilt is 
a necessary condition for one's expression of anger and 
indignation. Anger expressed without guilt is unjust and 
morally inappropriate. Retributivism hence provides a morally 
acceptable answer to the question of whom we are justified in 
punishing. 
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Thus far, I have concentrated on anger. I maintain that 
punishment should serve as a recognised channel for anger and 
indignation. What is the difference between anger and 
indignation? I hold the two emotions to be of the same kind 
(both being negative emotions in response to believed guilt), 
but being just of different intensity, intense indignation 
becoming anger. Hence, serious crimes (such as murder, rape, 
child molestation, armed robbery, and the like) may warrant 
anger, while minor offences (such as traffic violations) may 
only warrant indignation. It is difficult to say when 
indignation becomes anger, and may require an arbitrary 
di vi ding line, but this is irrelevant for the purpose of my 
argument since no precise distinction between the two need be 
made. 
Morality, as I have described it in this section, 
encourages coercion and rejection, and hence needs careful 
employment. I have already pointed out that the expression of 
emotions can be too excessive; hence, a case for well-
regulated revenge can be made, which will now be done. 
3.2.5 PUNISHMENT SHOULD BE WELL-REGULATED 
Critics of retributi vism may argue that the theory reduces 
punishment to revenge, an emotion that may sometimes be 
morally unacceptable because it may be excessive. Hegel had 
views regarding revenge and punishment too. When the 
arbitrary and the true (general) wills conflict, and the 
former prevails, and the individual breaks the law, the law 
retaliates by exercising retribution, punishing the 
individual. Seen from the standpoint of the individual, 
retribution becomes a form of coercion. Coercion is 
diametrically opposed to freedom. So if freedom is the 
substance of right, how can the curtailment of freedom, the 
exacting of coercion, be just and right? 
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Coercion is wrong, maintains Hegel, when it is a one-sided 
action, an aggressive act, a first action, 
offence. However, when it is a second act, 
coercion, i.e. coercion against coercion, 
i.e. when it is an 
a response against 
it is just and 
necessary. The second act of coercion is an annulment of the 
first, thereby reaffirming the law that the first act 
violated. Such coercion is therefore not the contradiction of 
the dignity of a free being and therefore retribution, 
coercion in response to coercion is right, just, and 
legitimate (Primoratz 1997: 69). 
Retribution may be seen as having two forms: revenge and 
punishment. Revenge is retribution administered by the 
injured party. It is justified when it is administered in the 
right measure, i.e. when it is proportionate to the injury 
suffered and is not excessive. By excess is meant inflicting 
greater harm or suffering than the injury or harm suffered 
justifies. In the state of nature, where there are no 
institutions of justice, it is the only means of retribution. 
It has two major deficiencies, however. It may often be 
carried out partially and disproportionately to the magnitude 
of the injury suffered or right violated. This is so because 
it is administered by the party injured, thereby the injured 
become the judges of their own cases. Injured parties may 
often be incapable of examining a case objectively, being 
influenced by excessive emotions and they also often over-
estimate the harm caused. This results in revenge often being 
carried out in too harsh a measure, being disproportionate to 
the injury suffered, or right violated, resulting in 
injustice, a violation of rights, another triumph of the 
arbitrary will over the general will, to put it in Hegelian 
terms. Moreover, because revenge is not institutionalised, 
being exercised in response to often excessive emotions, the 
person against whom it is directed may come to see it as a 
simple wrong and react to it by causing another wrong by 
retaliating against those exercising revenge. Thus a series 
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of injuries may be set in motion, rather than bringing about a 
reaffirmation of justice with reconciliation (Hegel 1965: 
24 7) . Reconciliation would enable the injured party and the 
offender to put the injurious past behind them and live 
together in society in mutual toleration and respect of each 
other. 
Punishment, by contrast, is retribution carried out in the 
name of and in accordance with the general will. It thus 
administers justice without subjective considerations, doing 
so in the proper way and with the proper measure. Therefore, 
where there is an institution of justice, revenge is no longer 
necessary or justified (Primoratz 1997: 71). 
Revenge is not necessarily immoral. It is often held to 
be morally unacceptable because injured persons are seldom, if 
ever, able to administer justice fairly because they are 
seldom, if ever, able to evaluate the facts of the matter 
rationally, without excessive emotional intensity, or 
objectively. Victims ought therefore not to be judges in 
their own cases. If victims are judges in their own cases, 
evidence and verdicts are likely to be biased, and punishment 
is more likely than not to be excessive. It must be stated, 
however, that the tendency of being incapable of being 
objective when being the judge in one's own case is a mere 
contingency, not a necessity. The term "just revenge" is not 
a contradiction. We can imagine cases in which revenge could 
be justified, such as when a person is injured by another, but 
because they live in a country where the institutions are 
corrupt, filing a charge against the offender would not prompt 
the institutions of justice to take up the case. If the 
injured person then does just as much harm to the offender as 
was done in the offensive act, just revenge may be said to 
have occurred. 
To retaliate or to 
different moral matters. 
initiate an aggression are two 
It is therefore ineffective to 
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attempt a rejection of retributivism by arguing that it is a 
form of revenge. 
Moreover, there is a salient distinction between revenge 
and punishment, a distinction that is accepted by 
retributivism. The difference between the two lies in the 
fact that the latter is administered by persons authorised to 
do so (such as judges and prison officials), while revenge is 
carried out in absence of authority. Legal punishment (the 
moral justification of which is the primary objective of this 
thesis) is thus not plagued by the subjective biases that 
generally discredit revenge (Primoratz 1997: 84). 
Retributive punishment is not revenge, vindictiveness, 
cruelty, or the like, but can and ought to be humane. 
However, it is dangerous when carried out by individual 
persons or groups of persons, such as vigilante groups. 
Therefore, the state ought to administer the punishment and 
thereby (if done in a proper, regulated manner, with 
impartiality) deny feelings of resentment (Moore 1995: 128). 
Consequentialists may protest against revenge, arguing 
that it has a destabilising effect upon society. This 
argument is most forceful when directed against private 
revenge or vigilante activity. However, rather than weaken 
the case for retribution as partly constituted of revenge, it 
strengthens the argument for institutionalised, well-regulated 
revenge. The state should exercise retribution on behalf of 
its wronged members. 
Institutionalised revenge, i.e. retributive punishment, 
may be morally justified on two grounds, namely that it brings 
some satisfaction to the victims and interested members 
desiring it, and it defuses the likelihood of private revenge 
or vigilante activity (Murphy 1990: 144). This would of 
course not mean that the state would be required to act upon 
all desires for revenge since some would be unjustified or 
excessive. In order to ensure that revenge is not exercised 
excessively, punishment should be administered according to 
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desert, i.e. offenders ought not to be punished 
disproportionately to the gravity of their offences. 
Criminals ought to be protected from procedural biases too 
when tried. For this reason, it ought to be impermissible for 
criminals to be punished more harshly after hearing victim 
impact statements because criminals ought to be punished for 
what they have done and not in accordance with the emotional 
intensity caused in the victims. 
3.3 RETRIBUTIVISM AND LEGAL POSITIVISM 
Since retributivism justifies punishment as a response to the 
violation of a law, critics may attack it for endorsing legal 
positivism. I shall defend it from this attack. 
Retributivism, by being backward looking, may be described 
as being conservative. Furthermore, one may gain the 
impression that retributivism justifies any violation of law. 
This positivistic conception justifies punishment in response 
to any violation of any law, thereby supporting any political 
and legal order, no matter how just these systems may be. 
According to this view, punishment is justified completely by 
the commission of an offence. This implies that retributivism 
justifies punishment for violations against laws that violate 
human rights in totalitarian systems, or that it was just to 
punish persons violating 
Apartheid South Africa. 
racial laws under the Nazis and in 
This impression of retributivism, 
however, rests on a misconception. 
Primoratz (1997: 95) points out that these implications 
would hold if retributivism were logically linked to a legal 
philosophy that maintains that all laws ought to be obeyed 
regardless of their contents. This is not the case, however. 
When a retributivist describes an action as an offence, the 
term "offence" is not used in a substantive legal sense, but 
in a normative sense. By "violations of laws" is meant the 
violation of morally legitimate laws. Retributivism is not in 
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any way committed to what is to count as a legitimate law, and 
hence not to this conception of what is to count as an offence 
(Primoratz 1997: 96). Therefore, if retributivists pronounce 
judgement on the violation of any law, they must first 
determine that the law was in fact violated by the person 
charged, and must hold that the law in question was morally 
legitimate. If the law is held to be morally illegitimate, 
then what the accused has done can be seen as an offence only 
in the legal, substantive sense and not in the normative 
sense. Since retributi vis ts are concerned with the normative 
sense, they will say in cases of illegitimate laws that there 
are no real violations, and therefore there cannot be any 
justification for punishment against them. 
It is now important for me to briefly address the question 
of how we can distinguish between a moral and an immoral law. 
I agree with Kant on this point. He holds that moral 
requirements have the form of categorical imperatives. This 
imperative stipulates that we should act only on those maxims 
that we would will to be applicable for all agents. If our 
actions are to be guided by such a principle, then the laws 
ought to be guided by this principle too because laws 
prescribe how one may or may not act. 
3.4 THE LIMITS OF RETRIBUTIVE JUSTIFICATION 
Even though retributi vism is incapable of providing a 
satisfactory answer to the question of how we ought to punish, 
it does satisfactorily answer the question of whom to punish. 
However, even with respect to the latter, retributivism is not 
entirely satisfactory. In this section, further limits to 
retributivism's justification need to be mentioned because not 
all offenders who willingly and knowingly commit crimes may be 
justifiably punished. According to most retributive theories, 
punishment is imposed merely because the criminal deserves it, 
either from society's viewpoint, or from the criminal's. 
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Society's interest may be described broadly as revenge, and 
the criminal's interest as expiation. However, is it 
defensible to punish any sane individual committing a crime? 
Are there not instances in which it would be morally unjust to 
punish persons because of their backgrounds, for instance, 
such as starving persons who willingly and knowingly steal 
from others to provide for their families when they can find 
no alternative means of doing so? 
The explanation from society's perspective may hold that 
criminals deserve to be punished because they have taken 
advantage of the agreed upon sharing of benefits and burdens; 
they therefore owe something to society as a result of 
renouncing the burden of self-restraint which others have 
assumed. From the criminals' perspective, punishment is 
appropriate because it respects their autonomy in choosing to 
perpetrate. After having paid their debts, they are allowed 
back into society. This is what thinkers such as Kant and 
Hegel see as the criminal's right to be punished. 
It was argued that punishment is justified retributively 
if criminals would have consented to their being punished from 
an original position, subsequent to due rational deliberation. 
This presupposes that those committing crimes do so willingly, 
i.e. it presupposes that they have a reasonable choice whether 
to restrain themselves according to the rules of society or to 
disregard the rules and risk being punished. 
Not all crimes are of such a nature, however. One cause 
of criminality is need and deprivation on the part of 
disadvantaged members of society. Others include motives of 
greed and selfishness that are reinforced by capitalist 
society. Primoratz (1997: 97) maintains that the 
retributivist will be the 
conditions ought to be taken 
punishment. However, let us 
first to insist that social 
into account when meting out 
not go this far yet. Let us 
first determine whether a person is guilty or not. If a just 
law has been violated, and the accused fulfil the conditions 
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of guilt, then we have grounds for punishing them. Turning to 
the administering of punishment, I have already argued in 
2.7.2 that retributivism is incapable of taking issues of 
aggravation or mitigation into account; therefore, it cannot 
morally determine the extent of punishment to be administered. 
Since my concern is with the moral justification of 
punishment, it follows that a highly important issue to 
consider when establishing the degree of guilt of an offender 
is the moral standing of society. To have the right to 
punish, the laws of society must be just. This is a necessary 
condition, but not a sufficient one. Society must also be 
committed towards eradicating the conditions that breed crime. 
Of course, it is unrealistic to expect that this objective can 
ever be fully met, but society should aim towards doing so: 
If it does little or nothing about those social problems that 
generate law-breaking, and then goes on to punish the law-breakers, 
it will be rightly seen as both callous and hypocritical, and thus as 
lacking the moral standing requisite for punishing offenders in good 
faith (Primoratz 1997: 98) . 2 
If society is accused of being hypocritical when it 
punishes its criminals while failing to undertake any measures 
to eradicate the negative conditions that breed crime, making 
it an accomplice to their crimes, it will be seen as even more 
hypocritical if it furthers those motives that lead to crime. 
It is often argued that capitalist society furthers precisely 
those traits that lead to crime. The correctness of this 
evaluation is not a philosophical question, but one of 
empirical interest reserved for criminologists and 
sociologists. Any society in which it can be shown that its 
criminals are motivated by precisely those motives and traits 
2 David Lyons (1993: 3-6) argues that the general obligation to obey the 
law rests on the idea of a social contract and fairness. If we cannot 
fully participate in the political system, or if we are not treated fairly 
(where this is seen in a broad sense), then we do not have any moral 
obligation to obey the law. This entails that we do not have a moral 
obligation to obey a law that oppresses us. 
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generated and reinforced by it will have forfeited its 
legitimate right to punish: 
. . . any society where it can convincingly be shown that those who 
break the law are acting out of the very motives which the society 
systematically generates and reinforces will be guilty of gross 
hypocrisy and will lose its moral license to punish (Primoratz 1997: 
98) . 
Capitalism promotes crime in two important ways: firstly, 
it is based on a system of exchange, which necessarily means 
that interests of members are opposed, leading to egoism, 
self-interest, and discouragement of community; secondly, 
capitalism has an unequal distribution of wealth, with a 
likelihood of confining some to poverty, thereby destroying 
any remaining sense of community. The laws of capitalist 
society ban criminals' egotistic actions because they conflict 
with the dominant societal class, while the egotistic actions 
of the powerful are legalised. It is not very difficult for 
the powerful to live according to the laws of society, nor is 
it a significant benefit for the powerless to live in a 
community with social ties. Capitalist society can therefore 
be seen as a direct cause of crime in the former and an 
indirect cause in the latter. Capitalist society alienates 
members of society from one another by motives that are not 
truly human in that it promotes competitiveness that creates 
an obstacle to the establishment of genuine communities 
(Murphy 1985a: 86) 
The assumption that criminals need to be punished in order 
that their bonds to society are restored has the underlying 
assumption that each individual is bonded in a meaningful way. 
However, this assumption may be challenged. If society fails 
to take the interests and needs of all communities seriously, 
if it neglects the powerless, the poor, the needy, the 
disadvantaged, then it cannot legitimately demand allegiance 
of the neglected communities, and consequently lacks the moral 
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basis for punishing them for many crimes, crimes that arise 
out of the social conditions in which some offenders find 
themselves (Delgado 1995: 264) . 3 
The unqualified egoistic tendency of the capitalist 
society leads to the social instincts of society's members not 
becoming developed very strongly since they who are abandoned 
by all cannot have any strong attachment of feeling towards 
those who have left them to their fate. It may be presumed 
that they will not develop any strong moral behaviour either 
because the societal role models they have are often perceived 
as negative ones. 
As it has previously been established, the basis of the 
social feeling is reciprocity. When those in power disregard 
this, the social sentiments of the disadvantaged become 
weakened towards them; therefore, if the advantaged do not 
respect the disadvantaged, the latter will not respect the 
values of the former, which can lead to crime. 
Retributivism claims to be grounded in justice too. 
However, is it just to act out of those very motives that 
society is guilty of encouraging and reinforcing? If some 
criminality is caused by greed, selfishness, and indifference 
to one's fellows, then it must be asked whether acting 
according to these motives can be truly criminal when society 
itself encourages and reinforces these very character traits. 
Ironically, the characteristics that have been identified as 
the causal antecedents of crime are also those that enable one 
to be successful in a competitive society (Murphy 1985a: 89). 
Retributi vism' s legitimacy rests on a community's shared 
values and rules. The rules benefit all concerned, and as a 
kind of debt for the benefits derived, each person owes 
obedience to the rules. In the absence of such obedience, 
punishment is justified because payment for the benefit is 
3 Richard Delgado (1995: 249-273) investigates the applicability of a 
theory of punishment on those coming from "rotten social backgrounds" - a 
group comprised of a disproportionate number of poor people and minorities, 
but by no means limited to such people. 
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owed. This is so because as a rational being, one can see 
that the rules benefit everyone including oneself, and that 
being rational, one would have selected them in an original 
position of choice. However, many criminals do not share the 
values of their gaolers, instead they suffer from alienation. 
They would be hard-pressed to name the benefits for which they 
are supposed to owe obedience. Let us take, for instance, 
persons who are arrested and convicted of a felony offence 
with primarily economic motives, such as robbing a bank. On 
investigation, we find that they are impoverished members of 
the lowest social class, whose lives were filled with 
frustrating alienation from the prevailing socio-economic 
system. They were out of work, had no transportation even if 
they could find work, substandard education for them and their 
children, terrible housing and inadequate welfare for their 
families, condescending, tardy, and inadequate welfare 
payments, harassment by the police, but no real protection by 
them against the dangers in their community, and near total 
exclusion from the political process. Is their punishment 
still adequately described as a debt paid to society? (Murphy 
1985a: 91). If justice, as Kant and Rawls insist, is based on 
reciprocity, then it is difficult to see for what these 
members are supposed to reciprocate. 
Of course, one should be cautious in claiming that 
deprived indi victuals enjoy no benefits from society at all. 
Most do (at least to some degree) enjoy the right to general 
subsistence, to have water and electricity (although countries 
may be mentioned in which this is not the case, South Africa 
and many other African countries and most South American 
countries are notable examples) , and the right to life. The 
contention is, however, whether this bare minimum is all to 
which these members are entitled. Furthermore, if offenders 
grow up in a community without having any significant contact 
with the rest of society, without coming to share the values 
of society in general, then legal punishment against such 
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offenders can hardly be described as having any significant 
moral justification, and may rather be described as the 
arbitrary exercising of force (Delgado 1995: 264). 
What this amounts to is that retributivism cannot morally 
justify punishment as a response to all violations of law. 
Retributivism only rests on an acceptable foundation if the 
social conditions of society are of such a nature as 
reasonably to enable all of its members to have fair 
participation and acceptance of its general values. This is 
not an outright rejection of retributivism, however, but only 
stipulates the societal conditions that must be present for it 
to be morally justifiable. 
3.5 SUMMARY AND PERSPECTIVE 
In this chapter, I defended certain aspects of retributi vism 
by arguing that it is morally appropriate for one to express 
one's anger and indignation at offenders. In doing so, I 
showed that anger is only morally justified if the subject at 
whom the anger is directed is guilty. Therefore, 
retributivism answers the question of whom we may justifiably 
punish, namely those who fulfil the moral conditions of guilt. 
I argued for well-regulated (institutionalised) punishment. 
Retributivism hence pursues one of the five goals I set out in 
Chapter 1, namely that punishment must be a recognised channel 
through which society can express its anger and indignation at 
offenders. 
I then def ended retributi vism against the objection that 
it is an endorsement of legal positivism. Finally, I 
enumerated and discussed the social limits to the retributive 
question of whom we may morally punish. 
Let us examine to what extent retributivism fulfils each 
of the necessary conditions of morally justified punishment I 
identified in 1.8. In doing so, the approach must not only be 
evaluated in terms of whether it fulfils the conditions in 
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theory, but also whether it does 
provides a morally acceptable answer 
we are justified in punishing. ( 2) 
so in practice: ( 1) It 
to the question of whom 
It does not provide an 
adequate means for determining how much we may punish 
offenders. (3) Bringing satisfaction for society, i.e. 
serving as a recognised channel through which society can 
express anger and indignation at offenders: retributivism 
pursues this objective with most conviction; in fact, its 
defence rests upon this objective. It is morally obligatory 
to be indignant and angry at witnessing or experiencing 
injustices. In order to express this anger in an acceptable, 
channelled manner, retributivism maintains that we have a 
right to punish those who have willingly and intentionally 
committed criminal acts. (4) Crime reduction: the punitive 
system (which rests on retributivism) may have crime reduction 
as one of its objectives in theory, but it is wholly 
ineffective in attaining that objective as the high rate of 
recidivism shows, as Kolstad mentions: 
(5) 
has 
There seem to be problems with the prison system the world over. 
Prisons are overflowing, understaffed, and riddled with drugs. They 
do not seem to function adequately, even as a means of individual 
deterrence. The number of re-offences and offenders increase partly 
as a result of a non-functioning prison system. The rate of 
recidivism after imprisonment is about 70 percent all over the world 
(Kolstad 1996: 326). 
Improving offenders: 
held that criminals 
for centuries, the punitive approach 
must understand the extent of their 
wrongdoings through the penalties imposed upon them. What is 
clear, as the rate of recidivism shows, is that criminals did 
not become better persons by punishing them in this manner. 
Imprisonment alone is insufficient for improving offenders. 
Rotman ( 1998: 2 95) states: "Traditionally, rehabilitation has 
been considered to be one of the purposes of imprisonment, on 
the mistaken assumption that incarceration itself could be 
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rehabilitative." The aim of restitutionalism is to make 
offenders become aware of the suffering they have caused, 
thereby instilling guilt and remorse within them. However, it 
may be seriously doubted whether this can be enough to bring 
about a positive change within offenders. ( 6) Undoing the 
harm done through crime: This objective is not pursued at all 
by retributi vism - victims are completely disregarded. ( 7) 
Being economical: The punitive system of punishment does not 
approach this goal or strive towards it to any significant 
degree. Legal and penal costs are remarkably high and 
augmenting continuously in most Western countries, which have 
punitive legal systems based on retributivism. Retributivism 
consequently only fulfils two of the seven necessary 
conditions. 
Since retributi vism is incapable of furnishing a morally 
acceptable answer to the issue of how much to punish and does 
not pursue four of the five objectives I set out in Chapter 1, 
I conclude that the approach is insufficient on its own to 
morally justify punishment even though it gives us a channel 
for expressing our anger and indignation at the guilty. For 
this reason, the theory needs to be combined with other 
approaches. In the next chapter, I shall be preoccupied with 
utilitarianism since it promises to yield a solution to the 
question of how much or in what manner to punish. I shall 
argue, however, that the theory has severe shortcomings too 
and is insufficient on its own as a moral justification for 
punishment. 
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4.1 INTRODUCTION 
CHAPTER 4 
UTILITARIANISM 
In the previous chapter, it was pointed out that retributivism 
is only able to justify our administering of punishment upon 
offenders, but is not able to determine the extent of 
punishment, nor is it able to take any mitigating factors into 
account since it is capable of operating only according to the 
principle of lex talionis. In this and the next chapter, an 
acceptable answer to the "how much to punish" issue is sought. 
Both chapters focus on deterrence. In this chapter, I focus 
on utilitarianism since it attempts to employ the notion of 
deterrence as its main justificatory tool. However, I shall 
argue that the utilitarian approach to punishment has serious 
moral flaws for reasons I shall enumerate and discuss. 
Nevertheless, the notion of deterrence as such can be defended 
and successfully employed for determining the extent and kind 
of punishment, but that shall be the focus of the next 
chapter. I shall now first present utilitarianism and 
indicate why I hold it to have morally untenable implications. 
4.2 UTILITARIANISM'S DEFENCE OF PUNISHMENT 
4.2.l THE PRINCIPLE OF UTILITY 
The term "utility" in philosophy refers to what is of use to 
human beings, or sometimes to all sentient creatures. Thus, 
it denotes what is good for humans - most frequently welfare. 
Cicero and Hume argued for its fundamental importance for 
ethics, but it was promoted by Bentham as the only end of 
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right action. 
pleasure: 
For Bentham, utility means happiness or 
By utility is meant that property in any object, whereby it tends to 
produce benefit, advantage, pleasure, good, or happiness, (all this 
in the present case comes to the same thing) or (what comes again to 
the same thing) to prevent the happening of mischief, pain, evil, or 
unhappiness to the party whose interest is considered: if that party 
be the community in general, then the happiness of the community: if 
a particular individual, then the happiness of that individual 
(Bentham 1996: 12). 
Utilitarianism therefore is the doctrine that treats pleasure 
or desire satisfaction as the only good of morality: 
Of an action that is conformable to the principle of utility, one may 
always say either that it is one that ought to be done, or at least 
that it is not one that ought not to be done. One may say also, that 
it is right it should be done; at least that it is not wrong it 
should be done: that it is a right action; at least that it is not a 
wrong action. When thus interpreted, the words ought, and right and 
wrong, and others of that stamp, have a meaning: when otherwise, they 
have none (Bentham 1996: 13). 
Bentham maintains that the principle of utility requires no 
proof because it is the fundamental principle of morality. He 
denies that it can have any direct proof, reasoning that that 
which is used to prove everything else cannot itself be 
proved, i.e. a chain of proofs must have their commencement 
somewhere (Bentham 1996: 13). 
The main ethical element in contemporary utilitarianism is 
direct consequentialism - the view that rightness and goodness 
of any action, motive or political institution, depend 
entirely on the good of the overall state of affairs 
consequent upon it. Most direct (or act) utilitarians 
maintain that an act is morally obligatory if it yields better 
utility than any alternative available action open to the 
agent. If one believes that one should bring about the best 
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state of affairs possible, but believes, for instance, that 
equality rather than the quantity of well being is important 
for the attainment of overall goodness, then one may be a 
consequentialist, but then one is not a utilitarian. 
Utilitarianism is only interested in the overall quantity of 
happiness produced by an action. Some forms of 
consequentialism maintain that an action is not most desirable 
if it simultaneously causes maximum overall happiness and 
creates a grave imbalance. On the other hand though, if an 
action makes two persons very happy, but one very unhappy, 
ceteris paribus, act utilitarianism will maintain that the 
action is desirable, a position that may be denied by 
consequentialists. 
consequentialism in 
maintains that the 
Some utilitarians reject 
favour of rule 
rightness of an 
consequentialism, 
action depends 
direct 
which 
on the 
consequences of various sets of rules, rather than on the 
consequences of the action itself. Rule consequentialism thus 
maintains that we ought to follow that set of rules as a guide 
to our actions that will bring about the best overall outcome, 
rather than evaluating actions directly in terms of their own 
consequences, as direct consequentialism does. 
Utilitarianism has a number of elements that, prima facie, 
make it attractive, most salient of which is the view that the 
actions of humans ought to be evaluated according to the value 
of their consequences, together with the belief that only this 
approach will enable us to evaluate moral actions rationally, 
objectively, and uncontaminated without any emotional bias, 
while any other theory is bound to be plagued with 
subjectivism and sentimentality. The difference between 
utilitarianism and Kant's moral theory is that, while both 
theories insist that an action be evaluated unemotionally and 
without subjective bias, the former determines the moral value 
of an action by focusing only on its results, the latter by 
focusing only on the intention connected with the action. 
Utilitarianism accordingly presents itself as a theory in 
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which all moral issues, and the moral worthiness of all 
actions, can be evaluated with the same simple principle, 
namely by merely attending to the consequences of the actions 
in question (Primoratz 1997: 15). In addition to this, 
because utilitarianism counts each person as equal, agent and 
subject alike, a balance between the interests of the agent 
and others is attained. "This theory thus transcends the 
conflict between egoism and 
collectivism, and provides a 
ethics and political and legal 
16). 
altruism, individualism and 
solid foundation for social 
philosophy" (Primoratz 1997: 
The utilitarian theory of punishment is the mere result of 
applying utilitarianism as a general ethical theory to the 
moral problem of punishment. This implies that punishment is 
good, or held to be justified, if it brings about maximum 
overall utility. Therefore it may be expected that whatever 
is an advantage to the former will also be an advantage to the 
latter. As already mentioned, two main questions need to be 
answered when justifying punishment: ( 1) Whom may we punish, 
i.e. what justifies one's inflicting pain or suffering upon 
others on account of their past behaviour? And (2) how and to 
what extent may we punish, i.e. is there a general principle 
by which the proper amount of punishment can be determined for 
each offence? In answering the first question, exceptions 
also need to be addressed, i.e. what kind of defence should 
excuse one from punishment? In applying utilitarianism, it 
must be established under which conditions of applying 
punishment greatest overall utility would not be attained. 
Utilitarianism asserts the normative principle that an 
action or policy is right insofar as it promotes the greatest 
happiness or well being of everyone in question. By this 
principle, punishment is justified insofar as it improves the 
well being of society in general by discouraging potential 
offenders from committing crimes. This is because it 
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incapacitates offenders, discourages them from committing the 
same crimes again, and deters others: 
with 
The inunediate principal end of punishment is to control action. This 
action is either that of the offender, or of others: that of the 
offender it controls by its influence, either on his will, in which 
case it is said to operate in the way of reformation; or on his 
physical power, in which case it is said to operate by disablement: 
that of others it can influence no otherwise than by its influence 
over their wills; in which case it is said to operate in the way of 
example (Bentham 1996: 158). 
The most comprehensive theory 
adherence to the utilitarian 
of punishment established 
theory is the one by 
Bentham. He considered all the desirable effects of 
punishment, proceeding to more specific questions, such as 
what the appropriate limits of punishment are, how severely it 
ought to be administered, and what its desirable traits are. 
In his Introduction to the Principles of Morals and 
Legislation, Bentham announces this principle and points out 
its psychological foundations: 
Nature has placed mankind under the governance of two sovereign 
masters, pain and pleasure. It is for them alone to point out what we 
ought to do, as well as to determine what we shall do. On the one 
hand the standard of right and wrong, on the other the chain of 
causes and effects, are fastened to their throne. They govern us in 
all we do, in all we say, in all we think: every effort we can make 
to throw off our subjection, will serve but to demonstrate and 
confirm it. In words a man may pretend to abjure their empire: but in 
reality he will remain subject to it all the while. The principle of 
utility recognises this subjection, and assumes it for the foundation 
of that system, the object of which is to rear the fabric of felicity 
by the hands of reason and of law. Systems which attempt to question 
it, deal in sounds instead of sense, in caprice instead of reason, in 
darkness instead of light (Bentham 1996: 11). 
Utility may thus be seen as that which brings about advantage, 
pleasure, good, or happiness (Bentham 1996: 12). Simplified 
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it may be seen as a striving towards the reduction of 
mischief, unhappiness, pain, or evil. The principle of 
utility thus approves of any action that increases happiness 
and disapproves of any action that decreases it. For this 
reason, the principle of utility is also called the "general 
happiness principle" (Bentham 1996: 11) The roots of 
utilitarianism are evident in Ancient Greek philosophy, 
exemplified by the following showing that its entailment is 
not foreign to Aristotle's moral philosophy: 
Now there do appear to be several ends at which our actions aim ... it 
is clear that not all of them are final ends; whereas the supreme 
good seems to be something final. Consequently if there be some one 
thing which alone is a final end, this thing . . . will be the good 
which we are seeking .... a thing chosen always as an end and never 
as a means we call absolutely final. Now happiness above all else 
appears to be absolutely final in this sense, since we always choose 
it for its own sake and never as a means to something else 
(Aristotle 1999: 27-29). 
The utility, pleasure, and happiness referred to are those 
of all persons affected by the consequences of the action. By 
"action" is not only meant the action of an individual, or 
individuals, but also actions taken by governments, laws, and 
any social rule. Bentham believes, however, that all these 
actions can be understood in terms of the actions of 
individuals. The principle of utility is thus the fundamental 
principle of morality, as well as the fundamental principle of 
legal and political institutions. Thus, whatever is judged 
morally must be evaluated in terms of the principle of utility 
and nothing can therefore be said to be good or bad 
intrinsically: 
No actions are intrinsically right or wrong, obligatory or 
prohibited; no motives or dispositions are good or bad in themselves 
- it is only their consequences with regard to pleasure and pain, 
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happiness and misery, that give them their moral status (Bentham 
1960: 127). 
4.2.2 THE OBJECTIVES OF PUNISHMENT 
Punishment is the infliction of pain or harm on an offender, 
and hence, according to the principle of utility, must be an 
evil. If it ought to be administered, this ought to be done 
only if the evil thereby inflicted is outweighed by a greater 
benefit (Bentham 1996: 163). 
Utilitarians defending a theory of punishment generally 
find their rationale in three main claims: 
(1) Potential offenders, those tempted to break the law, 
can usually be dissuaded from doing so by the threat 
of punishment. 
(2) Punishment is instructive; it gives malefactors a 
lesson, resulting in an improvement of their 
characters, reducing the likelihood that they will 
offend again. 
(3) The utility of imprisonment is that it incapacitates 
offenders, preventing them from offending again 
during the time of their confinement. 
The consequences that should serve as the justification for 
the practice of punishment, as well as its institutions, 
according to utilitarianism, may consequently broadly be 
identified as (1) incapacitation, which may be temporary (as 
in a prison term) or permanent (as in life imprisonment or 
capital punishment); and ( 2) deterrence (particular and 
general) . 
Suppose X is guilty of a felony for which he is sentenced 
to a lengthy prison term. For the time of his confinement, X 
is incapable of committing a similar offence again 
(incapacitation). Since the pain and discomfort X experiences 
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through his imprisonment ought to persuade him that he should 
never commit a similar offence again in order never to be 
liable for a repetition of the punishment, punishment has a 
deterrent effect on him even once he leaves prison (particular 
deterrence) . But he also serves as an example to others. 
Potential offenders, those contemplating a similar offence to 
x, are often deterred from committing a crime because they 
fear that they will suffer the same punishment that was or is 
administered to him (general deterrence). 
The utilitarian theory of punishment looks wholly to the 
future because its only aim is 
Furthermore, the offence has 
victim, while similar offences 
to prevent future 
directly affected 
in the future 
suffering. 
only the 
can affect 
anyone. Then while the evil of the offence often cannot be 
rectified, those of the future can always be prevented. 
Therefore, the prevention of future offences is the objective 
of punishment, as well as its justification: 
If we could consider an offence which has been conuni tted as an 
isolated fact, the like of which would never recur, punishment would 
be useless. It would only be adding one evil to another. But when we 
consider that an unpunished crime leaves the path of crime open, not 
only to the same delinquent, but also to all those who may have the 
same motives and opportunities for entering upon it, we perceive that 
the punishment inflicted on the individual becomes a source of 
security to all. That punishment which, considered in itself, 
appeared base and repugnant to all generous sentiments, is elevated 
to the first rank of benefits, when it is regarded not as an act of 
wrath or of vengeance against a guilty or unfortunate individual who 
has given way to mischievous inclinations, but as an indispensable 
sacrifice to the conunon safety (Bentham 1962: 396). 
While retributivism looks back towards the crime and the 
responsibility of an offender, deterrence theory looks forward 
to discouragement of further violations of the law. 
Utilitarians therefore justify a state's having a system 
of laws and enforcing them, punishing violations in order to 
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maximise utility. Punishment, however, is itself an evil and 
should be avoided whenever this is consistent with the general 
good. Offenders are not to be punished for their own sake but 
are to be punished for offences they committed in the past as 
a way of maximising utility. 
Bentham (1962: 396) believes that all actions are the 
outcomes of rational deliberation, each person weighing the 
determine maximum utility. advantages and 
This analysis 
disadvantages to 
of the motivation of a potential off ender is 
extremely rationalistic. May we not accuse Bentham of 
oversimplifying the matter? Can we plausibly hold that every 
offender calculates rationally before committing an offence, 
carefully weighing the pleasures against the harms and then 
deciding how to act merely upon the result of this 
calculation? We know that many crimes are motivated by 
irrational factors, being driven by passions and prejudice. 
Bentham is aware of this objection, but finds it unconvincing. 
He believes that all persons calculate, especially when 
deciding between the options of pleasure and pain: 
... and as to the proposition that passion does not calculate, this 
like most of these very general and oracular propositions, is not 
true. When matters of such importance as pain and pleasure are at 
stake, and these in the highest degree (the only matters, in short, 
that can be of importance) who is there that does not calculate? Men 
calculate, some with less exactness, indeed, some with more: but all 
men calculate. I would not say, that even a madman does not 
calculate. Passion calculates, more or less, in every man: in 
different men, according to the warmth or coolness of their 
dispositions: according to the firmness or irritability of their 
minds: according to the nature of the motives by which they are acted 
upon (Bentham 1996: 173-174). 
Bentham sees the prevention of crime as the most important 
objective of punishment in the sense that the punished 
offender is only one person, while there are many that may 
commit similar offences in the future. He thus sees general 
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prevention as more 
therefore also as 
important than particular prevention, and 
the primary justification of punishment 
(Bentham 1962: 396). 
According to this view, punishment can give satisfaction 
too. This may take one of two forms, either by compensation 
or vindictive satisfaction. Punishment is devisable in such a 
manner that it provides material compensation to the victim. 
Needless to add, this is not always possible. Nevertheless, 
Bentham considers it an important form of satisfaction since 
it can often be applied. Furthermore, vindictive satisfaction 
can assume numerous forms in that it can be any pain or 
discomfort inflicted on offenders and so can be not only 
satisfaction for their victims, but also for 
experiencing anger and indignation at offenders 
them punished: 
anyone else 
and wanting 
It is not vengeance which is to be regarded as the most malignant and 
dangerous passion of the human heart; it is antipathy, it is 
intolerance - the hatreds of pride, of prejudice, of religion, of 
politics. The enmity which is dangerous is not that which is well 
founded, but that which springs up without any substantial cause 
(Bentham 1960: 309). 
Bentham regards this motive as not only useful to the 
individual, but also to the public, and considers it to be 
necessary because he believes that this vindictive 
satisfaction motivates accusers and witnesses to come forward, 
even though they may experience financial costs and other 
disadvantages by doing so: 
Take away this resource, and the power of the laws will be very 
limited; or, at all events, the tribunals will not obtain assistance, 
except for money - a means not only burdensome to society, but 
exposed to other very serious objections (Bentham 1960: 309). 
When administering punishment, 
ought therefore not only to 
according to utilitarianism, we 
take its deterrent value, or 
105 
compensatory function, into consideration, where appropriate, 
but ought also to respect society's right to express anger and 
indignation at offenders. I argued in the previous chapter 
that retributivism is required too for a comprehensive theory 
of punishment because it allows society to express its anger 
and indignation at offenders. If utilitarianism also fulfils 
this condition, one might ask why we need retributivism at 
all. Though both theories endorse this condition, I shall 
argue that utilitarianism is not able to answer the question 
of whom we are justified in punishing because it does not 
operate with the common conception of justice and makes too 
many exceptions (4.3.3). By making too many exceptions, 
utilitarianism does not allow punishment to serve as a 
recognised channel through which society can express its anger 
and indignation at offenders, therefore this objective must be 
covered by retributivism. 
Bentham insists, however, that the latter function of 
punishment ought not to be permitted to augment the extent of 
punishment beyond what is required by general and particular 
deterrence. Primoratz states it as follows: 
No penalty is to be meted out or made more severe for the purpose of 
satisfying the pleasure of vengefulness. Such pleasure, however great 
in its elf, is always outweighed by the suffering which causes it 
(Primoratz 1997: 22). 
4.2.3 THE LIMITS OF PUNISHMENT 
If the ends 
justification 
those ends, 
of punishment 
(punishment is 
the same ends 
simultaneously serve as its 
justified because it pursues 
determining the limits of 
punishment), it follows that it is unjustified when those ends 
cannot be attained by punishing, or when they cannot be 
realised rationally and economically, or when an alternative, 
less harmful method is available for attaining the same ends. 
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Punishment ought never to be inefficacious, 
unprofitable or unnecessary (Bentham 1996: 159). 
groundless, 
For Bentham, punishment is groundless when there is no 
utilitarian reason for applying it, i.e. when there is no harm 
to be prevented. It is also groundless when the action in 
question generally causes harm, but in the case in question 
has not done so because the persons to whom it was done 
voluntarily consented to it. Punishment is 
when the action was necessary to secure a 
prevent a greater evil (Bentham 1996: 188). 
also groundless 
great good or 
Utilitarians also hold that punishments that are 
administered in response to unconscious or unintentional 
violations of law, or retroactive laws, are inefficacious and 
ought not to be administered. The same holds for punishment 
of irresponsible persons (such as children), persons under the 
influence of alcohol, and insane indi victuals. Punishment of 
such indi victuals would have neither a function of particular 
deterrence, nor of general deterrence (Bentham 1996: 160-161). 
They also argue that punishment is unprofitable when the 
evil it inflicts is greater than the evil it prevents. For 
instance, when a community, such as a foreign country, would 
be enraged by its administration, or when guilty persons could 
greatly benefit society if they were not punished (Bentham 
1996: 163-164). 
It also follows that punishment ought not to be 
administered if it is unnecessary because the same desired 
result could be achieved by some other, less offensive means, 
such as through rehabilitation, social policy, or education. 
Bentham holds that it is logically possible for punishment 
to be administered upon an innocent person, i.e. the guilty 
person and the person punished need not necessarily be the 
same person, provided such punishment fulfils the principle of 
greatest happiness. However, the question is, even if it is 
permissible for utilitarians, can we justify such an action? 
An important distinction lies between avoidable and 
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unavoidable punishment. By "unavoidable" is not meant 
"absolutely unavoidable," but only unavoidable without thereby 
producing a greater evil; the distinction is therefore 
actually between unprofitable and profitable punishment. For 
Bentham, punishment of the innocent is unjustified when it is 
unprofitable. It is unjustified because it is unnecessary and 
groundless. When punishment of the innocent yields the best 
consequences, however, it ought, according to Bentham, to be 
administered. Faced with the objection that this is a 
violation of one of the most fundamental and universally 
recognised principles of justice, Bentham responds undeterred 
that this principle is frequently referred to but never 
convincingly argued for, and cannot stand up to the lucid 
principle of utility on which his theory of punishment is 
based (Bentham 1962: 476). Punishment is justified, of 
innocent and guilty alike, when it yields beneficial results 
and unjustified when it yields harmful ones. 
When would punishment of the innocent be beneficial? For 
Bentham, when the identity of the offender is known, 
punishment of the innocent is unnecessary and ought not to be 
administered since that would be an unnecessary infliction of 
harm. When it cannot be established who the real offender is, 
and when refraining from punishing would not yield greatest 
utility, then punishment ought to be administered, even if 
this means punishing the innocent. Collective punishment is a 
form of punishing the innocent that has to be endorsed by 
Bentham, should there be no reliable means of determining 
which individual is to blame and when this would further 
utility (Primoratz 1997: 26). 
4.2.4 THE MEASURE OF PUNISHMENT 
For the utilitarian, the measure of punishment is established 
by finding a balance between the good consequences achieved by 
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punishment and the evil thereby inflicted. 
main elements: 
This entails three 
(1) Punishment must be severe enough to serve as an 
appropriate deterrent. In order to do so, the pain of 
punishment must outweigh the benefits attained through the 
crime. The lower limit of punishment is thereby established, 
a limit below which crime would become inefficient because it 
would no longer deter adequately. 1 In order to do so, 
punishment must increase in proportion to the temptation to 
commit the crime (Bentham 1996: 167) . This utilitarian 
stipulation is in contrast to some other theories that hold 
that the more temptation was involved in committing a crime, 
the less the punishment ought to be. But Bentham (1996: 142; 
166-168) maintains that to hold such a view is to have an 
irrational assessment of punishment because applying this view 
in practice would diminish punishment's efficacy. 
( 2) The more severe an offence is, the more severe its 
punishment ought to be. This may be interpreted as an 
expression of proportionality. 
(3) Punishment should not be harsher than is required for 
the realisation of its objectives. This rule therefore 
establishes the upper limit of punishment (Bentham 1996: 175; 
Bentham 1962: 400). 
Bentham also maintains that rich persons should be 
punished more severely than poor ones. This would presumably 
only be applicable for monetary fines since a prison-term of 
ten years would presumably be equally severe for both, while a 
specific monetary fine would be disproportionate punishment 
1 Van den Haag (1997: 530-531) argues that although we do not know with 
absolute certainty whether capital punishment deters, its greater severity 
still gives us reason to assume more deterrence from it. He places the 
burden of proof on abolitionists to show why the greater severity of 
capital punishment should not have greater deterrence. By contrast, R. J. 
M. Costanzo (1997: 95-112) provides much evidence that the death penalty 
does not deter potential murderers and gives reasons why this is so. This 
indicates that it is not the case that the most severe punishment has 
greatest deterrent value. 
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since the rich person would comply with relative ease compared 
to the poor person (Brandt 1997: 514). 
4.2.5 THE PROPERTIES OF PUNISHMENT 
Three of the most important properties of punishment mentioned 
by Bentham are exemplari ty, popularity, and remissibili ty. I 
shall discuss each briefly. 
(1) The exemplary nature of punishment depends on the fact 
that it has both a real and an apparent value. The former is 
the actual pain and discomfort imposed on an offender, and the 
latter is the pain and discomfort imagined by others. 
Deterrence, the main function of punishment, is achieved by 
the apparent value. Punishment that had no apparent value, 
only real value, would serve no real purpose, it would only be 
an infliction of suffering upon the offender, and hence it 
would be unjustified. Beyond the satisfaction attained 
through real punishment, maintains Bentham, it ought only to 
be inflicted insofar as it maximises its apparent value. Any 
real punishment inflicted beyond what is necessary to achieve 
the desired apparent value is unnecessary and a needless 
infliction of suffering: 
If delinquents were 
nobody else knew 
constantly 
of it, it 
punished for 
is evident 
their 
that, 
offences, 
excepting 
and 
the 
inconsiderable benefit which might result in the way of disablement, 
or reformation, there would be a great deal of mischief done, and not 
the least particle of good. The real punishment would be as great as 
ever, and the apparent would be nothing. The punishment would befall 
every offender as an unforeseen evil. It would never have been 
present to his mind to deter him from the commission of crime. It 
would serve as an example to no one (Bentham 1962: 398-399). 
Punishment should thus always be as exemplary as possible; its 
apparent value should be as great as possible. This is most 
easily achieved by increasing the real value, but can also be 
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achieved by carefully choosing the type of punishment, or by 
ritualising it in order to make huge impressions on the minds 
of spectators: 
The real punishment ought to be as small, and the apparent punishment 
as great as possible. If hanging a man in effigy would produce the 
same salutary impression of terror upon the minds of the people, it 
would be folly or cruelty ever to hang a man in person (Bentham 1962: 
398). 
(2) Punishment should be popular, or at least not 
unpopular in the sense that unpopular punishment would be 
unnecessary inflictions of suffering upon innocent persons 
because the punishment cannot be reconciled with the 
community's moral or religious beliefs, its feelings, or 
traditions. Unpopular punishment may 
effect of weakening the institutions 
have the undesirable 
of justice people 
becoming reluctant to come forward to press charges or bear 
witness, or even actively working against the institutions. 
Bentham concedes that this is more a property of the people, 
rather than of the punishment, but he nevertheless insists 
that it should be considered (Bentham 1962: 308). 
(3) Punishment should be remissible because the 
institutions of punishment are fallible. Occasionally a 
person is punished who should not have been. In such cases, 
reparation should be possible. However, Bentham does not 
hold, as we have seen, that punishment of the innocent is 
impermissible, therefore this is not the reason why it should 
be remissible. The concern is rather that an offender may be 
punished without any overall positive consequence. 
4.3 EVALUATING THE UTILITARIAN APPROACH TO PUNISHMENT 
In this section, the utilitarian approach will be critically 
evaluated. I shall argue that utilitarianism cannot be 
rejected by appealing to practical consequences of the theory 
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(i.e. empirical findings cannot conclusively dismiss 
utilitarianism) or by criticising the theory for endorsing 
suffering. However, I shall argue that utilitarianism is 
morally unacceptable because it does not operate with the 
notion of desert and hence does not operate with the commonly 
held conception of justice. Act utilitarianism is also 
morally unacceptable because it endorses punishment of the 
innocent when doing so is utility maximising. Rule 
utilitarianism, however, cannot be said to endorse punishment 
of the innocent because it would have overall adverse 
consequences in the long-term, such as undermining authority 
of the legal institutions. 
4.3.1 THE UTILITARIAN APPROACH AND EMPIRICAL FINDINGS 
Given the aims of the utilitarian theory of punishment, it 
makes sense to ask whether the empirical conceptions 
underlying this approach to punishment are sound. According 
to the theory, punishment is justified because it brings about 
a reduction in crime, i.e. 
evil of crime. It does 
completely; nevertheless, 
the evil of punishment reduces the 
not say that crime is eradicated 
it significantly reduces its overall 
rate. Is this assumption correct? There are many instances 
in which a high degree of punishing, even severe punishing, is 
accompanied by a high level of crime and vice versa. The 
differences may be seen in the United States of America and 
European Union countries. The former has a much greater 
prison population with generally severer penal ties than the 
latter, and despite this, the United States has a far greater 
crime rate, indicating that punishment does not have a 
significant deterrent effect. Utilitarianism therefore faces 
the charge that punishment is not useful, that it is not 
beneficial, and in fact does not have utilitarian value 
(Primoratz 1997: 33). 
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Utilitarians may respond that this does not refute their 
theory because for them, if punishment does not have 
beneficial consequences, then it has no justification. This 
means that if it would have no utilitarian justification, then 
utilitarians would have to reject any form of punishment, and 
thereby become abolitionists, if they wish to be consistent. 
The only justification that can be given, utilitarians will 
insist, is that punishment should be beneficial; hence, it 
should bring about a reduction in crime, or curb a rise in 
crime if refusing to punish would increase the level of crime. 
Regarding exemption from punishment, it may be pointed out 
that Bentham neglects to show that failing to punish normal 
offenders would markedly decrease the overall well being, 
while exempting persons under the conditions mentioned above 
would only do so to a negligible degree. Critics may argue 
that utilitarianism ought to excuse no one in order to 
maximise the deterrent effect regarding a given behaviour. 2 In 
defence, the utilitarian responds that the intoxicated, the 
insane and the like, are not likely to be deterred by 
punishment. One does not maximise utility by eliminating the 
traditional excuses, therefore the theory is not threatened or 
weakened by them. 
Regarding the claim that utilitarianism ought not to 
consider mitigating factors when punishing, utilitarians 
answer by pointing to the fact that persons acting 
impulsively, rather than with premeditation, do not consider 
the penalties connected to their behaviour. They would 
therefore not be deterred by more stringent laws. Such 
persons are also not likely to repeat the offence, so a mild 
sentence saves a good person for society. Giving milder 
sentences to those offenders who have had fewer opportunities 
2 Richard Brandt (1993: 348-353) reviews the main concepts and principles 
of criminal law. After comparing moral and legal obligation, he carefully 
distinguishes between different kinds of legal justifications and excuses 
and goes on to explore the ways legal guilt and moral reprehensibility can 
diverge. 
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in life is also a way of increasing the good by decreasing the 
imbalance. 
4.3.2 WHY UTILITARIANISM ENDORSES SOME SUFFERING 
If we attempt a criticism of deterrence theory by questioning 
its utilitarian basis, by pointing out that suffering is bad 
in itself, and punishment is the deliberate infliction of 
suffering, therefore the suffering of offenders ought not to 
be added to that of their victims, utilitarians have a ready 
answer: utilitarianism demands only that punishment ought not 
to inflict more suffering than it prevents. Although Bentham 
regards all punishment as mischief, he maintains that it is 
justified if it avoids a greater evil. By reform, by 
deterrence, by incapacitation, the evils of failing to punish 
are outweighed by punishment (Benn 1985: 11). Bentham puts it 
as follows: 
But all punishment is mischief: all punishment in itself is evil. 
Upon the principle of utility, if it ought at all to be admitted, it 
ought only to be admitted in as far as it promises to exclude some 
greater evil (Bentham 1996: 158). 
4.3.3 UTILITARIANISM AND JUSTICE 
A strong objection that may be made against the utilitarian 
theory of punishment is that, in contrast to retributivism, it 
does not see punishment as something deserved and hence does 
not employ the concept of justice. Justice implies 
responsibility. In a normal sense, not in a moral or legal 
sense, we maintain that persons could have acted otherwise if 
( 1) they had the ability to do so, and ( 2) they had the 
opportunity to do so. If A represents her country in chess, 
she can be described as having the ability to do so, even if 
she performed poorly on a given occasion. B may have the 
opportunity to do so if she were chosen for the national team, 
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even if she did not actually have the required expertise to 
play at that level. Being responsible for a crime, however, 
entails more than this, it employs the term "responsibility" 
in a different manner. 
having a guilty mind. 
Being responsible for a crime entails 
A guilty mind, "mens rea," is said to 
contain three conditions: ( 1) knowledge of circumstances, ( 2) 
foresight of consequences, and (3) voluntariness (Sterba 1997: 
501). Assume one has a gun in his hand and has been told that 
the gun is not loaded. Assume he himself had verified only a 
short while ago that it is in fact not loaded. He pulls the 
trigger, unaware that in the meantime someone has loaded the 
gun. A bystander is injured. One cannot be said to have had 
If one knew that the gun was knowledge of circumstances. 
loaded, but failed to realise that one could kill or injure 
someone by firing into the air, one cannot be said to have had 
adequate foresight. Finally, if one is forced to pull the 
trigger by external coercion while the gun is aimed at a 
person, one cannot be judged to have acted voluntarily. Under 
such conditions, one would be excused from blame on the 
grounds of not having a guilty mind. Of course, in the first 
two cases, one may be charged with negligence, but that is 
another matter. 3 Persons are morally responsible if, and only 
if, they acted freely, that is, if they acted as free and 
responsible agents. This is not at all foreign to our Western 
justice systems. In order to find persons guilty, it must be 
established whether they acted freely, whether their action 
was one of choice. A person freely transgressing the law may 
3 Negligence alone does not establish legal liability. To be legally 
liable for one's conduct, one's actions must cause the harms of the other 
person. Stated differently, there must be a close causal connection 
between the conduct and the resulting injury. However, identifying the 
cause of a result is not always easy. When can we say that our actions 
have led to a certain consequence? When is the causal connection between 
our conduct and the injurious result close enough to establish legal 
liability? It is often maintained that the action must be the proximate 
cause of the injury. However, this only raises the further question, what 
constitutes proximate cause? Brody (1993: 416-420) examines causation in 
this respect. 
115 
be punished (Primoratz 1997: 34) . 4 
follows: 
Aristotle states it as 
But the term "involuntary" does not really apply to an action when 
the agent is ignorant of his true interests. The ignorance that 
makes an act blameworthy is not ignorance displayed in moral choice 
it is not general ignorance but particular ignorance, 
ignorance of the circumstances of the act and of the things affected 
by it; for in this case the act is pitied and forgiven, because he 
who acts in ignorance of any of these circumstances is an involuntary 
agent (Aristotle 1999: 125) . 5 
For the utilitarian, the object of the offence is wholly 
uninteresting since the only issue that matters is the 
consequences of punishing. Accordingly, punishment becomes a 
mere means of attaining the objectives of society. 
Utilitarianism does not see indi victuals as free, responsible 
agents, but merely as entities that may be manipulated for the 
common good (Primoratz 1997: 35). 
Bentham believes that mentally ill persons ought not to be 
punished, but not because they deserve some other treatment, 
such as therapy, as we generally hold, but because it would 
have no deterrent value and therefore would bring no benefit. 
The insane generally do not have the mental capability for 
being susceptible to deterrence by punishment; therefore, they 
should not be punished. I agree with Primoratz (1997: 39-40) 
who points out that this explanation is not convincing. It is 
correct to assume that we cannot deter other mentally ill 
off enders from committing similar offences by punishing 
mentally ill individuals; nevertheless, doing so may be 
effective in the sense that it may have a strong deterrent 
4 For an interesting treatment regarding the nature of intention, and the 
different kinds of it (a criminal action done with direct intention; an 
action done with a further criminal intention; and simple intention), as 
well as the distinction between direct and oblique intentions recognised by 
many legal systems, see Hart ( 1993: 353-362), where Hart deals with the 
place of intention in the criminal law. For the purpose of my argument, it 
is sufficient that intention be dealt with in its general broad sense. 
5 For an elaboration of Aristotle's views regarding under which conditions 
a person is not considered blameable, see Aristotle (1999: 125-129). 
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affect upon other normal potential offenders. Off enders could 
not base their hopes upon the insanity defence by simulating 
mental illness if it were abolished. The utilitarian may 
respond that punishment of the mentally ill would have overall 
adverse consequences because it would bring about an 
unfavourable attitude within the general community because one 
generally believes that those who are mentally ill in such a 
way that they do not have their criminal behaviour under 
voluntary control ought not to be punished. If they would be 
punished, the legal ins ti tut ions would become disrespectful, 
thereby undermining their authority and effectiveness because 
persons would become less willing to co-operate with them. 
This defence, as Primoratz points out, is morally 
unsatisfactory. We do not disapprove of punishing the 
mentally ill because it would enrage the public, but because 
it would not be just. We would object to such punishment even 
if the community were wholly in favour of it. The utilitarian 
may attempt another defence by arguing that if a criterion 
could be found with which to reliably distinguish between 
normality and mental illness, then the problem of the insanity 
defence would not arise, but since we do not have such a lucid 
criterion, the distinction between punishment of mentally ill 
offenders and normal ones is not as obvious as assumed. 
However, this is not strictly correct as we do have some 
criteria and we do use them. This attempt to defend the 
position can be seen as just a desperate attempt to evade the 
problem since there are indeed generally recognised methods 
and procedures for determining the mental state of an accused 
individual. These may not be infallible, but they are the 
best available. 6 
6 Thomas Aquinas held the natural law position that only a just law is a 
law - lex iniustia non est lex (1993: 69-75). He first provides a 
definition of law and then describes the four types and their 
interrelationships. He believes, as does Aristotle, that each being has 
its natural purpose or end and that fulfilling that purpose defines its 
good. Norman Kretzmann (1995: 7-19) examines Aquinas's arguments, and his 
motives for adopting this doctrine. 
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Withholding punishment because it would not serve overall 
utility is not only advocated by utilitarians for mentally ill 
individuals, as we saw; punishment would also not be 
administered when it would be offensive to a community or to a 
foreign power, or when the offenders could do more good for 
society if they were not punished. Offenders ought also not 
to be punished, according to utilitarianism, if they were 
intoxicated, were minors when committing the offence since 
they were incapable of foreseeing the consequences of their 
actions. Bentham also argues that offenders ought to be 
exempted from punishment if the crime was committed under 
physical compulsion, if the agents were ignorant of the 
possible consequences of their behaviour, if they innocently 
misapprehended the facts, or if the motivation to commit the 
offence was so strong as to preclude any possibility of the 
threat of law deterring them from the crime. Furthermore, 
Bentham believes that punishment should be remitted if the 
crime was a collective one and the total punishment of all 
offenders would be a greater disutility than that of the 
crime. The utilitarian also holds that punishment is 
unjustified when the apparent value of punishment could be 
achieved without actually punishing an offender (Primoratz 
1997: 42) . In all these cases, the utilitarian does not hold 
that punishment ought not to be administered because it would 
be undeserved, but because it would not serve the interests of 
utility. 
Before addressing the question of whether utilitarianism 
provides us with an adequate answer to the question of how and 
in what measure we may punish ( 4. 4), it may be noted that 
utilitarianism does not satisfactorily answer the question of 
whom we may punish because it does not employ the notion of 
desert. It makes too many exceptions in which punishment 
ought not to be administered, such as when it would not 
outweigh the harms done through punishment, even though the 
person in question may be guilty and hence deserve to be 
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punished. Utilitarianism does not address the need of society 
that punishment ought to serve as a recognised channel through 
which society can express its anger and indignation at 
offenders. This need is hence addressed by the retributive 
element in my theory. 
4.3.4 UTILITARIANISM AND PUNISHING THE INNOCENT 
Utilitarianism is often attacked for allegedly endorsing 
punishment of the innocent. In this subsection, I shall 
examine whether punishment of the innocent is always morally 
unacceptable and answer the question whether utilitarianism 
does indeed endorse punishment of the innocent. 
Punishing a single scapegoat may sometimes seem 
efficacious. Would utilitarianism not be committed to 
punishing in such cases? Imagine, for instance, that the 
crime rate in a society has risen sharply, and confidence in 
the police and the legal institutions has drastically 
deteriorated due to incompetence of the police. The only 
solution to this unwelcome state of affairs and the only way 
of preventing many offences from being committed, which they 
almost certainly would if drastic measures were not adopted, 
would be to punish someone. The measure would prevent many 
otherwise committed crimes and with the right kind of 
publicity would restore a great deal of confidence in the 
police and the legal institutions. However, because the 
police are so incompetent, they lack the opportunity to 
convict a guilty person. They have once again mistakenly 
arrested innocent persons. Releasing them would be the just 
thing to do, but it would also do a great deal of social good 
to make a conviction. The convictions would have bad 
consequences for the convicted, but overwhelmingly good 
consequences for society (Primoratz 1997: 43). From the 
utilitarian perspective, it would be morally prohibited to 
release them, and obligatory to convict them. Primoratz 
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( 1997: 4 4) claims that seen from a utilitarian perspective, 
even for the innocently arrested persons, it would be morally 
obligatory to cooperate in their own convictions, since that 
would bring about the most overall good by restoring 
confidence in the legal system. 
Michael Clark convincingly argues that punishing the 
innocent would undermine our autonomy because if the state 
would adopt the practice of punishing innocent persons, we may 
be subjected to crime by the state too. He believes that it 
would undermine our autonomy because we could not plan our 
lives confidently because we could not be sure that penal 
sanctions would not interfere with our plans even if we took 
care not to break any law. Under a system in which punishment 
of innocent persons is accepted (at least under some 
conditions), morally innocent persons punished vicariously, or 
as part of a collective penalty, would have no case against 
the state (Clark 1997: 31). To quote Clark: 
Freedom from unfair sanctions imposed by officials of the state has a 
special value for us: if we tolerated unjust penal sanctions we would 
not be accorded respect as people even by those who were, in a decent 
regime, otherwise honest, trustworthy and acting officially in the 
public interest. We shall always be at risk from criminal elements, 
but if we were unjustly at risk from the state as well, we should be 
liable to be treated as means by anyone. Respecting the constraint 
on distribution is not a matter of maximising overall autonomy, since 
it may expose us to more crime; but if it does, it is the criminal 
offenders, not the state, who are primarily responsible for it. The 
state would not be responsible for the extra crime in the way it 
would be responsible if it punished personally innocent people (Clark 
1997: 31-32) . 7 
J. Mccloskey (1993: 253-261) provides an alarming estimate of how 
frequently innocent persons are convicted in the United States of America. 
He estimates that at least one in ten of those convicted of serious and 
violent crimes is completely innocent. He investigates seven causes of 
wrongful conviction, namely: presumption of guilt, perjury by police, false 
witnesses for the prosecution, prosecutorial misconduct, shoddy police 
work, incompetent defence council, and the nature of conflicting evidence. 
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Autonomy is something that concerns Bentham, however. He 
contends that punishment should not be administered if the 
relevant law had been passed after the offence was committed, 
or if the law had not been made public because we could never 
be confident of regulating our conduct in any way if 
retroactive laws may make us liable for punishment in future. 
The question may still be posed, why should autonomy take 
precedence over social safety? We hold it appropriate, for 
instance, to lock up the insane and quarantine the infectious 
in order to protect society. The simple answer is that the 
innocent do not endanger society as the insane or infectious 
do. "The innocent, unlike the infectious and some of the 
insane, are not threats to others" by their own volitions 
(Clark 1997: 32). 
What could we say if utilitarians tried to defend 
themselves against the above example by arguing that a theory 
ought to be evaluated and tested against actual cases, not 
against highly improbable hypothetical situations? To this we 
may respond that the example above is not merely a 
hypothetical example - many actual instances can be given in 
which innocent persons were deliberately convicted and 
punished. (I shall provide historical examples shortly.) 
Staying with the charge of hypothetical examples for the 
moment, however, we may respond that even if this were only a 
hypothetical example, it would still have relevance because 
when evaluating an ethical theory, not only actual cases may 
be examined, one ought also to test all logical possibilities. 
Pertaining to utilitarianism, and despite the protests of 
utilitarians, it is not illogical that punishment of the 
innocent could become highly desirable, in which case 
utilitarianism would be committed to it (Primoratz 1997: 45). 
If we remain with actual historical examples, we still 
find sufficient evidence in which innocent persons have been 
convicted for the "good" of society: 
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In our century - to go back no farther in time - the trials in Moscow 
in the thirties, or in Budapest in 1949, or in Prague in 1952 gave 
eloquent proof of this. 
At these trials, people who had devoted their entire lives to the 
revolution were condemned as counter-revolutionary conspirators; 
people who had done nothing against their country but, on the 
contrary, had always been patriots, were denounced as foreign spies. 
Besides these standard accusations, in Budapest and Prague the 
accused were punished, equally without grounds, as "Titoists" and 
"Zionists." ... 
... It is reasonable to presume, however, that at least some of the 
leading actors in these trials, at least some of those who initiated 
the trials organized the entire business because they believed 
that these trials were politically necessary, and acted with a 
perfectly clear conscience, in the conviction that what they were 
doing was morally justified. With respect to false confessions and 
repentances of the accused, one can reasonably claim, on the basis of 
what has been learned about these trials so far ... that many of the 
accused made these confessions because ... it was their moral duty to 
do so ... 
The ethical standpoint which led the one and the other to reach such 
a conclusion was a variant of utilitarianism widespread in our 
century, which is best described as "revolutionary Machiavellianism" 
(Primoratz 1997: 49-50). 
The utilitarian may retort that those trials were not 
really justified, doing more harm than good because the truth 
did come out and undermined the respect people had of the 
legal systems of those countries. We may grant this, but the 
fact that the organizers of the trials believed them to be in 
the best interest gave them a subjective justification at the 
time. If the trials would have had overall beneficial 
consequences, would we hold that they were morally fully 
justified? We would not because they would not accord with 
our commonly held conception of justice, which rests on guilt 
and desert. 
Primoratz (1997: 
attempted a rebuttal 
innocent by pointing 
52) 
of 
out 
mentions that utilitarians have 
the 
that 
argument against punishing the 
punishment is by definition a 
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hardship inflicted upon an offender. They claim that since 
innocent persons cannot be termed "offenders, " punishment of 
the innocent is logically impossible. In response, we may say 
that this line of argument fails to distinguish between 
"punishment" and "deserved punishment." Guilt is not a 
necessary condition for a practice to count as punishment and 
no contradiction is involved in asserting that someone was 
punished for something they did not do. 
Juridically, however, there is a connection between 
punishment and guilt. We would find it extremely odd if a 
judge sentenced a person, but added that the accused was 
actually innocent. This shows that (even if it is not 
necessary) there is indeed a connection between guilt and 
punishment. The connection lies in the fact that we believe 
persons ought only to be punished if they are guilty. This is 
a different point from the conceptual one, which is 
independent of what we believe. Aristotle explains it as 
follows: 
... if a judge has given an unfair judgement in ignorance, he is not 
guilty of injustice, nor is the justice unjust, in the legal sense of 
justice (though the judgement is unjust in one sense, for legal 
justice is different from justice in the primary sense), yet if he 
knowingly gives an unjust judgement, he is himself taking more than 
his share, either of favour or of vengeance. Hence a judge who gives 
an unjust judgement for these motives takes more than his due just as 
much as if he shared the proceeds of the injustice (Aristotle 1999: 
311). 
This does not rule out any possibility of judicial error, but 
merely shows that unintentional punishment of the innocent is 
possible, al though intentional punishment of the innocent is 
not held to be possible. If we do not call intentional 
conviction and punishment of innocent persons "punishment" 
then we would have to call it something else, "deliberate 
institutionalised victimisation of the innocent" perhaps. 
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This does not bring us any further since it is just changing 
the term with which we describe the phenomenon under 
discussion. 
What would we say if utilitarians challenged us by saying 
that if their theory would sometimes endorse punishment of the 
innocent, then it would be in justified situations? What if 
they challenged us by asking whether we would never endorse 
punishment of the innocent? 
In order to answer this question, let us first examine 
what it is to test an ethical theory. Testing an ethical 
theory entails examining its fundamental moral principle. 
Such a principle, being fundamental, cannot be deduced from 
other moral principles, nor can it be criticised for not 
having been deduced in such a manner. Such a principle will 
almost invariably be very general. It will hardly ever appear 
unacceptable, prima facie. The Golden Rule, or the 
categorical imperative, does not seem to raise any objections 
at the outset. Maximizing the good and minimizing the bad 
seem equally appealing. However, in order to establish 
whether we can live by such a principle, its contents must be 
more closely examined and tested. The contents of a moral 
principle are the implications it has for the lives of 
individuals and for society in various situations. So to 
evaluate the implications, one must consider one's emotions, 
attitudes and thoughts that arise in the pre-theoretical 
evaluation of the situation. This is not to say that our 
emotions, attitudes and thoughts are infallible. Certainly, 
they can and sometimes need to be revised. This becomes 
necessary when they are inconsistent, or contradict another 
principle we already accept ( Primoratz 1997: 57) . It is not 
unreasonable to suggest that most people would find punishment 
of the innocent, even if this would have overall beneficial 
consequences, both counterintuitive and morally unacceptable 
(Primoratz 1997: 58). 
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Fundamental principles sometimes conflict, leaving us no 
way in which to satisfy both, in which case we have to choose 
between them. Our choice depends on the situation, however. 
If we were to be asked by a utilitarian, whether we would 
never endorse punishment of the innocent, the answer would 
have to be that the case is not that simple. If a person is 
faced with punishing an innocent person to secure some good 
for society, we usually hold it to be wrong. However, a much 
worse situation can be imagined. If the choice is punishing 
an innocent person or destroying a whole nation, such as when 
a small country is seriously threatened with total destruction 
by a big nuclear power if the former does not hand over a 
specific person whom the small country holds to be innocent, 
we would endorse punishment of the innocent. The reason may 
lie in the absolute irremissibili ty of the destruction of an 
entire nation. No good could ever be done towards that nation 
again. In the case in which punishment of the innocent is 
accepted to halt a crime wave, this is not the case. A crime 
wave does not completely destroy and a more appropriate 
solution may be found in the future. Perhaps this must be our 
conclusion - perhaps our conclusion depends on the degree of 
harm threatened. It seems that punishment of the innocent is 
only justified if the consequences of not doing so result in 
the total destruction or permanent harm of a community or 
society. The difference between this stance and that of act 
utilitarianism is clearly distinguishable. Act utilitarianism 
would endorse punishment of an innocent person even just to 
save two other persons: it would endorse it even just to do 
more good than harm. 
The prohibition against punishment of the innocent should 
therefore be seen as a fundamental moral principle, but not an 
absolute one. Perhaps morality should be seen as having a 
plurality of fundamental moral principles. This example 
illustrates that morality does not have perfect answers for 
resolving all moral dilemmas, i.e. morality is not always 
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capable of providing an answer with which a moral agent can 
feel wholly comfortable (Hursthouse 2001: 63-87) . 8 
Against the charge that utilitarianism endorses punishment 
of the innocent, rule utilitarians have a plausible defence. 
They can argue that in the long run, convicting and punishing 
innocent persons undermines confidence in the state, hence 
doing more harm than good. Any provision allowing punishment 
of the innocent would be detrimental to public confidence in 
the law. This is something that cannot be done universally 
without ultimately undermining confidence in the law and 
political systems; therefore, rule utilitarianism cannot be 
accused of endorsing punishment of the innocent, even if this 
were to have short-term utility value. It is therefore not 
obvious that the rule utilitarian is committed to an immoral 
action with respect to punishing innocent persons. 
4.4 UTILITARIANISM AND THE "HOW" QUESTION 
Having enumerated all the difficulties of utilitarianism in 
the previous section, is it capable of furnishing us with a 
morally acceptable account of how much to punish? This was 
the main reason for examining utilitarianism since it promised 
to do so. 
A major criticism directed against it is that the theory 
would at least sometimes justify punishment disproportionate 
to the magnitude of the crime committed. If we examine the 
issue of severity of punishment, a salient contrast between 
retributi vism and utilitarianism is encountered: whereas 
retributivism maintains that punishment must fit the crime 
8 Rosalind Hursthouse argues that not all moral dilemmas are resolvable in 
such a manner as to be wholly satisfactory for a moral agent. She 
advocates a virtue ethical approach to ethics, rather than a deontological 
or consequentialist approach. While I believe that virtue ethics has an 
important contribution to make to ethics, I have not chosen to use this 
approach in defending the practice of punishment because I hold a rights-
oriented approach to be better suited for establishing precise criteria, 
such as those constituting the necessary conditions of my defence of 
punishment. 
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(capital punishment for murder, for instance, and less severe 
punishment for less serious crimes), utilitarianism determines 
the severity of the punishment so that it meets the objectives 
of the utilitarian system (Benn 1985: 13). In this respect it 
is not inconceivable, nor is it a contradiction to the theory, 
to punish a less serious crime more severely than a more 
serious one, should the former be in need of more deterrence 
because that particular crime, for instance, exhibits a 
striking increase in society. 
It was pointed out earlier that the primary objective of 
punishment for utilitarians is general deterrence. It was 
also stated that the apparent value of punishment increases 
when the real value of punishment is increased, and the main 
objective of the utilitarian theory is to increase the 
apparent value to the highest feasible level. Now, executing 
persons in public for minor offences has a high likelihood of 
having a very strong deterrent effect. Utilitarianism would 
be against it, prima facie, since the inflicted evil would 
greatly outweigh the evil caused by commit ting the offence. 
We need not strain our imagination too far, however, to find 
an example in which vastly disproportionate penalties would be 
justified by utilitarian theory. Disproportionate punishment 
would be justified if the principle of economy would 
simultaneously be upheld (Primoratz 1997: 37). 
If a minor offence, such as disorderly conduct in public, 
were to become widespread, it may be useful to impose harsh 
punishments for it, rather than the generally mild ones 
imposed. If the offence could be prevented by imprisoning 
only one person for five years, for instance, the punishment 
would be effective and economical, and hence "JUSTIFIED" by 
the utilitarian theory. Alternatively, let us assume that a 
country is experiencing a sudden increase in organised crime, 
specifically the crime of car theft. After many months of 
investigation, the police manage to arrest a significant 
number of the criminals, but by that time the indignation and 
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anger of the public has grown to such an extent that opinion 
poles indicate a large majority being in favour of the 
organisers being sentenced to life imprisonment. This would 
definitely incapacitate them, and would probably discourage 
anyone else susceptible to discouragement from committing 
similar offences. The objective of deterrence would thereby 
be completely attained. But surely, this cannot be morally 
right. Car theft, no matter how great its extent, cannot 
possibly warrant punishment equal in severity to rape or 
murder, or other dangerous crimes. The deterrence theorist 
can respond by pointing out that punishment should provide a 
motive for preferring the lesser offence to the greater. If 
less serious crimes were to be punished with disproportionate 
severity, so that these crimes receive equal or greater 
punishment than some more serious ones, then criminals 
committing the less serious crimes would have no prudent 
reason for not committing the more serious ones, especially if 
this would favour their cause of remaining undetected. If 
armed robbery, for instance, were punishable by death, just as 
murder, then an armed robber would have no prudent reason for 
not killing any bystander who may be an eyewitness. 
Nonetheless, it still does not completely rule out any 
inconsistencies in the severity of punishment. Utilitarian 
theory would also permit disproportionate punishments in the 
other direction, however. If six months imprisonment were to 
be sufficient to serve as an adequate deterrent against first-
degree murder, then the punishment would be sufficient, and 
hence justified according to utilitarianism. As argued in the 
previous chapter, this would not begin to serve the aims of 
morality because by punishing too mildly, we indicate that the 
offence in question is of no great concern to us; therefore, 
if the legal ins ti tut ions were to punish too mildly, they 
would no longer serve as an adequate channel through which 
society can express its anger and indignation at offenders. 
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Utilitarianism justifies severe penalties of minor 
offences, but this would not be objectionable if the threat 
never had to be carried out. Retributivism maintains that 
only serious crimes deserve to be seriously punished, while 
utilitarianism claims that the benefit of punishment must 
always outweigh the harm of punishing. 
Utilitarianism would endorse higher penalties for offences 
committed under a strong temptation to do so since they would 
be in need of greater deterrence. On this view, a starving 
person who steals a loaf of bread would be punished more 
severely than a rich person stealing something not desired 
very strongly, ceteris paribus. 
In this section, it became evident that utilitarianism 
cannot furnish us with a morally acceptable account of how 
much or in what manner to punish. In the next chapter, I 
shall defend a non-utilitarian approach to deterrence, one 
resting on retributive foundations. In doing so, I shall 
provide a morally acceptable account of how we ought to 
resolve the question pertaining to the measure of punishment. 
4.5 SUMMARY AND PERSPECTIVE 
Having established in the previous chapter that retributivism 
furnishes us with a morally acceptable answer to the question 
of whom to punish, I shifted the focus in this chapter to 
deterrence as propounded by utilitarianism in pursuit of a 
morally acceptable answer to the question of how much to 
punish. Although utilitarianism was a candidate for this 
question because it emphasises deterrence, the approach has 
numerous implications that make the theory morally untenable, 
such as that it does not aim at justice and that it endorses 
disproportionate sentencing. Utilitarianism is consequently 
unable to provide us with a morally acceptable account of 
determining the measure and kind of punishment. 
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Although I rejected utilitarianism, I wish to defend 
deterrence and shall do so in the next chapter. I shall argue 
that deterrence can be defended by demonstrating that 
deterrence has retributive foundations, and in doing so it can 
be defended without having to depend on utilitarianism with 
its untenable implications. The arguments in the next chapter 
will also provide an acceptable way of determining the measure 
of punishment. 
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5.1 INTRODUCTION 
CHAPTER 5 
DEFENDING DETERRENCE 
Utilitarians hold that deterrence is one of the central 
concerns of their theory and are usually opposed to anything 
approaching retributivism. In what follows, I shall show that 
it is in fact possible to divorce deterrence from 
utilitarianism since it is possible to show that deterrence 
actually relies on retributive foundations for its 
justification and that we can therefore keep deterrence 
without having to rely on any utilitarian implications. 
I shall defend both particular and general deterrence by 
employing retributive principles and shall also argue that the 
requirements of particular and general deterrence are not the 
same in all cases, the latter sometimes requiring more force, 
or punishment, to be inflicted in order to be effective. I 
shall argue that this is morally justified. 
Of course, to use criminals for purposes of general 
deterrence, when general deterrence requires more than mere 
particular deterrence would require, entails using criminals 
as means towards an end, the end of general deterrence, and 
not to see them as ends in themselves. I shall need to 
justify this too, and shall do so by employing a distinction I 
already made in 2. 4. Kant would argue that using criminals 
for purposes of general deterrence, when this is more than 
particular deterrence requires, would be wronging criminals 
because we would thereby reduce them to means to a social end. 
However, it may be argued retributively, as Kant himself does, 
that murderers deserve to die, for instance, and that the 
deterrent effect this would have on potential murderers would 
just be a fortunate side effect. However, if we do not accept 
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this retributive rationale, we must face the challenge of 
justifying general deterrence in cases where punishing 
criminals goes beyond what is required by particular 
deterrence. I shall therefore argue that general deterrence 
is morally justified, even if it goes beyond what particular 
deterrence requires, by employing an argument based on self-
defence and the principle of just distribution. 
As we also saw, utilitarianism was rejected because it 
entails untenable consequences, such as not aiming at justice, 
and endorsing disproportionate punishment when this is utility 
maximising. It was pointed out that the central concern for 
the utilitarian approach to punishment is deterrence. 
However, if I can show that punishing with deterrent 
objectives is actually to do so retributively, I shall be able 
to retain deterrence while rejecting utilitarianism, rejecting 
it with its untenable implications. 
I shall first turn to particular deterrence, thereby 
laying the foundations for the defence of general deterrence. 
I shall argue that particular deterrence is morally justified 
since we may describe it as a form of self-defence. 
5.2 PARTICULAR DETERRENCE AS A FORM OF SELF-DEFENCE 
Daniel Farrell (1995: 39) contends that in a Lockean state of 
nature, one right we would claim directly is to resist others' 
attempts of violating our rights. Imagine, for instance, that 
we are attacked by persons wielding knives and who intend to 
kill us in order to rob us more effectively. Most of us would 
agree that we have a right to resist the attackers, even with 
deadly force if necessary. Let us term this "direct self-
defence." I shall distinguish this from "indirect self-
defence" shortly. We would not normally voluntarily yield to 
the attacks of such attackers, since we believe it to be our 
right that we defend ourselves in situations in which we are 
attacked without provoking the attackers. It is important to 
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point out that one is justified in exercising this right only 
if no other viable option is available. 
follows: 
Clark explains it as 
If rational persuasion worked well enough, there would be no need to 
threaten punishment. Equally, if there were every prospect that I 
could protect life and limb against an aggressive assailant by 
rational persuasion, I would not be justified in using violence to 
defend myself; but, if persuasion fails or is not feasible, then may 
I not use physical force, at least when the assailant is responsible 
for attacking me, having chosen to do so? (Clark 1997: 29). 
Imagine that we have been attacked by specific attackers 
on numerous occasions in the past, and we have reasons to 
presume that the attackers will continue with their attacks in 
the future. Suppose further that we have learned that the 
attackers have a particularly strong aversion to physical 
pain. Suppose that we had learned that if we could subject 
them to a specific level of pain, if continuing with their 
attacks, they would cease attacking us. In such a case, we 
seem to be justified in threatening them with severe physical 
pain if the attacks are continued. If threats are not enough, 
subsequent to an attack, we have the right to inflict such 
pain. We are supposing that short of killing the aggressors, 
this is the only way of deterring them from trying to kill us: 
We are surely as justified in defending ourselves against crime when 
necessary by threatening penal sanctions against those who might be 
responsible for offending as we are in defending ourselves with force 
where necessary when others voluntarily attack us. The threat of 
punishment can be regarded as a form of self-defence; though when the 
punishment is inflicted it is no longer self-defence, since the 
offence has already been committed (Clark 1997: 28). 
The question I shall now address is whether we are 
justified in applying more force to fend off a future attack 
than is necessary to fend off a present attack. Let us 
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therefore shift the focus slightly. Suppose that 
circumstances are exactly as above, only that at the time of 
the most recent attack, we know exactly that a future attack 
will occur and when it will occur. Suppose also that we know 
that when it occurs we will be incapacitated because we will 
be recovering from an operation, for instance. During the 
present attack, we are only faced with two choices: either we 
repel the attack as before, or in addition to repelling the 
attack, we inflict severe physical pain as a deterrent to 
future attacks. lf we inflict the additional pain, the 
attackers will not attack us again when we are unable to 
resist, while otherwise they will. If we are justified in 
fending off an attack, even with deadly force if necessary, 
why should we not be justified in inflicting force beyond 
presently necessary force in order to prevent a future attack? 
Applying this to legal punishment, it may be contended that 
the above justification of particular deterrence is directly 
applicable to punishing offenders. By incarcerating them, for 
instance, we prevent them from committing further crimes. If 
one has the right to self-defence in a Lockean state of 
nature, then in a society where the state is one's agent, the 
state may exercise that right on behalf of its citizens 
(Farrell 1995: 40-41). 
The question that needs to be answered, however, is 
whether indirect deterrence is indeed justifiable. Are the 
principles of self-defence not backward-looking? We would not 
say that one is justified in doing just anything to anyone in 
defence. Generally, we do not believe, for example, that one 
is justified in killing an attacker's family, even if this is 
the only way of repelling an attack. For example, we usually 
hold that one is justified in killing murderers in self-
defence, rather than their children, even if the latter action 
would be just as effective. What this indicates is that 
punishment must be aggressor-oriented. We believe, for 
reasons discussed shortly, that by attacking us, aggressors 
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lose certain rights, but we do not thereby believe that anyone 
else loses those rights. This is all connected in some way to 
the question whether the principles of self-defence and of 
particular deterrence are retributivistic. 
If one believes that one is justified in inflicting harms 
on a potential aggressor when one is faced with only two 
choices, either inflicting harms or suffering harms oneself, 
then one must state why one holds one's belief to be 
justified. Following Farrell ( 1995: 42), I argue that since 
it is the aggressors who force us to make the choice, they are 
entitled to suffer the consequences since by hypothesis one or 
the other must suffer. Hence, this may be seen as a form of 
distributive justice and it follows that one would be 
justified on these grounds. From a spectator's point of view, 
it is plausible to argue that I am justified in intervening on 
behalf of a victim against a potential aggressor in order to 
save the former. I am justified on the same grounds in 
intervening even if the aggressor is not directly threatening 
me. 1 It may be pointed out that this line of reasoning is 
weakly retributivistic: because aggressors attack us, 
therefore we subject them to certain harms, harms we would not 
be justified in imposing upon persons who did not aggress 
against us. Weak retributi vism thus holds that perpetrators 
must suffer, not because they perpetrate, but because by their 
choices they establish a situation in which someone must 
suffer, and they can and should be the ones who suffer 
(Farrell 1995: 43). Consequentialism also justifies my using 
as much force as necessary in self-defence, even if it is not 
in accordance with the utilitarian principle. An elderly man 
may, for instance, kill three attacking young men in self-
defence and hence on balance cause greater harm and yet be 
justified in his deed (Clark 1997: 30). 
1 Jane English (1986: 248-256) presents an interesting set of arguments 
pertaining to self-defence. 
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Let us now proceed to general deterrence, where I shall 
argue that we are morally justified in using offenders as 
means towards general deterrence, beyond what is required for 
mere particular deterrence, because by offending they have 
forfeited certain of their rights. 
5.3 GENERAL DETERRENCE AS WEAK RETRIBUTION 
In the previous section, I argued that particular deterrence 
is a form of self-defence, and even if this is so, punishment 
with this end has retributive characteristics. Let us now 
turn to general deterrence. 
If general deterrence is justifiable, it cannot be 
justified on distributive premises like particular deterrence 
because we have justified particular deterrence by arguing 
that aggressors force us to suffer harm or inflict harm upon 
them. In carrying the above example over to general 
deterrence, we are concerned with the situation in which no 
attacker is responsible for the other potential attack with 
which we are faced, but where we can decrease the likelihood 
of these potential attacks becoming actualised by doing more 
harm to any actual attacker, thereby creating a greater 
deterrent effect for other potential attackers than is 
required for self-defence. Perhaps we should extend the 
distributive principle to allow us to use those who have 
committed certain offences in the past to deter future 
potential wrongdoers. We are justified in using them as means 
towards this end by virtue of the fact that they have 
forfeited some rights by their perpetrations. 2 Farrell calls 
this view "undefended extensive weak retributi vism" (Farrell 
1995: 44) • 
deterrence, 
If this is all we can say about general 
then the result remains a weak element of 
retributivism. Put simply, what this view holds is that it is 
more appropriate that certain groups of individuals suffer, 
2 See 2. 4. 
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namely those who have committed crimes, rather than that 
certain other individuals should suffer, and that it is more 
appropriate because the members of the former group have been 
convicted of crimes, while the members of the latter group 
have not. 
An alternative defence along these lines may be Herbert 
Morris's view, which employs the principle of fair play. 
Morris argues that unless we all restrain ourselves in certain 
ways, we would all be worse off than we would otherwise be. 
The argument maintains that if most members of society 
restrain themselves in relevant ways, then they have the right 
to take advantage of those who fail to restrain themselves in 
the required manner. Morris's argument fails to provide an 
answer to the question, how we have the right to punish some 
in order to deter others, however. Of course, we may assume 
that fairness grants that those managing to restrain 
themselves have the rl ght to do cert2ir:. 
failing to restrain themselves, but it does not show that it 
justifies doing exactly what general deterrence would require; 
and it implies using these people for social ends. 
Furthermore, Morris's account fails to justify using offenders 
as means to our social ends if they are simply not willing to 
restrain themselves in the appropriate way, i.e. if they are 
simply not willing to adopt the rules laid down by a society 
with whose objectives they disagree or are indifferent 
towards. If we, for example, are surrounded by people still 
in the Lockean state of nature, we have the right to defend 
ourselves against their attacks by justifying our actions 
according to the principle of self-defence, but we cannot 
appeal to the principle of fair play, advocated by Morris, 
since the attackers have not agreed to accept our conditions 
for fair play (Farrell 1995: 45). 
Rawls provides a more plausible account. The idea 
propounded by Rawls is that even if the perpetrators have not 
consented to restraining themselves in a certain way, they 
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would have done so in an original position from behind a veil 
of ignorance. It follows for Rawls that we are bound to 
conform to the standards and rules to which we would have 
agreed in the original position (Rawls 1971: 1 7-22) . For 
Rawls, justice thus requires us to restrain ourselves in the 
appropriate manner and allows us to punish those failing to 
restrain themselves in the appropriate way too. Rawls's 
approach may be plausible, but it is vulnerable in whichever 
way his philosophy is vulnerable in arguing from an original 
position behind a veil of ignorance is vulnerable. It is 
vulnerable on a theoretical level - it presupposes that those 
behind the veil of ignorance are ignorant of the socially 
significant facts about themselves (race, sex, economic class, 
social standing, religion, natural abilities, and even our 
conception of the good life). From behind the veil of 
ignorance, they are to determine those principles that would 
enable them to further the good life, whatever that may be. 
Since the good life is not known, we cannot suppose that the 
life leading to moral justice can necessarily be known. For 
this reason, Farrell deems it necessary to seek an alternative 
justification for general deterrence. 
In our Western legal systems, we do not simply use 
perpetrators once they have been convicted in order to attain 
certain ends, but rather, we warn people that if they commit 
certain offences, they will be used as means towards certain 
ends. It might be wrong to use criminals as means towards 
general deterrence if we have not warned them before they 
committed the crimes that we shall use them for such purposes; 
but having warned them, having proclaimed penalties, for 
instance, beyond what is necessary for particular deterrence, 
are we justified in using them for general deterrence purposes 
following conviction? It must here be pointed out that we do 
not generally believe that we are justified in doing Y if A do 
X, even if we previously told A that we would do Y if they did 
X. Simply our telling persons that we would do Y if they did 
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X is not sufficient to justify our doing Y when they do X. 
Otherwise, we would be justified in doing something we had no 
right to do simply by telling the relevant party that we would 
do it (Goldman 1979: 54-56). We are not primarily making the 
threat in order to rationalise our punishment once the 
offender has acted against our threat. Threats, if they are 
taken seriously, are means of restricting certain people's 
actions, and they require moral justification. If we believe 
that our threats would restrain some people from performing 
certain harmful actions, and this is the only available 
effective measure for reducing such harmful actions, then we 
may argue that we are morally justified in making our threats, 
adding that our threats are not directed at the public in 
general, but only towards potential offenders (Farrell 1995: 
49) . 
A problem that arises in making threats is that they are 
generic threats, rather than individualised ones. We are 
threatening everyone with the same penalty, or range of 
penalties, for each particular crime. Stated differently, our 
threats are not based on individual considerations, derived in 
response to particular threats. This may be objectionable 
since we might not be justified in threatening anyone with 
more than is necessary for deterring him or her from 
committing certain offences against us. It may be possible to 
individualise our threats in a setting of small magnitude, but 
in any larger society, it would be practically impossible to 
do so. Since we are therefore left with either issuing 
uniform threats or establishing an extraordinarily complex 
bureaucracy for issuing individualised threats, it seems that 
we are justified in doing the former (Farrell 1995: 49). 
Supposing now that our threats have been justifiably made, 
we are still faced with the task of justifying their carrying 
out. We may argue that threats that are never carried out 
when appropriate are not credible. Therefore, in order to 
maintain the credibility of our threats, we are justified in 
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carrying them out - in fact, we must carry them out if they 
are to have any effect: 
Sanctions are threatened principally in order to defend us from crime 
by deterring potential offenders from committing criminal acts. It is 
inconceivable, at any rate in the societies we live in, that such 
threats should prove effective if they were never carried out (Clark 
1997: 29) . 
Critics may rightly respond that we have things back to 
front. If there are certain things we are not justified in 
doing, then we have no right to do them simply because we say 
that we would do them. The critics' objection presumably 
rests on the assumption that in issuing generic threats, we 
will do more than necessary to perpetrators than is required 
to prevent them from wronging us again, at least in some 
cases. Put differently, the argument is that in doing more to 
criminals than particular deterrence requires, we are 
invariably wronging them because we are thereby using them as 
means towards our own ends. 
It is not sufficient for us to put certain penalties on 
certain forms of behaviour, and make potential offenders aware 
of the penalties attached to various forms of offensive 
behaviour, in order to justify our using offenders as means 
towards general deterrence. The critics may respond that we 
are simply never justified in doing more than is required to 
deter offenders from committing the same offences again, even 
if we told them that we would do more if they violated our 
laws (Farrell 1995: 50). 
We are not left in an impasse, however. Farrell (1995: 
51) asks us to imagine that we are attacked in a Lockean state 
of nature. Imagine not only that we would not be able to 
repel a future attack by the recurrent aggressors, but also 
the attacks of other potential aggressors. According to the 
principle of distributive justice, we are justified in harming 
an attacker in order to deter any future attack. If the 
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present attack makes one more vulnerable to attacks from 
others, then we are surely justified in using the present 
attacker as a means towards preventing future possible attacks 
by inflicting harm upon the aggressor beyond what is necessary 
for preventing attacks from the present attacker. Remember 
that our principle has established that if either the innocent 
or the offenders must suffer, it is desirable that the latter 
do so. It is therefore not only a principle of self-defence, 
but also one of protecting the innocent against unjust 
aggression. 
Again, the critics may respond that the attackers might 
have had no way of knowing the harm caused by their unlawful 
conduct. What is therefore required is that we extend our 
principle to include both harms that are created knowingly and 
those that are not (Farrell 1995: 51-52). Alternatively, if 
we do not want to extend our principle in this manner, we may 
respond to the critics' objection by saying that the offenders 
ought to have known the extent of the harm caused based on 
evidence and calculable probabilities. This evidence was 
available to them; therefore, we shall still hold them liable 
even if they claim to have been ignorant of their actions' 
probable consequences. The argument thus runs as follows: 
(1) We are justified in doing more to offenders than 
particular deterrence requires, if our failure to do 
more makes us more vulnerable to attacks from others. 
(2) The attackers knew or ought to have known that their 
attacks would make us more vulnerable to attacks from 
others. 
(3) Therefore, we are justified in doing more to offenders 
than mere particular deterrence requires. 
The critics of general deterrence are therefore incorrect to 
assume that we are not morally justified in doing more in the 
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interests of general deterrence than particular deterrence 
requires (Farrell 1995: 52). 
5.4 USING CRIMINALS AS MEANS TOWARDS GENERAL DETERRENCE 
Suppose our vulnerability would not be augmented by a given 
offender's attack if we do not retaliate at all, nevertheless 
we have good reason to believe that our doing so will increase 
our general level of security against attacks from others. 
Alternatively, suppose that we are more vulnerable by not 
retaliating, then it is tempting to believe that by doing more 
than necessary we will increase our general level of security 
to what it was prior to the attack. If we justify our 
retaliation, or our doing more in these circumstances, then we 
must resort to what Farrell (1995: 52) previously termed 
"undefended extensive weak retributi vism." Our principle of 
distributive justice is not applicable here because we are not 
faced with a dichotomous choice - either harm or be harmed. 
The harming of the perpetrator to deter others must therefore 
be seen as retributivistic since the harming of the 
perpetrator is carried out wholly because it would do us some 
good, and we are justified in doing so because the harmed 
individual is a wrongdoer; and this is undefended extensive 
week retributivism. We are thus forced to conclude with 
Farrell that general deterrence is not as consequentialist as 
commonly assumed. It has retributive foundations because it 
rests on the foundation that we are justified in using 
criminals for general deterrence purposes; we are justified in 
using criminals because by offending they have attained a 
diminished moral status. Not just anyone may be used as such 
a means, innocent persons may not be in virtue of their having 
a higher moral status because they have not been found guilty 
of a criminal offence. This is in agreement with the 
distinction I already made in 2.4. 
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5.5 THE MEASURE OF JUSTIFIED FORCE 
I have argued that the principle of distributive justice 
justifies our using force against an offending individual to 
protect others or ourselves from harm. The question that now 
arises is, what limits does this principle impose on our 
responses? It must be pointed out here that the harms imposed 
in accordance with this principle need not have been 
proclaimed in advance. This is because offenders leave us 
with a choice of either our being harmed or our harming them. 
This principle seems to warrant our use of force only insofar 
as it is necessary to prevent harm done to us or other 
innocent persons. How then are we to determine the magnitude 
of the force necessary for successfully repelling a given 
attack in advance? By any standard, this is an empirical 
question that is difficult to answer. Perhaps it may be 
impossible to determine precisely. If this is the case, we 
will have to base our actions on estimates of the amount of 
force required. Needless to add, our estimates will vary from 
case to case, and these too will be very difficult to make. 
Farrell asks us to imagine that we bypass this problem by 
announcing a set of responses in advance, actions we shall 
take in response to certain wrongdoings against us. The 
intensity of our response will vary, being placed in different 
categories, depending on the seriousness of the possible 
attack against us. Our proclamations will face two distinct 
limits. Since we are basing our justification on the 
principle of distributive justice, we are not justified in 
doing just anything to fend off an attack. If my life is 
endangered, for instance, I may kill the attacker in self-
defence, but if I am only facing the prospect of having my 
clothes torn, I may blacken an eye. Once again, however, we 
are left with a vague guideline, since people's intuitions 
vary about which response is acceptable in a given situation; 
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it is the same sort of problem with how much to punish 
(Farrell 1995: 55-56). 
I have supposed for the purpose of my investigation that 
we are only entitled to use as much force as is necessary to 
fend off an attack. Let us now examine this assumption more 
closely. It is plausible to assume that by not repelling 
attackers in a manner that discourages them from launching any 
further attacks, they are likely to attack again, thereby 
endangering us or other innocent individuals. Therefore, 
doing more than is minimally necessary to fend off specific 
attacks seems justified. Nevertheless, each case still seems 
to have an upper limit of justifiable force. Because the 
exact amount of force might not be determinable, we are still 
justified in establishing it by means of estimation, by virtue 
of the fact that we are entitled to defend ourselves and other 
innocent individuals. 3 This does not rule out the fact that in 
our need to ensure our safety, our estimates may exceed the 
amount of force necessary for repelling some attacks in some 
instances. However, this would be going beyond what the 
principle of self-defence justifies. Suppose, however, that 
we decrease the likelihood of attacks by reacting not to 
individual cases, but to categories of cases pre-determined on 
empirical estimates, such as that car theft should be 
punishable between one and three years imprisonment, and 
first-degree murder between fifteen years and life 
imprisonment. Under such conditions, we would be justified in 
adopting such a strategy to decrease our vulnerability as well 
as that of other innocent persons, even if this means doing 
more in some specific cases (Farrell 1995: 57-58). We are 
justified in doing so on the principle of distributive 
justice, not only on grounds of utility. Once again, it must 
3 Cohen (1993: 485-493) emphasises the extent to which contract law can be 
seen as a branch of public law. Because the law must have regard for the 
general and institutional effects of classes of transactions, it must, when 
settling disputes, be prepared to go beyond the original intention of the 
contracting parties. 
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some individuals as means 
is justified because the 
harshly than their cases 
be emphasised that even using 
towards attaining a general goal 
persons who might be treated more 
require are wrongdoers, and either wrongdoers or we must 
suffer. This means that our theory still relies on some 
element of retributivism. The retributivistic element lies in 
the fact that perpetrators must suffer, rather than any other 
person, or groups of persons, having to suffer. 
5.6 IMPLICATIONS OF DETERRENCE THEORY 
The conclusions derived from the previous section allow us to 
draw distinct implications of deterrence theory: 
The first is that no one should deliberately and 
intentionally violate 
feasible alternative. 
another's rights 
This implication 
where there is a 
is derived from the 
fact that deterrence relies on the notion of self-defence, and 
one may only aggress in self-defence if there is no feasible 
alternative. The implication for punishment is that it ought 
not to be greater in severity than is required for general 
deterrence. As mentioned in the previous section, this means 
that punishment ought to be graded according to the severity 
of the offence: the more severe an offence is, the more severe 
its punishment ought to be, ceteris paribus. This does not 
only mean that punishment should be fair, or that it should be 
most carefully imposed, but also that there is a noticeable 
relation between the magnitude of the punishment and that of 
the crime. A proper gradation is also beneficial to the 
furthering of deterrence (as I have already established in 
5.5). If a murderer and a car thief were both to receive five 
years imprisonment, ceteris paribus, then justice cannot be 
said to have been done because the former is guilty of a more 
serious offence than the latter. 
Another implication we may draw from the foregoing is that 
if the rights of individuals are to be risked, the risk should 
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fall more heavily on wrongdoers (the guilty) than on others 
(the innocent) . This, as has been established above, is the 
principle underlying weak retributi vism, which is the basis 
for a defence of general deterrence. Since rights sometimes 
have to be violated for general deterrence to be effective, it 
should be the rights of the guilty, rather than of the 
innocent. This is also the rationale behind the reasoning 
justifying the use of guilty persons as means towards the end 
of general deterrence. 
Concisely stated, the implications of deterrence theory 
are that the following three principles are derivable as 
restraining principles of a morally defensible punishment 
system, principles that ought to guard against abuse in the 
striving towards the goals of punishment: 
(1) No one should deliberately and intentionally violate 
another's rights where there is a feasible 
alternative. 
(2) Fairness requires that punishments should be graded in 
their severity, according to the severity of the 
offences. 
(3) If the rights of individuals are to be threatened, the 
threat should fall more heavily on wrongdoers (the 
guilty) than on others (the innocent). 
Pertaining to the 
unobjectionably be imposed, 
amount of punishment that may 
I showed that we are justified in 
issuing uniform threats to categories of potential offenders 
and in punishing off enders according to pre-established 
categories. Such categories may have upper and lower bounds 
within which sentences may be handed down, thereby enabling 
one to take aggravating and mitigating factors into account. 
This conclusion, however, may be one that is not wholly 
satisfying to some since it limits the range of possibilities 
for sentencing in di vi dual off enders. Nevertheless, it is the 
146 
only practicable solution I found that does not invite 
excessive abuse. We saw that retributi vism is wholly 
inadequate for determining the severity of a sentence. The 
remaining two theories that will still be discussed 
( rehabili tationism and res ti tutionalism) fare no better. It 
will be seen that, in a pure theory, rehabilitationism would 
endorse indeterminate sentence lengths, punishment of the 
innocent, and largely disproportionate sentencing. 
Restitutionalism faces similar difficulties to retributivism. 
Whereas deterrence theory does not provide us with an ideal 
solution, it does have the advantage of furnishing us with an 
acceptable one, however, one that provides certain discretion 
for aggravating and mitigating factors while curbing the 
possibility of administering largely disproportionate 
sentences. 
5.7 SOCIAL LIMITS OF DETERRENCE 
Prevention occurs when persons make 
forego the benefits of crime because 
rational decisions to 
the pain or discomfort 
would be greater. An assumption underlying deterrence theory 
is that persons are rational calculators who, prior to 
committing crimes, weigh the benefits against the possible 
disadvantages of apprehension and the likelihood thereof. 
Deterrence also functions in a second, subtler way; by 
stigmatising those who violate society's norms, it reinforces 
compliance with the norms. However, this theory does not have 
strong applicability for those living in impoverished 
communities. Persons who rebel against the norms of society 
for political reasons, thereby wishing to draw attention to 
their community's plight, are unlikely to be deterred by 
prudential considerations. Furthermore, deterrence is also 
likely to have little or no effect on severely impoverished 
individuals committing crimes due to economic necessity. 
Those in despair are inaccessible to deterrence motivations. 
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Members of deviant sub-cultures are socially inaccessible, 
while disoriented impoverished members are psychologically 
inaccessible. For deterrence to have utility value, it must 
threaten the individual with the loss of something valued. 
Individuals living miserable, impoverished lives have little 
or nothing to lose that is valuable to them and may even be 
better off imprisoned since in prison their basic needs are 
met. This has also been given as a reason why recidivism 
amongst those from impoverished communities is so high 
(Delgado 1995: 2 65) . What I wish to point out is that even 
though deterrence may often be justified, employing it may 
sometimes be partly or wholly ineffective. 
The question may also legitimately be raised, whether 
punishing individuals not sharing society's norms has any 
deterrent value. It is most likely that such treatment is 
counterproductive when seen as unfair by the punished. If we 
are punished for what we cannot help doing, then we have 
little incentive to avoid what we can help doing, resulting in 
a further undermining of values. Unjust punishment is not 
really punishment, but the mere exercising of force against 
persons whose behaviour is against the values and norms of 
society in general. In addition, if persons are punished to 
deter others for actions not reasonably under their control, 
the punishment is unjust (Delgado 1995: 265-266). One could 
just as well punish insane indi victuals to deter sane persons 
from committing crimes. Such arbitrary application of the law 
is likely to be detrimental, persuading people that the law is 
arbitrary and therefore not worthy of respect. 
In 3. 4, I argued that the retributive justifications of 
punishment are acceptable only if society is structured in 
such a manner as not to alienate any of its members from full 
participation. "Participation" is meant as that which 
provides or allows equal opportunities for all citizens in all 
spheres of society. In terms of deterrence, it is not the 
case that one is not justified in deterring the alienated, 
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impoverished members of society, when doing so is in agreement 
with a law that is not immoral; one may do so to protect 
oneself. The problem is, however, that al though it may be 
morally justified in response to a given violation of law, the 
deterrence of such persons is likely to be much less effective 
than deterrence of other societal subclasses. 
5.8 SUl'1MARY AND PERSPECTIVE 
In this chapter, I argued that deterrence is justified on both 
a particular level, as well as a general one. General 
deterrence is justified even if it requires that one employ 
more force than would be necessary for mere particular 
deterrence for a case at issue. This of course requires that 
criminals be used as means towards social ends, but I argued 
that this is morally acceptable in virtue of their having 
forfeited certain of their rights through offending, and hence 
having diminished moral standing. Having argued thus, I was 
able to address the issue of how much force is justified in a 
particular case, i.e. how severe the punishment may be in 
order for it to be morally tenable. I argued for a punishment 
scale with categories of punishment being in proportion to the 
force applied in cornrni tting the criminal acts. This may not 
be an ideal solution, but it is the most suitable one I could 
envisage that could be practically applied. Having defended 
deterrence, three principles were derivable from the 
conclusions drawn, principles that ought to constrain the 
objectives of any punishment system. These are: (1) no one 
should deliberately and intentionally violate another's rights 
where there is a feasible alternative; ( 2) fairness requires 
that punishments should be graded in their severity, according 
to the severity of the offences; and ( 3) if the rights of 
individuals are to be threatened, the threat should fall more 
heavily on wrongdoers (the guilty) than on others (the 
innocent). 
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How far does deterrence go towards vindicating punishment? 
Let us examine it in light of the necessary conditions for 
which I argue. Because deterrence is usually associated with 
utilitarianism, and I have here given a defence of deterrence 
with retributive foundations (to avoid the untenable 
implications of utilitarianism), I shall here evaluate both 
theories, pointing out differences where appropriate. In this 
evaluation, deterrence theory based on utilitarianism will be 
referred to only as "utilitarianism" and deterrence theory 
with retributive foundations only as "deterrence theory": ( 1) 
Only deterrence theory (as defended in this chapter) provides 
a morally acceptable answer to the question of whom we are 
justified in punishing. (2) Only deterrence theory is able to 
adequately answer the question of how much to punish, and of 
all the theories I examine in this thesis, deterrence theory 
is the only theory that provides a morally satisfactory answer 
to this question. It is also the only theory capable of 
accommodating aggravating and mitigating factors. ( 3) 
Utilitarianism is not capable of accounting for punishment in 
such a manner that it serves as a recognised channel through 
which society can express its anger and indignation at 
offenders because it does not punish according to desert and 
therefore endorses vastly disproportionate sentences. 
Deterrence theory can do so, however, since it rests on 
retributive foundations and retributivism fulfils this 
condition. (4) Bringing about a reduction in crime: both 
utilitarianism and deterrence theory wholly endorse this 
objective the theories are wholly directed towards this 
goal. ( 5) Improving offenders: utilitarianism and deterrence 
theory are only concerned with punitive punishment, hence it 
is just as ineffective in pursuing this objective as is 
retributivism. (6) Undoing the harm done: neither 
utilitarianism, nor deterrence theory, mentions this objective 
at all, although utilitarianism would have to endorse it if 
doing so would be utility maximising, which it presumably 
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would be since it would increase the happiness of 
(7) Being economical: utilitarianism is committed 
victims. 
to this 
objective since it holds that punishment should not cost so 
much as to make it financially disadvantageous. Deterrence 
theory, by contrast, does not have this objective, and there 
is no reason to believe that it pursues this goal any more 
than retributivism does since it rests on retributivist 
foundations. Utilitarianism therefore fulfils only two of the 
seven conditions, while deterrence theory fulfils three of 
them. 
It is now appropriate to ask again, what has been achieved 
so far? I have argued that we are justified in punishing 
offenders if they fulfil the requirements of having guilty 
minds. Consequently, the question of whom to punish has 
therefore been successfully addressed by retributivism. By 
administering punishment, one of the goals I argue punishment 
ought to strive towards, namely to serve as a recognised 
channel for expressing anger and indignation at offenders, is 
pursued. 
morally 
Retributivism is however not capable of furnishing a 
acceptable answer to the question of how much to 
punish. For this reason I turned to utilitarianism with its 
emphasis on deterrence. I rejected the approach because it 
has numerous morally untenable implications. However, in this 
chapter I defended deterrence without utilitarian principles, 
arguing for its defence with retributi vi st foundations. In 
addition, I was able to develop a means for determining the 
amount of punishment to be administered. The "how much to 
punish" issue was hence successfully dealt with in this 
chapter. Three constraining principles were derivable from my 
defence of deterrence. By answering the questions of whom to 
punish, how to punish, and by allowing punishment to serve as 
a recognised channel through which society can express its 
anger and indignation at offenders, only three of the seven 
necessary conditions for the justification of punishment have 
been addressed. To adopt a moral stance to punishment is to 
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adopt a civilised stance. The mere identification of whom we 
may punish, how we may do so, and that the institution is a 
recognised channel for society to express its anger and 
indignation at offenders, does not make any attempt to improve 
offenders, nor does it address the needs of victims either, 
for instance. These are issues that need to be addressed in a 
civilised society; these are issues that must be addressed by 
morality. In the next chapter, I shall therefore focus on the 
rehabilitative approach since it pursues three of the five 
objectives I set out in Chapter 1. Once again, the 
rehabilitative approach will not be morally acceptable in its 
entirety, but it is well suited for a broader hybrid 
justification of punishment. 
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CHAPTER 6 
REHABILITATION: A QUALIFIED DEFENCE 
6.1 INTRODUCTION 
In the previous chapter, I dealt with deterrence theory, 
arguing that we have the right to use offenders for general 
deterrence purposes. However, mere imprisonment seems to be 
ineffective in significantly reducing the incidents of crime. 
A brief look at today's penal systems suffices to confirm that 
our present systems of punishment are not working optimally, 
i.e. punishment often does not have the intended deterrent 
effect, the high rate of recidivism being one of many 
indicators. Some persons dissatisfied with this contingency 
have argued that criminals ought not to be punished, but 
rather treated. The criminal is not seen as a person 
requiring punishment, i.e. someone 
infliction of pain or suffering, 
requiring treatment. 
needing the deliberate 
but rather as someone 
The favourable attitude towards rehabilitation of 
offenders however, is not the mere response to the inefficacy 
of wholly punitive responses to crime. Plato holds in The 
Republic that persons who do not possess the characteristic of 
justice are afflicted with disharmony between the elements of 
the soul. Such persons, maintains Plato, are comparable to 
persons afflicted with physical ailments. This seems to imply 
that treatment of offenders is appropriate, just as treatment 
of ill persons is appropriate: 
. . . we ought to consider injustice! It must be some kind of 
civil war between these same three elements, when they interfere with 
each other and trespass on each other's functions, or when one of 
them rebels against the whole to get control when it has no business 
to do so, because its natural role is to be a slave to the rightfully 
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controlling element. This sort of situation, when the elements of 
the mind are confused and misplaced, is what constitutes injustice, 
indiscipline, cowardice, ignorance and, in short, wickedness of all 
kinds .... there is an exact analogy between these states of mind and 
bodily health and sickness. ... Healthy activities produce health, 
and unhealthy activities produce sickness. And health is 
produced by establishing a natural relation of control and 
subordination among the constituents of the body, disease by 
establishing an unnatural relation. So justice is produced by 
establishing in the mind a similar natural relation of control and 
subordination among its constituents, and injustice by establishing 
an unnatural one (Plato 1987: 221-222). 
The issue of rehabilitation is not without moral 
difficulty, however. In this chapter, I shall critically 
evaluate the rehabilitative approach to punishment and provide 
a qualified defence of rehabili tationism. I argue that in 
order to be morally justifiable, rehabilitationism must be 
constrained by distinct principles, such as that only the 
guilty be treated, or that indeterminate sentence lengths are 
only acceptable if there is no feasible alternative because 
the subjects in question pose a serious threat to society. I 
will also address reasons why rehabilitation may have been 
unsuccessful in the past and shall then defend a qualified 
rehabilitative approach, i.e. one that is constrained by 
principles of justice. The social limits of any 
rehabilitative approach will then also be enumerated and 
discussed. In the next section, I present a paradigmatic case 
o f the rehabilitative approach to exemplify its nature, before 
contrasting it with the punitive approach in the section 
following. 
6.2 A PARADIGMATIC APPEAL FOR THE REHABILITATION OF OFFENDERS 
Karl Menninger, a renowned psychiatrist, argues for the 
abolition of the punitive approach to punishment, replacing it 
with a rehabilitative approach. He argues that criminals 
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should be treated, not punished. Just as Plato, he sees 
criminals as being mentally imbalanced, that is as having a 
disharmony, a disposition that should be corrected. 
Menninger rightly maintains that our current punitive 
system of punishment is an utter failure. He criticises 
current practices of dealing with criminals as being 
hopelessly ineffective prisons are expensive, often over-
crowded, unhealthy crime-breeding dens and seem to operate 
with revolving doors, the same people going in and out 
repeatedly, i.e. recidivism is a major problem. Menninger 
does not believe that punishment serves as an adequate 
deterrent as illustrated by the fact that the crowds attending 
public executions in eighteenth century England were most 
likely to have their pockets picked, even though pocket 
picking was a capital offence. Many criminals are also 
prepared to take chances, only a small percentage of them 
being caught, convicted and punished. Of those criminals who 
are punished, many only become more resolute, living in 
constant opposition to the law. In addition to this, the 
intelligent criminal is seldom caught. On the contrary, it is 
the less skilled criminal, the less intelligent, the criminal 
who does not know how to commit crime properly, who is usually 
caught. Furthermore, Menninger maintains that for many the 
crime is a mere impulse or accident expressed under unbearable 
stress. If offenders are perverse, lonely, resentful 
individuals, they join the only group to which they are 
suited, the outcasts and criminals. Having been ostracised by 
the community, they join the society to which they have been 
introduced, adopting their new set of rules. Many criminals 
are sentenced to arbitrary confinement and once they have 
served their time, they are again dumped loose on society, 
without positive (most likely negative) changes having taken 
place in them. They are expected to survive without any help 
from society; hence, recidivism becomes the logical outcome 
(Menninger 1985: 173-174; Menninger 1986: 325). 
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Crime 
it 
is so difficult to 
serves the needs 
eradicate, Menninger contends, 
of offenders and non-offenders because 
alike. 
motives 
Not only does it serve the needs of both sides, the 
of offenders and non-offenders are similar what 
distinguishes serious offenders is that they merely have a 
greater sense of helplessness and hopelessness in the pursuit 
of their objectives. Menninger further believes that all 
forms of crime are manifestations of violence in some or other 
form. Based on his psychiatric practice, he asserts that most 
episodes of violent outbursts are preceded by intense feelings 
of helplessness or hopelessness by the offender. He argues 
that this is because no one has complete freedom since we are 
all constrained by societies norms, rules, and restrictions. 
However, most of us manage to keep our impulsive, anti-social, 
destructive impulses under control, or sublimate them into 
socially acceptable practices and behaviour. This is a 
position already held by Plato: 
There is a better and a worse element in the personality, of each 
individual, and that when the naturally better element controls the 
worse then the man is said to be "master of himself", as a term of 
praise. But when (as a result of bad upbringing or bad company) 
smaller forces of one's better element are overpowered by the 
numerical superiority of one's worse, then one is adversely 
criticised and said not to be master of oneself and to be in a state 
of indiscipline! (Plato 1987: 201). 
Not all, however, manage to restrain themselves. Persons who 
have failed to receive love and affection often attempt to 
attain it by illogical means that often assume criminal forms. 
It should here be noted that such means almost certainly do 
not seem illogical to those employing them, i.e. those with an 
imbalance often lack the ability to assess the situation 
rationally. 
faculty of 
In Platonic terms, we may describe this as the 
reason being overridden by the other faculties. 
Menninger also holds that retaliatory responses to crime are 
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ineffective because the potential to commit crime, being a 
mental imbalance, is an illness that requires treatment by 
professionals such as psychiatrists, psychologists and social 
workers. Therefore, it follows that because such behaviour is 
held to be an illness, vengeance or retaliation is itself a 
crime because it is usually held to be morally wrong to punish 
persons for being ill (Menninger 1985: 173; Menninger 1986: 
325-326). 
Menninger argues for the replacement of 
attitude to crime by a therapeutic attitude. 
the punitive 
He pleads for 
the attitudes of avoidance, ridicule, scorn, and punitiveness, 
when dealing with criminal off enders, to be replaced by an 
attitude in which criminals are seen as individuals not fully 
in control of their behaviour or mode of conduct, and in need 
of professional help in order to attain adequate control, to 
be able to live in society as law-abiding citizens. For 
Plato, once again, this would be equated to restoring a 
balance within the soul between disharmonious elements. 
Doctors, psychiatrists, psychologists, social workers, and 
everyone else involved in reforming criminals, should not 
impose any unnecessary suffering on offenders, even if they 
are provocative, uncooperative, hostile, or the like. In 
addition, just as physically sick patients, they are to 
receive only the treatments necessary for their cures. 
Therapists have the duty to care for them, to rehabilitate 
them, to reform them, and to prevent them from doing harm to 
themselves or others. It follows that in order to be 
successful, the therapeutic attitude requires love accompanied 
by hope, not hate (Menninger 1986: 328). 
Thus, in order for our legal system to have any positive 
affect upon those with whom it is most concerned, the 
ineffective punishment system must be replaced by an 
effective, scientific treatment system. The fundamental 
scientific question that needs to be asked is, which of the 
available treatments would bring about most effective reform 
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regarding the criminal in question? Once this has been 
settled, Menninger argues for treatment to be continued until 
a positive change, a satisfactory change, has been attained. 
"Satisfactory change" is meant as criminals having gained 
adequate control over their behavioural modes of conduct to be 
able to live as law-abiding citizens in society. Given the 
scientific nature of the assessment, each offender is to be 
evaluated unemotionally and the only objectives are to be 
positive results. Since the time required to attain effective 
rehabilitation may differ markedly between different subjects, 
Menninger argues for indefinite sentencing, the length being 
dependent on the success or otherwise of the treatment. 
Criminals' characters, their personalities, the environments 
from which they come, its effects upon them, and their effects 
upon it, would all be assessed. Employing scientific re-
education, the offenders are to be reformed to establish, 
respectively, a mutually satisfactory situation for them and 
society, which entails different levels of control, including 
releasing them back into society as soon as their situation 
allows it. Those who cannot yet be rehabilitated must be 
indefinitely detained in the interest of society; there are to 
be no exceptions, i.e. no one is to be released prior to being 
satisfactorily rehabilitated (Menninger 1985: 17 5) . The 
protection of society is therefore adopted as the fundamental 
objective (Menninger 1985: 177). Nothing is to be done in the 
name of punishment 
The objective is 
interest of society. 
since punishment would 
only to rehabilitate 
now be irrelevant. 
off enders in the 
Menninger concedes that the rehabilitative approach has 
its limitations. He agrees that some criminal conduct is not 
yet curable, just as many physical afflictions are not yet 
curable, pending further scientific knowledge. Therefore, the 
only option is for offenders with such behaviours to remain 
confined in prisons. 
most reluctant to 
Menninger is also aware that society is 
let violent criminals, such as brutal 
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murderers, be treated without punishment. In response, he 
argues that the aetiology of most crimes is still largely 
unknown, but that it is these brutal, seemingly inexplicable 
modes of criminal behaviour that are most in need of 
scientific explanation. Questions such as why some people 
become brutal murderers, why others become sexual off enders, 
and why others from impoverished social backgrounds, from whom 
one might expect a tendency towards criminal activity, never 
become criminals, are pressing scientific questions that need 
urgent attention (Menninger 1986: 329). Menninger argues that 
crime is often the indirect product of poverty, psychosis and 
social immaturity and so to neglect these variables is 
therefore to impose moral blindness upon oneself, and to treat 
people by leaving out essential human factors. Therefore, he 
concludes that we must rely more upon creative parole, 
counselling, education, and outpatient treatment. His method 
of dealing with offenders is clearly consequentialist. He 
argues for a constructive social attitude, therapeutic in some 
instances, restraining in other instances, but preventive in 
its total social impact (Menninger 1986: 330). 
6 . 3 DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE PUNITIVE AND REHABILITATIVE 
APPROACHES 
( 1) The first difference that may be noted is the intended 
subjective experience of the subject. Punishment usually is 
seen as an unpleasantness deliberately inflicted on off enders 
for offences they have committed. The unpleasantness is 
essential to it and not just an accidental accompaniment to 
another treatment. It is administered by a person authorised 
to do so by the system of rules against which an offence has 
been committed. The rehabilitative approach on the other hand 
does away with punishment in the commonly used sense, 
replacing it by scientifically based treatments. Instead of 
asking what penalty is warranted by the crime, whether agents 
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were fully responsible for their actions, whether 
circumstances exonerate them wholly or in part, it asks what 
kind of treatment is most likely to rehabilitate them. This 
no longer represents deliberate suffering, and if suffering 
occurs through the treatment, it is an accompanying factor 
that is not intended. Desert is replaced by needs. 
(2) A further distinction between the objectives of 
punishment as general deterrence and rehabilitation is that 
the former attempts to prevent crimes by would-be offenders, 
while the latter attempts to prevent additional crimes by one-
time offenders. Deterrence aims at the behaviour of non-
criminals, while rehabilitation aims at modifying criminals' 
behaviour. Seen from this perspective, rehabilitation would 
seem to be preferable to deterrence since it aims at 
influencing the behaviour of offenders, those who have already 
committed an offence, while deterrence also aims at 
influencing the behaviour of potential offenders, those who 
have not yet committed an offence. It is justifiable to ask, 
why should we be the targets of any deterrent action if we 
might never actualise a negative potential? Rehabilitation, 
on the other hand, in this respect, deals with the changing of 
maladaptive behaviour once such behaviour has been exhibited. 
This certainly seems to be less objectionable. It is clear 
that rehabilitation is therefore not aimed at preventing new 
crimes, i.e. first offences by individuals, but only 
subsequent crimes. 
( 3) An obvious practical advantage of rehabilitation is 
that it can be tailored to suit individual needs while 
punishment as deterrence is tailored to suit a general target 
group of which, as in any target group, there may be strong 
deviations from the norm. This means that the instrument of 
deterrence will be applied more stringently than is necessary 
for some individuals, and not stringently enough for others. 
Proponents of reform theory see punishment not as a means for 
deterring offenders from off ending again, but rather changing 
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their characters, i.e. changing the conditions within them 
that lead them to commit crimes. Criminal behaviour is seen 
as an illness that can and ought to be treated. 
(4) If crime is the by-product of illness, or if criminals 
can be successfully treated without violating their rights, 
then rehabilitation is the rational response to crime as seen 
from the point of view of those treated. If I exhibit 
criminal behaviour, which may thwart my long-term well being, 
because, for instance, I may be incarcerated, then it would be 
rational for me to want any treatment that does not violate my 
rights if the treatment aims at eradicating my maladaptive 
behaviour. It would therefore be irrational for me to choose 
mere imprisonment because I believe imprisonment would deter 
me from similar conduct in future. It would also be 
irrational to choose mere deterrence, being operantly 
conditioned like any animal capable of reacting towards given 
stimuli; however, it would be rational to choose therapy, and 
that which enables me to cease my maladaptive behaviour and 
gain greater control over my conduct. Proponents of reform 
theory argue that the justification of punishment is that it 
provides the state with an opportunity to reform offenders 
that punishment itself is insufficient to effect. However, 
since reform need not be accompanied by punishment, punishment 
is neither a sufficient nor a necessary condition to effect 
reform. 
It has already been established that society has a right 
to express its anger and indignation through punishment and 
that offenders may be used for purposes of general deterrence. 
Neither of these objectives, however, makes any significant 
attempt at improving offenders, one of the goals I insist 
morally defensible punishment must have. Therefore, the 
rehabilitative approach, with its emphasis on therapy, must be 
examined and critically evaluated, with the objective of 
drawing positive elements into a unitary theory of punishment. 
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The rehabilitation of offenders is arguably the most 
audacious of the goals I defend since, 
in this chapter, if rehabilitation is 
as will become evident 
advocated in a pure 
theory, it leads to violations of individual rights, such as 
indeterminate sentence lengths: 
The reformation of the offender is a result more difficult to 
achieve, but also more worthy of effort. To "reform" or "amend" the 
offender means to effect a change of her inclinations, motives, 
habits, character. If an offender wanted to repeat the offence, but 
desisted under the influence of fear of punishment, we should not say 
that she has been successfully reformed; we should say that she is no 
better than before, but has been efficiently deterred by fear. An 
offender truly reformed is one who does not desist from breaking the 
law again out of fear, but one who no longer wants to do that, who is 
free from criminal inclinations and habits. She will not break the 
law even when she has reason to believe that she will not be 
discovered and need not fear punishment (Primoratz 1997: 20). 
The rehabilitative approach has probably created more 
passionate opposition than any other approach, philosophers 
arguing for a return to retribution, or at least remaining 
with a normal punishment system, motivated by fear of the 
abuses and unlimited authority that a system of rehabilitation 
might have. These concerns pertain to, amongst others, the 
issues of indeterminate sentence or treatment lengths, 
treatment of non-offenders, preventive detention, the lack of 
respect accorded off enders under such a system, and often 
changing their value systems against their wills. In addition 
to these is the claim that while such a system would be just 
as compelling as any punishment system, a therapy system is 
incomprehensible to the public and that it would not function 
in the interests of justice, but in the interests of science, 
which is in contrast to the punitive system. 
Luis (1997: 517-521) is one of those urging a return to 
retributi vism, not in the interests of society, but in the 
interests of criminals. The concerns of critics like Luis, 
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are that the things done to criminals under a humanitarian 
system, under a system of rehabilitation, would involve 
greater compulsion than that under a punishment system. If 
embezzlers, for example, were to have a likelihood of being 
cured by undergoing psychotherapy, they would almost certainly 
be compelled to undergo the treatment for as long as is 
necessary, which some opponents of rehabili tationism see as 
forcing them into something against their wills, and hence a 
violation of their human rights; while if they were punished, 
the length of their sentences would already be known when 
their punishments were handed down. It is denied that 
rehabilitation is connected to desert (a person may, for 
instance, be detained for many years for a minor offence, 
should therapy require it), but desert, maintain the critics 
of the rehabilitative approach, is the only connecting link 
between punishment and justice. Rehabilitation is implemented 
as a means towards a cure, not as a means towards justice, 
i.e. justice is replaced by scientific results. 
Then, the system of punishment is comprehensible to the 
public, i.e. society has a sense of what is right. In 
countries with a jury system, this can be exemplified by the 
fact that juries sometimes refuse to convict when they regard 
a given threatening punishment as unjust. This was often the 
case in nineteenth century England for example, when capital 
punishment was mandatory for theft above a specified value. 
Juries then often arbitrarily set the value of the stolen item 
below the value requiring capital punishment, thereby 
acquitting the accused. This could not be done in a 
rehabilitative system where the public would not be making the 
decisions; rather experts would determine the length, nature 
and intensity of treatment. These experts would work with 
instruments and techniques that are no longer accessible to 
any but those who have been trained in their relevant field of 
expertise. This is so because the punishment system is based 
on principles that are accessible to the "common man," while 
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the rehabilitative system is concerned with specialist facts, 
facts that are accessible only to scientists and other experts 
(Luis 1997: 518). If we were to object about any given 
treatment, claiming that it is way beyond desert, the experts 
would reply that no one was talking about punishment and 
therefore no one was talking about desert. The objective, 
they would remind us, is rehabilitation, not punishment. The 
therapist will bring research findings, statistics and 
progress reports of persons being treated, thereby proving 
that one treatment deters or cures. Only if the results of 
the presented research are shown to be unreliable by other 
findings, or the statistical analyses are brought into doubt, 
can the administering therapist be criticised, but this would 
not remove the rehabilitative approach, at best, it would 
bring a more efficient treatment for the offender in question. 
Science does not work in terms of rights or justice, only 
evidence (Luis 1997: 519). 
Although, another objection to the rehabilitative approach 
is that if one uses persons as deterrents for others, i.e. if 
one employs them in the interests of general deterrence, then 
one is using them as means and if one uses them as means 
towards an end, it is objected, one no longer employs desert. 
This, as I argued in 5. 4, is not the case. When one uses 
criminals as deterrents for others, one is doing so only 
because they have offended, thus one is employing retributive 
justification. Of course the scientist (the psychiatrist or 
psychologist) would rehabilitate the criminal in the interests 
of society and would thereby not be doing this in the 
interests of justice, but in the interests of desired 
scientific results, thereby no longer taking interest in the 
criminal as a human being, but merely as a scientific subject. 
The critic asks why anyone should be sacrificed in the name of 
rehabilitation for the interests of society (Luis 1997: 519). 
A system of rehabilitation that is divorced from desert 
would open the door to severe violations of human rights. 
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What would hinder a government from curing any unwelcome 
condition, such as being critical of an oppressive regime, 
standing up for human rights and freedom of expression, for 
instance? (Luis 1997: 520). 
What I shall argue is that punishment combined with 
rehabili ta ti on is the only morally desirable course to take. 
Nevertheless, the concerns pertaining to a rehabilitative 
system must be addressed. 
I begin by examining the connections between crime, 
illness, and rehabilitation. Is it really the case that all 
crimes are the result of illnesses? Alternatively, even if 
all crimes are not the result of illnesses, are we not still 
morally obliged to treat offenders? 
6.4 THE CONNECTION BETWEEN CRIME, ILLNESS, AND TREATMENT 
To answer the question, whether it is plausible to assume that 
all crimes are the result of illnesses of some or other sort, 
I will argue in the first subsection that the answer must be 
in the negative. In the second subsection, I shall argue that 
even though crime is not necessarily the result of an illness, 
treating criminals is nevertheless an appropriate response to 
crime. 
Are criminals really responsible for their actions? Is it 
not possible that they are not really responsible, that they 
did not really intend their actions, that they are not really 
guilty of their offences? Would it not be more appropriate to 
see them not as free agents, but rather as unfortunate 
products of unfavourable environmental conditions, such as 
unemployment, broken homes, bad housing, alcoholism or other 
substance abuse? If we answer in the affirmative to these 
questions, then social environments in which such conditions 
prevail are identifiable as "crime-breeding environments.'' If 
such environments breed crime, then societies that tolerate 
such conditions are responsible for their consequences and 
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therefore have the criminals they deserve. Consequently, 
society may be identified as the real culprit, or at least as 
an accomplice to the offence. If this were the case, then 
punishing offenders would be the epitome of hypocrisy, blaming 
them for something for which they are not really responsible, 
claiming to punish according to desert and justice (Primoratz 
1997: 96). 
Those who question the efficacy of a punishment system, 
advocating a rehabilitative system instead, may do so by 
arguing in either of two distinct ways: the first denies that 
offenders are ever responsible for their actions, therefore 
they ought not to be punished; the second is that even if they 
are always responsible for 
system is still preferable 
their actions, a 
for dealing with 
rehabilitative 
them. These 
positions will be dealt with in the two following subsections 
respectively. 
6.4.1 WHY CRIME IS NOT NECESSARILY CAUSED BY AN ILLNESS 
The first argument maintains that because offenders are never 
really responsible for their actions, they can never be 
justifiably punished. This approach may be superficially more 
attractive, but ultimately less plausible than the position 
holding that not all crime is the result of illness, but 
nevertheless should be treated. It might mean that offenders 
are not at all responsible in which case the entire blame is 
to be ascribed to the social conditions of offenders, i.e. to 
the conditions of society. The extreme societal determinism 
propounded by this view is difficult to accept, however. The 
assertion that there are no responsible actions, that no one 
is responsible for their actions, is highly implausible. None 
of us would be responsible for our actions. But, our everyday 
institutions of society function adequately by employing terms 
such as "responsibility," 
argued that criminals 
"choice," 
generally 
"decision," etc. If it is 
come from unfavourable 
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environments, then we may respond that, on the contrary, not 
all persons committing crimes come from crime-breeding 
environments, such as poverty, unemployment, child abuse, or 
the like. Many criminals come from very good social 
backgrounds. If this is not denied, and the argument is to be 
upheld, then the definition of "crime-breeding environment" 
will have to be extended to cover these good environments too, 
probably coming to cover all environments at some stage 
because all environments to a greater or lesser extent will 
have criminals. By doing so, we would assert the thesis that 
the mere fact that someone breaks a law is proof that they 
come from a crime-breeding 
nothing useful at all about 
environment. This is to say 
social reality. It would mean 
that we all come from some such an environment; therefore, it 
would apply to everyone, and hence would be non-explanatory 
with respect to criminal behaviour because all our 
environments (socio-economic class, 
family background, etc.) have at 
educational standard, 
least some criminals. 
Furthermore, if we were to adopt the position that if criminal 
behaviour occurs, then there must necessarily be an 
unfavourable environment causing it, we would have no way of 
testing the theory because we would have no way of falsifying 
it. Even if this does not destroy the theory's appeal, it 
certainly diminishes its intellectual satisfiability. 
Where does rehabilitation come in? If all environments 
have the potential for causing crime, then why do some people 
become criminals and others do not? 
susceptibility of subjects. This 
The answer may lie in the 
would imply that those 
persons who turn to crime must have a lower resistance level 
for negative environmental influences. Since rehabilitation 
aims at raising the susceptibility level of offenders so that 
they are able to refrain from offending again, criminal 
behaviour becomes equated to an illness of some sort. 
Surely it is wrong to punish someone for something she 
could not help doing, for something for which she is not 
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responsible. If offenders are not responsible, if they are 
sick, then it seems right that they ought not to be punished. 
Ill persons ought not to be punished, 
everyone who commits a crime is ill, 
punish anyone who commits a crime. 
and since on this view 
it is surely wrong to 
Since the appropriate 
response to sickness is treatment, it follows that offenders 
ought to be treated, not punished. The relevance of treatment 
to the rightness or wrongness of punishing off enders is 
anything but obvious since the problem is that we seldom, if 
ever, punish people for being sick. Instead, we punish them 
for actions they performed. The reason for not punishing sick 
persons is connected to the notion of responsibility. If one 
cannot be held responsible for some illness, punishment makes 
no sense and is morally unjustifiable. However, even if we 
grant that crime is an illness, then this by no means implies 
that the afflicted persons are thereby judged not responsible 
for their actions. Illness itself is not a sufficient 
condition for withholding responsibility. If this were to be 
the case, then we would have to judge persons afflicted by 
physical illness as not being responsible for their actions 
either. But we do not do this. We do not, for example, 
acquit bank robbers if it was established that they had 
serious flu at the time of committing their crime. Secondly, 
even if mental illness rather than physical illness can be 
identified as predisposing someone towards becoming a specific 
criminal, this disposition does not excuse them from all kinds 
of crime. Thus, a person judged to suffer from exhibitionism 
may be excused for indecent exposure, but it cannot be a 
plausible defence for car theft, income tax evasion, rape, 
murder, or any other unrelated crime. Thus, it seems that 
mental illness per se, just as physical illness, is not a 
sufficient condition for excusing someone from performing a 
given offensive act (Feinberg 1993: 395). Even if offenders 
are mentally sick, it by no means follows that we can make the 
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general claim that they are not responsible for any of their 
actions. 
In order for the argument (that criminals are never 
responsible for their actions) to be persuasive, it must be 
shown that the particular illness with which offenders are 
afflicted prevented them from ever acting differently 
(Wasserstrom 1985: 191). This would be plausible, for 
instance, if criminals all suffered from a compulsion to break 
the law, i.e. if they all had an irresistible impulse to do 
so. The kleptomaniac, or someone suffering from an addictive 
affliction, would be a person approaching a condition that may 
be described as an illness. But here pity rather than blame, 
and treatment rather 
(Wasserstrom 1985: 191). 
obsession as follows: 
than punishment, seem appropriate 
Carson, Butcher and Coleman describe 
An obsession is a persistent preoccupation with something, typically 
an idea or a feeling. A compulsion is an impulse experienced as 
irresistible. In obsessive-compulsive disorder, individuals feel 
compelled to think about something that they do not want to think 
about or to carry out some action against their will. These 
individuals usually realize that their behavior is irrational but 
cannot seem to control it ... 
Most of us have experienced minor obsessional thoughts, such as 
persistent thoughts about a coming trip or date, or a haunting melody 
that we cannot seem to get out of our minds. In the case of 
obsessive reactions, however, the thoughts are much more persistent, 
appear irrational to the individual, and interfere considerably with 
everyday behavior (Carson, Butcher & Coleman 1988: 189). 
The obvious question to ask is, however, how strong would 
a compulsion have to be in order for criminals to be 
exonerated from any guilt? Would they, for instance, have to 
be compelled to steal even though a police officer is visible? 
Is there something more involved in compulsive behaviour? What 
is meant by "compulsive behaviour" other than meaning that the 
behaviour is inexplicable according to the motives and 
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behaviours that people usually have? Why should we suppose 
that criminal behaviour is caused by more motiveless behaviour 
than to which we are usually all subjected? Alternatively, why 
should criminals be less constrained by rules that ordinarily 
constrain us? While there are problems such as these, there is 
also no reason to believe that all criminal behaviour is 
caused by irresistible impulses. It therefore cannot be 
claimed that all criminals ought to be exempted from 
punishment because they have sicknesses of this sort. Those 
criminals whom we are willing to exonerate are generally those 
we judge to be driven towards performing the criminal 
behaviour without any rational deliberation, and the behaviour 
may be wholly irrational. Kleptomaniacs who steal i terns for 
which they have no use and exhibitionists who expose 
themselves occasionally despite knowing that their behaviour 
is offensive and the object of disapprobation may be examples 
of this kind. The rationally deliberating clerk who quietly 
and cautiously embezzles money, blackmailers who employ their 
intelligence in a rational manner but towards illegal ends, 
and terrorists who carefully and methodically plan destructive 
flights into buildings to cause extensive numbers of victims, 
however, are examples of criminals we would not be willing to 
exonerate. Criminals of the latter group knew what they were 
doing and could have done otherwise (Feinberg 1993: 396-399). 
It may be argued, however, that while all criminal 
behaviour is not caused by compulsive disorders, the remainder 
are also afflicted by an illness, the most ready candidate 
being insanity. It has always been conceded that persons 
ought not to be punished if they did not know the nature of 
their actions or could not evaluate their behaviours as wrong 
(Wasserstrom 1985: 192). It is by no means obvious, however, 
that all remaining crimes are caused by mental illness. The 
rationally deliberating clerk who quietly and cautiously 
embezzles money, blackmailers who employ their intelligence in 
a rational manner but towards illegal ends, and the terrorists 
170 
who hijack aircrafts to crash into buildings may again serve 
as examples of criminals we would not normally consider 
mentally ill. It is by no means evident that all criminals 
are either acting under irresistible impulses, are incapable 
of foreseeing the consequences of their own actions, or are 
suffering from other definite diseases. Accordingly, it is 
incorrect to assume that they ought not to be punished 
(Wasserstrom 1985: 193). 
One final approach brings all remaining offences under the 
category of mental illness. It does so by making the 
commission of an illegal act the defining characteristic of a 
mental illness. Those criminals who are not afflicted by 
mental illness or irresistible impulses are termed 
"sociopaths." This is a mental illness that manifests itself 
solely through the commission of illegal acts. The argument 
is that the illness, like any other, should be treated rather 
than punished (Wasserstrom 1985: 193). This assumption also 
may be questioned and dismissed as unconvincing, however. 
When we hold that an event X causes an event Y, both X and Y 
must be independently identifiable. This is not always a 
simple scientific matter since in science, causes are 
sometimes unobservable, such as when we speak of sub-atomic 
particles, radio and electromagnetic waves, molecular 
structures, etc. In these latter cases, however, there are 
clear correspondence rules connecting unobservable causes with 
observable phenomena. The problem with the theory assuming 
that all criminal behaviour is caused by a sociopathic 
personality is that if mental illness is the cause of criminal 
behaviour, then criminal behaviour cannot be proof that 
criminals are ill. Arguing that criminals have a sociopathic 
personality because they exhibit criminal behaviour is to 
employ an invalid argument having the form: if p then q, and q 
therefore p (the fallacy of affirming the consequent). 
Having found no plausible account 
criminal behaviour is the result of an 
maintaining that 
illness, let us 
all 
now 
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shift the focus slightly to the position that even though all 
criminals might not be ill, they nevertheless should be 
treated. 
6.4.2 TREATING CRIMINALS 
I now turn to the second of two issues addressed in this 
section. I shall argue that even if criminal behaviour is not 
always the result of an illness of some sort, criminals ought 
nevertheless to be rehabilitated because they stand to benefit 
thereby. 
If we believe that the environment has an influence on 
shaping one's behaviour, it would mean that society is 
partially responsible for the crimes committed: it is not 
necessarily the sole culprit. If the objection is to be 
understood as such, then it no longer rules out responsibility 
completely: it at least leaves open degrees of responsibility, 
and therefore also degrees of guilt on behalf of criminals 
(Primoratz 1997: 97). 
This second approach argues that a rehabilitative system 
is preferable to a punishment system, not because all 
criminals have diminished responsibility and therefore cannot 
be held fully responsible, but because rehabilitation is 
preferable to punishment even for those who are fully 
responsible. It therefore maintains that the legal system 
ought not to deal with how to punish offenders, but rather 
with how best to rehabilitate them. This is not because all 
of them are sick, but because no good comes from punishing 
even those who can be held responsible for their actions 
(Wasserstrom 1985: 193). 
Menninger, as we have seen, advocates the elimination of 
responsibility. The state of mind at the time of the act in 
question, he maintains, is no longer to be determinative (as 
it now is) of how the criminal shall be handled by society. 
For him only two questions are relevant: did the offender 
172 
commit the act in question? If he or she did, what is the 
appropriate societal response to him or her? This proposal is 
completely forward-looking and rehabilitative in perspective. 
This approach brings with it the elimination of a distinction 
between wickedness and disease. Penal institutions would 
become places of safety in which offenders receive their 
required treatment. We ought to treat them as though they 
were sick because this just makes more sense than punishment. 
Whether someone was responsible for their actions or not is 
not relevant. So even those who are not sick ought to be 
treated in a manner that would best facilitate their adequate 
functioning in society. The only question is how to bring 
about the rehabilitation of offenders (Wasserstrom 1985: 194). 
The advantage of the wholly forward-looking approach is 
seen when contrasted with the present punishment system. The 
latter does not rule out that offenders would be punished even 
though they were cured, i.e. when there is no likelihood of 
their offending again. This punishment would not benefit 
them, but might even harm them. And punishment, 
judged morally seriously offensive. It is 
of course, is 
this which a 
rehabilitative system, such as by Menninger, seeks to prevent, 
and on this ground may be judged to be preferable. 
However, both theoretical and practical objections to such 
a view may be expressed. 
The practical objections are: firstly, certain effective 
treatments may themselves be morally objectionable, and 
secondly, this may bring about a world in which we all become 
indifferent to those characteristics that make a person 
responsible (Wasserstrom 1985: 195) . The proposed system 
could become an institution of manipulation, for instance, 
operating under the guise of safety. However, these are 
difficulties that may be avoided by, for instance, determining 
precise timeframes in which rehabilitation must be undertaken 
to rule out indeterminate sentencing. In addition, it may be 
stated that abuses can occur in all rehabilitative systems, 
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but also under all penal systems today, leaving the former no 
more objectionable than the latter; and the former may be 
argued to be preferable since it may rehabilitate some who 
would otherwise become recidivists. 
More serious are the theoretical objections. The first is 
that a purely rehabilitative system would wholly disregard the 
issue of general deterrence. Such a system, as that proposed 
by Menninger, would ask only one question regarding offenders: 
what is the best response to these individuals in order to 
prevent them from offending in a similar manner again? If we 
have offenders who committed a crime by an impulsive act that 
is unlikely to be repeated, or who are unlikely to offend 
again because they are sincerely contrite, then the logic of 
this treatment approach would require that they be released 
immediately. This is so because in this system it is only the 
future conduct of offenders that receives consideration. 
There is simply no room for general deterrence in such a 
treatment system (Wasserstrom 1985: 196). 
The second objection is that it would 
indefensible consequences. It should be 
lead to morally 
clear that the 
rehabilitative approach has one objective as its main concern, 
namely the improvement of offenders. Offenders ought to be 
altered so that they will not offend again. This is certainly 
a most commendable objective to pursue. To do so without 
constraints, i.e. to do so with the only guiding principle 
being the improvement of offenders, however, is to invite 
consequences which we would not hold to be morally 
justifiable, including unqualified preventive detention, the 
problem of treating the innocent, and the problem of 
indeterminate ,entence lengths. However, we ought not to 
reject rehabi · L tat ion in its entirety, but ought rather to 
constrain the :heory in such a way so that it accords with our 
generally he 1 principles of justice, while retaining the 
objective of _mproving offenders. 
174 
In the next three sections, the focus will be on the main 
problems pertaining to a rehabilitative system, namely 
preventive detention, treating the innocent, and indeterminate 
sentence lengths. I shall argue that a mixed theory can deal 
with such issues successfully, while being internally 
consistent, resulting in a rehabilitative system that is just. 
I begin with preventive detention. 
6.5 PREVENTIVE DETENTION 
The rehabilitative approach gives rise to the concern that 
such an approach would justify preventive detention, i.e. 
detention of persons judged extremely likely to commit serious 
offences if not prevented from doing so, because this approach 
has as its primary objective the prevention of crime by 
treatment of offenders or likely offenders. If a group of 
offenders was to be identified as being exceptionally likely 
to commit crimes because it has a certain character trait, 
lives in an unfavourable environment, or the like, then 
advocates of the rehabilitative approach might argue for 
preventively treating the offenders by, for instance, trying 
to change their character traits or conditioning them to be 
more resistant against criminal behaviour in their 
unfavourable environments. In this section, I shall 
investigate whether preventive detention is morally 
justifiable, and if so, under which conditions this would be 
the case. 
It first will be necessary to determine under which 
conditions quarantine, as a form of detention of those 
suffering from certain physical illnesses in order to prevent 
the spread of disease, is held morally unobjectionable, before 
arguing by analogy that preventive detention, being analogous, 
is morally justifiable under similar conditions. I shall 
establish that preventive detention is in theory justifiable 
to prevent harms to others. In the light of the moral 
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distinctions made in 2.4 between innocent persons, criminals, 
and former criminals, I shall attempt to establish how 
accurate the predictive techniques must be in order for 
actions taken on their basis to be justified. This will be 
followed by an examination of how invasive the information 
gathering process morally may be. I shall point out that 
different standards for both issues are applicable for 
innocent persons and former criminals. Finally, I shall argue 
for what may be the acceptable and justifiable duration and 
extent of preventive detention. 
6.5.1 HARM AND THE MORAL JUSTIFICATION OF QUARANTINE 
To determine under which 
morally justifiable, it 
conditions preventive detention is 
is necessary to determine precisely 
under which conditions quarantine, i.e. a state of enforced 
isolation from the public on medical grounds due to a threat 
posed, is morally unobjectionable. 
We hold it appropriate that persons posing a serious 
medical threat to others are quarantined if the threat is 
life-threatening or threatening to long-term well being. I 
set out the argument as follows: 
( 1) The liberty of persons posing a serious threat to 
others may be curtailed. 
(2) Persons having serious, contagious diseases (i.e. 
life-threatening diseases or diseases seriously 
threatening one's long-term well being) pose a 
serious threat to others. 
(3) Therefore, the liberty of persons having severely 
serious contagious diseases may be curtailed. 
It is obvious that the justification of quarantine rests on 
the prevention of harms to others, i.e. on the harm principle, 
and not because any good is imposed upon those quarantined, 
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i.e. on the grounds of paternalistic intervention. 1 Posing a 
serious medical threat, where "serious threat" is defined as 
"threatening life or long-term well being, " is therefore a 
necessary condition for quarantining. 
It is not, however, a sufficient condition. The 
contagious disease not only must pose a serious threat to 
others, but also must uncontrollably do so. We are not 
justified in quarantining persons with flu or a contagious 
cough, even though both conditions may be life-threatening: 
flu for the elderly and young children and a cough for persons 
with a constitutionally weak respiratory system. If early 
treatment is sought, or adequate precautions taken, then the 
threat can be significantly reduced. Therefore quarantining 
persons afflicted with serious diseases that are contagious, 
but whose contagiousness is controllable, would also be 
morally objectionable. Persons afflicted with AIDS or other 
sexually transmitted diseases, for instance, are not 
quarantined, and ought not to be quarantined, since their 
life-threatening contagious diseases are not beyond their 
control, i.e. not all persons coming into contact with persons 
having such diseases are vulnerable and we have a reasonable 
idea of what to do to prevent passing on the disease. I thus 
continue with the above argument as follows: 
( 4) But only serious, contagious diseases that are 
uncontrollably threatening to others justify a 
curtailment of liberty. 
( 5) Not all serious, contagious diseases uncontrollably 
threaten the life or long-term well being of others. 
(6) Therefore, not all persons having serious, contagious 
diseases may be quarantined. 
The conclusion arrived at is thus that a sufficient and 
necessary condition for quarantining persons is that the 
1 The harm principle will be discussed in detail in Chapter 7. 
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quarantined have a serious, contagious disease beyond control. 
I shall argue in the next subsection that if the same 
conditions hold for persons posing any threat to others, i.e. 
not only a medical threat, then preventive detention is also 
justified for them. 
6.5.2 HARM AND JUSTIFIED PREVENTIVE DETENTION 
Let us assume for the moment that we are able to determine 
with absolute accuracy that certain persons pose a serious 
threat to others, i.e. if they are not forcibly restrained 
from doing so, then they will kill or seriously harm others 
within a determinable timeframe. Are we justified in 
preventively detaining them in order to prevent them from 
committing violent crimes? If the argument of the previous 
subsection is held to be sound, then, by substitution, 
preventive detention is also morally permissible under certain 
determinable conditions. If we substitute the term "serious, 
contagious disease" with "strong disposition towards 
committing serious crime," we get: 
( 1) The liberty of persons posing a serious threat to 
others may be curtailed. 
(2) Persons 
crimes 
having 
(i.e. 
strong dispositions towards serious 
crimes threatening life or long-term 
well being) pose a serious threat to others. 
(3) Therefore, the liberty of persons having strong 
dispositions towards performing serious crimes 
against others may be curtailed. 
Just as with quarantine, preventive detention is justified by 
the harm principle, persons may be preventively detained to 
prevent others from being seriously harmed. All that has been 
argued thus far, therefore, is that we are morally justified 
in preventively detaining persons for the well being of 
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others, and not for their own well being. 
quarantine, posing a serious threat was 
necessary condition for quarantining. The 
In the case 
found to be 
same holds 
preventive detention, 
not a serious one, 
i.e. persons posing a crime threat, 
may not be preventively detained. 
of 
a 
for 
but 
By 
"serious crime threat," I mean the threat to commit a crime of 
grave magnitude that would threaten life or long-term well 
being. 
Analogous to quarantine, preventive detention has serious 
threat as a necessary condition for its moral justification, 
but serious threat is not a sufficient condition. Persons 
preventively detained must not merely pose a serious threat to 
others, but must uncontrollably do so, i.e. the threat must be 
beyond their voluntary control, or they must be unwilling to 
exercise control over the threat. The latter implies, for 
instance, that persons with AIDS can morally be detained if 
they are unwilling to practice protected sex, knowing that 
their disease is serious and contagious under such conditions; 
if they are willing to practice protected sex, however, there 
is no moral ground for preventively detaining them. Thus, not 
all dangerous persons may be preventively detained. The above 
argument therefore continues as follows: 
(4) But only conditions uncontrollably threatening serious 
crimes to others justify a curtailment of liberty. 
(5) Not all dispositions towards serious crimes 
uncontrollably threaten the lives or long-term well 
being of others. 
(6) Therefore, not all persons having a strong disposition 
towards crime may be preventively detained. 
The conclusion arrived at is thus that a sufficient and 
necessary condition for preventively detaining persons is that 
the detained have a strong disposition towards performing 
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serious crimes against others, and that they are unable or 
unwilling to exercise control over their dispositions. 
We may now proceed to the question, how accurate the 
predictive techniques must be in order for us to act on their 
bases in preventively detaining persons. 
6.5.3 ACCURACY REQUIREMENTS 
Schoeman (1985: 201) believes that if a rate of accuracy on a 
par with jury trials were to be attained, then a sufficiently 
high level of accuracy would be attained to justify our 
preventively detaining persons on that basis. He believes 
that the maxim that rather ten guilty go free than one 
innocent be detained may serve as a suitable guide. It is not 
being asserted that the worst thing in the world would be to 
find an innocent person guilty, for that would preclude all 
investigations since all human investigations are bound to be 
fallible sometimes, no matter how much care is taken to avoid 
making mistakes. I will show why I take Schoeman's assumption 
to be incorrect. 
For the sake of argument, it was assumed in the previous 
section that we could establish with absolute certainty 
whether a person does, or does not, pose a serious threat to 
others. It was found that preventive detention would be 
morally justifiable if it were absolutely certain that a 
person would pose a serious threat to others in a determinable 
timeframe. The issue now at hand is, however, whether we can 
ever determine with absolute accuracy what a person will do 
precisely in the foreseeable future. If we are not able to 
attain absolute certainty, then the question needs to be 
asked, whether a lower standard is acceptable for detaining 
innocent persons. The answer we are forced to give is an 
emphatic "no!" 
Having an accuracy rate 
usually attained in jury 
of ninety percent, or anything 
trials, is not sufficient for 
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enabling us to preventively detain innocent persons. The 
reason is that we are dealing with innocent persons, not with 
persons who already have a diminished moral standing. It is 
therefore not sufficient to have an accuracy rate of ninety 
percent, or any rate less than absolute certainty, since we 
are not dealing with criminals or former criminals, but with 
mere potential or possible criminals, i.e. innocent persons. 2 
Possible or potential criminals are not guilty, they have not 
yet committed crimes and it is not absolutely certain that 
they ever will. For this reason the accuracy rate vindicating 
preventive detention of innocent persons must attain absolute 
certainty. This requirement may rule out preventive detention 
of innocent persons altogether because it is highly doubtful 
whether we could ever attain an absolutely accurate predictive 
technique, i.e. one that never resulted in any mistake. 
The absolute certainty requirement has been established 
for innocent persons. When dealing with former criminals, 
however, the accuracy requirement need not be so stringent 
when having a less stringent requirement enhances the safety 
of innocent persons in society. In 2. 4, I established that 
former criminals have a diminished moral status in virtue of 
having been criminals. For this reason a lower accuracy rate 
is morally acceptable when dealing with former criminals, so 
when dealing with former criminals, a rate of accuracy on a 
par with jury trials may be morally acceptable. I argued in 
the previous chapter that we are justified in using offenders 
as means towards the end of general deterrence, i.e. for 
purposes of crime reduction. Similarly, we may use former 
criminals for such purposes if there is a reasonable degree of 
scientific certainty that they will offend again. This would 
amount to preventive detention. As we have seen, we are not 
justified in using anyone as a means to such an end, but only 
those who have acquired a diminished moral standing by 
2 See 2.4 for the important distinction between "innocent person," 
"criminal" and "former criminal." 
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commit ting crimes. By preventively detaining those who have 
already off ended against society in a severe manner and are 
judged as being very likely to do so again in the foreseeable 
future, we are using former criminals as a means towards the 
prevention of severe crimes, a measure that we are justified 
in employing, since, as was explained in the previous chapter, 
we are faced with either suffering the consequences of crime 
or causing those to suffer themselves that would cause us to 
suffer in such a manner. However, I established in the 
previous subsection that we are only justified in preventively 
detaining persons who pose a serious threat. Hence 
preventively detaining former offenders is only justified if 
there are weighty reasons for expecting a severe threat to be 
imminent. Preventive detention is therefore not an instrument 
that may be employed for general crime reduction purposes, 
i.e. preventive detention may not be employed against former 
criminals to prevent crimes that are not life-threatening or 
threatening to long-term well being. Preventive detention for 
car theft, for instance, is hence morally untenable. 
Now that I have argued for the conditions under which 
preventive detention may be imposed, the question that arises 
is how invasive the predictive techniques may be to justify 
their employment. 
6.5.4 PREDICTIVE TECHNIQUES 
I established that we would be justified in preventively 
detaining innocent persons if our predictions would be of 
absolute certainty, and that a less stringent requirement is 
morally acceptable for preventively detaining former 
criminals. In order to make predictions of dangerousness, it 
is safe to assume that it would be necessary to investigate 
the lives of the subjects investigated in detail. How 
invasive may the information gathering process be? It is a 
common fact that the prediction of natural phenomena requires 
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extensive probing. The variable and highly complex nature of 
human beings would make it astonishing to find that accurate 
predictions about human behaviour could be attained without 
extensive probing into every facet of persons' lives. Since 
the problems of interaction and interpretation seem to make 
the task of prediction almost impossible, we may have reached 
the point at which we must conclude that preventive detention 
must be abandoned altogether. This is not because isolating an 
individual for the protection of others is unjust, but because 
determining whether a person is dangerous would require such 
extensive violations of individual liberties that we are not 
even entitled to make the investigation into the threat 
potential (Schoeman 1985: 201) . 3 Schoeman (1985: 202) believes 
that mass mandatory screening is morally acceptable if the 
threat facing society is of extreme magnitude. 
that he is not correct in holding this view. 
I shall argue 
Compelling innocent persons to undergo screening for the 
purpose of preventing violent crimes to others is not 
justified by the harm principle because it is not known 
beforehand whether those persons subjected to screening pose 
any threat at all. This would almost inevitably lead to the 
compulsion of many innocent non-threatening persons to undergo 
screening. Only once it is absolutely certain that certain 
innocent persons pose a serious threat to others, may they be 
compelled in any way, and this certainly cannot be established 
without screening, screening to which innocent persons cannot 
be morally compelled. This is not comparable to screening 
aircraft passengers before they board aircrafts since airport 
passengers are not compelled to anything to which they do not 
agree. By purchasing a ticket for a flight, every passenger 
implicitly consents to the conditions of the airline and their 
3 A practical consideration pertaining to the information gathering process 
is that the more time consuming the process is, the fewer people one is 
able to investigate, with the result that the effectiveness of reducing 
crime by this means will be limited in roughly inverse proportion to the 
time required for an investigation. 
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which includes being thoroughly checked and security, 
searched. But if a state decided to screen all its members 
for any signs that they may become criminals in the future, it 
would involve screening to which the members of society have 
not consented in any way. 
There is once again a difference between innocent persons 
and former criminals when we come to the measures for 
preventing crime. Former criminals have a diminished moral 
standing in virtue of having been criminals. Therefore, the 
requirements pertaining to interference into their lives need 
not be as stringent as for the innocent. Former criminals 
may, in virtue of having been criminals, be compelled to 
undergo screening, should this be deemed necessary. They were 
violent in the past and hence are no longer wholly innocent. 
In the interests of preventing violent crimes, former 
criminals may be subjected against their wills to screening in 
the interests of preventing violent crimes. If it is 
established that they still pose a serious threat, or a 
renewed threat, they may be preventively detained. 
6.5.5 DURATION AND EXTENT OF PREVENTIVE DETENTION 
Now that I have argued under which conditions preventive 
detention may be determined and imposed, the duration of such 
detention must be determined. Persons who are quarantined are 
detained until the threat their conditions pose for society is 
no longer above a specified threshold level, i.e. until their 
medical conditions have been cured or changed to such an 
extent so as no longer to pose a serious threat to others 
(Schoeman 1985: 204). As long as they fulfil the necessary 
and sufficient conditions for quarantine, however, they may be 
quarantined. The same may be held for those preventively 
detained. In the previous chapter, I argued that the measure 
of punishment is dependent on the amount of force exercised by 
criminals. This determination may be overridden if it is 
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evident that criminals still pose a serious threat at the end 
of serving their sentences (the sentences handed down for 
their crimes). They may then be kept in detention as a 
preventive measure for longer than their sentence determined. 
It is important to point out that preventive detention is 
not to be seen as a cure for any disease and is hence not a 
therapeutic act, it nevertheless shares several 
characteristics with therapy: both are imposed without any 
sense of moral outrage and the duration of detention may in 
both cases be indeterminate. Preventive detention would be an 
everyday affair because we will presumably always have some 
dangerous former criminals who are likely to commit serious 
offences, while quarantine is usually only a response to an 
emergency. However, we may presume that quarantine would 
become an everyday affair too if there were always people with 
serious, contagious diseases in society who fulfilled the 
necessary and sufficient conditions for quarantine. 
6.6 TREATING THE INNOCENT 
The answer to the question whether innocent persons may be 
compelled to undergo treatment ought already to be clear from 
the previous section. Even if given indi victuals were to be 
identifiable without unjustified interventions into their 
lives (because, for instance, they come from broken homes, 
have had inadequate education or vocational training, are 
unemployed, etc.), i.e. are potential offenders, it would not 
be justified to compel them to undergo any treatment. 
A medical example may again be illustrative. If a group 
of persons is identifiable as being at heightened risk of 
contracting a specific contagious disease because its members 
have a certain gene, it could not be morally forced against 
its collective will into undergoing gene therapy. In being 
mere carriers of the gene, they are not yet an actual threat, 
and, depending on contingent factors, might never become one. 
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Of course, once the potential threat becomes an actual threat, 
once these indi victuals become afflicted, thereby endangering 
others, treatment against their wills is morally justified; 
even quarantine is justified, should it be necessary. The 
same conditions hold for persons being disposed towards 
criminal behaviour. Perhaps they will never offend, perhaps 
they will be able to restrain themselves, and then forced 
treatment would have had no moral justification. But of 
course, treatment may be administered once the threat has 
become actualised because they would no longer be innocent. 
6.7 SOLVING THE PROBLEM OF INDETERMINATE SENTENCE LENGTHS 
Menninger pleads for indeterminate sentence lengths, i.e. 
detention until criminals are reformed. However, this would 
open the door to disproportionate sentencing - murderers would 
be released after only six months if scientific evidence 
showed that they are cured of their criminal behaviour, while 
car thieves would still be detained after twenty years if 
their conditions had not improved sufficiently to warrant 
release. This would be a disconcerting contingency. However, 
there is nothing intrinsic to a rehabilitative theory that 
requires indeterminate sentencing. 
In 5.4, I argued that we are justified in using offenders 
for purposes of general deterrence. I then showed in that 
chapter that the magnitude of the punishment we impose on 
offenders ought to be ranked on an ordinal scale (the more 
serious the harm inflicted by an offensive act, the more 
serious the punishment ought to be, ceteris paribus), and that 
the force imposed on offenders ought not to be of excessive 
magnitude when compared with the harm done or intended by 
their offensive acts. The extent of punishment ought 
therefore to be determined by adjusting it to the demands of 
general 
Within 
deterrence (as established in the previous chapter). 
the sentenced period, intense therapy ought to be 
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undertaken. The demands of therapy may not increase the 
length of confinement within a prison institution unless the 
requirements for preventive detention are satisfied, but then 
this is not done primarily for therapy, but for society's 
protection. 
Having surpassed the objections facing a therapy system, 
it is now appropriate to ask why attempts at reforming 
offenders have generally been unsuccessful in the past. 
6.8 REFUTING PAST ATTEMPTS AT REHABILITATION 
Some writers who have examined the attempts at rehabilitation 
over the last few decades point out that they have not yielded 
the anticipated results. Why is this so? Is it perhaps that 
rehabilitation is just unsuitable for dealing with offenders? 
In this section, I shall argue that rehabilitation is not 
always ineffective, depending on how it is administered and on 
the paradigm within which it is conceptualised. However, I 
shall not restrict my analysis to the empirical findings, but 
shall show that the underlying difficulty may be of a more 
fundamental nature, namely that psychology (and other human 
sciences concerned with rehabilitation) has inherent 
difficulties pertaining to how it approaches some problems. 
In the final subsection of this section, I shall address the 
problem of choosing values for those being rehabilitated. 
6.8.1 SCIENTIFIC REASONS WHY THERAPY MAY HAVE FAILED 
Before attending to the more fundamental reasons why 
rehabilitation may have been unsuccessful, I shall briefly 
mention three scientific reasons why it may have been so: 
(1) Punishment and rehabilitation should not be used as a 
means of aversion therapy as some behaviourally oriented 
psychologists 
modification 
may 
of 
have done. This 
offensive behaviour 
approach 
by the 
involves the 
old-fashioned 
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method of punishing the subjects. Such punishment may entail 
either the removal of positive reinforcers or the use of 
aversive stimuli, the fundamental objective being the 
reduction of the "temptation value" of stimuli that elicit 
undesirable behaviour. Electric shock is the most commonly 
used aversive stimulus, although drugs may also be used 
(Carson et al. 1988: 592). 
Researchers 
aversive, it is 
have indicated that because punishment 
likely to prompt avoidance learning. 
is 
If 
aversive treatment is likely to do so, then it may be assumed 
that aversive rehabilitation prompts such learning too. 
Learning how to avoid punishment does not necessarily mean 
learning how to cease with the offensive behaviour; instead it 
may result in the person's learning how to avoid being 
detected and apprehended. This may result in an increase of 
criminal behaviour, rather than the intended decrease. Which 
of these outcomes occurs seems to depend partly on the 
recidivists' perceptions of how fair the treatment is, and 
partly on the kind of treatment to which they are being 
subjected. In this case, treatment may well be 
counterproductive since studies have shown that punishment 
augments future offending in social out groups. This may be 
because the criminals become more motivated to evade 
detection, or because they are assisted by members of their 
community who perceive the administered punishment as being 
too severe. Research findings show that undesirable behaviour 
(understood here as offensive behaviour) can be suppressed 
only by employing extremely severe punishment, punishment that 
is more intense than would otherwise be considered humane. 
Moreover, if punishment is sufficiently intense to serve as an 
adequate deterrent, it is likely to have severe emotional 
effects that can interfere with any alternative learning of 
socially acceptable behaviour. It may therefore be concluded 
that rehabilitation should not employ punishment to any 
significant degree since doing so seems to be ineffective. 
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( 2) Rehabili ta tors should take the perceptions of their 
subjects into account. Rehabilitation seen by the recipients 
as objectively unjust is likely to foster defiance in the form 
of increased offending, therefore rehabilitative measures 
should not be severe so as not to be counterproductive 
(Sanson, Montgomery, Gault, Gridley & Thomson 1996: 157-158). 
An appropriate response in the light of these findings is that 
therapists should take special care to take the perceptions of 
their subjects into consideration, and ensure that these are 
not of an undesirable nature. Criminals should therefore 
always be treated as humans worthy of respect, and every 
effort should be made to ensure that they perceive the 
treatments as being for their own goods, justified by the 
actions they performed in the past. Even though I maintain 
that criminals have a diminished moral standing, this is not 
in opposition to seeing them as humans who ought to be treated 
with respect. An analogy may again be illustrative: even 
though a late-term foetus has less moral standing than an 
adult person (which means that the rights of the former may be 
overridden by the rights of the latter when their interests 
clash), we nevertheless hold that foetuses are to be 
respected, exemplified by our treating the killing of a foetus 
as a very serious moral matter. Even though criminals may be 
used as means towards the ends of general deterrence, for 
instance, they can and ought to be treated with respect. 
( 3) Rehabilitation should not be preoccupied with 
deterrence. Deterring off enders does not significantly change 
them in any way; it merely fosters in them the fear of being 
punished if they behave in a certain way. Rehabilitation 
should be different: it should not deter off enders or 
potential offenders out of fear of being punished; rather, it 
should change offenders' value systems so that they no longer 
wish to off end, having come to believe that offending is wrong 
and ought not to be done. In the past, rehabilitation may 
often have focused on deterring offenders from committing 
189 
further crimes, a rehabilitative effort that is not likely to 
be very effective since it does not involve changing 
offenders' outlooks on life, and hence what ought or ought not 
to be done. There is nothing intrinsic to rehabilitation, 
however, that requires it to focus on deterrence, rather than 
on the value systems of offenders and on teaching them more 
acceptable behavioural patterns in society. Since I showed 
that many of the empirical problems are problems only because 
the rehabilitative efforts were incorrectly applied, I 
conclude that there is no weighty empirical reason why a 
comprehensive system that yielded positive results ought not 
to be developed for the rehabilitation of offenders. 
6.8.2 FUNDAMENTAL REASONS WHY THERAPY MAY HAVE FAILED 
I now turn to more fundamental reasons why therapy may have 
been unsuccessful, namely that psychology and the other social 
sciences involved with rehabilitation of offenders are, if 
applied on their own, often inadequate for dealing with the 
complex problem of criminal rehabilitation. The criticisms I 
shall level against psychology will be applicable (unless 
otherwise indicated) for the other sciences dealing with 
therapy too. The difficulties pertain mainly to two issues: 
firstly, psychology applies in inadequate model for describing 
abnormality; and secondly, there is seldom agreement between 
the schools on how data are to be collected or which are to 
count as relevant. 
The first source of difficulty is that, in dealing with 
behavioural abnormalities, psychology in general (and 
psychiatry in particular) employs a medical model - patient, 
treatment, prognosis, etc. This model demands that subjects 
be categorised and then treated according to their diagnosis. 
This categorising frequently leads to difficulties and 
differences of opinion amongst experts concerning the category 
into which the subject is to be placed: 
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Unfortunately, both reliability and validity have proven 
extraordinarily difficult to achieve in the classifications employed 
in abnormal psychology. This is due in no small part to our 
complexity as human beings, as behaving entities. But it is also 
due, according to many observers, to our having chosen an inadequate 
model for describing behavioral abnormalities. The reasons for our 
having done so are doubtless complicated, but a significant 
contribution to the confusion thereby introduced was the adoption by 
our forebears of an essentially medical or disease metaphor in 
conceptualizing abnormal behavior. By this we mean that abnormal 
behavior has been viewed as the product of illness or disease, and 
the average citizen has been given much information assuring him or 
her that this is indeed the case. But is it? While we are 
untroubled by the notion of a diseased brain, what possible meaning, 
on close examination, can be assigned to the concept of a diseased 
mind? Philosophical profundities aside, they are not, after all, the 
same thing (Carson et al. 1988: 24-25). 
Philosophy, unlike psychology as part of a medial model, given 
its nature of asking fundamental questions (critically 
examining the meaning of concepts, ideas and theories, 
critically analysing and evaluating arguments, and its pursuit 
of wisdom and fundamental insight) works with a model of 
philosophical counselling (client, orientation in life, 
conceptualisation, meaning, perception, interpretation, etc.). 
I shall defend the role of philosophy in rehabilitation later. 
But now, I return to the issue of categorisation. 
Michelle Foucault argues that by categorising we constrain 
our ability to think in any other system. At the beginning of 
The Order of Things, he quotes a category system, purportedly 
taken from a certain Chinese encyclopaedia, which classifies 
animals according to the following categories: belonging to 
the Emperor, embalmed, tame, sucking pigs, sirens, fabulous, 
stray dogs, included in the present classification, 
innumerable, drawn with a fine camelhair brush, etcetera, 
having just broken the water pitcher, and that from a long way 
off look like flies (Foucault 1970: xv). What Foucault wishes 
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to show with this classification is that the sheer 
impossibility of our thinking in these categories is the 
limitation of our own system of thought which has different 
categories. We simply cannot perceive how the animal world 
can be classified in such a manner because we are locked in 
our own discourse. When we classify anything, we operate 
within a system of possibilities bounded by our own conceptual 
schemes. This system enables us to do certain things, but 
also limits us to this system and these things since it 
depends on our 
something, one 
is, but rather 
own limitations. Furthermore, by classifying 
has not yet necessarily said precisely what it 
grouped items together which resemble each 
other in certain ways or have some characteristics in common. 
This is the case with many categories employed by psychology, 
most notable of these probably being schizophrenia: 
While we now have ... a set of defining criteria that when properly 
applied will permit us to say who is and who is not schizophrenic 
with a high degree of reliability, we remain to an extraordinary 
extent uncertain of the information yield pertaining to any such act 
of inclusion or exclusion. That is, it remains unusually difficult 
for most of us to arrive at a coherent picture of what schizophrenia 
is, one that goes beyond, so to speak, the defining criteria 
themselves (Carson et al. 1988: 364). 
A possible further problem of psychology, as well as all 
other human sciences, is that there is seldom, if ever, an 
agreement within the discipline on how to gather data, or 
which data are relevant, i.e. there is a proliferation of 
different schools. This may not always be a problem when 
there is general agreement between the schools, but when they 
operate in mutually exclusive frameworks, communication 
between them becomes difficult, 
psychology, the way clinicians 
depends on their basic orientation. 
if not impossible. In 
approach a given problem 
When assessing a subject, 
for instance, the biologically oriented clinician, such as a 
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psychiatrist or neuropsychologist, will generally concentrate 
on biological assessment methods aimed at uncovering any 
underlying organic malfunction causing the maladaptive 
behaviour; unstructured assessment techniques, such as the 
Rorschach, will be used by the psychoanalytically oriented 
clinician to detect intrapsychic conflicts; in the effort to 
determine the functional relationships between the environment 
and maladaptive behaviour, the behaviourally oriented 
psychologist will employ techniques such as behavioural 
observation and self-reports to identify maladaptive learned 
behaviours; and the humanistically oriented clinician might 
use interview techniques to discover blocked or distorted 
personal growth. This is not to deny or throw doubt on the 
value of any of these approaches, but what we often have is 
that the same problem is frequently described, evaluated, and 
treated in radically different means without making any 
overall attempt to determine whether an alternative approach 
might not be more accurate and effective in a given case. 
The claim that scientific treatment is superior to other 
treatments is not of an a priori truth, but is of an a 
posteriori nature, the truth of which is dependent on 
contingent factors, such as what the problem is. This is not 
to argue that science is not of great value, or that 
alternative methods and procedures are always superior, but 
science, 
sciences, 
especially when we are dealing with the human 
may of ten have an inadequate approach for 
investigating certain behavioural phenomena, therefore we 
would be wise to widen our scope in such cases. This is 
particularly true for the rehabilitation of offenders too: 
There are many experiences and problems common to human existence 
about which science as yet has had little to say. Included are such 
vital experiences as hope, faith, courage, love, grief, despair, 
death, and the quest for values and meaning. Authentic insights into 
such experiences can often be gained from literature, drama, and 
autobiographical accounts that strike a common chord and relate 
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directly to an understanding of human behavior. Material from such 
fields as art, history, and religion can also provide useful insights 
... (Carson et al. 1988: 24) . 
Philosophy is, of course, the most 
providing fundamental insights into 
expand on this point in 6.9.1. 
invaluable discipline in 
such issues. I shall 
6.8.3 REHABILITATION AND CHOOSING VALUES 
Since I defend a rehabilitative system, it is necessary to 
face a possible criticism levelled against it, namely one that 
is often directed against psychiatry, but that may be directed 
at all professions concerned with the rehabilitation of 
offenders or with behavioural therapy, which is that they are 
actually the guardians of the status quo, adjusting persons to 
a sick society, rather than improving society through the 
betterment of its indi victuals. There were frequent 
allegations that psychiatry was used as a means of political 
control in the Soviet Union - that dissidents were controlled 
by placement in mental institutions. 
claimed that psychiatry is used in 
Al though it is seldom 
the West to deal with 
social critics, there remains the possibility that therapists, 
including those dealing with the rehabilitation of offenders, 
are placed in some ways in the role of gate keepers of social 
values, changing behaviours and attitudes that are 
disagreeable to society as a whole. This may even be more so 
when dealing with offenders, when dealing with individuals who 
violated the laws of society. This again brings us to the 
question, what do we mean by "abnormal?" The answer to this 
question is possible only in the light of our values. Of 
course, it may be questioned whether scientists, or in this 
case therapists, should be concerned with how what they 
develop should be used. Should the physical scientist who 
develops long-range nuclear weapons be concerned with how they 
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are used? Should someone advocating therapy for criminals be 
concerned with how the particular therapy approach advocated 
is employed? Should a behavioural scientist who develops 
powerful techniques of behaviour control be concerned with how 
they are applied? Many scientists try to sidestep this 
question by insisting that science is value free, that it is 
concerned only with developing techniques, not with how they 
are applied. Science cannot be value free, however. Each 
time, for example, that therapists eliminate one form of 
behaviour or substitute one form by another, they are making a 
value choice since rehabilitation takes place in a context 
containing the values of the rehabilitator, the subject to be 
rehabilitated, and the society in which they both live. So 
how does one distinguish between norms that are relevant and 
those that are not? This question will often have to be 
answered by the rehabilitators themselves because they are the 
highest authorities on issues pertaining to rehabilitation of 
persons' behaviours, i.e. psychology often lays down its own 
rules, rules that are inaccessible to any other profession. 
The answer they give should, however, be determined by 
adhering to a fundamental principle regarding normality 
(Carson et al. 1988: 614-615). This should be in accordance 
with the conception of normality presented in 1.2, namely that 
normality furthers the well being of the individual and of the 
group of which the individual is a member. This conception of 
normality is also what characterises civilisation. 
6.9 DEFENDING A QUALIFIED REHABILITATIVE APPROACH 
In Chapter 1, five objectives, which any morally defensible 
system of punishment ought to strive towards, were presented. 
The theory of punishment towards which I am working in this 
thesis, a mixed theory having rehabilitation as one of its 
components, is best able to pursue three of them by 
rehabilitation. These are: ( 1) punishment should contribute 
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to the reduction of crime, ( 2) convicted offenders should be 
made better persons, rather than left as they are or made 
worse, by the process of punishment, and (3) punishment should 
be economical, i.e. it should not waste social resources. 
Each of these will be attended to in turn. 
6.9.1 REHABILITATION AND THE REDUCTION OF CRIME 
As we have seen, Menninger rightly pointed out that our 
present system of punishment is ineffective and that as a 
result our prisons seem to operate with revolving doors. This 
need not surprise us; in fact, it would be surprising if it 
were otherwise. Many persons turn to crime because they 
cannot manage to lead a normal life, a life without 
confrontation or offence against society. The reasons for 
their inability may be as varied as crime itself; 
nevertheless, they are all treated roughly uniformly by the 
punitive system. Once offenders are caught and convicted, 
they are generally thrown into prisons where they spend the 
time until their release dates without help or rehabilitation. 
Now branded "criminal," each is ostracised from society. In 
prison, they join others who are in similar conditions. Able 
to join the only community that is still willing to accept 
them, they meet other more experienced criminals from whom 
they acquire skills and techniques on how to be "better" 
criminals: "And if an offender comes to identify himself as a 
'criminal,' the result may be more crime, since crime is what 
'criminals' do" (Garvey 1998: 752) . 4 On being released, they 
are often just dumped back onto society, expected to have 
learned their lessons and now to live lives devoid of crime. 
However, the label "criminal" has not left any of them, it 
4 It is an established fact that prison sentences often make even "better" 
criminals out of offenders, teaching them even more undesirable skills and 
behaviours, enculturating them into a subclass that is outcasted by 
society. This greatly contributes to the high recidivism rates in most 
systems (Sanson et al. 1996: 163). 
196 
will often stick to them for the rest of their lives. Their 
chances of finding suitable employment, of settling down 
peacefully, are thus diminished from the outset. The only way 
of life they ever knew, a life of crime, is soon adopted again 
until they are re-arrested, tried, convicted and imprisoned. 
There they again spend their time without rehabilitation or 
any constructive help at all. Can we expect such a system to 
bring about a reduction in crime? The answer is an obvious 
"no!" Not only does it not assist the offender in any 
beneficial way, it does not even attempt to do so. 
The rehabilitative approach, by contrast, has as its 
fundamental guiding principle the rehabilitation of offenders. 
The objective is to rehabilitate off enders so that they will 
not off end again. In this sense, it has a forward-looking 
perspective. Needless to add, rehabilitation must be 
criminal-oriented, i.e. the therapy or assistance provided 
must be tailored to meet the criminals' needs. In this sense, 
it is backward-looking. In addition, there is not only one 
therapy that is a panacea for all crimes, just as there is not 
only one medication for all illnesses. No doubt, there will 
be criminals who cannot yet be effectively treated by any 
available therapy. For many there will be effective 
treatments, however, and these criminals ought to be helped. 
The question of who can be helped, who cannot, and by what 
method or technique, is to be answered by the rehabilitation 
experts, just as physicians decide who can be helped medically 
and in what way. This is not to say that those for whom no 
effective treatment is available ought to be left unattended. 
After all, many illnesses do not yet have cures, but we 
nevertheless do our best to apply the existing therapies, 
based on current research findings and the state of our 
present knowledge pertaining to the issue, hoping that they 
will have some positive effect, and develop more promising 
treatments as experience is gained. We have no reason to be 
less optimistic when dealing with criminals. No doubt, the 
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cause of crime, as other human behaviour too, may be 
biological, psychological, or sociocultural. The nature of 
the therapy will depend on the cause of the criminal 
behaviour. The therapy approach is undoubtedly committed to 
the reduction of criminal behaviour, and ultimately to its 
total elimination, thereby necessarily bringing about a 
reduction in crime if no criminal behaviour, then no crime. 
The wholly punitive punishment system has no such objective: 
... society should give some thought to what it is that causes these 
people to become so barbaric, and should give some thought to what 
the penal system ought to do with them. Because if we do not, we had 
then better plan what to do when they become our neighbors once again 
(Nygaard 1995: 7). 
In the previous section, 
reasons why past attempts at 
ineffective is that they 
I pointed out 
rehabilitation 
were mainly 
that one of the 
may have been 
conducted by 
psychologists who used an inadequate model for dealing with 
maladaptive behaviours and categories that often hinder, 
rather than facilitate, the rehabilitation of persons with 
such behaviours. A less rigid approach, one not preoccupied 
with scientific method and being more pragmatically oriented 
pertaining to the crime problem, may be more efficacious: 
If the present categorical classification system continues to be 
used, there needs to be a clearer set of classification rules to make 
the categories more accurate and more mutually exclusive. The 
classification rules should be made more exhaustive and incorporate 
behaviors that do not overlap with other categories. Such an 
undertaking, while scientifically desirable, would doubtless be 
extremely difficult - perhaps, in the final analysis, impossible. 
There appear to be few if any "pure" clusters for grouping the 
behavior of persons into the type of neat pigeonholes ideally 
required by the categorical approach (Carson et al. 1988: 247). 
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Science, however, is not the only route to knowledge, nor is 
it the only way of rehabilitation. 
philosophy. 
Another of these is 
Schuster (1999: 75) points out that Plato's philosophy is 
preoccupied with the good life and well being. 5 Aristotle 
maintains in his ethics that virtue is constituted by the 
mean: his ethics therefore has the primary objective of 
teaching people the good life through moderation. He 
maintains that moderation can be taught through philosophy 
(Aristotle 1999, Bk. 7 Ch. 5). The Stoics held crime and 
other behavioural abnormalities to be manifestations of a 
diseased soul, which in turn is caused by disharmonious 
emotions. Impulses and passions were thought to be controlled 
by reason, hence the Stoics argued that people could be 
improved or cured through the education of their reason 
(Inwood 1985: 128-152). It is interesting that Bertrand 
Russell (1986: 110) held Stoic self-discipline to be more 
appropriate than much twentieth-century psychotherapeutic 
practice. The Epicureans and Sceptics also held philosophy to 
be the key to a meaningful existence (Nussbaum 1994: 15, 508). 
Further examples of philosophy being employed therapeutically 
may be found in Augustine (1939), Philo of Alexandria (Winston 
1981: 42), and Maimonides (Bakan 1991: 46). 
Over the past two decades, philosophers have been setting 
up philosophical practices as an alternative to psychotherapy. 
The objective is to deal with many problems usually faced by 
psychiatrists or psychologists, problems that actually have a 
philosophical nature, such as finding a meaningful life, or 
developing a satisfying world-view according to which one can 
orient oneself. Within the psychotherapeutic paradigm, these 
have been seen as mental disorders, rather than as examples of 
the kind of conceptual confusion that they are. The success 
attained by such practitioners is in many cases just as high, 
5 For a more detailed discussion of Plato's concern with well being, and 
how his philosophy has been adopted in philosophical practice, see Schuster 
(1999: 78-84). 
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and sometimes even higher, than that attained by 
psychologists, if success is measured that is, by the 
satisfaction of the clients. 6 Let it again be noted that one 
approach is here not being advocated in favour of another, the 
replacement of scientific rehabilitation by philosophical, or 
any other non-scientific rehabilitation approach, is not being 
argued. I am however arguing a broader approach towards 
rehabilitation, an approach that does not just work according 
to a narrow scientific method of analysis and that does not 
automatically categorise each subject according to certain 
criteria. 
Crime is a phenomenon that not only affects the criminal 
and his or her direct victim; it affects all of us, everyone 
in society. It therefore is an issue that should concern all 
of us, and we should all work towards its elimination, or at 
least towards its reduction. Persons not involved in law 
enforcement, the penitentiary, or rehabilitation of offenders 
may ask, how can we help? This is not an idle question for 
much of the progress that has been achieved regarding our 
treatment of criminals has resulted from the work of concerned 
citizens. Many opportunities dealing with rehabilitation will 
be reserved for trained specialists, both professional and 
paraprofessional psychiatrists, psychologists, social 
workers, and other medical and para-medical personnel. In 
addition, there are many professions, ranging from law 
enforcement to teaching and the ministry, that can and do play 
6 Matthew Lipman (2000) provides examples in which philosophy is being 
applied therapeutically. A centre in Montreal, La Traversee, is devoted to 
helping women and children who have been victims of sexual aggression. The 
centre uses philosophy as an integral part of its therapeutic approach and 
is satisfied with the results. Philosophy is capable of providing a 
special kind of enlightenment that is critically important to those who are 
bewildered. Coping with traumatic experiences, such as sexual abuse, 
requires cognitive factors such as concept formation and critical 
questioning. This is where philosophy plays a crucial role. The abused 
children at La Traversee make use of philosophical dialogue with the 
objective of discovering acceptable alternative ways of coping with 
violence. Through the dialogue, their judgements are improved and they 
learn ways in which they can count on one another. The Austrian Centre for 
Philosophy for Children also conducted valuable conversations with Bosnian 
refugees. 
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key roles in the well being and behaviour of many people. 
Training in all these fields usually offers individuals 
opportunities to work in community clinics and related 
facilities, to gain experience in understanding the needs and 
problems of people in distress, and to become familiar with 
community resources. If citizens are aware of community 
resources, they can find many ways of being of direct service. 
Whatever their roles in life teacher, student, business 
executive, homemaker, lawyer, police officer, or trade 
unionist their interests are directly at stake. For 
al though the heal th of a society may be manifested in many 
ways in its purposes, courage, moral responsibility, 
scientific and cultural achievements, and quality of daily 
life its heal th and resources derive ultimately from the 
individuals constituting it. It is they who plan and 
implement its goals in a participatory democracy. We should 
all work towards improved public education, responsible 
government, the alleviation of group prejudice and poverty, 
and the establishment of a more sane and harmonious world. 
If, when dealing with offenders, our fundamental objective 
is not concerned with assisting them in not offending again 
and reducing the conditions that lead to the criminal 
behaviour as well as possible with our available means, then 
we cannot truly claim to be doing our moral duty in respect to 
dealing with criminals. 
6.9.2 REHABILITATION AND IMPROVING OFFENDERS 
Society labels criminals as "bad" and non-criminals as "good," 
ceteris paribus. It follows that if persons become non-
criminals after having offended, they become better persons. 
However, more than this is meant by "good." Good persons are 
also able to care for others and make meaningful contributions 
to society, 
not foreign 
such as by pursuing a meaningful career. This is 
to the views held by the ancient philosophers, 
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such as Plato and Aristotle. In fact, ethics in ancient 
philosophy was explicitly directive in how to live the good 
life. This ability persons can also gain through the right 
kind of rehabilitation. The question may now arise, but if 
different conceptions of the good life exist, how are we to 
choose which of them is to be advocated in rehabilitation? 
This was already addressed in 1.2 in dealing with the issue of 
normality. It follows from the definition of normality argued 
for that no fixed set of values is to be imposed on those 
rehabilitated, but rather, the objective of rehabilitation 
ought to be the fostering of well being of both the individual 
rehabilitated and the group of which he or she is a member. 
The present punishment system, as has already been 
mentioned, releases persons who have served their sentences 
without providing them with any means for coping in society 
and without enabling them to be meaningfully reintegrated into 
it, such as by finding a job and having a stable home. The 
therapy system would at least make this one of its primary 
objectives: 
Specific deterrence forestalls future offenses by changing the 
offender's cost-benefit calculus. Rehabilitation, on the other hand, 
forestalls future offenses by changing the subject's preferences. The 
specifically deterred offender now knows what it feels like to be 
punished, and out of fear, avoids making the same mistake twice. The 
rehabilitated offender, in contrast, now knows and accepts that what 
he did was wrong, and out of respect for the law and the rights of 
others, no longer thinks it is morally tolerable to violate either of 
them. The distinction can be elusive, but it is important nonetheless 
(Garvey 1998: 757). 
Of course, there will still be recidivists, just as recovered 
patients sometimes have relapses, but many successes will also 
be attained, successes that will become more frequent as 
rehabilitation becomes more effective. Here too, the only 
system that has the improvement of offenders as its objective 
is the rehabilitative system. Imprisonment does no good and 
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cannot plausibly be expected to do so: " ... containment is only 
a shot of morphine for a sick and painful society. When it 
wears off, the disease is still there and the pain is worse" 
(Nygaard 1995: 6). 
6.9.3 WHY REHABILITATION PROMISES TO BE ECONOMICAL 
One common reaction to be expected from persons first reading 
the above proposals is, who is going to bare the cost of such 
treatment? The rehabilitative system will require many 
psychiatrists, psychologists, social workers, and other 
persons involved in rehabilitation; who is going to assume the 
cost? Before answering this question, let us ask what the 
present system of punishment is costing society. What do the 
many prisons cost and what are they delivering in return? 
Crime is thereby not being effectively reduced; on the 
contrary, recidivism is the norm rather than the exception. 
Are we then getting our money's worth? If crime is not 
actually being reduced, then for what are we really paying? 
The further question that needs to be asked is not only what 
the expenses are, but also what the returns are. Undoubtedly 
the rehabilitative system will initially cost a fair deal, but 
the advantages society is likely to attain by it are 
immeasurably greater. In the first place, if offenders no 
longer become recidivists, we save productive persons for 
society. The persons might cost the state more money for 
their initial treatment, but should ultimately cost the state 
less since repeated imprisonment should become unlikely. 
Returned to society, former offenders ought to be able to be 
productive citizens, generating wealth rather than costing 
revenue for their repeated imprisonments and care. The 
reduction in crime promised by the rehabilitative system 
should ultimately reduce the cost of crime enforcement as well 
as of the legal system. Being able to return productive 
members to their families also has the benefit of enabling 
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them to contribute to their care, where they might otherwise 
have been dependent on the state for their support. 
Ultimately, however, the greatest benefit will probably not be 
found in monetary terms, but in the peace of mind gained 
through having a more peaceful, crime-free society. 
6.10 SOCIAL LIMITS OF REHABILITATIONISM 
Rehabili tationism does not emphasise the offenders' blame for 
their actions, nor does it presuppose a rational agent, or the 
existence of rational choice: it emphasises that offenders are 
maladapted to their environments and that they can usually 
improve if assisted to do so. If we examine the treatment of 
offenders from impoverished communities, offenders guilty of 
offences arising out of economic need, political offences 
committed as a form of protest against their miserable 
conditions, or to draw attention to their oppression by the 
dominant social group, we are faced by numerous moral 
difficulties. 
Firstly, the wholly rehabilitative approach assumes that 
criminal offenders are always ill in some form or other, an 
assumption that is not always correct. Persons such as Martin 
Luther King, Lech Walesa and Nelson Mandela (all Nobel Prize 
Laureates) and Mahatma Gandhi all served time in prison for 
crimes against the state or the general social order, yet no 
one would seriously suggest that any of these persons is 
mentally ill. 7 Persons committing more minor offences, such as 
theft, are also not necessarily exhibiting the symptoms of a 
mental illness. Starving persons who steal food are not 
exhibiting ill health either. On the contrary, many will 
7 Ronald Dworkin (1993a: 6-13) considers civil disobedience in the 
context of the nature of law and of the roles various actors play in 
our legal system. He argues that because law and morality are not 
easily separated, the validity of law is itself often an issue of 
dispute in civil disobedience cases. Both prosecutors and 
legislators should weigh the consequences of prosecution and the 
fairness of prosecuting people for violating laws they believe to be 
immoral and that may be invalid. 
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assert, as I do, that they have a healthy instinct for 
survival. If they steal to save their families from 
starvation, they are not only not ill, but are loving and 
caring to those close to them (Delgado 1995: 266). It should 
be emphasised that most criminals exhibit the very character 
traits encouraged by capitalist society as normal self-
interest, indifference to others and acquisition. Of course, 
society may still wish to rehabilitate such offenders, 
providing them with means and modifying their behaviour in 
such a manner that they may satisfy their needs and interests 
in non-violent and socially acceptable ways. This 
presupposes, however, that such an alternative exists, but 
this may not always be the case. 8 If society fails to create 
the structures and social conditions enabling all members of 
society to satisfy their needs and interests, then no 
rehabilitative approach will be adequate in the long-term 
(Delgado 1995: 267). 
If rehabilitation is applied to persons not sharing the 
dominant values of society, they will almost certainly be 
considered cured or rehabilitated only once they have adopted 
the values of the rehabili ta tor and of the dominant society. 
This means that offenders' rights to determine and choose 
their own values is denied. We may well imagine offenders 
saying that we may punish them if we so wish, but we should 
not interfere with their rights to choose what is valuable 
(Delgado 1995: 267). Therefore, rehabilitators should not 
impose any values upon offenders other than those that 
facilitate the fostering of well being of the individual and 
ultimately of the group. 
In the chapters dealing with retribution and with 
deterrence, I argued that punishment is only justified if 
8 Feinberg (1995c: 91-112) considers the consequences of the debate 
between positivism and natural law for conflicts in the political 
arena. Most positivists agree with their natural law opponents that 
citizens in a democracy are morally obliged to obey the valid laws of 
their country. Feinberg dissents from this opinion. 
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society provides a framework in which all communities can 
participate as equals, having the same rights and 
opportunities. The same holds for the rehabilitative 
approach. Societies ought therefore to strive towards the 
reduction and ultimate elimination of social, ethnic, 
religious, or racial oppression to be able to legitimately 
expect the members of its communities to accept the norms and 
values of the general society and thereby avoid conflicts. It 
may be reiterated that the view of normality adopted in this 
thesis is that survival and actualisation of a group's 
potential is worth striving towards too, not only that of 
individuals, and hence a society that does not strive towards 
the well being of its communities may be described as 
maladaptive (as well as uncivilised) and in need of reform. 
The rehabilitative ideal defended in this chapter, i.e. in 
which the aim is to foster and enhance the well being of the 
individual and ultimately of the group, does not conflict with 
any of the limits mentioned in this section. 
6.11 SUMMARY AND PERSPECTIVE 
In this chapter, I presented the rehabilitative approach and 
defended a qualified form of it. I first presented a paradigm 
exposition of the theory before enumerating the main 
differences between this approach and the punitive one. The 
main concerns pertaining to such a system were also mentioned 
before dealing with the main problems in detail. 
I found no necessary connection between crime and illness, 
i.e. I found no plausible account that attributed all criminal 
behaviour to some illness or other. I also pointed out, 
however, that even if offenders were ill in some way or other, 
it would not condone any offensive actions they may have 
performed by virtue of this fact alone. To do so, the illness 
would have to have determined their actions completely. 
Having argued that not all crimes are the result of illnesses, 
206 
I nevertheless argued that even if not all criminals are ill, 
they still ought to be treated because this promises to yield 
a more positive outcome than mere imprisonment. 
Turning then to preventive detention, I established by 
means of argument that this is morally justified only for 
those persons who have already committed offences in the past, 
which means that innocent persons cannot morally be subjected 
to such treatment. In this respect, I concluded that the 
accuracy requirements for criminals and former criminals is 
not as high as that of innocent persons since the former have 
diminished moral standing. I also argued that preventive 
detention morally may be imposed on those qualifying for such 
treatment (i.e. criminals and former criminals) until they no 
longer pose an uncontrollable threat. 
The arguments with regard to preventive detention also 
enabled me to draw conclusions for the issues of treatment of 
innocent persons and indeterminate sentence lengths. 
Pertaining to the former, I argued that this is not morally 
tenable at all; pertaining to the latter, I contended that the 
length of sentences ought to be determined by the requirements 
of general deterrence set out in 5.5, and not by the 
requirements of rehabilitation, except when conditions for 
preventively detaining persons exist. 
Before arguing for a qualified rehabilitative approach, I 
addressed the reasons why past attempts at rehabilitation may 
have been unsuccessful, both on empirical and philosophical 
grounds, and addressed the problem of imposing values. In 
expounding a qualified rehabilitative approach, I showed that 
rehabilitationism pursues three more of the five objectives I 
set out in Chapter 1. Finally, I discussed the social limits 
of rehabilitationism too. 
Let us evaluate rehabilitationism in light of the 
necessary conditions I argue for justified punishment: ( 1) It 
does not provide a morally acceptable account of whom to 
punish or rehabilitate, since even innocent persons would be 
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rehabilitated in a pure system if doing so would prevent 
crime. (2) The "how" question is also not acceptably handled 
because a pure system would endorse open-ended punishment, 
i.e. rehabilitation until the goals of rehabilitation have 
been achieved, regardless of how long this takes. (3) 
Bringing satisfaction for society: the rehabilitative approach 
does not aim at this goal at all in any direct way. 
Punishment is not an aim, even if it would serve a need of 
society; the only primary objective is to rehabilitate 
offenders. If rehabilitation for murder could be achieved 
without any discomfort for a given group of offenders by, for 
instance, prescribing a specific medication for them, then 
these off enders would be released, according to the 
rehabilitative approach, resulting in no visible punishment 
for society, thereby denying society the right to express its 
anger and indignation through punishment. On the contrary, it 
may be presumed that prematurely releasing criminals, or 
releasing them without any perceptible punishment, has the 
contrary effect, i.e. it angers the members of society even 
further. (4) Crime reduction: the rehabilitative approach has 
as its fundamental guiding principle the rehabilitation of 
offenders with the objective of reintegrating them into 
society without re-offending. If therapy is successful, it 
will ultimately bring about a most noticeable reduction in 
crime. 9 ( 5) Improving offenders: the only approach that is 
committed towards improvement of off enders is the 
rehabilitative approach, having it as its fundamental guiding 
principle. Off enders are to be assisted and changed so that 
they will be able to return to society once released and live 
productive, crime free lives. The ultimate aim of 
rehabilitation is the fostering of well being of the 
individual being rehabilitated as well as the well being of 
9 See 6. 9 .1 for elaboration on how rehabilitation pursues the goal of 
bringing about a reduction in crime. 
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the group of which he or she is a member. 10 ( 6) Undoing the 
harm done: rehabili tationism is not concerned with the well 
being of victims in any way; it focuses only on criminals and 
does therefore not pursue this objective at all. ( 7) Being 
economical: the approach that is ultimately most committed to 
being economical is the rehabilitative approach. It promises 
to give taxpayers best value for their money. Of course, the 
rehabilitative system will initially cost a fair deal, but the 
advantages it is bound to yield are immeasurably greater than 
those attainable from any other simple approach. Criminals 
who do not become recidivists are saved as productive persons 
for society. Their initial treatment may cost the state more, 
but the reduced likelihood that they will require repeated 
imprisonment would ultimately reduce the costs. Former 
criminals who are able to become productive members of society 
generate weal th rather than cost revenue for repeated 
imprisonments and care. The reduction in crime promised by 
the rehabilitative system will ultimately reduce the costs of 
crime enforcement and of the legal system too. Of the seven 
necessary conditions, rehabilitationism in a pure form is only 
capable of fulfilling three. 
At this stage, it is once again appropriate to address the 
question, what has been achieved so far and what still lies 
ahead? Retributivism and deterrence theory together fulfilled 
three of the necessary conditions for a justification of 
punishment, namely to show whom we may punish, to what extent, 
and allowing punishment to serve as a recognised channel 
through which society can express its anger and indignation at 
offenders. In this chapter, I then addressed the 
rehabilitative approach, stressed its positive elements, and 
argued that rehabilitationism is best able to pursue three of 
the five objectives I maintain any punishment system must 
have. A hybrid approach with rehabilitative objectives too, 
with sentences determined by the demands of general 
1° For details on this point, see 6.9.2. 
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deterrence, has so far been argued. Four of my stipulated 
objectives are already pursued, namely: punishment ought to 
serve as a recognised channel through which society can 
express its anger and indignation at offenders; punishment 
should bring about a reduction in crime; punishment should 
improve off enders, rather than leave them as they are, or 
leave them to deteriorate further; and punishment should be 
economical. One more objective is to be pursued, but for this 
I shall need to turn to the restitutional approach. Before 
doing so, it is important that I discuss paternalism, since 
one of the most common reactions from this chapter may be that 
rehabilitation as I defend it would result in paternalism. 
Paternalism, as I shall argue in the next chapter, is morally 
defensible and unlike many of its critics would claim, is not 
even diametrically opposed to liberalism. 
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7.1 INTRODUCTION 
CHAPTER 7 
DEFENDING PATERNALISM 
In the previous chapter, I argued that just punishment ought 
also to have retributive elements. One of the goals of 
rehabilitation is that offenders ought to be made better 
persons, rather than left as they are, or allowed to 
deteriorate further, by the process of punishment. Making 
them better, rather than leaving them as they are, or leaving 
them to deteriorate further, requires making changes to their 
lives to which they may sometimes not consent since many 
offenders assume a hostile, acrimonious and suspicious 
attitude towards the system imposing punishment on them. A 
possible objection against my defence of rehabilitation is 
that it would amount to paternalism and it is by no means 
obvious that this is morally justifiable. Therefore, I need 
to show that paternalism is morally justified. 
What exactly is paternalism? Paternalism is "the power 
and authority one person or institution exercises over another 
to confer benefits or prevent harm for the latter regardless 
of the latter's informed consent" ( Honderich 1995) . It is 
therefore a threat to autonomy as well as to liberty and 
privacy. On any normative principle, paternalism is desirable 
towards children, the mentally ill, and others similarly 
incapable of adequately caring for themselves. Since I have 
argued against the view that criminals are in general mentally 
ill, I offer a defence based on different grounds. In 
addition, liberals, such as John Stuart Mill, seek to limit 
paternalism to the bare minimum. As examples of paternalistic 
laws, one may mention: laws requiring motorcyclists to wear 
helmets when operating their machines, laws forbidding persons 
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from swimming at a public beach when life-guards are not on 
duty, laws making suicide a criminal offence, laws forbidding 
women and children to work at certain types of jobs, laws 
requiring a license to engage in certain professions, laws 
specifying that persons must spend a certain proportion of 
their income for the purchase of retirement annuity or medical 
aid insurance, laws forbidding specific types of gambling, 
laws regulating the maximum rates of interest for loans, and 
laws against duelling. Other regulations may also be 
paternalistic, such as laws specifying the types of contracts 
that will be upheld by the courts, not allowing consent as a 
defence in a murder charge, and requiring members of certain 
religious sects to accept blood transfusions (Dworkin 1995a: 
210) . 
Regarding punishment, the question that needs to be 
resolved is, can we compel anyone against his will to undergo 
treatment or therapy with the objective of making him a better 
person, with the aim of reforming him? 
I shall begin by presenting a wholly paternalistic theory 
of punishment. Because I am concerned in this thesis with 
establishing a theory of morally justifiable punishment, I 
hold it necessary to examine a wholly paternalistic attempt at 
justifying punishment, and then to show why this attempt 
fails. I have chosen Herbert Morris's theory because it is 
the most comprehensive attempt at justifying punishment 
paternalistically that I have come across. I shall first 
briefly describe the theory before subjecting it to critical 
evaluation. I will then begin with my own defence of 
paternalism. Given the liberal opposition to paternalism, my 
defence of paternalism will begin with a discussion of 
liberalism, taking Mill's liberalism as the basis for my 
discussion since his philosophy may be considered as 
paradigmatic on the issue. Liberalists usually oppose any 
paternalistic intervention, but I shall argue that this is 
inconsistent and that liberalism endorses some paternalistic 
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intervention, and hence liberalism and paternalism are not 
diametrically opposed to each other. Finally, I shall examine 
the issue of whether it is morally justified to preventively 
detain persons on paternalistic grounds. 
7.2 PATERNALISM AND PUNISHMENT 
In this section, I examine an attempt to justify the whole 
institution of punishment paternalistically. In the theory I 
present here, Herbert Morris defends the paradoxical claim 
that punishment respects the status of offenders as moral 
persons. He argues that punishment is a complex communicative 
act that conveys the message to moral agents that the 
behaviour they exhibited was a violation of communal values 
and therefore wrong. Morris is not advocating a communitarian 
theory, however, since he does not hold that paternalistic 
punishment ought to have any communitarian benefit, but ought 
to benefit only the individuals punished. For him the 
objective of punishment is the realisation of offenders that 
certain behaviour is wrong: a recognition of the good, and the 
offender's freely choosing the good in future. Off enders 
should come to see the good of their own punishment and 
realise that violating certain communal values is ultimately 
detrimental to themselves. Legal punishment is seen as 
analogous to parental disciplining of children, which is for 
the well being of the individual being disciplined, as well as 
for society. Morris's theory rejects utilitarian 
justifications of punishment, regarding these as failing to 
acknowledge criminals as moral agents. He insists that basic 
retributive values be upheld, namely that only guilty persons 
be punished, that punishment should be proportional, and that 
the moral worth of the individual should always be upheld. 1 
1 Morris (1995: 74-93) maintains that punishment is justified primarily, 
not as a method of crime control, but because the criminal, having 
committed a crime, deserves to be punished. He attempts to derive the 
principle of retribution from more general principles of justice or 
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7.2.1 MORRIS'S PATERNALISTIC THEORY OF PUNISHMENT 
Morris attempts to defend paternalism as an appropriate 
response in terms of a system of punitive sanctions against 
offenders. He approves of punishment, but in order for it to 
be justified, one must punish paternalistically (Morris 1998: 
9 6) . 
He assumes that a system of punishment presupposes the 
following: (1) certain conduct has been determined to be 
wrongful, ( 2) recognised deprivations are imposed in response 
to such conduct, (3) these deprivations are imposed by someone 
having authority to do so, ( 4) wrongdoers are made aware that 
the deprivations are imposed because of the wrongdoing, and 
(5) the context of punishment makes it clear that the measures 
are designed to make offenders aware that their conduct was 
wrong, and not to compensate victims or make reparations of 
some sort (Morris 1998: 96-97). The communicative element 
therefore distinguishes punishment from mere retribution or 
retaliation. 
The communicative act of paternalism is primarily 
concerned with justifying conduct for another's well being. 
Deprivations and limitations thereof are justified in terms of 
the benefits for actual and potential offenders. Morris 
therefore sets out to argue that punishment is for the actual 
and potential offenders' goods. He distinguishes his theory 
from rehabilitation, claiming that rehabilitation may often be 
undertaken not primarily for the good of the individual, but 
for that of society. He also maintains that rehabilitation 
fails to inculcate a message of the moral good, a central 
component of his theory (Morris 1998: 97). He does not give 
fairness. He argues that the criminal, by free riding on a mutual scheme 
of social co-operation, has treated law-abiding citizens unfairly, and 
hence owes them a debt. He further argues that a system of deserved 
punishment, unlike a system that regards criminal behaviour as a mental 
illness, treats criminals with respect and dignity, as responsible agents, 
and that criminals therefore have a right to be punished. They also have a 
right to all the guarantees of a due process system, in contrast to a 
therapy system. 
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reasons for this claim, and if one considers what he means by 
the "good," no apparent reason for his holding this view comes 
to light. For Morris, the good requires that one come to 
realise the wrong done to oneself and others by one's criminal 
actions, which requires empathy, the ability to accurately 
imagine oneself in another's situation and also requires the 
imaginative capacity for understanding the implications for 
one's future self that result from wrongful actions. It 
further requires a commitment towards being a certain kind of 
person (a view not elaborated upon by Morris) . It therefore 
not only requires an understanding that certain actions have 
led to the present situation, but that certain actions will 
lead to certain consequences, i.e. it not only entails an 
understanding of past actions, but also of future ones (Morris 
1998: 98). For him the "good" thus has a number of component 
parts, including that one come to appreciate the nature of the 
evil involved for others and for oneself in wrongfully 
behaving, but there is no reason why rehabilitation ought to 
rule out instilling within offenders a sense of empathy and 
developing the required imaginative capacity. 
Morris also assumes that paternalism always entails giving 
someone something they do not desire, or withholding something 
from someone they desire. According to Morris, paternalism is 
in opposition to the desires of the paternalistically treated 
persons. He believes that giving someone something they 
desire is not paternalism but benevolence. This, I hold, is a 
fallacious assumption because of the following: collective 
restrictions are also paternalistic if the liberty of the 
whole group is restricted so that if every member adheres to 
the restrictions, each will benefit thereby. Compulsion may 
be necessary to enforce such restrictions, but this is only 
done with the understanding of the members that general 
restrictions are necessary for their collective benefits. 
Paternalism therefore is not necessarily the restriction of 
liberties against the subject's consent (Dworkin 1995a: 211). 
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For example, if one requires that seat belts be worn in the 
front seats of cars, one is enforcing a good for the well 
being of the subjects, a good which most of them recognise. 
It is not that those neglecting to wear seat belts do not 
value their bodily well being, but, as I will discuss in 
7. 4. 3, may value another freedom more, perhaps unreasonably, 
namely the freedom of travelling in the front seats of cars 
unrestrained. Perhaps they do not recognise the danger 
involved or underestimate the odds of becoming victims. 
Morris defines punishment as a deprivation that persons 
generally seek to avoid, therefore being in opposition to 
their desires; but their present desires will not influence 
the deprivations imposed on them. Most importantly, however, 
his theory entails that punishment has the objective of 
inculcating a certain moral good within actual and potential 
offenders (Morris 1998: 98). 
Morris's theory presupposes that the rules defining 
punishment meet certain moral conditions, but he remains vague 
on these conditions: he assumes that attachment to these 
values partly defines one's identity as a moral being and as a 
member of a moral community, and that disregard for such rules 
may result in a rupture between oneself and others or oneself 
and the community, accompanied with a loss of identity to some 
extent. He assumes that it is part of the good that one 
suffer for having done wrong, and that one be inclined to 
restore what has been damaged and that one acknowledge the 
appropriateness of having to suffer as a consequence of having 
committed a crime. Morris also holds that to be part of the 
good is to be determined to avoid repeating those actions that 
were wrong or injurious in the past and hence to be able to 
forgive oneself; and finally, it is also held to be part of 
the good that one see oneself as an individual worthy of 
respect and responsible for one's actions (Morris 1998: 99): 
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It is a moral good, then, that one feel contrite, that one feel the 
guilt that is appropriate to one's wrongdoing, that one be repentant, 
that one be self-forgiving and that one have reinforced one's 
conception of oneself as a responsible being. Ultimately, then, the 
moral good aimed at by the paternalism I propose is an autonomous 
individual freely attached to that which is good, those relationships 
with others that sustain and give meaning to a life (Morris 1998: 
99). 
Morris's theory therefore seeks to justify punishment as a 
means towards the good of the offender. Any punishment that 
does not have this objective is held to be morally 
unacceptable: 
. . . on this theory we seek to achieve a good entirely through the 
mediation of the wrongdoer's efforts to understand the full 
significance of the wrongful conduct, the significance of the 
punishment being imposed, and the significance of acceptance of that 
punishment. Thus, unacceptable to this theory would be any response 
that sought the good of a wrongdoer in a manner that bypassed the 
human capacity for reflection, understanding, and revision of 
attitude that may result from such efforts (Morris 1998: 100). 
Offenders must also always be treated with dignity, even when 
the offender consents to being treated otherwise (Morris 1998: 
100) 
The paternalistic goal is not to make offenders feel less 
burdened or more content. This may be a likely by-product of 
the punishment when the good is attained, but it is not one of 
punishment's objectives (Morris 1998: 100) 
Morris considers possible criticisms of his theory, 
specifically, can a plausible connection between punishment 
and the good sought be given? Secondly, can there be any 
serious objection to limiting someone's liberty for their own 
goods? 
In response to the first, he argues that parents: 
sometimes coercively interfere with their children to prevent 
harm to them, sometimes to ensure continued heal thy growth, 
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sometimes to establish appropriate 
Pain, 
moral 
but socialisation, 
deprivation, and a 
education. Not 
sometimes for moral education. 
feeling of loss often accompany 
anger directed against a child is punishment, however. 
all 
A 
parent's spontaneous outbursts of anger serve no moral 
purpose; they only distress the child. Anger or disapproval 
only serves as punishment if the parent deliberately visits 
upon the child some pain or deprivation because of some 
wrongdoing by the child. The absence of this connection 
between wrongdoing and punishment may arouse guilt in the 
child, and may bring about future compliance, but does not 
relieve guilt, nor is it proper moral communication, and hence 
does not serve as moral education. Morris therefore argues 
that punishment must have some special and logical 
relationship to wrongdoing. In this way, punishment is 
connected to the good in a way in which mere blame or 
disapproval is not (Morris 1998: 101). 
He argues as follows: one of the important lessons 
children learn is that parents are entitled to inflict some 
pain or deprivation in response to wrongdoing. A punitive 
response also conveys to children the magnitude of the values 
disregarded. The child therefore becomes aware that there are 
different degrees of value to which different degrees of 
punishment are connected as responses to their disregard 
(Morris 1998: 101-102). Furthermore, punishment rights the 
wrong done (a point I shall criticise and reject shortly). It 
is as though the debt is paid, life can go on with normal 
societal relationships. Punishment assists the child in 
learning what it must know as a moral person, that some things 
are not permitted, that there are degrees of seriousness, and 
that one is sometimes responsible for wrong done and sometimes 
not, and that it deserves degrees of blame. By feeling guilt, 
by acknowledging responsibility for the wrong done, and by 
accepting some deprivation as a consequence, the child is 
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restored to a normal position with others. It is an integral 
part of moral education (Morris 1998: 102-103). 
Morris projects this paternalistic theory of punishment 
onto society and therefore onto adult individuals. By 
legislating laws, providing sanctions, and enforcing these for 
violating laws, citizens learn what society's values are, what 
the weight of each value is, and the response that may be 
expected for disregarding these values. Punishment is a 
forceful reminder of the harm done to others and oneself. In 
the case of legal punishment too, Morris maintains that it 
rights the wrong, allowing offenders to restore their 
relationships with society, having paid the debt (Morris 1998: 
104) . 
Morris (1998: 
justified because 
105) 
it 
argues that 
ultimately 
punishing 
benefits 
offenders is 
the punished 
indi victual. He believes that all of us, 
would consent to a system in which we 
should stray from society's prescriptions. 
as rational beings, 
are benefited if we 
Morris denies that 
this is objectionable because it is for the moral good of the 
punished. The person's personhood and dignity are respected 
throughout. 
Regarding the objection whether we should always only 
punish paternalistically after having warned that we will 
punish, Morris replies that society does warn by proclaiming 
its laws and prescribing punishments for transgressions. 
Responding to the criticism that paternalism would justify 
open-ended punishment (punishment until the moral 
transformation of the perpetrator has been achieved), Morris 
replies that his theory does not justify such treatment since 
the goal is not repentance at all costs, but repentance freely 
arrived at and not just an adherence to norms and laws. 
Punishment must also take into consideration the severity of 
the harm done, thereby ruling out an open-ended punishment 
system since that would result in disproportionate 
punishments. 
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A further question faced is whether conditioning or 
forfeiting of one's autonomy would be appropriate when 
consented to by the offender. Morris clearly rejects this, 
arguing that the goal of punishment is to increase moral 
autonomy, not to make offenders automatons (Morris 1998: 105-
106) . 
Morris realises that his theory faces its sternest 
challenge from critics who argue that the theory has no 
relevance for those off enders who are already repentant, or 
for those who know the values of society but are indifferent 
to them. Regarding the first, he claims that the guilty and 
repentant wrongdoers will accept the appropriateness of the 
punishment because it is an indication to them and others that 
they are truly repentant and because it rights the wrong. 
Regarding the indifferent offender, Morris states that his 
theory presupposes two fundamental conditions of the society 
in which his theory is applied, namely, ( 1) that the values 
promulgated are indeed just and that society's members have 
roughly an equal opportunity of conforming to those values, 
and ( 2) that there is a general commitment to upholding the 
values promulgated. However, Morris fails to conceive how a 
moral theory of punishment could be applied if such conditions 
are not met (Morris 1998: 107). 
Regarding the theory's application, it can only be applied 
to agents capable of recognising society's values. Reasonable 
ignorance or mistakes of law are to be mitigating factors. 
What about the assumption that criminals have the same right 
to be free as do we all? The answer is, perpetrators have 
forfeited their rights, especially if the restrictions placed 
upon them are similar to those inflicted by them on others. 
The theory presupposes that rights can be forfeited, waved 
aside, and relinquished. A right not forfei table, according 
to this theory, is the right to one's dignity and autonomy, 
but he does not give a reason for this right's special status. 
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This paternalistic theory therefore opposes any theory of 
punishment primarily retributivist or based on utilitarian 
considerations (Morris 1998: 108-109). 
7.2.2 EVALUATING MORRIS'S THEORY 
Morris argues against therapy or rehabilitation, claiming that 
these measures are generally designed to benefit society, 
rather than the individual (Morris 1998: 97) . However, this 
need not be the case. Many persons voluntarily undergo 
psychotherapy, and would be indignant at the suggestion that 
their primary objective is to benefit society. Of course, 
oppressive regimes may sometimes want to employ rehabilitation 
for changing the attitudes and behaviour of individuals 
critical of the regime, but such employment of rehabilitation 
would be morally unjustified if it is not conducive to 
furthering the actualising of potential within the individual. 
Morris's definition of the good encompasses the capacity 
to empathise with others and develop a future-oriented 
perspective. He would therefore almost certainly be incapable 
of dealing with antisocial personality offenders, bearing in 
mind that he has ruled out rehabilitation for the treatment of 
offenders. Carson, Butcher and Coleman describe antisocial 
personality as follows: 
Antisocial personality, is a personality disorder in which the 
outstanding characteristics are a marked lack of ethical or moral 
development and an apparent inability of the individual to follow 
approved models of behavior. Basically, these individuals are 
unsocialized and seemingly incapable of significant loyalty to other 
persons, groups, or social values. These characteristics often bring 
them into repeated conflict with society ... 
Typically intelligent, spontaneous, and usually very likeable on 
first acquaintance, antisocial 
manipulative, callously using 
Often they seem to live in a 
personalities are deceitful and 
others to achieve their own ends. 
series of present moments, without 
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consideration for the past or future (Carson, Butcher & Coleman 1988: 
237-238). 
Then, Morris believes that punishment should arouse guilt in 
criminals, i.e. they should experience guilt and not only 
acknowledge that they are legally guilty. Antisocial 
personalities are unlikely to experience any guilt, depending 
on the degree of their antisocial conditions. He also does 
not provide any indication how the system of punishment ought 
to ensure that the punished feel guilty. Criminals may 
acknowledge that they are guilty but may not feel guilty, 
which is what Morris wants. However, not only might 
antisocial individuals be incapable of feeling guilt and 
remorse in a punishment setting, But criminals might also see 
their criminal actions as having been justified, rationalising 
that violence is appropriate in given circumstances, for 
instance, or that society is responsible for their behavioural 
malfunction, and therefore they need not actually feel guilt 
or remorse since they are not primarily responsible for the 
crimes. 
Morris maintains that punishment rights the wrong done. 
He stipulates, however, that it is not imposed to make 
reparation to the victims or to society. How then is the 
wrong made right? In the case of legal punishment too, Morris 
maintains that it rights the wrong, allowing offenders to 
restore their relationships with society, having paid their 
debts (Morris 1998: 104). Are we to understand it in terms of 
a Platonic or Hegelian notion? Plato argued that punishment, 
though often painful to the body, is a benefit rather than a 
harm to the person being punished to the degree that the 
punishment improves her soul or character, making her a better 
person in the future. 2 If Morris wants us to think along 
Platonic lines, then it must be pointed out that the Socratic 
theory has therapy as its underlying theme. Hegel believes 
2 For this dialogue extracted from Plato's Gorgias, see Plato (1995: 8-13). 
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that punishment is a negative act, one that can only be 
negated by punishment. Punishment rights the wrong done in 
criminal behaviour by inflicting suffering on the perpetrator. 
This metaphysical argument fails to show, however, how two 
negatives make a positive. If punishment is a negative, then 
how is the original negative of the crime negated by it ? 3 
Leaving metaphysical arguments aside, is not the crime victim 
usually the one to suffer most by the criminal's behaviour? 
Morris and Hegel fail to take account of the actual harm done 
or type of harm. 
In response to the claim that criminals pay a debt to 
society through punishment, it must be stated that this is a 
very simple and incorrect picture, as Nozick's counterexamples 
have made clear. 4 It is not necessarily the case that those 
who have benefited from some joint enterprise have a duty, or 
moral obligation, to contribute to it. They may, for 
instance, have been innocent bystanders, innocent recipients 
of the benefits, who could not avoid receiving them and who 
would not have voluntarily taken part in the joint venture to 
receive the benefits. Examples would be people who voted 
against their government but now benefit from their 
government's economic reforms; or people benefiting from the 
negotiations their organisation is engaged in with the trade 
union, even though they themselves are not members of the 
latter. It is not sufficient that they merely receive the 
benefits; they also must have accepted them willingly (Ellis 
1997: 92). 
It is a difficult question to answer under which 
conditions a person has accepted a benefit willingly, but we 
may identify situations more easily in which this clearly is 
not the case. Someone who thought, for instance, that the 
benefits of cooperation would not repay the costs involved, 
and therefore who would rather that there be no such scheme 
3 This stance was already rejected in 2.5. 
4 See Nozick's examples in Chapter 6 of Anarchy, State, and Utopia (Nozick 
1974) • 
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and not pay the costs, and who receive the benefits merely 
because they cannot avoid receiving them, or it would be too 
costly not to receive them without others doing likewise, 
cannot reasonably be described as having received the benefits 
willingly. An example of the first kind are persons 
benefiting from a sports field built in front of their house 
so that they can watch the events held there from their 
balconies. They are not causing the organisers any loss when 
they do so, although the organisers would be better off if the 
balcony spectators were to contribute financially too for the 
benefits they get, just as normal spectators do. 
equitable with their causing them a loss, however. 
This is not 
Similarly, 
if someone causes one a loss, he is not necessarily benefited 
by it. If a person weighing one-hundred-and-sixty kilograms 
were to fly with a small airline, the airline may indeed 
suffer a loss for having to use more fuel than would be the 
case with a passenger with less weight, but the passenger 
causing the loss would not benefit in any way that other 
passengers do not. The heavy passenger's receipt of the 
benefits does not put him under an obligation to pay the costs 
in return. The question here is not whether free riders 
sometimes cause a loss to participants, but whether they 
necessarily do so and do so in a relevant way (Ellis 1997: 
92). They need not do so, however. 5 It is conceivable that 
criminals deny that they owe any allegiance to society since 
they have not willingly accepted the benefit of security 
created through mutual cooperation. 
The analogy drawn between punishment of children in their 
families and punishment of off enders in society may also be 
questioned, and Morris may be accused of employing a false 
analogy. Unlike parental punishment, legal punishment might 
not be analogous to familial discipline because it usually 
5 For similar details on these arguments and examples, see Ellis (1997: 92-
95). 
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does not have a happy family environment, but rather involves 
hostile attitudes. 
Morris's theory also ignores: the magnitude of the 
punishment to be administered, society's right to express its 
anger and indignation at offenders, deterrence, bringing about 
a reduction in crime, undoing the wrong through restitution, 
and the costs of punishment. His theory leaves many issues 
unexamined, just as all other simple theories that I have 
examined have left issues unexamined. This is not to assert 
that no single approach could adequately address all these 
issues, but I have not been able to determine how this might 
be done and therefore I advocate a unitary theory that 
combines retributional, deterrent, 
rehabilitative, and restitutional elements. 
7.3 LIBERALISM 
7.3.1 MILL'S LIBERALISM 
paternalistic, 
Mill argues that the only justification one has for curtailing 
the liberty of any person is self-protection (Mill 1995: 198). 
For Mill, a utilitarian, the only purpose for which power may 
be exercised over members of society against their wills is to 
prevent harm to others. A person's own well being, either 
physical or moral, is not a sufficient reason for warranting 
restriction of liberty. Remonstrating with, reasoning with, 
persuading or entreating persons to act in a manner that would 
make them happier, or because in the opinions of others to do 
so would be wise or even right, are good reasons, but they are 
not sufficient reasons for compelling them to act as suggested 
because Mill sees a greater danger in interfering in the lives 
of others for their own good than not interfering (as will be 
explained shortly) . The liberty to act in any way one pleases 
may be restricted only if one's actions cause harm to others, 
either individually or collectively. This is referred to as 
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the "harm principle." Concerning themselves, their 
independence is an absolute right. Everyone has sovereignty 
over her own mind and body (Mill 1995: 198). 
Mill qualifies his principle so that it applies only to 
persons fully capable of making rational decisions. Children, 
or those who are still in a state requiring them to be taken 
care of by others, must be protected against their own actions 
as well as against external injury. Mill's principle also 
applies only to societies in which the members are capable of 
responsibly leading their lives by means of rational 
deliberation in a liberal environment (Mill 1995: 198). 
Mill strictly adheres to utilitarianism regarding all 
ethical matters. It is utility in the largest sense, grounded 
on the permanent interests of man as a progressive being. If 
someone acts to hurt others, there is a prima facie case for 
punishing them by law, or where laws are not applicable, by 
expressing general disapprobation. Persons may also be 
compelled to perform positive acts for the benefits of others, 
such as to defend the country, or to testify truthfully in a 
court of law, or any other action necessary for the orderly 
functioning of society. Persons may cause injury to others, 
not only by their actions, but also by their inactions. In 
either case, they are accountable for the harm done (Mill 
1995: 199). 
Liberty, according to Mill, is 
domains of: individual consciousness, 
feeling, absolute freedom of opinion 
to be granted to the 
liberty of thought and 
and sentiment on all 
subjects, practical or speculative, scientific, moral or 
theological. Expressing and publishing opinions is closely 
connected to the liberty of thought, and is therefore, in 
Mill's view, practically inseparable from it. One ought to 
enjoy the liberty of pursuing one's own goals and shaping 
one's life according to one's life-plans by doing as one 
likes, as long as what is done does not harm others. Persons 
are to enjoy the liberty of uni ting in groups for pursuing 
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diverse interests and activities so long as these do not harm 
others. The persons uniting are to be of full age and are not 
to be deceived or coerced. Mill maintains that only societies 
upholding these liberties are free, regardless of their form 
of government. These principles are absolute and unqualified. 
One is only free when one is capable of pursuing one's own 
good in one's own name, so long as one does not deprive others 
of theirs or impede their efforts to obtain it. Mankind gains 
most, if all its members are left to pursue their goals as 
they find best according to their own judgements rather than 
by compelling each to live as seems good to the rest (Mill 
1995: 199). 
Curtailing another's opinion, maintains Mill, is morally 
objectionable since by doing so one may curtail a correct 
opinion, thereby assuming one's own infallibility; and even if 
the silenced opinion is wrong, it may still possess a portion 
of truth. Furthermore, even if the def ended opinion is not 
only true, but the whole truth, it will be held as a 
prejudiced opinion if not permitted to be strongly contested 
because persons believe most strongly what they themselves 
have experienced. This may have the consequence that the 
meaning of the doctrine itself will be in danger of being lost 
and deprived of the vital effect of its character and conduct, 
which means that a truth we wish to impose by silencing other 
opinions will not be readily adopted and hence not be held as 
the truth by others (Mill 1995: 200). 
Andrew Kernohan (1998: 30) argues that coercive state 
paternalism can be rejected on the grounds that interfering 
with someone to accept some conception of the good, cannot 
make it a conception of the good for that person. This was 
similarly argued by Locke in A Letter Concerning Toleration. 
Locke argued that a law could not be enforced pertaining to 
the worship of God because what would be enforced would only 
be acceptable to those believing it. If such practices are 
carried out without faith, they cannot be a part of the good, 
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nor pleasing to God. "Even if a life of prayer is the best 
life to lead, forcing someone to pray against her will cannot 
make prayer a component of the best life for her" (Locke 1991: 
33) . Kernohan (1998: 33) maintains that we would not be doing 
any good by imposing a good upon others, even if they adopted 
the good, if the means for imposing the good life limited 
their abilities to make autonomous choices. Thus, only a life 
that is accepted when subjected to critical reflection, can be 
part of the good. Kernohan therefore argues that it is not 
sufficient that one endorse the life paternalistically 
imposed, but that one realise it as the truth, i.e. that one 
not only endorse the view, but accept it as knowledge too: 
Our interest in leading as good a life as possible explains what is 
wrong with the coercion of a malevolent despot who forces people to 
lead bad lives. It does not explain, however, what is wrong with the 
coercive paternalism of a benevolent despot who forces people to lead 
good lives. If we add that people have an interest in leading a life 
that not only is a good life but also is a life they believe to be 
good, and we note, with Dworkin, that people cannot be forced to 
assent to beliefs about value, then we can say what is wrong with 
coercive paternalism (Kernohan 1998: 34-35) . 6 
Given these reservations, what control may 
exercise over its members? Everyone who is 
society 
enjoying 
protection from society should be bound to observe a certain 
line of conduct towards the rest. This conduct, Mill 
maintains, exists first in not injuring the interests of one 
another and in all persons bearing their shares of duties (to 
be fixed on some equitable principle) in defending the society 
or its members from injury and molestation. Society is 
justified in enforcing these conditions at all costs on those 
who endeavour to withhold fulfilment of these conditions. 
Society is justified, according to Mill, in going further. A 
person's actions may be injurious to others or lacking in 
6 For more information about Kernohan' s arguments regarding a person's 
ability to seek the good, see Kernohan (1998). 
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consideration for their welfare, in which case society is 
morally justified in punishing the individual. However, no 
such consideration is justified if the actions of the 
individual bear consequences only for the agent, even if these 
are detrimental ones. In such cases, the individual is to 
have the liberty (both social and legal) to do the action and 
face the consequences (Mill 1995: 200). Bird expands on this 
point as follows: 
Libertarian rights are of such weight that it is not only the case 
that they cannot be violated in order to produce greater overall 
welfare. They are also not to be violated even to prevent a greater 
number of similar violations in the future (Bird 1999: 141). 
No one, Mill asserts, can have as strong an interest in a 
person's life 
interference of 
as the person 
society to 
possessing it 
overrule persons' 
can. The 
judgements 
regarding their own lives must be based on general assumptions 
that may be wholly wrong, and even if correct are likely to be 
misapplied to individual cases by persons beholding the 
circumstances merely from without. This is because the first-
person account is held by Mill to be more reliable than the 
third-person one since the former has direct experience of a 
given situation, while the latter does not. Society may 
provide opinions or seek to persuade, but the persons 
themselves are the fin al judges. The persons in question may 
suffer severely as a result of their misjudged actions, or 
because others avoid them or have less favourable sentiments 
towards them because their behaviour aroused strong 
disapprobation, but the sufferings are not imposed as a 
punishment for their actions (Mill 1995: 201). 
Actions injurious to others require a very different 
response, argues Mill. Encroachment on their rights, losses 
or damages suffered by them not justified by the agent's own 
rights, or injury to others as a result of failure to act 
where acting was required, calls forth moral reprobation or 
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moral retribution and punishment in more serious cases (Mill 
1995: 201) . Not only these acts, but also the dispositions 
that lead to such acts, are considered immoral and hence fit 
subjects for disapprobation (Mill 1995: 202). 
Mill correctly realises that no person is a completely 
isolated being and that it is therefore impossible for anyone 
to do anything seriously or permanently injurious to 
themselves without thereby affecting at least their near 
connections. He therefore deems it necessary to argue why 
society ought not to be permitted to curtail the liberty of 
adult persons in such circumstances. If persons ruin their 
moral or mental faculties, they may bring adversity on all who 
depended on them for their happiness and so disqualify 
themselves from rendering the services they were obliged to 
perform to society. If such offences were to become frequent, 
they might have as great an impact on society as any other 
action of disapprobation, and even if they do no direct harm 
to others, they may nevertheless be described as harmful by 
serving as bad role models. Many may require them to conduct 
their activities so that they do not mislead those susceptible 
to corruption. Even if their conduct were to have no further 
influence than upon those who already share their attitudes, 
some will question whether society ought not to intervene 
amongst persons incapable of taking care of their own lives, 
just as it intervenes on behalf of children or under-aged 
indi victuals. Such intervention could only be against 
practices that have proved themselves adverse in every respect 
for indi victual well being over the ages. Mill ( 1995: 203) 
maintains that if persons become incapable of paying their 
debts or adequately caring for their families because of 
extravagant behaviour, for instance, they may be held liable 
for not being able to settle their debts or care for their 
families, but not for their lifestyle leading to the 
difficulties. Only when there is definite damage (or definite 
risk of damage) to another individual, or to the public, is 
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society morally justified in punishing them. Mill contends, 
however, that society has no moral right to curtail the 
liberties of adults in order to bring their conduct up to a 
certain acceptable level. Society has this opportunity 
throughout the childhood years of its citizens. It has had 
the whole period of childhood in which to try making them 
capable of rational conduct in life. If society lets a 
considerable number of its children remain incapable of any 
significant degree of rational consideration, society has 
itself to blame for its consequences (Mill 1995: 203). 
7.3.2 EVALUATING MILL'S LIBERALISM 
Mill argues that self-protection is the sole justification for 
using force against another and that intervening on behalf of 
an in di vi dual' s self-interest is never a sufficient reason. 
Gerald Dworkin rightly analyses Mill's argument as follows: 
(1) Since restraint is an evil, the burden of proof rests 
on those advocating restraint. 
(2) Since the conduct that is being considered is wholly 
self-regarding, the normal appeal to the protection 
of the interests of others is not applicable. 
(3) Therefore, we have to consider whether reasons 
referring to the individual's own well being are 
sufficient to overcome the burden of justification. 
(4) Either the interests of the individual cannot be 
advanced by compulsion, or the attempt to do so 
involves evils that outweigh the prospective good. 
(5) Therefore, the promotion of the individual's own 
interests does not provide a sufficient justification 
for the use of compulsion (Dworkin 1995a: 212) . 7 
7 Gerald Dworkin ( 1995a: 209-218) investigates whether legal paternalism 
(restricting someone's liberty for their own good) is ever justified. He 
respects Mill's position, but points out how widespread paternalistic 
practices are, and how drastic their total elimination would be. He 
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Clearly, the premise that may be questioned here is ( 4) . It 
entails Mill's assumption that individuals are the best judges 
of their own interests. The claim is that they are the ones 
most interested in their own well beings, and therefore have 
an immeasurably greater understanding of their conditions than 
anyone else. For Mill the interference of society in 
individual affairs, as has already been shown, requires 
general presumptions which may be wholly incorrect, and even 
if right, have a high probability of being misapplied to 
individual cases. The strongest of Mill's arguments against 
the interference of conduct affecting only the agents is, 
however, that when it does interfere, there is a high 
probability that it interferes wrongly and in the wrong place. 
All errors individuals may commit by acting unrestrainedly are 
outweighed by the harms caused by being restrained by others, 
by what the latter believe is expedient (Dworkin 1995a: 213). 
Translating this into utilitarian terms results in the view 
that society gains more if everyone is permitted to do what 
seems good to themselves, rather than by compelling each other 
to live as seems good to the rest. 
case? 
But is this really the 
Legitimate criticism may be directed at the assumption 
that the vast majority of adults know what is best for 
themselves. Interestingly, Mill himself is aware of the 
limitations of the doctrine that everyone knows best what 
actions best promote their well being. He realises that the 
uncultivated cannot be competent judges of motivation, those 
who need to be made wiser usually desire it least, and if they 
desire it, they would be incapable of procuring the means 
towards it by their own judgements. A second example of 
incompetent decision-making is when someone attempts to make 
an irrevocable decision about something that will affect him 
attempts to establish criteria for distinguishing justified from 
unjustified paternalism. 
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in the future, such as selling himself into slavery. The 
presumption on personal liberty of judgement is only relevant 
when pertaining to present and actual considerations, not when 
it is formed prior to experience, and when it cannot be 
reversed after experience has led one to judge the original as 
an error. The important point about these exceptions is that 
Mill does not argue that government interference is always and 
everywhere unjustified, but that the burden of proof regarding 
such interference should rest on those advocating it. 
We are therefore not left with an absolute prohibition, 
but only with a presumption. Why does the argument against 
paternalism not assume a similar form? Mill would have to 
show that exercising force against someone against their will 
for the subjects' own well being is necessarily a greater evil 
than withholding force and precluding the persons' attainment 
of the otherwise obtained benefit. However, according to 
Dworkin, this cannot be done since it is not correct (Dworkin 
1995a: 214). 
Preventing persons from selling themselves into slavery (a 
paternalistic measure, which Mill himself acknowledges to be 
legitimate), or from taking heroine or other addictive drugs, 
or from hang gliding without first being formally instructed, 
may constitute a lesser evil than allowing them to have the 
liberty of carrying out such intentions. A consistent 
utilitarian could only argue against paternalism if it could 
be argued that it does not maximise the good. This contingent 
question may be refuted by contrary evidence in some cases. 
For instance, motorcar manufacturers are being compelled by 
law in some countries to equip their vehicles with airbags. 
Recent evidence shows, however, that these safety devices can 
be extremely dangerous for children and that they are already 
responsible for a number of deaths. In this case, the 
paternalistic measure, 
maximum utility. 
as applied, may not always yield 
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Mill's argument has a non-contingent element too, however. 
He assumes that all normal adult human beings have the 
rational capacity for interpreting experiences in their own 
way, a way that is best for them. However, the case in which 
adult persons wish to sell themselves into slavery brings out 
the difficulty. Why should we here not interfere? Mill would 
answer, because of their liberty. Their voluntary choice is 
evidence that what they choose is desirable, and allowing them 
their own means of pursuing it best attains their well being. 
However, by selling themselves into slavery, they relinquish 
their liberty, abandoning any possibility of enjoying it again 
in the future. Their present act has an irrevocable 
consequence. Mill holds that in alienating one's freedom one 
is not acting freely. Strictly speaking, it may be held that 
the original act of selling oneself into slavery is a free 
act, but that this free act precludes the performing of 
further free acts. Nevertheless, Mill is correct in arguing 
that persons wishing to sell themselves into slavery must be 
constrained if they are unaware that their intended acts would 
limit their freedom in this way. 
Paternalism is therefore given justification by Mill, 
albeit a very narrow one. It is justified if one limits the 
voluntary actions of individuals that would, if exercised 
freely, preclude any further free enjoyment of their liberty. 
Pertaining to slavery, however, it is incorrect to argue that 
slavery is wrong merely due to utilitarian considerations: 
In demanding a collective order that gives fair and equal 
consideration to individuals and their claims and rights, then, the 
liberal individualist is taking ultimate value to inhere in states of 
the collectivity as such. But this is just what value-individualism 
forbids (Bird 1999: 73). 
Liberal-individualists may attempt to counter that they do 
not deny the value of states of collectivity, but these 
collectivities have value only because they ultimately are 
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conducive to positive states within individuals. Thus, 
equality or justice is good because it gives individuals peace 
of mind or other positive internal states. However, this, as 
Bird rightly realises, is utterly implausible. Liberal 
individualists surely would not only reject slavery on the 
grounds that it has adverse consequences for the enslaved; but 
would they not reject it even if it would not have such 
negative consequences for the enslaved? (Bird 1999: 73) . 8 
Slavery is wrong independent of whether it gives peace of mind 
or any internal state of individuals merely on the basis that 
it limits the potential of individuals, preventing them from 
freely acting and developing to the full. 
The implications for punishment are clear. Mill rejects 
any curtailment of an offender's liberty beyond what is 
necessary to prevent harm to others. Thus, according to Mill, 
one is not morally justified in rehabilitating offenders or 
admitting them to a treatment programme without their consent. 
If after the punishment, imprisonment for instance, they 
resort to the same legally prohibited behaviour, society is 
again justified in punishing them for violating the liberties 
of others. Rehabilitation and treatment, however, remain 
morally unacceptable for Mill. 
Different implications result, however, for juvenile 
offenders. Mill acknowledges that children, or persons not of 
mature age, are not to enjoy unrestrained liberty. They still 
are in the formative stage, the stage in which society trains 
and educates its members, enabling them to become responsible 
individuals. Therefore, since Mill's liberalism does not 
apply to persons not of adult age, nothing moral may be said 
against treating juvenile individuals paternalistically, even 
compelling them to undergo treatment or rehabilitation if this 
enables them to become responsible adults. 
8 For a more elaborate account of Bird's argument regarding this issue, see 
Bird (1999: 73-81). 
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shall I Therefore, 
d · 1 the objection that 
defensible, and thereby ispe . 
rehabilitation of offenders is morally unjustified because it 
is a paternalistic measure. 
7.4 DEFENDING PATERNALISM 
d · l'cati'ons of liberalism for Now that the nature an imp i 
interfering in a person's liberty have been expounded, we may 
turn to paternalism. I shall begin by arguing that 
paternalism is justified in its commitment towards the 
elimination of harms. I shall claim that the harm principle 
is applicable to accumulative harms too and show that liberals 
are committed to preventing such harms, the prevention of 
which is sometimes equitable to paternalistic coercion. I 
shall subsequently make an important distinction between 
coercion and interference because not all coercions are 
interferences, and liberalism is not opposed to paternalistic 
coercions. This will be followed by my defence of 
paternalism. 
7.4.1 LIBERALISM, PATERNALISM, AND THE HARM PRINCIPLE 
When may we morally restrict the liberty of another person? 
Mill furnishes us with the classic liberal answer to the 
question: restricting the liberty of one person can be 
justified only if it prevents a greater harm done to others. 
Mill's position will be termed the "harm principle." 
Several things should be noted about this principle at the 
outset: by "harm" is meant not only direct personal injuries, 
such as broken bones or the loss of material property, but 
also more diffuse social harms, such as air and water 
pollution or the impairment of public institutions. Mill 
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stresses that harm to others is a necessary condition for the 
justification of public actions, but not a sufficient 
condition. He determines the importance of harms and 
interferences against two fundamental interests, namely 
personal security and the appropriate opportunities for self-
development and progress. These two interests are the only 
two at stake in the distribution of liberty, according to 
Mill, and the harm principle is proposed as the broad 
political guideline that attains the appropriate balance (Mill 
1972: 146; 163). Thirdly, the harm principle always forbids 
one's deciding for others what is in their best interest, i.e. 
individuals should always have the right of veto in their own 
case (Mill 1972: 171-172). 
Liberals agree that liberty has priority over any other 
kind of good. They differ, however, over how stringently this 
principle should be applied in practice (Bird 1999: 37). 
Welfare liberals may hold, for instance, that a certain amount 
of material welfare is a prerequisite for one's enjoying the 
liberty to which one is entitled. More libertarian liberals 
might maintain that it is not only possible, but morally 
obligatory, to separate institutional protections of liberty 
from the provision of material welfare in order to safeguard 
liberty (Bird 1999: 37-38). 
If we analyse Mill's harm principle more closely, we see 
that it is not a simple principle, but complex, containing at 
least the following two simple principles: 
( 1) The prevention of harm to others 
sufficient reason for interfering 
person, and 
is sometimes a 
against another 
( 2) the individual's own good or well being is never a 
sufficient condition for exercising force over him or 
her, either by society or by individual members 
(Dworkin 1995a: 209). 
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I agree with Dworkin in assuming that no one, with the 
possible exception of a few pacifists or anarchists, questions 
the validity of the first half of the principle. The second 
part deals with Mill's rejection of paternalism. 
Let us examine the first part of the principle. Mill 
argues that the harm principle pertains only to the actions of 
individuals in which it is evident that the action itself 
caused the harm. This, however, does not account for 
accumulative harms, and Mill's conception of the principle may 
therefore be too narrow, as will now be explained. 
Kernohan (1998: 72) argues that the liberal state should 
adopt policies that interpret the harm principle in such a 
manner as to prevent accumulative harms: 
An accumulative harm is a harm done by a group, not to a group. It is 
a harm to another person brought about by the actions of a group of 
people where the action of no single member of that group can be 
seen, by itself, to cause the harm. Most often, an accumulative harm 
will also be a public harm, a harm which cannot be done to one 
individual without at the same time being done to a whole community 
or populace, but there is no conceptual necessity to this fact; 
accumulative harms may be serious individual harms. A public harm can 
take two forms: Either it is a harm to the interests of individual 
members of the group or it is a harm to the group's interests that is 
not a harm to the interests of any individual member (Kernohan 1998: 
73). 
When seen by themselves, the actions of accumulative harms 
may be quite harmless, only when seen collectively do they 
assume a harmful nature. A number of examples may be 
illustrative. If only one person in a city were to have a 
vehicle emitting harmful gases, the person's use of it would 
have almost no affect on the surrounding air. If a thousand 
such vehicles were to do so in the given city, there might 
still not be any significant affect on the environment. At 
some stage, however, a threshold is reached at which the 
emission of gases into the air by such vehicles causes a 
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Change l·n the quality of air in the city. noticeable 
At that 
fully justified in curtailing the 
stage, the authorities are 
th ·r even though no single emission of further gases into e ai , 
responsl.ble for the present state of affairs. person is alone 
Therefore, they are prima facie justified in prohibiting the 
use of harmful fuels. If one person walks across the lawn in 
a park, it has no significant affect on the lawn. If ten 
thousand people walk across it, however, there is bound to be 
almost nothing left of it. Once again, at some stage the 
threshold is reached beyond which any additional walking would 
9 harm the lawn. Again, any kind of activity that is done in 
excess causes harm. If everyone of a medium-sized town were 
to visit the same supermarket within the same hour, the result 
would be an extraordinary chaos. Thus, "The state should take 
an active role in society to prevent both individual harmful 
conduct and accumulative harms" (Kernohan 1998: 73). Since 
any action can become harmful if overdone, and because 
circumstances can change so that activities that were once 
harmless can become harmful, and persons once doing no harm 
suddenly do harm, empirical investigations must be undertaken 
to establish whether a specific action causes harm (Kernohan 
1998: 78) and whether something can be done to prevent it. 
Kernohan applies his theory of accumulative harms to 
cultural oppression. He believes that the state should modify 
its neutrality in order to prevent harm. Such harm is 
difficult to realise because of two reasons, namely 
individuals can be harmed by the prejudices accepted within 
their cul tu re, thereby being unaware that they are actually 
being harmed, and such harm is cumulative in nature, i.e. no 
specific act or event can be identified as the cause. Racial, 
9 It is interesting to note that utilitarianism is incapable of dealing 
with accumulative harms. An act utilitarian will have to hold that walking 
across the lawn is unobjectionable since one's action causes no harm. The 
rule utilitarian, by contrast, goes to the other extreme, reasoning it 
would have best consequences if a rule were adopted prohibiting any walking 
across the lawn, thus the rule utilitarian will not walk across the lawn, 
even if it would do no harm. 
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sexual, or religious oppression in everyday affairs is not the 
result of one single act of discrimination, for instance. By 
ignoring cultural oppression, liberalism has given preference 
to tolerance to the detriment of equality (Kernohan 1998: 1). 
"Equality" is understood in the sense that all persons are 
equally free, i.e. all are able to act as free individuals, 
un-coerced by other individuals or groups. 
A distinction between a theoretical and a 
challenge to equality may be made. A theoretical 
practical 
challenge 
becomes a practical challenge when the former challenge gains 
sufficient support in order to be a force reckoned with in 
society (Kernohan 1998: 5-6). If only one person in society 
promulgates sexist views, the challenge will not have any 
significant affect on society, thereby remaining a theoretical 
challenge; but if many others adopt this attitude too, a point 
will be reached at which it affects society, thereby becoming 
a practical challenge. Oppression is never just the result of 
one action, but a sequence of actions (Kernohan 1998: 12). 
The argument Kernohan employs to argue that the state 
ought to act against cultural oppression runs as follows: 
( 1) Liberalism must regard beliefs in the unequal moral 
worth of persons as false. 
(2) If the transmission of false beliefs in moral 
inequality by individuals causes harms to significant 
interests, then the liberal state must abandon 
universal tolerance and combat this individual harm. 
(3) The transmission of false beliefs in moral inequality 
does cause significant harm. 
( 4) Therefore the state must combat the transmission of 
false beliefs by individuals. 
(5) If the social transmission of false beliefs in 
inequality is a harm, then it is an accumulative 
harm. 
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( 6) rt is of equal importance for the state to combat 
accumulative harms, as it is to combat individual 
harms. 
(7) Therefore the liberal state must adopt an active role 
in reforming culture and combating the cultural 
oppression of groups (Kernohan 1998: 24-25). 
Liberals endorsing the harm principle ought therefore to 
endorse measures curtailing accumulative harms too, which 
means that measures ought, according to the harm principle, to 
be adopted that curtail harms not directly attributable to any 
specific person or group of persons, or do not harm any 
specific person or group of persons, but are nevertheless 
harmful. Such measures may not necessarily be paternalistic, 
since the harms prevented need not necessarily have been harms 
directed at those causing the harms; however, if the 
accumulative harms would have harmed the persons causing it, 
by, for instance, harming the group of which one is a member, 
or polluting the water on which one depends, then such 
measures may be termed "paternalistic." 
Turning now to the second part of the harm principle, we 
may agree that no reasonable person would disagree that 
prevention of harm to others is always a relevant reason for 
coercion. 10 However, many disagree with Mill's contention that 
it is the only relevant reason. Thus, no one will seriously 
suggest that laws against larceny, battery and homicide are 
unjustified, but many maintain that the state is also 
justified, at least in some circumstances, in prohibiting 
actions that hurt or endanger the actor. Most of us agree, 
for example, that it is morally right that motorcyclists be 
compelled by law to wear helmets. 
The liberal tradition has been prominent in its commitment 
to anti-paternalism. The idea behind this is that all 
10 I shall make an important distinction between coercion and interference 
in the next subsection. 
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individuals ought to have a sphere in which they are immune 
from external moral influence, regardless of the consequences 
for their own well being. This by no means implies a view of 
humans as being only sentient beings. Persons who are able to 
pursue projects and to act as moral agents are also capable of 
making substantial miscalculations of what would be in their 
own best interests. These errors may cause them serious and 
permanent injury or harm. Liberals generally argue that 
individual liberty is of such great value as to preclude any 
intervention in such cases, excepting only the most serious 
cases, such as wanting to sell oneself into slavery, which 
Mill himself mentions. However, opening the door for some 
exceptions, such as wanting to sell oneself into slavery, 
seems already to allow in some form of paternalism, and 
therefore paternalism and liberalism seem no longer to be 
diametrically opposed (Bird 1999: 30). 
Before dismissing the second part of the harm principle, 
it is necessary to clarify the difference between coercion and 
interference. Coercions, I shall argue, are not necessarily 
interferences. 
7.4.2 COERCION AND INTERFERENCE 
One reason why libertarians may want to reject any form of 
paternalism may be that any form of coercion of persons is 
seen as an unjustified intervention in the lives of those 
persons. 
coercion, 
It is correct to assert that paternalism implies 
but coercion does not necessarily result in 
interference; therefore, coercions that are not interferences 
are not affected by the argument that they are unjustified on 
the ground that they are interferences. 
In order to argue this proposition, I 
distinction made by Bird (1999: 116). Bird 
between four kinds of obstacles, only two 
necessary for purposes of this argument: 
introduce a 
distinguishes 
of which are 
( 1) coercive 
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obstacles, i.e. obstacles prohibiting certain actions by a 
person in authority to do so, and (2) interferences, i.e. 
obstacles that interfere with, or hinder, one's pursuit of 
certain of one's goals. This point is of central importance 
because the negative concept of liberty is often associated 
with a strong libertarian stance, a view in which society, or 
the state, is only justified in coercing when another coercive 
interference is thereby prevented or punished. 11 The central 
concern of negative liberty is, however, the notion of non-
interference, a category that is broader than that of non-
coercion. The liberal using a negative concept of liberty is 
therefore not correct in asserting that all coercions are 
interferences. If they are not interferences, then the 
principle of non-interference is not necessarily violated by 
applying coercion (Bird 1999: 120) . 12 
It follows that paternalistic measures that are coercions 
are not necessarily interferences. Thus, when dealing with a 
coercive measure, such as taxation, the question is not 
whether liberty is reduced by it, but rather whether the 
reduction of liberty caused by it is always serious enough to 
qualify as the kind of interference that individuals should 
never be forced to undergo, and the state is never justified 
in applying (Bird 1999: 121). 
The kind of ownership right that is of central concern to 
libertarians is the right to prevent anyone else from making 
authoritative decisions over how the owned object is to be 
disposed of. Pertaining to the self, this means that 
outsiders have no right to decide how it is to be used (Bird 
1999: 142). 
Since I have argued that not all coercive interventions in 
persons' lives are interferences, i.e. if interferences are 
11 A distinction between a "negative concept of liberty" and a "positive 
concept of liberty" may be made. The former construes liberty simply as 
freedom from obstacles, interference and coercion; the latter construes 
liberty as the freedom to perform a privileged category of actions. 
1 2 For an expansion of this point, see Bird's discussion (1999: 115-120), 
including his explanatory diagram (Bird 1999: 119). 
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obstacles that prevent one from pursuing certain of one's 
goals, the rehabilitation of offenders is not morally 
objectionable if it can be shown that such interventions count 
as coercions and not interferences. It must be borne in mind 
that we are concerned with convicted offenders, persons we are 
justified in punishing. These persons would be rehabilitated 
while they are serving their sentences. We would therefore 
not interfere with any of their goals because these could not 
be pursued anyway while they are serving their sentences. Our 
coercive measures would not only not hinder their pursuit of 
their goals, but would increase their ability to do so once 
they leave prison, enabling them to live as productive, law-
abiding individuals. 13 
Thus far I have argued that liberalism and paternalism are 
not diametrically opposed since the former is committed by the 
harm principle to the prevention of accumulative harms, which 
in some cases amounts to preventing persons from harming 
themselves, and hence is a paternalistic measure. I also made 
the distinction between coercions and interferences and 
pointed out that rehabilitation is not necessarily 
interference and hence is unaffected by the libertarian 
rejection of paternalistic measures as being unjustified 
interferences. Having argued that paternalistic interventions 
are coercions, and not interferences, I shall now argue that 
such coercions are morally justified. 
7.4.3 PATERNALISM AND FURTHERING OF WELL BEING 
The second part of the harm principle now needs to be 
rejected, i.e. the part that maintains that the individual's 
own good or well being is never a sufficient condition for 
exercising force over him or her, either by society or by 
individual members. This part of the harm principle can be 
1 3 See 6. 9. 2 for how rehabilitation improves offenders, thereby enabling 
them to actualise more of their potential. 
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rejected if it can be shown that paternalism can be morally 
justified. I shall endeavour to do so in this section. 
As has been shown, even Mill argued for paternalism 
towards children, arguing that it is only unjustified to 
curtail the liberty of adult human beings. What is the 
difference? What justifies paternalism towards children? The 
answer given would be that they lack the cognitive capacities 
to make fully rational decisions. Nothing is more natural 
than for parents to discipline their children. Young children 
are ignorant of certain dangers, are unaware of the adverse 
consequences of many actions, actions that not only can hurt 
them, but also hurt others, or lead to irrevocable damages to 
persons or property. This does not in any way mean that 
children are mentally ill in any way. Such actions are kept 
in check until the child becomes mature enough to recognise 
the consequences or most likely outcomes of intended actions. 
What does it mean to be fully rational, however? How many 
adults might not be capable of making responsible, rational 
decisions because they are not fully rational either? To what 
extent are the criminals, the persons primarily under 
discussion, capable of exercising fully rational choices? 
Al though the extent to which children are capable of 
exhibiting fully rational decisions is an empirical issue, 
their capacities are clearly below those of the average adult. 
First, it is difficult for children to delay gratification for 
significant periods. Furthermore, very young children are not 
capable of imagining themselves in different situations. It 
follows that it therefore is not only morally justifiable, but 
also morally obligatory for adults to restrict the actions of 
children in specific ways. Paternalism exercised by the 
parent is not intervention for the mere sake of restricting 
children, but for enabling them to develop the insights 
necessary to judge certain modes of acting as desirable or 
undesirable, advantageous or disadvantageous, beneficial or 
harmful. It therefore has as an objective the development of 
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the future orientation of the children, an objective of 
fostering a responsible attitude within children. However, 
the paternalist may now go further and argue that some adults 
also lack the capacity to make enlightened, mature, 
responsible decisions; and by guiding their conduct, we do 
what they would do if they were fully rational. Therefore, we 
are not really interfering with their wills and are not really 
interfering with their freedoms. As was shown in 2. 6, Kant 
holds too that some forms of coercion are morally defensible 
since they are consistent with rational freedom. He therefore 
holds coercion to be morally completely acceptable if it could 
be rationally willed by the subject who is being coerced. I 
lay out the argument as follows: 
(1) Given situation X, a rational person would choose A. 
(2) Person P is faced with situation X. 
(3) But P is not rational and does not choose A. 
(4) But if P were rational, he or she would choose A. 
( 5) Therefore, we are justified in guiding P's choice 
towards A. 
Certainly, it would be more desirable to 
paternalistically towards persons with their consents. 
act 
This 
is not as absurd as it first appears. There are instances in 
which persons have to be forced in a given way, a way that is 
not contrary to their actual desires, but for which they 
merely lack the ability to carry out the appropriate choice. 
An example may be illuminative. Persons trying to give up 
smoking, for instance, may ask their friends not to offer them 
any cigarettes and to forcibly compel them to stop smoking 
should they wish to do so in their company. They would 
thereby be giving consent to actions being done to them that 
are in agreement with their own objectives or desires, but 
where they themselves are unable to pursue these objectives on 
their own. 
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What needs to be justified, however, is not a specific 
measure, but a whole system of rehabilitation without consent. 
Since none of us is without rational or emotional deficiencies 
of some sort, at least occasionally, as well as avoidable and 
unavoidable ignorance, it is rational and prudent for us to 
take out social insurance policies. However, it is a 
contentious issue what forms of protection one ought to 
accept. Since we are now dealing with a whole system of 
rehabilitation, a mode of conduct towards offenders, however, 
we have to establish carefully defined limits. Detention of 
criminals is here not at issue - it was already established in 
Chapter 5 that it is morally justifiable to use criminals for 
purposes of general deterrence. The issue under discussion 
is, however, whether criminals who are being detained for 
purposes of general deterrence may, while they are being 
detained, be forced to undergo rehabilitation. The question 
at issue is, to what conditions could rational persons agree 
to limit their liberty even when the interests of others are 
not affected? (Dworkin 1995a: 216) . 14 It is reasonable to 
assume that there are certain basic things all rational beings 
would want to have in order to pursue their own good, no 
matter how that good is conceived, such as the right to be 
justly treated. Even Mill argues for compulsory education of 
children. Of course, he argues that this is because children 
are not yet fully rational, but if they were rational, they 
would also choose education for themselves. One could then 
agree that the attainment of such goods should be promoted, 
even when not presently recognised as such by the individuals 
concerned. I formulate the argument pertaining to the 
compulsory education of children as follows: 
14 Dworkin attempts to justify paternalism in general as a legitimate 
societal policy in specific instances. 
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( 1) It is morally justifiable to act paternalistically 
towards beings incapable of attaining conditions that 
would allow them to maximise their good. 
(2) Children are not capable of attaining conditions that 
allow them to maximise their good. 
(3) Therefore, paternalism towards children is morally 
justifiable. 
However, when we turn to adults and to goods in general, we 
are faced with the contingent fact that people are prone to 
differ on what is desirable, even when faced with very basic 
issues such as health or life. We are faced with the 
difficult situation in which, for instance, some people are 
willing to risk their lives defending a political regime 
because they believe it upholds certain ideals they value, 
such as religious ones, an issue over which others of another 
persuasion are bound to disagree. What persons will value 
most, depends on the relative merits they attach to different 
values. Consider persons who know the statistical probability 
of being injured or killed when not wearing seat belts in the 
front seats of cars and who know the types and extent of the 
various injuries that may occur as a result. However, these 
persons also insist that the inconvenience of fastening the 
belts every time they get into a car outweighs for them the 
possible risk to themselves. I agree with Dworkin (1995a: 
216) that such weighing is unreasonable. Let us assume that 
these are not persons trying to injure themselves, for 
conscious or unconscious reasons, nor do they just like living 
dangerously. We are assuming that they are like us in all 
relevant respects, but just put an extraordinarily high value 
on inconvenience, one which is considered unreasonable. The 
only difference is, the outcome of the actions is ignored once 
the calculations are made. Paternalism, I shall argue, may be 
employed to correct evaluative mistakes. We are prepared to 
act against cognitive delusions. If persons believe they will 
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not be hurt when jumping off a fifty-story building, we would 
detain them, even forcibly if necessary. Our justification 
for interfering would be that they do not really want to be 
harmed, and that if they were fully aware of their actions' 
consequences, they would be dissuaded from performing them 
(Dworkin 1995a: 216). The same holds for the case in which 
persons choose not to fasten their seat belts. If the persons 
who chose not to fasten their seat belts, judging the 
inconvenience to outweigh the risk involved, were to have a 
serious accident, they would look back on it and regard the 
fastening of the seat belt as not such a grave inconvenience 
compared with the injuries suffered. 
Turning again to offenders, we may say that many offenders 
are not aware of the benefits involved in being rehabilitated. 
If they could lead a more productive, law-abiding life after 
being rehabilitated, then they would surely agree that the 
inconvenience of having their right to refuse treatment 
temporarily curtailed for the attaining of this objective does 
not outweigh the inconvenience of running the risk of being a 
recidivist. Therefore, if we could convince them of the 
course of action, they also would not wish to continue with 
their course of action. 
The distinction made between coercion and interference is 
of importance. 
benefit of the 
Paternalism implies coercive measures for the 
subject, and not to further any other 
objective. One is therefore not justified in curtailing the 
liberty of individuals where this is not for the individuals' 
own benefit, or, in a milder form, one is not justified in 
curtailing the liberty of individuals if one's coercion would 
interfere with their pursuit of reasonable goals. Activities 
such as hang gliding or mountain climbing can therefore not be 
justifiably curtailed completely, since this would preclude 
persons interested in 
such activities. If 
reasonable precautions, 
pursuing such goals from undertaking 
such activities are undertaken with 
they do not pose an unreasonably high 
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risk to their lives or general well being. 
only properly instructed persons with proper 
Demanding that 
equipment hang 
glide or climb mountains in reasonable weather conditions is 
not coercion that may be termed "unnecessary interference" 
since making such demands neither hinders persons from 
participating in such activities, nor curtails them from 
carrying out such activities completely. 
7.5 PATERNALISM AND PREVENTIVE DETENTION 
In the previous chapter, I argued that preventive detention of 
former criminals is morally justified if a serious threat to 
others is thereby eliminated. It may now be asked, whether 
preventive detention is also morally justified on 
paternalistic grounds is it morally permissible to 
preventively detain persons who seriously contemplate 
committing suicide, for instance, is it morally defensible to 
preventively detain people who have a high likelihood of doing 
serious harm to themselves? 
I argued in the previous section that it is morally 
justifiable to act paternalistically towards persons if the 
interventions impose an alternative upon the persons being 
coerced, which they would have chosen themselves, had they 
been able to consider the matter rationally. Of course, in 
the case of suicide, the issue is whether they would have 
chosen suicide when deliberating over their situation 
rationally, taking the present and the possible future into 
account. If it could be established that a wholly rational 
decision led to their choice, and that there was no preferable 
alternative, then paternalistic intervention is morally 
unjustifiable. However, if persons contemplating suicide are 
doing so while in a temporary depression, and a rational 
decision would not yield suicide as an option, then preventive 
detention to prevent persons from killing or seriously harming 
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themselves is morally justifiable. 
follows: 
I set out this argument as 
(1) We are justified in acting paternalistically towards 
others if we are thereby imposing a good upon them or 
preventing them from doing harms to themselves that 
they would recognise as such, were they capable of 
rationally deliberating over the matter. 
( 2) Preventive detention may preclude persons from doing 
harms to themselves that they do not actually want, 
i.e. have not rationally chosen. 
(3) Therefore, we are justified in preventively detaining 
persons on paternalistic grounds. 
Just as preventive detention for the protection of others, 
preventive detention for the protection of those being 
preventively detained on paternalistic grounds may in practice 
only be imposed on former off enders since the accuracy 
requirement for former offenders is less than absolute. If it 
could ever be determined with absolute accuracy that anyone 
will do serious harm to herself if she is not preventively 
detained, then preventive detention on paternalistic grounds 
would be justified for innocent persons too. However, since 
it is unlikely that complete accuracy will ever be attained, 
only former criminals may be preventively detained because a 
standard of accuracy less than absolute is acceptable for them 
since they have diminished moral standing in virtue of having 
been offenders. 
7.6 SUMMARY AND PERSPECTIVE 
This chapter began with an examination of Morris's theory, 
which is an attempt to justify punishment administered 
paternalistically. I rejected the theory as being too 
simplistic, as I have found all other theories of punishment 
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that focus only on one element to be, such as paternalism, 
retribution, deterrence, rehabilitation, or restitution. It 
must be noted that I am not suggesting that this is 
necessarily the case, but I believe that a complex approach, 
as the one I am proposing, can yield a better theory than a 
simple one. 
I then proceeded with my own defence of paternalism. For 
me to fully justify rehabilitation, the question that I had to 
resolve 
treatment 
was, can one morally force offenders to undergo 
against their wills in order to make them better 
To defend paternalism as part of rehabilitation, I 
necessary to examine it against the backdrop of 
since liberalism usually opposes any form of 
persons? 
deemed it 
liberalism, 
paternalism. 
We saw that Mill held the exercising of force over another 
permissible only to prevent harm against another. Doing so in 
the interests of someone's own well being is not a sufficient 
condition for doing so. He held, however, that this pertains 
only to fully rational beings. Beings incapable of taking 
care of themselves, such as children and the insane, are 
exempted from the harm principle. The implication that Mill's 
liberalism has for punishment is that one is not justified in 
forcing offenders to undergo treatment except in the case of 
juvenile offenders. 
I argued that the harm principle consists of at least two 
simple principles, each of which was dealt with in turn. The 
first of these (namely the prevention of harms to others is 
sometimes a sufficient reason for interfering against another 
person) was shown to be relevant not only for individual 
harms, as Mill held, but for accumulative harms too. Not only 
does the prevention of accumulative harms sometimes assume a 
paternalistic form, but also Kernohan convincingly argued that 
the liberal state should take actions against accumulative 
harms. Even Mill made exceptions to his harm principle, and 
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thus his application of the harm principle and paternalism are 
not diametrically opposed. 
I then attended to the second part of the harm principle 
(namely, the individual's own good or well being is never a 
sufficient condition for exercising force over him or her, 
either by society or by individual members). Before rejecting 
it, it was necessary to make a distinction between coercion 
and interference. There are obstacles that are not 
interferences. This point is of central importance because 
the negative concept of liberty is often associated with a 
strong libertarian stance, a view in which society, or the 
state, is only justified in coercing when another coercive 
interference is thereby curtailed or punished. The central 
concern of negative liberty is, however, the notion of non-
interference, a category that is broader than that of non-
coercion. Liberals are therefore not correct in arguing that 
all coercions are interferences - coercions do not necessarily 
violate the principle of non-interference. Implications of 
this distinction were spelled out: I argued that forced 
rehabilitation of offenders, while they are serving their 
sentences, would amount to coercion, but not to interference. 
Turning to a rejection of the second part of the harm 
principle and a defence of paternalism, I claimed that 
paternalism towards children is justified because they are not 
yet capable of exercising fully informed, rational choices. I 
maintained that one finds paternalism justified in those cases 
in which the subjects would have selected the benefit, had 
they been capable of making a rational, informed decision. I 
then argued that one should also extend paternalism towards 
adults when evaluative mistakes are thereby to be corrected. 
Many adults make irrational decisions, or are incapable of 
making fully rational ones, and these should be the targets of 
paternalistic interventions. In the case of paternalism 
towards criminals, 
paternalistically 
I argued that one is justified in acting 
towards them by forcing them to undergo 
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rehabilitation because it is what they would have desired if 
they had been capable of assessing the situation rationally. 
If rehabilitation would enable them to avoid becoming or 
remaining recidivists, then this is surely a desirable course 
of action to take. The limits of morally justifiable 
paternalistic intervention were also briefly discussed. 
Finally, I examined whether it is ever morally justified 
to preventively detain persons against their wills for their 
own goods. I concluded that preventive detention on 
paternalistic grounds is morally justified if the subjects 
being preventively detained could have willed the preventive 
detention rationally. 
I showed thus far that retributivism adequately determines 
whom we are justified in punishing, and deterrence theory, 
with what measure we are justified in doing so. I have argued 
that justified punishment allows society to express its anger 
and indignation at offenders, that we are justified in using 
criminals as means towards general deterrence, and that we may 
morally rehabilitate criminals, thereby pursuing the 
objectives of improving offenders, reducing crime, and 
ultimately having economical punishment. The rehabilitative 
ideal was defended in this chapter against the objection that 
it implies paternalism by arguing that paternalism is morally 
desirable. One more objective needs to be pursued, namely 
that punishment ought to aim at undoing the harm done through 
the criminal act, thereby acknowledging the plight of victims. 
This will be my main concern in the next chapter. 
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CHAPTER 8 
RESTITUTION: UNDOING THE HARM 
8.1 INTRODUCTION 
An examination of punishment systems in use worldwide today 
shows that they are largely ineffective. Recidivism is a 
major problem. Furthermore, severe penalties do not deter to 
the extent hoped by advocates of deterrence theories. In the 
previous chapter, I argued that a morally justified punishment 
system ought also to place strong emphasis on rehabilitation, 
not only on punitiveness. 
system has prompted some 
The ineffectiveness of the punitive 
thinkers to re-evaluate the whole 
system of punishment, however, 
more effective, less costly one . 
Our present system for 
replacing it with a different, 
dealing with criminals, the 
punitive system, which sees crime as a violation of the 
state's laws, has not always been the paradigm in use for 
responding to crime. Prior to the adoption of this paradigm, 
the system that was in use may be described as a restitutional 
one. This system is as ancient as the provision of the Old 
Testament and the 4000-year-old code of Hammurabi (Tobolowsky 
1993: 90). Its underlying premise is that crime was not 
primarily a matter between criminals and the state, but 
between criminals and their victims. 
Our contemporary understanding of social theory related to crime and 
victimization can be traced back to a major paradigm shift that 
occurred during the Norman invasion of Britain in the twelfth 
century. This marked a turning away from viewing crime as a victim-
offender conflict within the context of community. Crime became a 
violation of the king's peace, and upholding the authority of the 
state replaced the practice of making the victim whole (Umbreit 1994: 
1) • 
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Randy E. Barnett argues that the present paradigm of 
criminal justice is experiencing a crisis and ought to be 
replaced by a more efficient one, described as a system of 
restitution. 1 
In this chapter, I discuss the res ti tutional paradigm, 
followed by a critical evaluation thereof. Barnett's position 
on restitution will serve as the basis for the discussion of 
this chapter because his position may be seen as paradigmatic 
on this issue, containing the main elements of the 
restitutional approach. I argue that it has certain merits, 
merits that ought to be incorporated into the present 
punishment system, but that the res ti tutional paradigm ought 
not to replace the punitive paradigm entirely, 
ought only to complement it. 2 
instead it 
I previously stated that any justification of punishment 
must answer two distinct questions, namely whom one is 
justified in punishing, and to what extent one is justified in 
doing so. Retributivism was shown to be capable of providing 
a satisfactory answer only to the first question, deterrence 
Corrunon themes are distinguishable amongst abolitionists, including a 
critique of the concept of "crime,"- seeing it not as a violation against 
some corrunonly acknowledged norm, but rather as a conflict between members 
of the corrununi ty. Another is that we should civilise our responses to 
crime - our model should be the civil law's resolution of disputes, rather 
than the criminal law's punishment of crime. Thirdly, we should resolve 
disputes within the corrununities in which they occur by informal procedures 
involving the parties involved in the conflict and their corrununities. 
Finally, there is the theme of reconciliation: reparation or restorative 
justice ought to be sought, but that which will reconcile the offender to 
the corrununity, rather than that which is merely retributive justice (Duff & 
Garland 1998: 333). 
2 Judith Karp (1996: 331-339) argues that judges and prosecutors should 
consider restitution in the same manner in which they consider other 
criminal sanctions. Karp explains that the UN Declaration of Basic 
Principles of Justice for Victims of Crime and Abuse of Power empowers 
judges to order compensation for victims for damage and pain suffered, but 
that few actually use this power. She argues that the only difference 
between criminal and civil law is one of emphasis, and the sanction of 
restitution can serve the goals of punishment and penological philosophy. 
She argues that there is little difference in enforcing a criminal fine and 
ordering restitution. Her conclusion is that increased awareness of, and 
sensitivity towards, the victim's plight would increase the use of 
restitution sentences. While I agree that restitution ought to become more 
frequent and insist that punishment ought always to have a res ti tutional 
element where there is a victim, I argue that concentrating only on 
restitution would make the system too simplistic, since it would neglect 
important rehabilitative, deterrent and retributive elements. 
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theory to the second. A rehabilitative theory is not capable 
of answering either without constraints of justice. In this 
chapter, we shall find that the restitutional approach 
provides an answer to both questions. The answer it provides 
to the question of degree is laden with difficulties of a 
practical nature, however. 
8.2 BARNETT'S PARADIGM OF RESTITUTION 
8 . 2 . 1 BARNETT I s 
PUNISHMENT 
CRITICISM OF THE PRESENT APPROACH TO 
Barnett attacks the system that sees punishment as a response 
that is unpleasant, and deliberately imposed on offenders 
because of an offence that they have committed, not just the 
natural consequence of their actions. The unpleasantness is 
essential to it, not a mere accompaniment to some other 
treatment (Barnett 1985: 213). 
This definition of punishment is not necessarily in 
accordance with the rehabilitative paradigm because the 
primary aim is not to improve offenders; it is rather that if 
improvement does occur, then it is a welcome accompanying 
effect of punishment. The retributive paradigm may, for 
instance, maintain that the infliction of suffering on 
offenders causes them to realise the harms they have done and 
causes them to change their moral outlooks. 
out that this end in itself is "speculative 
counterfactual at worst" (Barnett 1985: 214). 
of recidivism is an indication that it is 
Barnett points 
at best and 
The high rate 
contrary to the 
are not changed facts because many criminals' moral outlooks 
by mere punishment; on the contrary, they often become more 
resolute criminals. 
Barnett questions the foundation on which deterrence rests 
because, if deterrence actually is the end, he maintains, then 
it is unimportant whether the individual really committed the 
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offence, since all that is required for deterrence is that it 
be proved that the individual committed an offence. The actual 
occurrence is relevant only insofar as that a truly guilty 
person is more easily proved guilty. The judicial system 
becomes not a truth-seeking device, but merely a means to 
legitimate the use of force (Barnett 1985: 214). This would 
be correct if one justifies punishment wholly on utilitarian 
grounds, as I argued in Chapter 4, but I seek to justify 
punishment by means of a hybrid approach, so not only 
utilitarian considerations are brought into the theory, but 
retributive, rehabilitative and restitutional ones too. 
Barnett furthermore maintains that there is no reliable 
criterion for determining how much deterrence may be employed. 
This, I argued in Chapter 5, is incorrect too; there are clear 
criteria that may be employed for determining the amount of 
punishment administrable, based on the amount of force 
generally required to deter potential offenders, and by 
grading punishment in proportion to the crime committed. 
Therefore, deterrence is not rejected or seriously attacked by 
Barnett's criticism. 
Barnett does not argue that retribution, deterrence, or 
rehabilitation are undesirable, but maintains that they alone 
are insufficient to justify punishment (Barnett 1985: 215), a 
point on which I am in full agreement with Barnett. Regarding 
the present paradigm of criminal justice, he points out that 
even its advocates generally acknowledge its overall 
ineffectiveness (Barnett 1985: 216). These advocates 
maintain, however, that it is ineffective because it is not 
administered severely enough. All that is needed, they argue, 
is that crime be punished more severely. Barnett says that 
they neglect to ask why the system fails to punish so as to 
yield beneficial results, instead of harmful ones. 
criticises the punitive system as follows: 
Bianchi 
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What we in our western societies understand by a criminal law system 
is a state-run organization, possessed of the monopoly to define 
criminal behaviour, directed towards the prosecution of that 
behaviour which it has defined - irrespective of the wishes or needs 
of a possible victim or plaintiff - and which has at its disposal, 
pre-trial and post-trial, the power to keep its prosecutees and 
convicts in confinement. Representatives and managers of the 
criminal law system cherish the pretension that their organization 
could protect society from such a dangerous threat as criminality. In 
fact, however, the organization, since it was established in its 
present form about the end of the 18th century, has, in every respect 
and on all counts, failed to accomplish what it promises. Quite the 
reverse. For a long time the criminal law organization has been 
escalating dangerously. Any enhancement of the punishing power of 
the organization has so far led to more rather than less criminality. 
A nation that builds more prisons and imposes more repressive 
punishment usually provokes criminality (Bianchi 1998: 336). 
Barnett believes that the criminal 
paradigm 
stage in 
is experiencing 
which a decisive 
a crisis, 
present 
i.e. it is in a 
justice 
crucial 
change is impending. It is in a 
i.e. the public lacks the crisis because it is in an eclipse, 
will to apply it in any but the prevailing way. He further 
maintains that there is an increasing tendency to allow people 
to live according to their own means so long as they do not 
harm others. He believes that this attitude is exemplified in 
society's stance towards drug use, abortion, and pornography. 
Society increasingly maintains that where there is no victim, 
the state has no right to intervene, no matter how morally 
suspect the behaviour may be, 
prostitution. A second 
an example being freely chosen 
reason why the paradigm is 
experiencing a crisis is that it is largely ineffective. 
Inflicting pain or unpleasantness on criminals generally 
produces sympathy towards them, which causes offenders to feel 
victimised too. In addition, many criminals are not caught, 
and even if caught, the criminal justice process is slow and 
far removed from the crime. Furthermore, victims stand to 
gain little, if anything at all, by pressing charges against 
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an offender. On the contrary, the victim stands to lose 
further time and money, so do the witnesses, as well as incur 
increasing risk of retaliation. 3 He goes on to claim that the 
criminal justice system is in a crisis due to the collapse of 
its twin pillars of support its moral legitimacy (which I 
wholly agree) and its practical efficacy (Barnett 1985: 216). 
Bianchi's criticism again emphasises this point: 
In order to do the job it has undertaken and to find continuous 
public support for that, the criminal law organization must always 
keep alive a negative stereotype of "the criminal". It must maintain 
its stigmatizing power. At best the managers of the system are 
unable, or unwilling, to prevent the media from feeding the negative 
stereotype of "the enemy of society". This negative stereotype is a 
direct result of the system's ideology. Since the "war against crime" 
is continually being waged by its managers and their supportive 
politicians, an "enemy-image" is constantly being produced (Bianchi 
1998: 336) . 
Barnett contends that attempts to salvage the present 
system have assumed three distinct forms: 
(1) Offenders are punished in proportion to their crimes. 
The aim is to increase faith in the criminal justice system, 
perceiving it to punish according to desert. 
(2) Having realised that mere punishment failed to 
rehabilitate offenders, the rehabilitative ideal was promoted 
in the belief that rehabilitation is the only main goal of the 
criminal justice system. However, this failed too - prisons 
still functioned merely as places of secure confinement with 
little improvement for offenders or their families. The 
system was expensive and required offenders to be supported by 
3 This chapter should not create the opinion that victims are always 
completely blameless regarding their victimisation experiences, and that 
offenders are necessarily wholly to blame. Many victim-offender 
relationships constitute complex interactions. The degree of guilt or 
blame varies from case to case. Elucidating the differences and describing 
the interactions is the task of victimologists. For details regarding 
victim responsibility for crimes, see especially Chapter 3 of Karmen 
( 1984) . 
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the state, as well as many of the offenders' families who 
subsequently required welfare benefits. 
(3) In recent years the field of victimology has emerged, 
resulting in victims gaining some rights, such as claiming 
compensation, but these are usually very limited in scope and 
only applicable in certain types of victimisations. 4 
No theory directly questions the paradigm of criminal 
justice, however (Barnett 1985: 217-218). 
8.2.2 BARNETT'S PROPOSAL 
The system Barnett proposes in response to the ineffectiveness 
of the punitive one is one of restitution, not of punishment. 
It treats crime as an offence of one individual against the 
rights of another. The victim has suffered a loss. Here 
justice consists in culpable offenders making good the loss 
they have caused. This means that an offence is not to be 
seen as an offence against society, but against an individual 
victim. The rapist did not rape society, he raped the victim 
and his debt therefore is to the victim, not to society. 5 
The position that sees crime as an offence of an 
individual committed against the rights of another is, 
however, strictly speaking, incorrect. Many crimes involve 
companies, organisations, institutes, or the state. An 
Rosenfeld ( 1996: 312-313) distinguishes between compensation and 
restitution, the latter being a special case of compensatory justice. For 
the purposes of this thesis, a distinction between the two terms is not 
essential and may be interchanged unless otherwise indicated. 
5 Gordon Basehor (1998: 768-813) discusses the roots of new integrative and 
restorative justice theories, as well as success of current preliminary 
applications of these theories. He argues that the traditional 
retributi vi st and rehabilitative paradigms offer only a simplistic choice 
between harming and helping offenders. He claims that these theories fail 
to adequately address the needs of communities and victims; and proposes a 
new paradigm to replace the others, namely one of reintegrative or 
restorative justice. This theory, based on specific cultural approaches to 
crime found in New Zealand and Japan amongst others, aims at addressing the 
needs of communities and victims through apology and reparation. It is 
hoped that this process leads to the reintegration of offenders into 
society. While he is right that the other two paradigms are simplistic 
when applied on their own, the restitutional paradigm is just as simplistic 
when applied in a pure form. I therefore advocate a hybrid approach to 
punishment, pursuing goals from all here examined paradigms. 
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example may be persons cheating on their tax returns. These 
crimes are not accurately described as being between two 
individuals. If we allow, however, that Barnett actually 
means "person" instead of "indi victual," then his claim has 
more credence. Organisations, companies, institutes, and the 
state, to name only a few, may be described as "legal 
persons, " and are recognised as such by most legal systems. 
Persons, whether they are individuals or complex institutions, 
have rights, rights that can be violated. When the rights of 
a person are intentionally violated by the actions of another, 
a crime is committed. 
by a person. 
Crime is thus an unlawful loss suffered 
Barnett mentions two restitution proposals: punitive 
restitution and pure restitution: 
( 1) Punitive res ti tut ion: Given this view, restitution 
should merely be added to the paradigm of punishment. The 
offender is 
ought also 
still to be punished as before, but res ti tut ion 
to be made to the victim. Offenders might be 
forced to compensate the victims by their own work (whether 
this be while in prison or not) . Another proposal is that 
offenders pay proportionally to their ability. In this 
regard, a poor person could pay in terms of days of work, a 
rich person by an equal number of day's income (Barnett 1985: 
219). However, this approach does not replace the given 
system of punishment, but only supplements it. Offenders are 
still sentenced to an unpleasant period of punishment. 
( 2) Pure res ti tut ion: Here the focus is not on the fact 
that the offender deserves to suffer, but that the offended 
party desires compensation. The system would work in the 
following way: when persons are apprehended for an alleged 
offence, a court would determine their guilt or innocence. If 
they were found guilty, the offenders would be sentenced to 
make res ti tut ion to the victims. If they were immediately 
able to do so, this would be possible. If they were not 
immediately able to do so, but the court found them to be 
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trustworthy, they would be permitted to continue at their jobs 
or find new ones, while paying restitution out of their future 
income. This would entail a legal claim against future wages. 
Failure to pay could result in confinement or other more 
restrictive measures (Barnett 1985: 220). If it is found that 
offenders were not trustworthy, or unable to find employment, 
they would be confined to an employment project. This would 
be an industrial concern in which actual goods and services 
would be produced. The level of security at such centres 
could vary, with those confined to centres requiring least 
security receiving the highest wages. Cost for room and board 
would first be deducted, followed by a sum for res ti tut ion. 
Any additional earnings would go to the offenders, which they 
could either use at their own discretion or pay as restitution 
in order to hasten their release. If workers refused to work, 
they would not be entitled to release. If they did not make 
restitution, they could not be released. Such would be the 
basic philosophy of the new system. Variants could be found 
in the details. Barnett claims, for instance, that with 
such a system, victim 
economically feasible and 
crime insurance 
highly desirable. 
would be 
Victims 
more 
would 
claim from the insurance companies, leaving the companies with 
the right to claim restitution. The insurance companies could 
better supervise the progress offenders make and in addition 
could establish industries in which they employed released 
offenders. It would be in the interest of insurance companies 
to reduce the overall level of crime and recidivism since that 
would reduce the overall number of claims. The benefit for 
the victims is immediate compensation, provided that they co-
operate with the authorities to apprehend and convict the 
offenders. Centralisation, Barnett further contends, would 
increase efficiency by enabling the pooling of smaller claims 
against an offender (Barnett 1985: 221). 
Another device may be direct arbitration between victims 
and their offenders as a kind of substitute for plea-
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bargaining. By allowing criminals to negotiate reduced 
restitution, the likelihood that a guilty plea would be 
attained would be increased so reducing the risk of a rejected 
charge for the victims or insurance company. Proponents of 
this view hold that it brings greater satisfaction to the 
victims, creates a greater awareness of offenders that their 
offences are against another individual and not against 
society in general, and might bring about a more effective 
change in offenders towards becoming more responsible (Barnett 
1985: 221). 
What exactly is restitution, however? Which standard is 
to be applied in ensuring the right amount of restitution? 
The problem is how one can put a price on pain, suffering, or 
life? Barnett concedes that any non-arbitrary solution is 
lacking, but holds that this shortcoming does not seriously 
discredit the restitutional theory. Restitution is still held 
to be superior to punishment because the former provides at 
least some tangible compensation, even if this is arbitrarily 
determined, while the latter provides none at all. The 
primary intention of any system as a response to crime, 
Barnett insists, must be restitution, not punishment (Barnett 
1985: 223). 
8.3 EVALUATING BARNETT'S RESTITUTIONAL THEORY 
8.3.1 THE AFFECT OF CRIME 
Barnett claims that most members of society are today just 
spectators of the justice system, including the victims. If 
one's car is stolen, for instance, the whole justice process 
proceeds without one's involvement after one has provided the 
necessary details when reporting the crime. Seldom is one 
aware of progress made, or how the investigation is 
proceeding, until one is required to testify in court. 
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Barnett therefore urges more victim involvement 
criminal justice process. 
in the 
The restitutional system is highly commendable because the 
victims of crime receive assistance. Restitution cannot undo 
a loss, but it can make the loss easier to bear. A 
restitutional system would not neglect victims' needs as they 
are in the punitive system. 6 There is no reason, however, why 
the needs of victims could only be addressed in a wholly 
restitutional system, why in fact, restitution, rehabilitation 
and punitiveness cannot be accommodated within a unitary 
system. 
But is it correct that an offence is not to be seen as an 
offence against society, 
victim, as Barnett claims? 
and only against an individual 
It is indeed correct to say that 
the rapist did not rape society, but only the individual 
victim. This by no means implies, however, that only the 
individual directly harmed suffers a loss. When a person is 
raped, he or she is the direct victim. His or her family is 
also harmed, however, experiencing grief, anger, and a sense 
of deep injustice. The victim's community is victimised too. 
When one hears of a rape in one's neighbourhood, one does not 
only have deep compassion for the victim, one also feels 
vulnerable and experiences fear and anxiety because the rapist 
may strike again, possibly victimising oneself or one of one's 
loved ones, and one is angry that such an injustice has been 
done. Crime is therefore not only a matter between the 
criminals and their victims. It affects the whole society. 
Society therefore has a right to employ measures to deal with 
crime and those responsible for criminal activities. The 
state, as the supreme guardian of society, not only has the 
right to exact a punishment in response to crime and 
criminals, but also has a moral obligation to do so. If the 
state shows no interest in the well being of its members, it 
6 For a lucid victimological account of how victims are treated by present 
punishment systems, see Chapter 5 of Karmen (1984). 
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cannot expect to have the respect and loyalty of those members 
for long because it will have lost its moral authority. 
It is not the case therefore, as maintained by Barnett in 
facing possible objections, that only the primary victim is 
actually involved, and that most other members of society are 
mere silent observers of the justice system. They are 
affected too, even if not as directly or intensely. Although 
it is correct to say that the principle source of the 
restitutional model's strength lies in the fact that it 
recognises the rights of victims, secondary victims ought not 
to be forgotten. What Barnett is doing is not replacing one 
system that neglects the rights of some parties involved by 
another that does not, but rather replacing one system that 
neglects the rights of primary victims with a system that 
neglects the rights of secondary victims. The aim of my 
thesis is to propose and defend a system that addresses the 
needs of all parties involved, and one which does so to the 
best possible degree. 
8.3.2 ACCUSING THE INNOCENT 
The principal source of the restitutional paradigm's strength 
is that it recognises the rights of the victims. By offending 
against others, off enders become indebted towards their 
victims, a debt that can be assigned, inherited, or bestowed. 
Persons could select in advance who would be entitled to claim 
restitution, should one not be able to do so. By insuring 
with a company with a record of accomplishment for tracking 
down those who victimised their policyholders, security is 
augmented because crime is more effectively combated (Barnett 
1985: 222). If a person is murdered, having no heirs, the 
restitutional right could fall to anyone willing to track down 
the perpetrator. Specialists might develop in this business. 
However, if criminals become indebted to their victims, 
and this debt can be assigned, inherited, or bestowed, as 
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Barnett suggests, then we are inviting misuse of a system to 
an extraordinary degree. We can imagine, for example, that 
for a given crime, two persons are suspected. One is 
unemployed, only has the minimum standard of education, and 
does not have any savings. The other is the son of a wealthy 
millionaire, has good education, and earns extremely well in 
his father's company. Leaving the interests of justice aside, 
it is clear that the victim would stand to gain much more 
compensation from the latter than from the former. The rich 
suspect might pay immediately, while the poor suspect would 
have to work (perhaps in an employment community where he or 
she would not earn much because unable to find work anywhere 
else). For some victims it might be very tempting to press 
charges against the rich suspect because the prospects of 
gaining financially would be much better than if charges were 
pressed against the other. This is a problem that Barnett 
recognises when dealing with possible objections, but with 
which he deals inadequately, as I shall explain. The rich 
person might even be accused, rather than the poor one, if the 
case against him would be slightly more difficult to prove 
than against the other because although the victim might have 
a more difficult case to win, the rewards of winning would be 
far greater. If the accuser wins, he or she has much to gain; 
if not, only the legal expenses would have to be paid. What 
Barnett would be creating is not a system that would increase 
the attainment of justice, but rather a system functioning 
according to market logic, and it can hardly be in the 
interest of justice that sentencing be dictated by such logic. 
Al though it is probable that specialists would arise in 
tracking down the perpetrators of murdered persons without 
heirs, they would not do so with the motive of doing justice, 
but rather of making money. Again, it can be assumed that 
those from whom more could be gained, or could be gained in a 
shorter period, would have a higher likelihood of being 
accused. The punitive system is not without error, and 
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innocent persons are frequently convicted; however, this flaw 
is not the result of financial greed. It is therefore 
reasonable to assume that the percentage of innocently 
convicted criminals would rise significantly under Barnett's 
res ti tutional system compared to a system in which monetary 
gain is not the primary objective of victims. 
8.3.3 POOLING CLAIMS AND FRAUD 
Pooling smaller claims against an offender may increase 
efficiency. Would it, however, not also undermine the 
interests of justice because those not entitled to claim 
(those who have not been victimised) would add their claims to 
an already existing pool of claims in which it is likely that 
the case against the accused will be won, in order to receive 
money? This would be similar to insurance fraud in our 
present system. This is not to claim that abuse of the system 
only occurs in the restitutional system, but I believe that 
the res ti tutional system encourages abuse more so than the 
punitive system. In a restitutional system, persons who claim 
that they have been victimised when they have not been, may 
still have a chance of receiving restitution payments. In the 
punitive system, such fraud also occurs, but mainly for 
insurance claims where claimants may benefit financially by 
making false reports. There is unfortunately no conceivable 
way of eliminating such fraud completely. I am not arguing 
that any system is likely to have no fraud, but Barnett's 
system would make every crime a wholly restitutional question, 
thereby providing an incentive to commit fraud against all 
types of crimes, not only against insurance claims or the like 
as is the case in our present system. 
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8.3.4 REPORTING CRIME 
Victims would become more willing to report crimes and appear 
at trials if restitution could be gained. Naturally, only if 
crimes are reported, could damages be claimed. By contrast, 
our present system often victimises victims further, requiring 
them to spend vast amounts of time and energy in the interest 
of serving justice. Karmen explains as follows: 
Those who cooperate with the police and prosecutors incur additional 
losses of time and money for their trouble (for example, attending 
lineups and appearing in court) . They also run a greater risk of 
retaliation by the offender. In return, they get nothing tangible -
only the sense that they have discharged their civic duty by 
assisting in the apprehension, prosecution, and conviction of a 
disruptive or dangerous person, 
goes largely unappreciated. 
generally a social obligation that 
The only satisfaction the system 
provides is revenge. But when restitution is incorporated into the 
criminal justice process, cooperation really pays off (Karmen 1984: 
186) . 
8.3.5 VICTIMLESS CRIMES 
One may object to Barnett's system because he suggests only 
activities that have victims should be defined as crimes. He 
argues that since crime is a matter between criminals and 
their victims, activities that do not have victims should not 
be considered as crimes (Barnett 1985: 231). Barnett is not 
correct on this point since it would lead to a much more 
dangerous society as negligence would not be punishable. Most 
traffic laws, for instance, would have to be scrapped since 
one could only punish if harm were done, and not merely if one 
posed a risk on the roads to others. 
If only offences against individuals ought to count as 
crimes, and victimless offences would not be considered as 
such, then many felonies of today would not rank as crimes. 
Treason, for instance, cannot be seen as an offence against an 
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individual, and yet it is a very serious one, having the 
potential for threatening the social order. Attempted crimes, 
such as attempted murder, in which there is no victim, would 
also go unpunished. Nor is there always a specific potential 
victim who might claim psychological damages, we need merely 
think of attempted fraud, or attempted terrorism, which is not 
directed at anyone specifically. This system might even have 
a high probability of increasing the level of crime in society 
since persons would only be punished for harms actually 
committed, not those they only attempt. Therefore, they would 
be willing to take greater risks because the odds of gaining 
through offensive behaviour are much greater. If it is known, 
for instance, that there is only a one in ten chance of being 
convicted for fraud, many may believe it to be a risk worth 
taking. Attempted murders or attempted robberies, for 
instance, where no one was injured, would be ignored by the 
system except for psychological harm suffered. 
8.3.6 RESTITUTION AND DETERRENCE 
Responding to the objection that the restitutional system 
would not deter potential off enders because monetary sanctions 
are insufficient deterrents, Barnett rightly responds that 
this is unproven, and in any case the punitive system does not 
adequately deter offenders from offending. Certainty is more 
effective than severity, and it may be assumed that a system 
of restitution would be more certain since victims would have 
a greater interest in co-operating with the justice system, 
increasing the likelihood that more will be done to arrest and 
convict perpetrators. This greater success itself should 
deter potential offenders (Barnett 1985: 225-226). 
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8.3.7 THE BENEFIT OF CRIME 
Crime would no longer pay, Barnett maintains. But would it 
not? If we mean by "pay" that crime benefits those committing 
it, can we then expect the eradication of crime under a wholly 
restitutional system? Such a system, or any system with 
restitution as one of its components, can be expected to have 
the advantage of motivating inmates towards becoming 
productive persons, since by being productive they are able to 
reduce their time required to complete restitution, thereby 
shortening the time until they can attain complete freedom. 
However, I would not go so far as to assert that the 
restitutional system would create an environment in which 
crime would no longer pay, and hence deter all potential 
offenders from committing crimes. Even abolitionists, such as 
Bianchi, acknowledge that not all elements of the present 
punishment system can be wholly eliminated because the 
restitutional system is not capable of dealing adequately with 
all contingencies. A res ti tutional system might be a more 
certain one than the present punitive one, but those offenders 
unwilling to cooperate with this system would still have to be 
confined until they would be willing to do so. These may be 
few, but the practice of confinement cannot be wholly 
eliminated: 
Perhaps, if we improve our legal system, the number of dangerous 
people will be so small that, even in a large country like the United 
States, two or three small places of quarantine will be sufficient, 
and certainly not the huge store of hundreds of thousands of human 
beings which that country has today (Bianchi 1998: 342). 
8.3.8 THE ECONOMICS OF RESTITUTION 
Another advantage is the enormous savings to tax payers since 
the cost of arrest, trial and detention would be borne by 
criminals themselves. Idle inmates under the present system 
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might be encouraged to become productive inmates with the 
whole society benefiting. Compared to the punitive system, 
the savings to tax payers might be considerable, but it should 
be questioned whether it would yield a financial advantage 
compared to my multi-dimensional system that also emphasises 
rehabilitation. 7 The restitutional system would not be 
educative or rehabilitative, i.e. it would not provide the 
criminal with means of learning adaptive behaviour and 
recidivism may therefore still be a significant problem, in 
contrast to the results attained in a well-functioning 
rehabilitative system. Not all crimes are consciously willed: 
many are performed by persons with maladaptive behavioural 
patterns that can be reversed or corrected. 
8.3.9 LENGTH OF CONFINEMENT 
Offenders under this system would know that the length of 
their confinements is in their own hands the harder they 
work, the faster complete restitution could be made. In 
response, it must be stated that although offenders would know 
that the length of their confinements is in their own hands, 
those of the lower socio-economic classes can expect to have 
longer terms of confinement because their jobs would not pay 
as well as those of the higher socio-economic classes. The 
system would therefore not be just since it would favour the 
haves over the have-nots, i.e. it would not be a system of 
equality. 
8.3.10 SPILL OVER 
Pertaining to the making of res ti tut ion, 
occur, i.e. convicted persons may use 
spill over may also 
funds from family 
members to pay back their debts sooner. This may cause more 
people to suffer the consequences of restitution than the 
7 See 9. 4. 
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system ought to do. Of course, we may query whether this is 
as bad as the imprisoned families' having no source of income 
and the suffering caused by having a family member in prison. 
The restitutional system may therefore have the upper hand on 
this point. 
8.3.11 WORKING OFF THE DEBT 
Is it plausible to assume that criminals will work off or have 
the skills to work off their debts? Barnett answers that 
criminals will be faced with only one choice, either to work 
off their debts or to remain imprisoned. Barnett assumes that 
many criminals are acting rationally in an irrational system, 
a system in which it may sometimes be beneficial to commit 
crime. Some bank robbers have for instance, been imprisoned 
only to be released at the end of their sentences to live in 
weal th for the rest of their lives. Perhaps they thought it 
was worth it. The restitutional system would not make any 
such provision: criminals would have to work until they have 
made restitution in full, no matter how long it would take 
them to do so (Barnett 1985: 227). Therefore, restitution 
could break the vicious circle of recidivism. Barnett does 
not address the objection that some would not be able to work 
off their debts because they lack the skills to do so, but his 
argument implies that they would be fated to remain 
imprisoned. 
8.3.12 CRIME AND ECONOMIC COMPENSATION 
If the restitutional model has the advantage of bringing 
greater satisfaction to the victim, it has the disadvantage of 
focusing wholly on monetary restitution. Although it may 
increase awareness that an offence is primarily against the 
direct victim, and not against society, it may reinforce the 
belief that all crimes can be undone through monetary means. 
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This is not the case, however, since al though it is possible 
to pay a huge amount to a murdered person's family, or a raped 
woman, or a formerly kidnapped person, it is not possible to 
equate the amount to any monetary value. Non-monetary 
offences are not directly convertible into monetary terms. 
8.3.13 RESTITUTION AND THE MEASURE OF PUNISHMENT 
Under Barnett's restitutional system, persons found guilty of 
criminal activities would not be sentenced to confinement or 
sent for rehabilitation, they would be sentenced to make 
restitution to their victims. If immediately able to do so, 
this could be done, resulting in different justice for the 
poor and the rich because the financially well off would not 
experience the same degree of burden imposed upon them as the 
poor. Of course, this could be remedied to some extent by 
imposing sentences in proportion to the offender's income, 
rather than to the crime committed. This would greatly 
complicate the system, however, because a court would be 
obliged to determine each offender's income before imposing 
sentence. 
8.3.14 RESTITUTION AND REHABILITATION 
Seen from a psychological perspective, restitution would make 
the rehabilitation of offenders likelier. For my purposes, it 
would have an advantage compatible with the kind of 
rehabilitation for which I have argued. Being reparative, it 
could help alleviate guilt and anxiety, which can otherwise 
precipitate further offences. Restitution is an active 
process that contributes towards the improvement of the 
offender's self-esteem. However, the extent of this affect 
should not be overestimated. All of us have behavioural 
patterns; those of criminals are generally maladaptive. If 
learning better coping strategies does not change these 
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patterns, it is more likely than not that the criminal will 
offend again. Restitution might alleviate guilt, thereby 
increasing the offender's self-esteem, but there are no 
indications that it can do any more, nor are there any efforts 
to do more. 
8.3.15 RESTITUTION AND MENTAL COMPETENCY 
Barnett proposes that mental competency be done away with 
because only the harm done is to be determinative for 
punishment. However, doing away with the requirement of 
mental competency is to do away with one of the fundamental 
principles of criminal justice that holds that for one to be 
held responsible for a crime, one must have a guilty mind, 
i.e. one must fulfil the requirements of mens rea. We 
therefore hold it unjust to punish individuals who do not 
fulfil this condition. Barnett (1985: 230) responds that 
everyone who can be held responsible for a crime ought to be 
held responsible; this would deny many the defence of mental 
incompetency that they might have put forward even though they 
were mentally competent. 
In response, it must be observed that Barnett's 
endorsement of the position that mental competency be excised, 
that everyone should be held responsible for the harm they 
caused, also indicates the callousness with which this system 
is to operate. Of course, this is not a necessary condition 
of his theory, but he advocates it nonetheless. Are those 
persons whose criminal behaviour is the result of their having 
an illness that causes them to commit criminal behaviour to be 
held accountable for their uncontrollable behaviour? It must 
be borne in mind that not all criminal behaviour is the result 
of an illness of some sort, but some may well be (as has 
already been pointed out) . Moreover, is no effort to be 
undertaken to assist them, treat them, and cure them from 
their undesirable involuntary states? Barnett's restitutional 
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system is not concerned with the needs and conditions of 
offenders. On these grounds alone, his pure restitutional 
system would thus be more inhumane than the most stringent 
retributive system. 
Since doing away with mental competency is not a necessary 
condition of any restitutional system, but only one of 
Barnett's proposals, the objection raised here is not one that 
must be directed at all restitutional systems. Mental 
competency and a restitutional system are not mutually 
exclusive, i.e. they are compatible. The justification of 
punishment I am expounding in this thesis demands that only 
those who are to be punished fulfil the requirements of mens 
rea and that those punished make restitution. 
8.3.16 RESTITUTION IN ALL CASES? 
A wholly restitutional system would not be capable of 
addressing all contingencies pertaining to crime and dispute 
resolution either. Bianchi recognises too that even under a 
restitutional system we would still need elements of the 
criminal process. 8 There will still be a role for officials 
such as judges, prosecutors and police, and for institutions 
such as compulsory detention those who pose an immediate 
serious threat to others must be quarantined, those who refuse 
to negotiate their disputes must be detained until they are 
willing to do so, and those whose injurious conduct has 
aroused strong passions must be offered sanctuary pending 
successful dispute resolution (Bianchi 1998: 342-344). 
However, even if, as Bianchi insists, these forms of detention 
are more humane than those of the punitive paradigm, we may 
criticise it because it would be more liable to intrude on 
individual liberties than would a just system of punishment 
that at least determines the severity of punishment in 
8 Bianchi is an abolitionist who advocates the restitutional paradigm, and 
favours a civil process of dispute resolution, rather than a criminal 
process of conviction and punishment. 
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proportion to the severity of the crime committed. Moreover, 
one function of the criminal justice system is to protect 
offenders against the unlawful retaliation of victims, a task 
the res ti tutional system may not be capable of fulfilling as 
adequately (Duff & Garland 1998: 334). 
8.3.17 RESTITUTION AND THE NECESSARY CONDITIONS 
Let us evaluate resti tutionalism in respect to the necessary 
conditions which I argue any morally justified theory of 
punishment must fulfil. Is it capable of fulfilling the 
sufficient condition by fulfilling all the necessary 
conditions? 
(1) The "whom to punish" question: The restitutional 
system is capable of furnishing us with a morally acceptable 
answer of who may justifiably be punished. Although Barnett 
proposed discarding the requirements of mens rea, 
restitutionalism does not require this and can be implemented 
with these requirements. Those who are guilty and have 
victimised others are to make restitution. 
( 2) The question of degree: Resti tutionalism tries to 
answer this question by insisting that restitution must be 
made in full, regardless of how long this takes. This, in 
practice, however, as has been shown, leads to 
disproportionate sentences and is therefore morally 
unacceptable. 
(3) Serving as a recognised channel through which society 
can express its anger and indignation at offenders: Would 
society be just as satisfied if criminals would no longer be 
punished, but merely had to pay, if they have the means? It 
must be reminded that Barnett has proposed that those who 
could pay immediately would be permitted to do so, those who 
would be unable to would have to work to earn for their 
res ti tut ion. Is this something with which society would be 
satisfied? The answer is probably no. The well-known O. J. 
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Simpson case in the United States of America may serve as an 
appropriate example. Simpson was accused of double homicide 
after his former wife and her lover were brutally murdered. 
He was acquitted in the criminal case. More than two-thirds 
of Americans (who were able to follow the court proceedings on 
television) believed the jury's verdict to be incorrect. 
Simpson was then accused in a civil case brought forward by 
the father of the murdered male victim. This case Simpson 
lost and was subsequently ordered to pay a multi-million 
dollar settlement to the families of the victims. Was this 
satisfactory to the public, especially those who believed him 
wrongly acquitted in the criminal case? Was conviction in the 
civil case what he deserved, if one believed him guilty of the 
crimes? I think not, and I presume that most people would 
agree. Most of us believe that punishment should involve some 
form of pain or discomfort, and we also believe that the more 
serious a crime is, the greater the pain or suffering 
following in the form of punishment should be, ceteris 
paribus. Those believing that he was innocent, on the other 
hand, will see his conviction in the civil case as an 
injustice done to him, but nevertheless may believe that he 
was lucky not to have been convicted in the criminal case, 
which is indicative of the fact that they also do not hold 
punishment in a criminal case and punishment in a civil case 
as equal. Even those who believe him innocent seem to 
acknowledge that a prison sentence would have been a greater 
expression of anger and indignation against Simpson than a 
monetary penalty could ever be. Restitutionalism is therefore 
inadequate for serving the retributive need of society. 
(4) Crime reduction: Although proponents of both punitive 
and restitutional paradigms claim to strive towards this 
objective, it is not enough to claim that the objective is 
endorsed by their respective systems; Each system's 
efficiency needs to be demonstrated. Just as does the 
punitive system, the res ti tutional system may claim to have 
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crime reduction as one of its objectives, but it is 
ineffective in attaining this objective. There is no reason 
to assume that restitution should fare markedly better than 
the punitive system since punishment is pain that we can all 
imagine at least to some extent, but nevertheless it fails to 
serve as an effective deterrent. Those punished were not made 
better by their punishment and most subsequently reoffend. 
Restitution is likely to have the same effect if offenders do 
not learn new 
environments. 
likelihood that 
greatly increase 
behavioural coping patterns for their 
Certainly, restitution might increase the 
people will report crimes, but it may also 
falsely reported crimes. The res ti tutional 
paradigm cannot therefore be seen as adequately pursuing the 
goal of crime reduction. 
( 5) Improving offenders: Res ti tutionalism faces the same 
objections as retributivism. Neither is committed towards 
improving offenders in any serious way, relying wholly on pain 
and suffering, not on enabling offenders to develop more 
socially acceptable modes of behavioural patterns. Even if 
convicted persons would suffer by having to pay, there is no 
plausible reason why they should learn any differently than 
they did with retributive punishment. The aim of 
restitutionalism is to make offenders become aware of the 
suffering they have caused, thereby instilling guilt and 
remorse within them. It may be seriously doubted, however, 
whether this can be enough to bring about a positive change 
within offenders. The wholly punitive approach also conveys 
the message of wrongful action and suffering to offenders, 
most offenders nevertheless become recidivists. The 
retributive and restitutional approaches lack measures to 
improve off enders. It is a mistaken assumption that 
imprisonment alone will be rehabilitative, and it may 
plausibly be assumed that it is also mistaken to assume that 
restitution alone will be rehabilitative. 
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( 6) Undoing the harm done: Res ti tutionalism is the only 
simple approach that actively strives towards this objective, 
al though this is not always a straightforward matter. 
Property offences are most easily resolved in this regard. 
The value of property can be fairly accurately determined; 
hence, the amount of property lost by a victim can be 
established without extensive difficulties. Sentencing of 
convicted offenders would involve demanding from them that 
they repay the amount lost by the victims. However, bodily or 
psychological injuries inflicted are less easily given a value 
in monetary terms and the harm inflicted upon a homicide 
victim cannot be undone in any way. An arbitrary value could 
be assigned which murderers must pay into a fund, for 
instance, which is employed for the assistance of homicide 
victims' families, though the effect of homicide on the 
victim's family also cannot be undone in any direct way. The 
harm inflicted upon secondary victims the deep loss 
experienced by the families of homicide victims - cannot be 
translated into monetary terms non-arbitrarily. The same 
holds for victims of rape, armed robbery, aggravated assault, 
and other traumatic victimisation experiences. Al though the 
financial cost of psychological treatment required as a result 
of being victimised may be accurately and non-arbitrarily 
determined, this is not equateable to the actual harm suffered 
through the victimisation experience. 
The arbitrariness with which some restitutions need to be 
undertaken is, however, no grave disadvantage to res ti tut ion 
when compared with punitive treatments because the latter also 
relies on many arbitrarily determined sentence lengths. Of 
course it is possible to equate harms caused with punishment 
administered when punishment is applied wholly retributi vely 
in a telionic manner, such as when the death penalty is 
required for murder, ceteris paribus, but as I have already 
shown, this is only possible in the responses of a small 
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minority of crimes. 9 The vast majority of crimes have 
sentences attached to them that may be administered within a 
range of arbitrarily determined upper and lower limits. 
Since the punitive and rehabilitative approaches often are 
not concerned with the plight of the victim and do not attempt 
to undo the harm suffered, the restitutional paradigm is 
therefore commendable for pursuing the goal of undoing the 
harm done through crime. 
(7) Being economical: Restitutionalism is committed to 
this objective, at least in theory. A purely restitutional 
system would save the state a great deal since most of the 
costs would have to be borne by the convicted parties. Those 
responsible for crime would also be responsible for the 
administration of justice resulting from their unlawful 
behaviour. In the punitive system this is not so. Instead, 
criminals are convicted, sentenced to a term in prison, 
perhaps released on parole, meaning they require some form of 
supervision, each element costing money and none of which the 
convicted has to pay. On the contrary, the state pays and this 
means that it is the law-abiding tax-paying citizens who 
really pay for the administration of punishment to criminals. 
Under a restitutional system, criminals would not be 
imprisoned idly until their date of release. The system would 
demand that those who cannot make financial restitution 
immediately would have to work until the earnings of their 
labour have paid the required restitutional amount. 
Undoubtedly, putting prisoners to work could be 
profitable. Robertson (1997: 1058) mentions that prison 
labour was a profitable manufacturing business between 1890 
and 1935 in a number of American states: 
The New York prison system had a particularly rich offering of 
vocational courses, including commercial art, barbering, carpentry, 
9 See 3. 4 .1. 
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masonry, tailoring, bookbinding, machine shop practice, sales, and 
cartooning (Robertson 1997: 1058). 
The skills could be applied while the prisoners were serving 
their sentences, but could also be of great value to them once 
they left prison, enabling them to acquire jobs that may have 
been previously inaccessible 
prison industry programmes 
attractive for investments. 
to them. In addition to this, 
can be very profitable and 
It has been remarked that some 
companies that would otherwise relocate to the Third World to 
reduce labour costs find the cheaper workforce of prison 
labour an attractive alternative (Robertson 1997: 1059). It 
must be noted that here too it is extremely important that 
this goal be pursued without violation of any of the 
constraints established, such as that only the guilty ought to 
be punished, otherwise the institutions cannot be termed 
"prisons" in which prisoners work, but 11 labour camps, 11 as 
occurred often enough in immoral regimes of the twentieth 
century. 
Employing prisoners can also be expected to have 
widespread approval from society. Surveys suggest that the 
greater public strongly supports work-related programmes in 
prisons. Most people hold the view that inmates should not be 
released until they learn a skill or trade, and believe too 
that it would be a good idea that prisoners work in 
manufacturing, building, or provide services, especially when 
the state would otherwise have to hire workers to do the work. 
A vast majority of persons also welcome the idea that 
prisoners are paid wages if two-thirds of this would go to 
their victims or towards prison costs (Robertson 1997: 1059-
1060) . 
In theory, restitutionalism is therefore clearly committed 
to being economical. However, whether it could be fully 
implemented, as Barnett advocates, so that convicted offenders 
would be made liable for the legal costs, the costs of their 
282 
imprisonment, and having to make restitution to their victims, 
is highly doubtful. The costs of many felony trials are much 
more than what most persons earn annually and the cost of 
confinement with adequate supervision is far beyond many 
persons' earning capacities too, bearing in mind that most 
offenders come from the lower socio-economic class and are not 
highly skilled labourers. If prisoners were therefore 
compelled to cover all the costs resulting from their unlawful 
behaviour, then most criminals would probably have to serve 
life-sentences. This would neither be in the interest of 
society, nor would it serve the interests of justice, since 
less severe crimes would effectively be dealt with just as 
harshly as more severe ones. While the restitutional model is 
commendable for having the reduction of economic costs to the 
public as one of its objectives, the radical cost reduction 
envisioned by Barnett is almost certainly not attainable. The 
most realistic solution would be to assign an arbitrary value 
that criminals would have to pay, the amount depending on the 
severity of the crime and on their ability to make 
restitution. 
Restitutionalism therefore fulfils five necessary 
conditions in theory, but only two in practice. Hence, as a 
pure theory, it is morally inadequate for the justification of 
punishment. 
8.4 PUNITIVE VERSUS PURE RESTITUTION 
The evaluation of pure res ti tut ion reveals that, al though it 
has distinct benefits, it is deficient in many respects. But 
as even Barnett already mentioned in discussing possible 
restitutional models, a restitutional model need not be 
advocated in its pure form, it may be part of a punitive 
system; hence, such a system may be described as one of 
"punitive restitution." A system of punitive res ti tut ion has 
restitution as an element in punishing or rehabilitating 
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offenders. Such a system would be more likely to further the 
goal of a morally justifiable form of punishment as I am 
defending in this thesis, one that has retributive, 
deterrence, rehabilitative, and restitutional elements, and 
adequately answers the question of whom to punish and to what 
extent. 
Whereas no wholly restitutional system has been 
implemented in modern times, punitive restitution is 
increasingly being employed. Mediation sessions are becoming 
increasingly frequent. Victim-offender mediation, with the 
objective of attaining a restitutional solution, results in 
very high satisfaction for both victims and offenders. The 
vast majority of both groups is also found to perceive the 
outcomes of such mediations as fair. This may be because 
victim and offender meet each other with the objective of 
attaining a mutually acceptable solution. The process thereby 
assumes a more humane character than does the present system 
of punitive sanctions. Punitive res ti tut ion is also able to 
avoid the untenable consequences of pure restitution, such as 
that secondary victims are disregarded (since punitive 
restitution still involves punishment, thereby allowing 
society to express its anger and indignation), 
disproportionate sentences for the poor and the rich, creating 
the impression that crime can be wholly undone through 
monetary means, and failing to acknowledge that criminals 
ought to be rehabilitated. Victims having participated in 
such mediations generally experience much lower anxiety about 
being victimised again. Furthermore, a study, of which the 
sample was not statistically significant, found that juveniles 
who took part in mediation were less likely to become 
recidivists within a one-year period (Umbreit 1994: 154-155). 
Although the study was not statistically relevant, it may be a 
promising indication that such mediation does have favourable 
consequences in this respect. 
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It should be noted that mediation has only been applied to 
minor offences, such as burglary, theft, or other offences not 
involving losses or injuries of large magnitude. What happens 
is that victims and offenders meet each other with the aim of 
attaining a negotiated settlement acceptable to each of them. 
The restitutional solution is, however, not the only means 
available for dealing with offenders found guilty of such 
offences in systems providing mediation as an option. If one 
of the parties is not willing to participate in mediation, or 
if a mediated settlement cannot be attained, punishment is 
imposed by the court as is done in the wholly punitive system. 
Mediation is therefore an option, albeit a desirable one, not 
a requirement. 
The request that mediation be applied to violent cases has 
increased in frequency following the success attained in minor 
cases. This trend has been initiated by people who have 
become victims of violent crimes, such as aggravated assault, 
attempted murder, sexual assault, and armed robbery, probably 
because they have a need to be regarded by the justice system 
and desire a response that addresses the losses or injustices 
they have suffered. Family members of murder victims have 
also expressed this request (Umbreit 1994: 160-161) : 10 
A growing number of representatives of major victim advocacy 
organizations ... are beginning to recognize the value of mediation 
for those victims of violence who express a need for it. As they 
directly confront the very source of terror in their lives, through 
mediation, some victims of violence are able to obtain a greater 
sense of healing and closure. The field of victim-offender mediation 
is faced with an exciting opportunity to stretch its original vision 
10 Restitution sentences have been applied in severe felony cases too, but 
the outcome seems not to have been satisfying to the communities involved. 
In response to two incidences of dam collapse, one in the United States of 
America and the other in Italy, where the constructors of the dams were 
held accountable, victim compensation prevailed over criminal penal ties. 
These outcomes did not satisfy many who had lost family members in the 
disasters: "nor was it considered to be satisfactory by a significant 
number of the people affected. Indeed, in both cases the legal 
responses intensified anger and frustration" (Calavita, Dimento & Geis 
1991: 417). 
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and significantly alter its original model to appropriately address 
the needs of parties affected by violent criminal conflict. This can 
only happen with a serious commitment to re-examine the basic model 
and understanding its limitations; an increased awareness of the 
victimization experience (Umbreit 1994: 161-162). 
The emotional intensity of such cases, however, makes it 
unlikely that they could be mediated with a non-judgemental 
attitude. For this reason it is unlikely that severe cases 
could 
should 
be settled merely through mediation. 
not preclude any restitutional 
However, 
element in 
this 
any 
punishment 
levelled 
administered. I 
punishment system 
rehabilitation, retribution, 
therefore here propose a multi-
in which the elements of 
and restitution can all be 
pursued. Even though, as we have seen, pure res ti tut ion is 
unacceptable, the notion of restitution has many positive 
elements, elements that should not be rejected by discarding 
the whole theory. Res ti tutional elements ought to be part of 
any punishment system so that, importantly, an attempt is made 
to undo the harm done. 
8.5 SUMMARY AND PERSPECTIVE 
In this chapter, I critically examined the restitutional 
approach to punishment since one of the objectives I argue any 
morally justified punishment ought to have is that the harm 
done through crime be undone as far as possible. This 
dimension of punishment hence acknowledges the plight and 
needs of victims. The pure restitutional approach, however, 
has numerous flaws and shortcomings, which I pointed out. 
Therefore, I concluded that restitution should be part of a 
punitive approach having therapy as one of its components. 
Punitive restitution is increasingly being applied with 
promising results. 
It is again appropriate for me to review what I have 
argued thus far. I showed that retributi vism answers the 
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"whom to punish" question, and deterrence theory the "how to 
punish" question. Retributi vism also best pursues the 
objective of allowing punishment to serve as a recognised 
channel through which society can express its anger and 
indignation at offenders. Rehabilitationism best pursues 
three of the objectives, namely improving offenders, reducing 
crime, and being economical in the long-term. 
Res ti tutionalism best pursues the goal of undoing the harm 
done to victims. Thereby all necessary conditions have been 
realised by the different theories. 
In the next chapter, I will argue the reasons I hold the 
seven previously identified conditions (the answering of the 
two questions and the pursuit of the five goals) each as being 
separately necessary and jointly sufficient for the 
justification of punishment. Subsequently, in the final 
chapter, I shall briefly summarise what I have argued, discuss 
notions related to the justification of punishment, and 
present my hybrid approach, discussing how it could be 
realised in practice. 
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CHAPTER 9 
THE NECESSARY AND SUFFICIENT CONDITIONS 
9.1 INTRODUCTION 
In this chapter, the focus will be on the necessary and 
sufficient conditions for morally justified punishment. I 
shall defend each of the seven necessary conditions I proposed 
for the vindication of punishment and argue why I hold each of 
them to be necessary. Subsequently, I will give grounds for 
my position: the reasons I hold these necessary conditions as 
jointly constituting the sufficient condition and why this is 
important. But now, let us direct our attention to why the 
seven conditions I propose as necessary ones are indeed 
necessary. 
9.2 DEFENDING THE NECESSARY CONDITIONS 
In this thesis, I set out to defend a theory of punishment 
having seven necessary conditions together constituting the 
sufficient condition for morally justified punishment. I 
shall now undertake to establish why these are the conditions 
that are indeed individually necessary and together 
sufficient. In stating that "punishment is justified 11 or 11 X 
justifies punishment, 11 I am concerned with the relationship 
between two concepts, punishment and its justification. The 
justification of punishment, as I have argued, depends 
interalia on values that we have. Necessary conditions of any 
value statement can only be established by argument, i.e. 
value claims must be supported by valid and sound reasoning. 
When justifying punishment, we are dealing with morality 
and related concepts, particularly guilt, retribution, 
deterrence, rehabilitation, and restitution, and therefore 
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with an issue requiring conceptual argumentation. This 
assertion together with having stated in Chapter 3 that 
morality is a practical subject, results in an apparent 
contradiction, which I find myself compelled to reconcile. 
Morality is a practical subject insofar as it arises from our 
needs and interests in affairs of everyday life. The 
principles we derive in accordance with these needs are 
normative ones, which means that they are concerned with 
values. Because they are normative principles, their 
explication and vindication require, since we are concerned 
with the relation of these values to the justification of 
punishment, conceptual argumentation. 
I argued throughout this thesis that the justification of 
punishment requires it to have seven necessary conditions. To 
substantiate my claims that they are indeed necessary, I shall 
examine each of the conditions individually and ask whether 
punishment could be considered justified if the condition in 
question was not held. By asserting that P is a necessary 
condition for Q, it is being asserted that it is inconceivable 
that Q could come about without P. To state that 
rehabilitation is a necessary condition for morally justified 
punishment, for instance, is to hold that only punishment with 
a rehabilitative element can be held to be morally justified. 
9.2.1 THE WHOM TO PUNISH QUESTION 
The first of the conditions I hold to be necessary for any 
theory justifying punishment is that it adequately answers the 
question of whom we are justified in punishing. Although this 
is obviously important, we need to ask why it is necessary. 
Let us imagine a theory or system of punishment that did not 
find this question important. Could we hold any society 
adopting it as civilised in respect of how it dealt with 
punishment? We must bear in mind that I argued in 1. 2 that 
morality is conceptually connected to civility, i.e. only a 
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civilised society can be a moral society. 
connected to the furthering of well 
Civility in turn is 
being of both the 
individual members of society and of the group as a whole. 
It therefore follows that only a society which furthers the 
well being of its members and of the group as a whole is a 
moral society. This is because morality, civility, and well 
being are conceptually connected. 
If no attention were paid to the question of whom we are 
justified in punishing, then no distinction would be made 
between those who deserve punishment and those who do not. 
Punishment of the innocent under such a system would not be 
morally objectionable since the theory would not determine 
that only those who are not innocent might be punished, for 
instance. If we could not be certain under which conditions 
we would be punishable in our society, we would have no way of 
directing our conduct in any way that assured our remaining 
unpunished. This would not further our well being, and the 
society would therefore not count as a civilised one; 
therefore, it would not be a moral society. 
If we examine the theories I discussed in this thesis, we 
find that not all theories of punishment address this 
question. Retributivism and restitutionalism hold that only 
those who have committed a crime are liable for punishment, 
where the former holds that only those fulfilling the 
conditions of mens rea may be punished, while the latter, that 
everyone who has victimised another is morally punishable. 
Act utilitarianism holds that anyone may be punished when it 
is utility maximising to do so, even including innocent 
persons; rule utilitarianism holds that only when persons who 
are guilty are punished (and hence fulfil the requirements of 
mens rea) is it utility maximising in the long-term and hence 
morally justified. Rehabilitationism on its own endorses 
rehabilitation of anyone who could benefit from it, or who is 
judged likely to offend if not treated preventively. 
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Not just any answer to the question of whom we are 
justified in punishing is acceptable, however. Since morality 
is connected to civility and civility to the furthering of 
well being of the individual and of the group, where "well 
being" is understood as the realisation of one's potential, 
the answer to the question of whom we are justified in 
punishing is best answered by retributi vism because it does 
not endorse the encroachment of liberty of any innocent 
individual and a person is only considered guilty when he or 
she fulfils the conditions of mens rea. Any theory that would 
not consider this question or would not provide an answer that 
furthers well being would not be civilised and hence would be 
morally deficient. 
9.2.2 THE HOW TO PUNISH QUESTION 
In Chapter 5, I argued that morally justified punishment must 
be graded (i.e. more serious offences should receive more 
serious punishment, ceteris paribus) and punishment should be 
administered proportionally to the severity of the crime 
committed (i.e. punishment should fit the crime and should 
therefore not be too severe or too mild for a specific crime). 
Any system of punishment that did not address the issue of 
degree would disregard the demands of morality. Let us 
imagine that a system answered the question of whom to punish 
in a morally acceptable way (only persons who fulfil the 
conditions of mens rea may be punished), but gave no account 
of how much those to be punished may be punished, leaving this 
question open to the discretion or fancies of the judges 
passing the sentences. Theoretically, sentences could be 
passed that we would consider morally wholly untenable. In 
Chapter 3, I argued that morality is a practical subject 
concerned interalia with the expression of one's emotions in 
the sense that one's actions must be in accordance with the 
morally acceptable emotions in the circumstances in question. 
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If a minor crime, such as shoplifting, would be punished with 
life-imprisonment, for instance, it would not be in proportion 
to the magnitude of our indignation. We would consider the 
judge as having over-reacted in the situation; we would judge 
him or her to have climbed the ladder of importance too far. 
The sentence would therefore be unacceptable to society. The 
opposite extreme holds true too. If a judge sentenced a 
first-degree-murderer to six months imprisonment, suspended 
for one year, we would be enraged (rather than feeling that 
our original anger had been addressed) by the judge's failure 
to recognise or acknowledge the seriousness of the crime 
committed and the punishment to be handed down in response. A 
theory that disregards the emotional needs of the members of 
society who are affected by the crime is not in touch with 
social reality. It is thus imperative for any theory of 
punishment to address the question of degree of punishment. 
Of course, this does not mean that the theory must provide a 
decisive answer to every crime. That is an issue to be 
resolved empirically, perhaps by criminologists. A theory 
justifying punishment must provide general principles 
according to which the measure of punishment is to be 
determined, however. 
Once again, not all the here-examined simple theories 
adequately address this issue. Since retributi vism operates 
only with the principle of lex talionis, it is incapable of 
taking aggravating and mitigating factors into account. Since 
restitutionalism converts all harms into monetary terms, it is 
not satisfying either. As we have seen, the wholly forward-
looking approaches (utilitarianism and rehabilitationism) have 
no regard for proportionality: they only consider the overall 
outcome of the specific punishment. This is why we therefore 
need deterrence theory with retributive foundations as part of 
a hybrid approach to justify punishment only when punishments 
are graded according to the severity of their offences. 
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9.2.3 PUNISHMENT AND THE EXPRESSION OF ANGER AND INDIGNATION 
I have argued that one of the objectives punishment must have 
is to serve as a recognised channel through which anger and 
indignation experienced by members of the society at offenders 
can be expressed. A theory that does not have this objective 
as one of its components fails to acknowledge an important 
need of society, cannot really be said to promote the well 
being of society to the greatest extent, and hence we would 
probably not consider that society to have the right to be 
called "civilised," or at least not civilised to a high 
degree. If punishment does not serve as an adequate channel 
through which society can express its anger and indignation at 
offenders, then society will not respect the ins ti tut ion of 
punishment and will not rely on it to satisfy this need. It 
follows that if members of society feel that this need is not 
being met because punishment is not perceived to be 
administered properly (because hardened criminals are 
prematurely released, for instance), victimised members may 
have the propensity to take the law into their own hands, 
thereby often inflicting greater harm than is justified in 
return. Vigilante activities thrive in environments where the 
legal and penal institutions are perceived to be wholly inept. 
Not only does this fail to serve the interests of justice and 
is not constitutive of a civilised society, but the very 
institutions that should ensure these interests are 
undermined. Therefore, it follows that morally justified 
punishment ought to strive towards the goal of fulfilling this 
need of society. 
In a pure form, retributivism and deterrence theory with 
retributive foundations are the only theories examined here 
that can be said to adequately address this point. 
Utilitarianism would do so only when so doing would be utility 
maximising, rehabili tationism does not address this need at 
all, and restitutionalism does so only in an unsatisfactory 
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way because it attempts to undo all harms through monetary 
means. Retributivism is therefore required to cover this 
point too in my hybrid theory because it demands that the 
guilty be punished so that society is able to express its 
anger and indignation at the guilty and therefore that these 
emotional needs are met. 
9.2.4 PUNISHMENT AND CRIME REDUCTION 
Al though this might seem obvious, we need to understand why 
punishment should have this objective and what would happen if 
it did not. Let us imagine that punishment did not reduce 
crime, but had the contrary effect of increasing it. 
Although none of the theories examined in this thesis can be 
accused of increasing crime, some are not committed towards 
crime reduction, as I shall point out shortly. Supposing that 
a given approach increased crime, it would certainly harm 
society and its members, and thus not serve their well beings. 
What if punishment did not increase crime, but neither 
brought about a reduction, however? Let us imagine a society 
with a stable population with X number of criminals committing 
Y number of crimes per year. Let us imagine that Y is a 
fairly large number, large enough to be disturbing for the 
law-abiding society to be seriously vexed by it and to desire 
a decrease in crime. Let us imagine further that the crimes 
being committed are minor ones for which only short-term 
sentences can be given. If X continues to commit Y number of 
crimes annually, no more and no less, the law-abiding society, 
irritated by the persistent level of crime, will come to 
question the justifiability of the system of punishment in 
use. The search for a more effective means of dealing with 
criminals, one that promises to bring about a reduction in 
crime too, is bound to be sought because bringing about a 
reduction in crime furthers the well being of society which, 
it must be stressed again, characterises a society's level of 
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civilisation. Thus, punishment that does not strive towards 
bringing about a reduction in crime is not a civil response to 
crime: the opposite, by contrast, is. Consequently, bringing 
about a reduction in crime must also be a necessary condition 
of any theory justifying punishment. 
I have shown how crime reduction is pursued by 
utilitarianism, deterrence theory, rehabilitationism, and in 
theory but not in practice by restitutionalism. I have also 
argued why retributivism does not have the goal of crime 
reduction at all. It seems that rehabilitationism is probably 
best able to pursue this objective, since it promises 
ultimately to be most successful in reducing crime because by 
rehabilitating offenders, one enables them to acquire more 
socially acceptable modes of behaviour and be able to live 
productive, crime-free lives in society, which ultimately 
reduces the recidivism rate and therefore also the crime rate. 
9.2.5 PUNISHMENT AND THE IMPROVEMENT OF OFFENDERS 
Why must punishment work towards the improvement of off enders 
if it is to be morally justified? Is it not enough to ensure 
that they do not commit further crimes? The reason that this 
is inadequate is that only if we improve offenders, can we 
further their well beings. And since a moral response to 
crime is to have a civilised response (which means that one 
ought to promote the well being of both individuals and of the 
group, including the well being of offenders), it follows that 
any theory that does not have this as one of its goals can not 
be said to fulfil the requirements of a civil society. If 
punishment did not strive towards improving offenders, i.e. 
towards making them better persons, then it would not further 
their well beings and hence it would not be a civil response 
to crime and those responsible for criminal behaviour. Even 
if we imagine that punishment would not allow criminals to 
deteriorate further, but did not improve them, this would not 
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be doing enough since it would not be furthering their well 
beings in such a manner so as to allow them to actualise their 
potential as human beings in a more meaningful way. A medical 
example here may be illustrative again: we would hold it to be 
immoral not to treat those who are in need of assistance. If 
medical experts were to be content with stabilising a 
patient's condition so that no further deterioration occurred, 
but exerted no effort to cure him or her, we would judge the 
conduct as immoral. Of course, if no treatment is available 
to improve a specific patient, medical conduct would not be 
judged immoral if all were done that could be done under the 
circumstances. The same holds true for criminals. If 
criminals can be improved, then the only moral course to take 
is to improve them: if they cannot be improved under the 
circumstances, all efforts should be directed towards doing 
the best possible. 
The only approach that has the improvement of off enders as 
one of its explicit goals is rehabili tationism, 
one of its central concerns. None of the 
having it as 
other simple 
approaches makes any effort to improve offenders in any way; 
hence, it follows that we must adopt a system that includes a 
strong element of rehabilitation. 
9.2.6 UNDOING THE HARM 
Punishment must attempt to undo the harm done through crime in 
whatever way possible. Of course, it is not possible to undo 
all harms inflicted through crime, but punishment ought to 
have a restitutional element that strives towards restoring 
victims to the state they were in before they were victimised 
(insofar as possible) . The rights of crime victims have been 
violated. A society that did not care for its injured, and 
therefore for its crime victims too, would not be a caring, 
compassionate society. Such a society would not further the 
well being of its victims by actively promoting the 
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alleviation of the harm and injury done to them. Therefore, 
such a society would not readily be described as civilised. A 
society that cared for its victims, on the other hand, would 
further the well being of its victims, thereby deserving the 
label "civilised." Undoing the harm done through crime is 
hence a necessary condition for morally justified punishment. 
The only theory that has the undoing of harm to victims as 
one of its objectives is restitutionalism. This theory does 
not fulfil all other necessary conditions, however; and hence 
the restitutional element should be only one part of a complex 
theory justifying punishment. None of the other here-examined 
theories pursues this goal in a satisfactory way. 
Retributivism, deterrence theory, and rehabilitationism do not 
address it at all, while utilitarianism would be compelled to 
endorse it only if it were utility maximising. 
9.2.7 PUNISHMENT SHOULD BE ECONOMICAL 
Why must morally justifiable punishment also be economical in 
the sense that the cost of the punishment does not put an 
unbearable financial burden on the society? Let us imagine 
that punishment fulfils all the necessary conditions mentioned 
so far (i.e. it is administered only to those who fulfil the 
requirements of mens rea, is administered proportionally to 
the severity of the crime committed, serves as a recognised 
channel through which society can express its anger and 
indignation at offenders, brings about a reduction in crime, 
improves of fenders, and does everything possible to undo the 
harm done to victims), but that it strains the financial 
resources of the state to such an extent that it has to scale 
back on other essential services (such as housing, healthcare, 
education, welfare services, etc.) to meet these objectives. 
It follows that the citizens of that country will more than 
likely become disgruntled at the huge cost of the punishment 
services. Subsequently, they may demand a reform of the 
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punishment system so that it becomes less costly so allowing 
them to enjoy the benefits of better health and welfare 
services. This, however, may very well be at the expense of 
justice. They may, for example, demand executions without 
lengthy trials for severe felony cases, detentions, and appeal 
processes. Alternatively, they may resist long sentences for 
which the citizens themselves ultimately have to pay the bill. 
These outcomes would not, however, be in the interests of 
justice since a punishment system should punish only those who 
are guilty, and punishments should be graded proportionally to 
the severity of their crimes, so severe crimes require lengthy 
sentences. Furthermore, even if the death penalty would cost 
less than say, life-imprisonment, the other necessary 
conditions would not all be fulfilled by it, especially the 
demand that punishment improve offenders. Punishment ought 
therefore to cost no more than is required for attaining the 
six other necessary conditions mentioned above. 
The cost of punishment is ultimately dependent 
pursuit of the other objectives, however. If the 
punishment were to be reduced to such an extent so 
on the 
cost of 
that the 
other necessary conditions could no longer all be fulfilled, 
then punishment would no longer be morally justified. It is 
to be expected that the personnel entrusted with the 
rehabilitation of offenders (psychiatrists, psychologists, 
social workers, philosophers, and other experts) would cost a 
fair deal, especially in the initial stages when the long-term 
fruits of rehabilitation, 
forthcoming to a high 
ultimately be both in 
namely crime reduction, are not yet 
degree, but this expense would 
the interests of society and more 
run, if it helps to reduce crime as economical in the long 
well as fulfil the other conditions. 
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9.3 DEFENDING THE SUFFICIENT CONDITION 
Having discussed the necessary conditions, we now have to ask 
ourselves what is meant by "sufficient condition" and why it 
is important to specify the sufficient condition for morally 
justified punishment. X is a sufficient condition for P if P 
comes about in the presence of X. If persons need merely 
fulfil the conditions of mens rea in order for society to hold 
them responsible in a court of law for a crime committed, then 
mens rea is the sufficient condition for holding someone 
responsible in a court of law. Often multiple conditions 
together constitute the sufficient condition. X and Y fulfil 
the sufficient condition for P if P can come about merely by 
the presence of X and Y. P might come about too when X, Y, 
and Z are present, but this would be going beyond the 
sufficient condition since it would have already come about 
without Z. Air, earth, water, and sunlight together 
constitute the sufficient condition for the flowers on the 
windowsill to flourish. They may do better in some shade, but 
this is not part of the sufficient condition since they do 
quite well in the sun too. In this case, this is an empirical 
sufficient condition. A logical sufficient condition has a 
similar form. Having four angles and sides of which the 
opposite ones are parallel, together fulfil the sufficient 
condition for a figure to be a rhombus. Necessary conditions 
of conceptual claims, such as that punishment can be morally 
justified, also have such a form - I have argued throughout 
this thesis that the sufficient condition for the moral 
justification of punishment is constituted of seven necessary 
conditions (each of which I discussed in the previous 
section). In other words, if all of these obtain, then we 
need not have any more conditions for morally justified 
punishment. 
The necessary conditions together also cannot be more than 
the sufficient conditions. If X, Y, and Z are each necessary 
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conditions for P, then X and Y cannot be the sufficient 
condition for P since the third necessary condition would be 
lacking, and if X and Y together are sufficient, then Z cannot 
be necessary. 
To justify something is to give a good reason for that 
something or to give a sufficient reason for it. To give a 
sufficient reason for something is to have justified it. It 
follows that to give a sufficient reason is to provide 
adequate support, but to give a sufficient condition for 
punishment is to do more. It is to establish beyond any doubt 
what is required for punishment to be justified. Therefore, I 
find it important to identify the sufficient condition for 
morally justified punishment because by doing so complete 
vindication of morally justified punishment is attained. 
In the previous section, I argued that each of the seven 
conditions I identified and argued for are necessary for the 
moral justification of punishment. The question that now 
arises is whether they are jointly sufficient, or whether 
there are other conditions that must still be identified as 
necessary conditions for the sufficient condition to be 
fulfilled. I assert that the necessary conditions identified 
jointly fulfil the sufficient condition for the following 
reasons: the question of whom we are justified in punishing 
clearly identifies the group of people eligible for 
punishment. The question of how much they may each be 
punished identifies the magnitude of the punishment to be 
administered. Each of the five goals is concerned with 
furthering the well being of society in general, offenders, or 
victims. In order to be civilised, a society must further the 
well being of all its members, the law-abiding citizens, the 
criminals, and the victims. The goals that punishment must 
serve as a recognised channel through which society can 
express its anger and indignation at offenders, that 
punishment must bring about a reduction in crime, and that 
punishment must be economical, all further the well being of 
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the law-abiding society in general. Rehabilitation furthers 
the well being of criminals directly, and indirectly the well 
being of society if offenders do not become recidivists. The 
goal of undoing the harm done is concerned with the well being 
of victims. Therefore, the well being of all parties involved 
is addressed by the conditions identified; and since we need 
not add any more conditions to these for legitimately claiming 
that punishment can be morally justified, it follows that the 
seven conditions are jointly sufficient 
condition need hence be identified 
condition to be satisfied. 
9.4 SUMMARY AND PERSPECTIVE 
and that no further 
for the sufficient 
In this chapter, I undertook to justify each of the necessary 
conditions and substantiate my claim that the necessary 
conditions jointly constitute the sufficient condition. I 
have now provided a defence of my theory. In the next 
chapter, I shall briefly restate the main conclusions of my 
arguments to facilitate clarity. I shall then briefly discuss 
notions closely related to punishment. Subsequently, in the 
final section of this thesis, I shall indicate that my theory 
is not only of theoretical interest, but can also be easily 
put into practice. 
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CHAPTER 10 
CONCLUSION AND PRACTICAL APPLICABILITY 
10.l INTRODUCTION 
In this, the final chapter of this thesis, it is useful to 
briefly recapitulate what the main objectives of this thesis 
have been, what has been achieved, and why my thesis can be 
seen as a progressive synthesis between punishment and 
therapy. I shall briefly point out what was achieved in 
critically evaluating each of the theories I examined. 
Subsequently, I will discuss the relationship between 
punishment and notions such as blame, praise, reward, mercy, 
forgiveness, and justice. In the final section, I shall then 
show that the theory here expounded is not only of theoretical 
interest, but can also easily be practically implemented, 
concluding with a justification of this thesis' title. 
10 . 2 BRIE F RECAPI TULATION 
I shall briefly mention what I set out to argue and which main 
route my argument took throughout this thesis. I shall not 
repeat any of the arguments, however, as that would be mere 
distractive repetition. 
At the beginning of this thesis, I pointed out that 
deliberately inflicting harm upon others is usually held to be 
morally wrong, but that we seem to agree that punishment, 
which is a deliberate infliction of harm upon others, is 
acceptable and can be morally justified. In this thesis, I 
argued however that the mere infliction of harm upon others is 
not morally justifiable, even when those upon whom the harm is 
imposed are guilty of crimes. I argued that punishment, which 
can be seen as a harm being imposed, is morally justifiable 
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only when it benefits those against whom it is directed, as 
well as society in general and crime victims in particular. I 
argued that morality is inextricably linked to civility and 
civility is concerned with the furthering of well being. 
Therefore, morally justified punishment must further the well 
being of all parties involved. To do so, I argued that a 
theory of punishment must have seven necessary conditions and 
three restraining principles. The seven necessary conditions 
are: it must answer who is subject to punishment, it must 
determine how much they are to be punished. Punishment must 
serve as a recognised channel through which society can 
express its anger and indignation at offenders, bring about a 
reduction in crime, improve offenders, aim at restoring 
victims to the state they were in before they were victimised, 
and be economical, i.e. it must not waste social resources. I 
argued that these seven necessary conditions jointly 
constitute the sufficient condition for morally justified 
punishment. 
The first simple theory to be critically evaluated was 
retributivism. I argued that retributivism morally justifies 
the expression of anger and indignation by society at 
offenders through the process of punishment. Such expression 
is only justified at offenders, however, i.e. only against 
those who are guilty of having violated a morally acceptable 
law and who fulfil the requirements of having a guilty mind. 
Retributivism therefore fulfils two of the necessary 
conditions - it answers the question of whom we may punish and 
it justifies punishment as a recognised channel through which 
society can express its anger and indignation at offenders. 
Retributivism does not adequately fulfil any of the other 
necessary conditions, however, and therefore is inadequate as 
a simple theory for the justification of punishment. But 
because it most adequately fulfils two of the conditions, it 
should be part of a more complex hybrid theory. 
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I then turned to deterrence theory in pursuit of a means 
to adequately answer the question of how much to punish. 
Because utilitarianism is often connected with deterrence, I 
examined it critically, but found that I have to reject it as 
an unacceptable theory for justifying punishment because it 
has morally untenable implications, such as not aiming at 
justice and endorsing disproportionate sentencing. Abandoning 
utilitarianism did not lead me to the abandonment of 
deterrence too, however. I argued that deterrence theory can 
be defended because it rests on retributive foundations. 
General deterrence is retributivistic because fulfilling the 
requirements of mens rea is a sufficient condition for using 
offenders in a way we would not use innocent persons, even if 
doing so would be socially beneficial. Having argued that 
general deterrence is a form of weak retributivism, the 
important issue of how much criminals may be punished could be 
addressed. I concluded that we ought to proclaim a category 
scale in which categories of punishments are linked to 
categories of offences, taking the severity of offences and 
punishments into account. Our punishing according to 
categories of offences is less than desirable under optimal 
conditions, but I argued that this is the only feasible way in 
which sentences can be passed without neglecting aggravating 
and mitigating factors, and without permitting vastly 
disproportionate sentences. The defence of general deterrence 
also yielded three restraining principles, namely, no one 
should deliberately and intentionally violate another's rights 
where there is a feasible alternative; the severity of 
punishment ought to be graded according to the severity of the 
offence, ceteris paribus; and if the rights of individuals are 
to be threatened, the threat should fall more heavily on 
wrong-doers (the guilty) than on others (the innocent). Even 
though deterrence theory satisfactorily answers the question 
of how much to punish offenders, it does not adequately fulfil 
the other necessary conditions for the justification of 
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punishment. Even when combined with deterrence it does not 
fulfil all. Therefore, deterrence and retributivism, I 
argued, need to be part of a more complex hybrid theory. 
Because the wholly punitive system does not function 
optimally, I turned to rehabili tationism. I argued that even 
though not all crimes are the result of illnesses of some 
sort, offenders should all be treated nonetheless since this 
promises to benefit criminals and society in general most, and 
hence furthers their well beings. Preventive detention of 
criminals and former criminals is morally justified, I argued. 
I contended further that rehabili tationism is best able to 
pursue three of the five objectives, thereby fulfilling three 
of the seven necessary conditions, namely bringing about a 
reduction in crime, improving offenders, and being economical 
in the long run, i.e. not wasting social resources. We saw, 
however, that a rehabilitative system on its own is morally 
untenable too because it would lead to disproportionate or 
indeterminate sentence or treatment lengths. Nevertheless, it 
should not be wholly ignored: it should also be combined with 
the other approaches already mentioned because it is best able 
to fulfil three of the seven necessary conditions. Since 
rehabilitation would almost certainly have to be imposed on at 
least some criminals against their wills, which would result 
in paternalism, I found it necessary to argue that paternalism 
is morally acceptable when it is imposed in order to correct 
evaluative mistakes even of adults, i.e. paternalism is 
justified when the subjects upon whom it is imposed would also 
choose the treatment being imposed upon them if they could 
make an informed, rational decision regarding it. Since 
treatment of offenders promises to further the well being of 
criminals more than any other approach examined does, this 
paternalistic measure is morally justified. 
None of the approaches I examined had considered the 
plight of victims at all; therefore, I deemed it necessary to 
consider res ti tutionalism in pursuit of a theory that 
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fulfilled the remaining necessary condition. I argued that 
restitutionalism is commendable for focusing on crime victims, 
but just as all other simple theories examined in this thesis, 
it too does not qualify as a morally acceptable theory on its 
own because it fails to fulfil the other necessary conditions, 
or does so less effectively than do other approaches. Because 
it is the only approach that fulfils the necessary condition 
that punishment should seek to undo the harm done through 
crime, it should also be part of a more complex hybrid theory 
of punishment. 
Crime is a highly complex phenomenon having many different 
causes and explanations. To insist that such a phenomenon 
require a simple, one-dimensional response is to over-simplify 
the matter. I have argued in this thesis that none of the 
simple theories I examined, or found in the literature, is 
capable of yielding a comprehensive justification of 
punishment; therefore, I have argued for a complex hybrid 
theory. The theory I expounded synthesises the positive 
elements of each of the examined theories (retributivism, 
deterrence theory, rehabilitationism, and restitutionalism) 
into a unitary theory, a hybrid theory that I claim does 
justice to the complex problem of vindicating punishment. 
Seven necessary conditions together constituting the 
sufficient condition and three restraining principles may 
initially have seemed superfluous or cumbersome for a 
justification of punishment; however, I endeavoured to 
successfully and convincingly argue that this is the minimal 
requirement for the moral justification of punishment. 
Before indicating how my theory can also be put into 
practice, and thereby is more than of mere theoretical 
interest, I shall briefly discuss other notions closely 
related to the justification of punishment, thereby showing 
that my theory relates to these notions as well. 
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I 
10.3 PUNISHMENT AND RELATED NOTIONS 
In the introduction to this thesis ( 1. 4), I pointed out that 
the moral centrality of the concept of "punishment" requires 
that it be dealt with to gain a firmer grasp on notions such 
as blame, praise, reward, mercy, forgiveness, and justice in 
relation to punishment. I would therefore be neglecting an 
important corollary if I ignored this, although it is not part 
of the aim of this thesis to explain the relations between 
just punishment and these concepts in detail. I shall 
therefore briefly mention how my hybrid approach accommodates 
all of these: 
(1) To blame someone is to hold him or her responsible or 
think of him or her as being at fault. He or she is thus seen 
as responsible or guilty. It involves holding someone 
responsible for a right violated or a duty neglected by 
imposing censure upon him or her. By imposing censure, the 
responsible are condemned for the right violated or duty 
neglected. By insisting that criminals be punished for their 
crimes, my theory supports censure or punishment of all those 
who have violated the right of another, or have neglected to 
perform a duty, and fulfil the requirements of mens rea, i.e. 
have a guilty mind. 
( 2) Praise is an expression of warm approval or 
admiration. We admire those who have achieved something under 
difficult circumstances, those who exhibit great courage, 
determination, persistence, or any similar virtue. Victims 
who overcome fear, shame, or diminished self-esteem, as a 
result of being victimised, by coming forward to report crimes 
and assist in the prosecution of criminals, deserve praise and 
society does look favourably upon them and their actions. 
People involved in law-enforcement, those who work for the 
judiciary, for penitentiaries, and all involved in 
rehabilitating offenders, often under difficult conditions, 
deserve praise from society too for their efforts to combat 
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crime. But praise is also due those potential offenders who 
manage to withstand environmental factors that could draw them 
into becoming criminals, such as those who come from severely 
impoverished communities, and make real successes of their 
lives, such as becoming community leaders or favourable role 
models for others of their communities. They deserve 
admiration for having made successes of their lives in ways 
that may often be obvious in other communities. 
(3) A reward may be seen as a satisfying result or 
outcome. In this respect, the implementation of my theory 
promises to reward society as a whole, crime victims and 
criminals in particular to a greater extent than do any of the 
simple theories I discussed in this thesis. Punishing 
criminals and rehabilitating them while they are being 
punished rewards society because it sees justice being done 
and it yields positive results if those who are rehabilitated 
are prevented from becoming criminals. Victims are rewarded 
too in a way because they are not overlooked or ignored by the 
justice system, as is the case in wholly punitive or 
rehabilitative systems. With my system, they would receive 
restitution for injuries or harm suffered. But criminals too 
are rewarded in the right sort of way under my system. This 
is by no means to suggest that crime pays. By being 
rehabilitated, they can be taught ways of living more 
productive lives in socially acceptable ways. In doing so, 
they are able to realise more of their potential in a 
meaningful way. 
(4) Mercy may be described as the compassionate treatment 
of someone under one's power: it suggests that less force is 
exercised over subjects than would be permissible. Since my 
theory connects categories of crimes to categories of 
sentences with ranges between upper and lower bounds within 
which criminals are to be sentenced after taking mitigating 
and aggravating factors into account, mercy is accommodated in 
a regulated, institutionalised way. To go beyond this, by 
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10.4 PRACTICAL APPLICABILITY 
In the previous chapters, I indicated why I hold the different 
simple theories I discussed to be inadequate as moral 
justifications of punishment. 
does have some contribution 
However, 
to make. 
as I have argued, each 
My hybrid approach 
therefore incorporates retributivist, deterrence, 
rehabilitative, and restitutional elements into a unitary 
theory, which I believe overcomes the shortcomings of each of 
the simple approaches. But this approach would be of 
theoretical interest only if it could not be practically 
implemented. One of the strong points of my theory, I have 
argued, is that it is not only morally acceptable, but that it 
is also not difficult to put into practice. 
Persons who are found guilty of an offence, i.e. who 
fulfil the requirements of mens rea, should be imprisoned, 
given suspended prison sentences, or ordered to pay fines, 
depending on the severity of the crimes committed. 
The magnitude (or the range between an upper and a lower 
boundary) of each sentence is to be determined by the 
legislature, with more serious crimes receiving more serious 
sentences and vice versa, ceteris paribus. The perceived 
severity of a given offence may vary through time and from 
state to state; hence, this is to be empirically determined by 
criminologists, sociologists, or other experts. The 
legislature should determine the severity of punishments for 
crimes in accordance with an ordinal ranking determined by the 
experts. It must be borne in mind that punishment ought to 
serve as a recognised channel through which society can 
express its anger and indignation at offenders; but it can 
only be expected to be perceived as a recognised channel if 
punishment is judged by society to be neither too mild nor too 
harsh. The severity is therefore somewhat determined by the 
emotional involvement of society. A more liberal society that 
tolerates prostitution, for instance, will not be satisfied 
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rate of recidivism should bring down the cost of crime 
prevention, law-enforcement, and the judicial and penitentiary 
services, and allows former criminals to become productive 
members of society, rather than to become recidivists or mere 
burdens on the state while they languish in gaol). At the end 
of their sentences, criminals are to be released back into 
society, even if their rehabilitations have not been 
successfully completed according to the estimates of 
rehabilitation experts. Only when these experts judge 
criminals to pose a serious threat to others or themselves may 
they preventively be detained beyond the date of their release 
in accordance with the justification for preventive detention. 
In such cases, this is not primarily for the rehabilitation of 
criminals, but for the protection of society or the criminals 
themselves. Rehabilitation ought to continue for as long as 
required under such circumstances, however. As soon as 
preventively detained criminals no longer fulfil the 
conditions for preventive detention, they are to be released. 
If criminals have been successfully rehabilitated before they 
have served the minimum time foreseen, they are to remain 
imprisoned until they have served the minimum length so that 
their punishment satisfies society's anger or indignation. 
Punishment ought also to strive towards the undoing of 
harm done through crime as far as possible. Therefore, 
criminals should work in their detention centres (if they are 
imprisoned) when they are not undergoing rehabilitation, so 
that they can make restitution to their victims or pay into a 
restitution fund. Once again, the restitution requirement is 
not to be determinative for the length of prison sentences. 
If they have not completed restitution when they are released 
from prison, they ought to be required to continue making 
restitution from their future incomes. 
What holds for prison sentences also holds for suspended 
prison sentences. Offenders who only receive fines could also 
be required to undergo rehabilitative treatment for a number 
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of hours, the practical efficacy of which has to be determined 
empirically by rehabilitation experts. Restitution should be 
required even of those who only receive fines, either in the 
form of direct res ti tut ion or by payment into a res ti tut ion 
fund. 
Before concluding, I wish to address four possible 
criticisms against the theory here expounded: 
(1) How is one to respond, for instance, if, in order to 
deter criminals, the state must inflict greater punishment 
than criminals deserve? It should be clear from what I have 
argued that the goal of deterrence cannot morally override any 
of the other necessary conditions. If punishment cannot be 
administered proportionally in accordance with the principles 
derived in Chapter 5, then punishment is not morally 
justified. It may be legally justified, but legal 
justification by no means necessarily entails moral 
justification. 
(2) Is there not a conflict between rehabilitating actual 
offenders and deterring potential offenders? The more 
rehabilitation benefits people, by improving their 
interpersonal skills and training them for certain jobs, for 
instance, the less it will deter potential offenders. Would 
rehabilitative punishment still deter if potential criminals 
need not fear the consequences? Punishment will still have an 
element of deterrence because it would not just be a process 
of being rewarded. It would not only involve benefits and 
pleasures. The punishment system here defended entails 
retributi vism too, which ought to deter potential offenders. 
Criminals being rehabilitated would not be seen as mere ill 
persons needing treatment, and therefore as persons not 
requiring punishment. They would be seen as persons held 
responsible for crimes committed, but who can be improved so 
that they do not reoffend. My theory therefore seeks a 
balance between mere punishment and mere therapy. 
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( 3) What if society's need to express its anger at an 
offender requires that punishment be administered in such a 
manner so as to make any rehabilitation impossible, executing 
the criminal, for example? The rehabilitative component can 
never override any of the other necessary conditions. None of 
the five goals can override any of the others if punishment is 
to be justified. Just punishment requires that all seven 
necessary conditions be jointly fulfilled. 
(4) Does this not mean that punishment is counter intuitively 
rarely justified, given that punishment must always fulfil all 
seven necessary conditions? Does being required to pursue 
each of the five goals every time punishment is administered 
not make it difficult to administer morally justified 
punishment? It means that punishment is typically unjustified 
as it is administered in systems throughout the world today. 
It is usually legally justified, but it is rarely morally 
justified. However, as I have shown in this section, this 
need not be the case. This theory provides a moral 
justification of punishment, which, as I have argued, can and 
ought to be put into practice. 
The theory of morally justified punishment I here 
expounded is one which I see as a progressive synthesis 
between punishment and therapy, between punitiveness and 
rehabilitation. This hybrid approach argues for more than 
mere punishment as it is usually conceived or mere therapy as 
it is usually conceived; it is a progressive synthesis between 
them. I hold it to be progressive because it strives to 
further the well being of the whole society victims, 
criminals, and the law-abiding. It is more than a mere 
reaction to crime: it is a proactive response in pursuit of 
the well being of all involved. 
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